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Abstract 
This is a study of the international boundaries of Tanganyika: of the means by 
which they were implemented, of the effects upon the peoples of the region, and of the 
interaction between the two. Lines were indeed drawn on maps in Europe relating to 
the political division of Africa. This did not, however, bring about the boundaries in 
reality. For these lines to become tangible they had to be imposed. Policy differences 
became sharply demarcated and restrictions were applied, thereby making the 
boundary real. The effects were by no means entirely negative. Tax differentials and 
playing one colonial authority off against another allowed Africans to exploit the 
colonial partition of their continent. Many works have considered the making of 
Tanganyika with regard to the growth of a national consciousness and the campaign 
for independence. Little attention, however, has been paid to the making of 
Tanganyika as a territorial entity. This is the first substantive effort to fill that gap. This 
thesis assesses the role of colonialism in imposing the western system of political space 
upon Africa and Africans. It also considers the impact of the partition upon African 
political, economic and cultural systems before discussing the extent to which the 
actions of the European colonialists and African borderlanders influenced each other. 
Its conclusions have some relevance to colonial Africa as a whole but cannot be 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
AA: Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Office) 
AAKA: Auswärtiges Amt, Kolonial -Abteilung (German Foreign Office, Colonial 
Section) 
ADC: Assistant District Commissioner. 
BA: Bundesarchiv (German Federal Archives), formerly the Deutsches Zentralarchiv in 
Potsdam 
CO: Colonial Office 
DC: District Commissioner - colonial administrative officer who was responsible for a 
particular area. 
DO: District Officer - the official status of a DC. Some did not have their own areas to 
administer 
DOA: Deutsch -Ostafrika (German East Africa) 
DOAG: Deutsch -Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft (German East African Company) 
FO: Foreign Office 
H.L.Deb: House of Lords Debates 
JAH: Journal of African History 
JBS: Journal of Borderland Studies 
Mitt: Mitteilungen aus den deutschen Schutzgebieten 
PC: Provincial Commissioner 
PRO: Public Record Office 
RH: Rhodes House 
RKA: Reichskolonialamt 
TNA: Tanzania National Archives 
TS: Tanganyika Secretariat 
UJ: Uganda Journal 
WO: War Office 
ZNA: Zanzibar National Archives 
V 
GLOSSARY 
Akida: Acting chiefs under Zanzibari rule. generally not native to the area they ruled; 
sometimes of Arab descent. Generally an inferior title to that of liwali. Many were 
maintained by the German rulers. 
Askari: African solider. 
Bezirksamtmann: German version of the District Officer. 
Elmoran: the plural of Moran - Maasai warriors. 
Hongo: A word used in much of Africa meaning tax. It was generally paid for 
permission to do something; perhaps to pass through a particular polity or gain access 
to water supplies. 
Jumbe: chief. 
Liwali: Generally superior to the akida. Mostly of Arab descent, acted as district 
governors for the Sultan of Zanzibar, and continued as administrators under German 
rule. 
Mfalme: chief. 
Moran: Maasai warrior. 
Mwalimu: teacher, given to respected headmen and other men in positions of 
authority, and in more recent times applied to Nyerere. 
Reichkolonialamt: The German Colonial Office. 
Rugaruga: African irregular soldiers, employed by both European and African armies, 
often composed of criminals and freed slaves. 
Ujamaa: collective name for Nyerere's policies of African Socialism. 
Uti possidetis: the principle by which newly independent states accepted the 
international boundaries of the territories which they replaced. 
Ujamaa policy of collective villages. 
Zanzibar: The collective name for a group of islands lying off the east coast of 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1870s, European involvement in Africa centred upon Livingstone's 
three C's: Commerce, Christianity and Civilisation. Direct European control of African 
territory remained limited, and more Africans lived under Ottoman or Arab rule than 
under British, French or Portuguese domination. The situation changed radically with 
the entry of several new powers upon the scene. German and Italian nationalists 
clamoured for overseas territories, while King Leopold's dream of his place in history 
led him to carve an empire in Africa. In addition, the French need for national success 
to turn attention away from the defeat of 1871, encouraged the government to step up 
support for their push into Africa. The number of powers involved, the perceived 
potential gains, and the cheapness with which these perceived gains could be bought, 
all fuelled activity to such an extent that a fourth 'C' quickly became dominant - 
Colonialism. Colonial partition led to more than thirty defined political units, mostly 
determined by fixed linear boundaries. The creation of these political boundaries in 
Africa is one of the greatest legacies of colonial rule. 
Once the boundaries had been set up, certain challenges arose which had to be met, 
including forming relations with neighbouring territories, coping with existing African 
political and economic systems, and dealing with smuggling and with pastoralist 
movements. The mere existence of western -style linear boundaries provoked these 
problems and challenges. For Africans who had to live with the boundaries, the 
position was somewhat different. Colonial policies affected their lives: restrictions and 
regulations had to be avoided, by- passed or used to bring some advantage. The 
colonial authorities had to devise policies to counter these challenges and had to adapt 
them according to African responses and unforeseen circumstances. In addition to 
these reactive policies, the colonial administrations introduced pro- active policies in 
order to enforce new border functions, often intended to promote economic 
development, or to engender good relations with neighbouring territories. 
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The rest of this introductory chapter is divided into three main sections. Firstly, the 
historical context of the colonial imposition will be discussed. This study is a 
contribution to the reclamation of African history, a part of which is concerned with 
the reassessment of colonialism and the colonial partition. Secondly, the spread of 
western-style linear boundaries in Africa and throughout the world will be discussed 
alongside the relevance of African border studies. Finally, this chapter will move from 
the general to the specific, with an analysis of the main aims of this work, principally 
filling the gap in the historiography provided by the lack of a large -scale study of the 
history of Tanganyika's international boundaries. 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 
African History 
The right of Africa to have its own history was long denied. Pre -colonial Africa 
was seen as "fruitless confusion ", many assumed that modern Africa had nothing to 
learn from its pre -colonial past, and development was seen as an outside agency 
(Davidson, 1994: 281 -2). As Basil Davidson so rightly comments, "For no other major 
branch of humanity has it been said that the past has no instructive value for the 
present or the future" (Davidson, 1994: 282). Non -recognition of the African past was 
allied to the flimsy European presumption of racial superiority. Both had been used to 
justify the slave trade and were used again to justify colonial occupation. Yet as recent 
works by such writers as Herbst have demonstrated, current African political 
structures and developments may have as much in common with the pre -colonial past 
as with the continent's colonial legacy (Herbst, 2000). 
In the colonial period, assumptions of cultural superiority often stemmed from 
ignorance. In 1904, the German Bezirksamtmann (District Officer) Ewerback wrote 
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that Africans living along the Rovuma didn't lay any worth on permanent settlement, 
and moved freely back and forth across the river.' There was no suggestion that this 
may have been a more effective way of life in the area. The same doubts were raised 
over the effectiveness of nomadic pastoralism with regard to the Maasai in the north. 
Even in the mid- 1960s, Henderson could write that the German East Africa of the 
early Twentieth Century was "A land which in the early 1880s had suffered seriously 
from the curse of the slave trade and had been rent by continual tribal wars was now a 
peaceful colony with an expanding economy" (Henderson, 1965: 155) - a statement so 
ridiculous that it can be answered in two words - Maji Maji. The 1905 -7 Maji Maji 
rebellion, which was largely brought about by German oppression and cruelty, led to 
the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Africans. 
In the 1950s, terms such as 'ethnohistory' and 'intuitive history' were used to 
acknowledge that Africa had some sort of pre -colonial history (Davidson, 1994: 4 -7), 
but until relatively recently African history was a synonym for colonial history in 
Africa. Knowledge of African history continues to be rather limited in the world at 
large, and knowledge of pre -colonial history is almost non -existent among the general 
public. This should not be surprising. As Elizabeth Isichei writes, Africanists would do 
well "to reflect on the extent of their own ignorance of the history of Melanesia, or of 
Siberia" (1997: 6). 
In academia, at least, Africa has now been granted a history, and gone are the maps 
with vast empty spaces filled only by ibi sum leones - here be lions. Assumptions of 
western cultural superiority have been diminished if not expelled, and many Africanist 
commentators concur with Rodney when he wrote, "Who in this world is competent to 
judge whether an Austrian waltz is better than a Makonde ngoma ?" (Rodney, 1972: 
'RKA: R1001 627: 177, 2nd Feb 1904. Letter entitled "Machemba- Leute" from DO 
Ewerbeck to the Imperial Government, Dar es Salaam. 
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42). Another example of the reclamation of African history is the abandonment of the 
segmentation of all Africans into tribes. Africans in pre -colonial times did belong to 
various ethnic groups, but these groups were often not nearly so permanent or definite 
as the colonialists seemed to believe. 
It is also wrong to isolate pre -colonial Africa from the rest of the world. Attempts 
to do so are at best historically inaccurate and at worst another racist attempt to justify 
slavery and denigrate African achievements. Links between the world beyond the 
Sahara and central and southern Africa were limited but by no means negligible. Even 
the modern colonial intrusion into Africa has a much longer history than the partition 
and its aftermath. From the scattered west African trading settlements, the Cape and 
the Portuguese colonies of central - southern Africa, to Ottoman, Arab and Omani 
colonisation in the northern third of Africa and along the east coast, external influences 
penetrated Africa in many different ways. 
Colonialism 
It would be useful at this point to make a few observations about the nature of 
colonial rule in East Africa. When the rhetoric is stripped away, the colonial powers 
had only one justification for seizing and occupying African territory - and this is the 
first and last time that this work will quote Adolf Hitler - "By what right do nations 
possess colonies? By the right of taking them!" (Steer, 1939: 13). Military superiority 
and the technological imbalance between European and African powers enabled 
occupation on the cheap. The Europeans were progressively able to kill Africans more 
easily and with progressively reduced cost to themselves, and this knowledge aided the 
colonial take -over. German East Africa (DOA) and Tanganyika were territories of 
exploitation: the people, land and other resources were used to bring benefit to the 
colonisers. They were also developed in order to aid exploitation: a large transport 
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infrastructure was created and while the environment at independence remained a 
harsh one, the threat posed by famine and disease were surely less in 1961 than it had 
been in 1884.2 As Koponen writes, colonialism created "a great deal of things which 
we take as development in the post -colonial context" - a transport system, a system for 
exporting peasant crops, and a limited education and medical system. However, this 
work does not seek to balance the pros and cons of colonialism. It aims to examine 
one aspect of colonialism, an aspect which continues to influence and indeed define 
modern Tanzania. 
Borderlanders' experiences of colonial rule are somewhat different to those of 
colonial subjects elsewhere, in that they have two or more colonial powers to 
compare. These experiences can provide opportunities, whether for local benefits or 
for migration from rule in one polity to that in another. This was a similar situation to 
that which existed in pre -colonial Africa, where discontent citizens could flee one 
authority for another. Africans in one jurisdiction could easily be much nearer to the 
authorities in a neighbouring state than those in their own. For example, near the 
tripoint of DOA, Uganda and the Belgian Congo, the state of Kabale lay just inside the 
Ugandan border, yet there were five foreign posts closer to Kabale than any operated 
by the Ugandan British authorities (Hopkin, 1969: 217 -8). 
The study of colonialism is valid today for the massive impact that it has had upon 
the modern state of Tanzania. Colonial rule defined the country's borders, shaped the 
economy, and fostered its political leaders. It would be inaccurate to portray Africans 
as the passive recipients of colonial policy, and to contend that the success of any 
particular policy depended solely upon the abilities of the colonial powers. Colonial 
2 This work does not therefore, agree with Kjekshus' theory of ecological collapse 
(Kjekshus, 1995). Ecological problems were perhaps as bad, but more resources 
existed to combat them. 
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rule was a two -way, interactive process between the rulers and the ruled. 
Undoubtedly, the colonial authorities were more powerful than their African subjects, 
but the acceptability of policies to the people of the territory had to be taken into 
account in order to make them workable. Also, that African opinion and action during 
colonial times culminated in the struggle for independence, and thereby made a 
massive contribution towards the creation of a Tanzanian national consciousness, 
makes the study of colonial history relevant today. 
The imposition of the western concept of political space 
The role of the West in the imposition of linear boundaries upon Africa can be 
divided into two distinct periods: the colonial carve -up of Africa towards the end of 
the Nineteenth Century and the period of colonial rule; and its post -1945 role. It could 
be argued that large -scale western influence began well before the partition of Africa, 
but the opportunity to impose western concepts before about 1870, was limited to the 
few areas of the continent that were under colonial rule or influence. Even in these 
areas, western territorial interests actually conformed to the existing African structure, 
taking a form which was most appropriate to their location. Western influences ranged 
from formal control of territory with some recognition of boundaries, as at the Cape, 
to isolated outposts on the West African coast, which possessed little or no hinterland. 
There was also much control that was not at all closely defined, as with the Portuguese 
colonies of central - southern Africa, which had very vague notions of territorial extent. 
The western system of linear boundaries was imposed upon Africa in much the 
same way as in the rest of the world. Colonialism led to fixed territorial entities which 
were protected by African political elites upon independence. However, there were 
some significant differences in the manner of the imposition. Large -scale colonialism 
came about somewhat later in Africa than elsewhere, and it developed at a much faster 
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pace. It is unlikely that the western colonial powers actively sought to impose linear 
boundaries upon Africa. They wanted to ensure control of territory because of 
perceived economic potential, because of the fear of missing out, and also for prestige; 
linear boundaries were a logical consequence of these factors. However, these 
territories were different from those in Europe, which had developed along ethnic 
lines, at least to some extent. As in Europe, however, many ethnic groups were re- 
arranged to fit the borders, rather than the other way around, although because of the 
fluid nature of many African groups, the impact of this was not as great as might be 
imagined. 
During the closing decades of the Nineteenth Century, the colonial powers 
expanded their existing African colonies and protectorates, and founded new ones, and 
thereby came to govern the lion's share of the continent. Eight non -African powers 
were involved, although eighty percent of the continent's boundaries involved just two 
powers: Britain and France. The boundaries of North Africa had mainly been 
determined earlier, following the incremental but decisive exclusion of Ottoman 
influence from the continent (Dresch, 1982: 60). Further south, people had been more 
scarce than land in pre -colonial Africa, and so tended to be used to determine 
sovereignty. The colonial powers, however, were more interested in the land, its 
resources and the trade routes which exploited those resources, so the need for defined 
boundaries arose (Kopytoff, 1987: Ch.1). As territorial interests met, unilateral 
declarations were replaced by treaties and agreements, although borders were often 
not closely delimited. Even where precise lines were drawn, a surprising amount of 
adjustment occurred at a later stage. Effective occupation either by the colonial power 
concerned or through a subject African polity, was not required. In West Africa, the 
Anglo- German boundary reached the River Benue in 1886 and Lake Chad in 1893, 
but, "conquest and political control were left to the twentieth century" (Yearwood, 
1993: 270). Even the one major African aggressor in the partition - Ethiopia - was 
forced to conform to European norms of territoriality. Those lands to which it did not 
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stake a formal claim were taken by one of the colonial powers. As political control 
strengthened and crept into new lands, colonial rule became more relevant to the 
everyday lives of Africans, often through the introduction of taxes and the plantation 
economy. In this way all land became owned by somebody and the notion of fixed 
borders became recognised in much of Africa. 
The partition of Africa mirrored many facets of the imposition of colonial rule 
elsewhere. Economic activity led to chartered companies, which in turn often led to 
political rule because of political unrest; the British crown took control of India 
following the Mutiny, just as Germany stepped in in German East Africa following the 
'Arab revolt' led by Abushiri and Bwana Heri (Iliffe, 1979: 93). This step by step 
approach is mirrored in the extension of political rule. The British firstly established 
protectorates in Africa, so that they could wait before deciding to assume full control 
(Herbst, 1989: 684), just as they gradually took control of the Moghul states and wore 
down the Punjab in India. The balance of military power remained the guiding 
principle behind the acquisition of territory: when the Sikh Khalsa was deemed to be 
strong the British held back, but the Punjab was invaded when it was perceived to be 
weak because of internal divisions (Carmichael Smyth, 1847). This principle was 
applied to the Maasai, with the British and Germans taking advantage of a Maasailand 
ravaged by disease. It also applied to fellow colonial powers, as was demonstrated by 
the erosion of Portuguese claims. 
The Berlin Congo Conference of 1884 -5 laid down two criteria for the occupation 
of territory in Africa (Herbst, 1989: 683 -5). Although they were not legally binding, 
they provide an indication of the notions that were prevalent at the time, and were also 
used to justify claims to the interior (Katzenellenbogen, 1996: 29). These were that the 
other colonial powers must be officially notified of the occupation of coastal territory 
by one of their number, and that this must be followed by the establishment of some 
form of administrative authority, mainly in order to protect free trade. In theory, this 
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restricted the economic rights of a territory to a greater extent than in Europe, but in 
practice it rarely became an issue. All this serves to illustrate that the colonial powers 
chose to impose economic and political systems that they believed to be best for 
themselves in a particular situation, and did not always seek to impose a carbon copy 
of European ideas of territorial control. There had been no such arrangements for the 
partition of other parts of the globe, but a far larger number of colonial powers were 
involved in Africa and the avoidance of inter -European conflict was an important 
consideration. 
Effective administrative control of the interior was not a requirement of colonial 
claims, thus signifying that the value of political space was not even. In DOA, British 
East Africa (BEA), British Central Africa and Portuguese East Africa (PEA), the 
interior was generally parcelled out to chartered companies. The concept of territory 
being generally more valuable at the coast than inland was certainly new to Africa. In 
pre -colonial Africa, some centres of importance had been at the coast but many had 
also been inland, such as around the shores of Lakes Victoria and Tanganyika, where a 
great trading network had developed. Indeed, the highest population densities in DOA 
were the furthest from the coast - in Rwanda, Urundi and Tabora (Calvert, 1917: Plate 
219). It was also different from the situation in Europe, so the concept of political 
space which was created and applied during the era of the Berlin Conference was a 
concept that was specifically developed for use in Africa and on the colonial stage. The 
'rules' that the colonial powers employed in Africa, allowed them to establish colonies 
and protectorates without having to base their extent upon topography and 
demography. Africa was divided from a position of ignorance on several counts, and 
lack of information meant that borders were not set according to the practicalities of 
rule. The division and governance of territory in Europe did take such factors into 
account. Historical factors often overrode them, but they were acknowledged and 
played a major role in determining the political map. 
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It is possible to overstate the extent to which the partition of Africa varied from the 
creation of colonies elsewhere, as the West has created similar boundaries within its 
own lands where information has been lacking or there are no obvious grounds for the 
division of territory. The U.S.- Canadian border runs as a straight line for 1800 miles 
and many of the internal U.S. and Australian borders are also unbending. These lines 
may have been drawn in what was then colonial territory, but they have mostly 
survived to the present -day. Such boundaries are more a function of the western lack 
of regard for pre -colonial polities than a lack of interest in the colonies and states 
which they were setting up (Manshard, 1981: 59), and can also be seen to be a 
function of low population densities at the time of partition. Except where European 
claims were based upon treaties with African leaders and involved the transfer of 
sovereignty over a specific area, Europeans usually did not recognise existing patterns 
of the division of political space in Africa and so created their own borders, based 
upon the need to avoid conflict with the other colonial powers. Topographical features 
were also used where available: few boundaries were demarcated by the use of 
mountains, but water features were often used, including for almost all Malawi's 
borders and most of Tanzania's. 
There are many examples of the use of local factors, including topography and 
demography, to determine the boundaries. For example, in 1869 the South African and 
Portuguese authorities agreed on their common boundary running along the watershed 
of the Lebombo Mountains, although their was no tradition of these mountains 
forming any kind of political division (Prescott, 1987: 247). Elsewhere, an adjustment 
was made in the Taveta concession acquired by Harry Johnston on the DOA -BEA 
border, largely in order to avoid ethnic tensions (McEwen, 1971: 14 -15). An 1890 
Anglo- French declaration redrew the boundary from Say on the River Niger to 
Barruwa on Lake Chad so as to ensure that the Kingdom of Sokoto was not divided 
and could be transferred in its entirety to the Royal Niger Company (Prescott, 1971: 
66 -67). Also, the Bari had been divided by the Belgian Congo -Sudan border, so a 
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portion of the Belgian Congo was transferred to reunite the group. A new boundary 
commission was therefore required, and the commissioners were given express 
directions to avoid the division of other groups in the area (Blake, 1997: xvii). Such 
changes and agreements were more easily achieved when one power controlled both 
sides of a boundary, as revealed by British changes to the Kenya -Sudan border 
(Prescott, 1987: 250). Such alterations can be found elsewhere in the world. For 
example, following the division of Borneo between Britain and the Netherlands in the 
Nineteenth Century, demarcation commissioners moved the boundary by up to five 
miles in order to avoid cutting off bends in rivers, dividing headwaters, or partitioning 
one part of an ethnic group from another (Prescott, 1987: 289). 
Other sensible agreements provided for cross -border access where African 
economic and cultural systems would be unnecessarily affected. One such example 
involves a treaty known as the 'Maud Line', which was signed in 1907 between Britain 
and Abyssinia. It allowed people from both sides of the border grazing rights and well - 
access in the Abyssinia -Kenya borderlands, and despite the agreement being dissolved 
in 1947, the privileges remained in practice for several decades afterwards (Asiwaju 
and Adeniyi, 1989: 41 -2). 
Despite such changes for the good, boundary alterations aimed at easing the affect 
upon Africans and African structures usually, "coincided with the interests of the 
power in question" (Hargreaves, 1985: 23). For example, Britain supported the claims 
of the Appolonians against French support for the states of Kinjabo and Indenie, 
during the 1892 demarcation of the western border of the Gold Coast, because those 
claims coincided with British territorial claims (Hargreaves, 1985: 23 -4). Such 
cynicism is entirely compatible with European actions elsewhere. Even in Europe 
itself, successive divisions of Poland, the Greater Bulgaria settlement of 1878 and the 
delimitation of the Franco -German boundary through Lorraine in 1871, paid heed to 
ethnology when it was convenient, and dismissed it when appropriate (Hargreaves, 
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1985: 25). More often than not, where ethnic groups were divided by initial boundary 
delimitation, it was they who had to move and not the boundary. The British -French 
exchange of notes on the Guinea -Sierra Leone boundary in July 1911 reveals that the 
local population had six months within which to move across the boundary, taking 
their "portable property and harvested crops" with them (Brownlie, 1979: 344). 
On the many occasions when boundaries did cause a lot a difficulty for local 
people, ignorance was often as much to blame as exploitation. This could hardly have 
been otherwise given the speed of the partition. The term 'Scramble' is often deemed to 
be an inappropriate term for the partition of Africa, but it does encapsulate the 
breathtaking speed with which the continent was carved up during the last quarter of 
the Nineteenth Century. By contrast, British India remained a patchwork quilt of 
colonies, semi- autonomous dependencies and independent states, two centuries after 
colonisation of the interior had begun in earnest. The construction of many African 
boundaries as straight lines did have much to do with a lack of knowledge. It is worth 
repeating Lord Salisbury's much -quoted comment: "we have been giving away 
mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, only hindered by the small impediment 
that we never knew exactly where the mountains and rivers and lakes were" (Herbst, 
1989: 674). 
The Katanga- Northern Rhodesian boundary provides an excellent example of 
geographical ignorance. Article 2b of the 1894 Anglo- Belgian agreement which 
determined the boundary states that the boundary should be drawn along "the thalweg 
of the Luapula [river] up to its issue from Lake Bangweolo. Thence it shall run 
southwards along the meridian of longitude of the point where the river leaves the lake 
to the watershed between the Congo and Zambesi, which it shall follow until it reaches 
the Portuguese frontier. "3 In fact, the Luapula does not flow into Lake Bangweolo and 
3 From 'Agreement between Great Britain and His Majesty King Leopold II, Sovereign 
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as a result, the straight line boundary between the town of Mkuku on the Luapula to 
the Congo- Zambesi watershed cuts through several ethnic groups, creating an ideal 
situation for smuggling. Disputes over the location of the boundary and over 
smuggling in the region plagued relations in the borderland until Zambia and Zaire 
signed an agreement in 1989. 
While it is true that many boundaries were agreed without reference to the 
geography and ethnography of Africa, the impact was often not felt immediately. For 
example, the division of the Maasai had little impact at first, but conflict with the 
authorities over grazing rights and water access caused increasing problems (McEwen, 
1971: 147 -9). Even today, forty -four percent of Africa's boundaries are straight lines 
(Herbst, 1989: 674 -5), but the idea that they were created in total ignorance has more 
than adequately been shown to be false elsewhere, for example by Touval (Touval, 
1972: 3 -17). 
Once the West had created a system of colonies within a framework of political 
space similar to that used in the West, it would have taken a major upheaval to change 
the system. It was possible that this could have occurred during the years immediately 
leading up to and following independence. An explanation for why it did not will be 
given in the next sub -section. In addition to the role of African leaders, the West has 
continued to seek the maintenance of the present system of political space in Africa. 
Through the pressure of individual western countries and through such western 
creations as the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund, the West has 
acted so as to guarantee international trade through the maintenance of peace. In this 
way, western principles and practices have been imposed upon Africa in general, and 
have led to a convergence of international political practice. Some commentators have 
of the Independent State of the Congo, relating to the Spheres of Influence of Great 
Britain and the Independent State of the Congo in East and Central Africa. Signed at 
Brussels, 12th May 1894'. Reproduced in Brownlie, 1979: 693. 
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drawn a rather sharper line between modern concepts of political space in Africa and in 
the West than has been outlined here. Jackson and Rosberg perceive the 
Anglo- American idea of the international system as being one of international disorder 
against internal order, whilst Black Africa is portrayed as favouring international order 
over internal disorder (Jackson and Rosberg, 1982: 23 -24). This does not make 
African perceptions any less western- dominated. The West would surely much rather 
see internal discord in African states than cross -border conflict: it does not present as 
much of a problem to international stability. Perhaps the West has succeeded in 
imposing a western concept of political space, but not an identical concept to that used 
in the West. 
The Role of Africa 
The influence of African polities in the partition of Africa was limited. The actual 
division of Africa took the form of unilateral, bilateral or multilateral agreements, with 
many more players than were involved elsewhere in the colonial world. Only Abyssinia 
and to some extent Zanzibar were considered to be major players. The preconditions 
for the seizure of territory were the same throughout the world. Britain and France 
took huge chunks of Africa because of military superiority, just as Russia took vast 
tracts of Central Asia and China, and the U.S. moved into the North American interior. 
Potential economic gain outweighed the military risk and so all of these areas came to 
be colonised. Ethiopia survived because it was recognised as an independent state by 
the colonial powers, whether as a result of religion, history or military power. The 
European powers could not discount African polities during the partition, but they 
paid far more attention to the other colonial powers than to the polities of the lands 
they occupied. John Hargreaves' view of African indigenous polities is probably 
accurate. He likens the colonial powers to fighting elephants, who are not unaffected 
by events at their feet (Hargreaves, 1985: 19). 
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Africans have played the key role in maintaining the state system of Africa since 
independence and thus in protecting the imposition of the western concept of political 
space in Africa. It is not merely that many African leaders have been brought up in a 
westernised way and act in accordance with the norms of the international state 
system, which are rooted in western concepts. They also have a vested interest in 
maintaining the existing system and the present structure of borders in general. 
Modern African leaders are generally in a weak position nationally and internationally, 
and therefore do not want to risk their own positions by upsetting the situation. At 
independence, the demography, ethnography and topography of many border areas 
made them politically unstable. Administrative structures were very weak and the 
resources to strengthen them were lacking, so it was difficult to impose territorial 
control. With such internal problems, African leaders were unwilling to resort to war 
to reset their boundaries - apart from notable exceptions in the Horn of Africa. Even 
where expansion was desired, most armies were too weak to do much about it. 
This situation has not changed. Despite current events in central Africa, the vast 
majority of African leaders do not feel secure enough to risk changes to their borders. 
Change could be likened to Pandora's box - once unleashed, it would be impossible to 
stop. The entire continent could be thrown into chaos, as apart from the current 
structure, there are no universally recognised boundaries to revert to. The lack of 
national identity and national cohesion in Africa has left most African states feeling 
insecure about regions within their own boundaries. Even the most authoritarian and 
resource -rich states, such as Nigeria or Zaire, have faced major secessionist challenges. 
The main point is that if Africa's rulers do not feel strong enough to challenge the 
individual borders that were drawn by the West, then they will not be prepared to 
challenge the whole western -style state system in Africa. If any particular state wanted 
to introduce a new concept of political space, rather than merely to redefine the 
division of territory within the existing framework, it would be virtually impossible. As 
political space is concerned with international boundaries, a state would have to gain 
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the acceptance of its neighbours for any changes. As has been discussed, they would 
be loathe to do so. In addition, there are surely no African leaders who would be 
prepared to exchange the control - no matter how weak - that they are able to exert 
over their own countries today, for the looser kind of arrangement which was typical 
with pre -colonial polities. Therefore, the very people who are in positions where they 
could attempt to change the whole system of governance, rule and authority in Africa, 
have vested interests in the preservation of the western concept of political space and 
the system of borders that accompanies it. However, with the weakening of central 
government authority in countries such as Sierra Leone and Angola, rebel groups or 
ordinary borderlanders themselves can challenge the results of the partition. The lack 
of government control along the borders of Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone is a 
prime example, but not one that is easy to assess because of military conflict in the 
area. 
The Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U.) can be seen as an agent of the 
preservation of the international order and of the western concept of political space in 
Africa. Whilst this organisation is certainly against any border changes in Africa and 
works hard to prevent conflicts, it has no real power in itself and therefore merely 
carries out the wishes of its member states. It would be possible here to go through all 
that the O.A.U. has said and written on maintaining the status quo in Africa, and to go 
through the various border conflicts with which it has dealt. However, as its viewpoint 
is a consensus of the opinions of individual African leaders, this would add nothing to 
the argument. Some brief points are worth making on the subject, however, if only as a 
means of highlighting the opinion of African political elites in general. The O.A.U. is 
opposed in principal to changes to African borders, regardless of the rights or wrongs 
of the case. The principle of Uti Possidetis was adopted at the 1964 summit in Cairo: 
"The Resolution of the Heads of State Solemnly declares that all member States 
pledge themselves to respect the borders existing on their achievement of 
independence" (Asiwaju and Adeniyi, 1989: 40). Despite many resolutions supporting 
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pan -African ideals, the O.A.U. has consistently supported an Africa of separate and 
independent states, and has thus put national interests before international co- 
operation: true acceptance of western principles of politics and space. 
Conclusion 
The partition of Africa is certainly no longer seen as the dawn of African history by 
scholars and colonial rule is seen as only one period in Africa's history. Afro- centric 
studies have quite rightly become central to African history. It would, however, be a 
mistake to put the history of colonial Africa to one side. While European colonial rule 
lasted less than a century in most areas, and effective administrative control barely half 
a century in most of those, it was a key stage in the development of modern Africa. 
Firstly, because it occurred so recently, and secondly, because its effects were so 
profound. One of the greatest effects was the political division of the continent along 
western lines. This study will attempt to avoid the division into Afro- or Euro- centric 
focus. It is a study of man and men in a particular context and of their responses to 
given situations and circumstances. It is not a study of European and African history, 
of white and black, but of the struggle of men to impose their will upon other men and 
upon their natural environment. 
BORDER STUDIES 
The Study of African Borders 
International boundaries can be divided into two groups: those in western Europe 
and those in the rest of the world. On paper, there is little difference: all international 
political boundaries share the same legal and theoretical basis. They do not, however, 
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share the same historical basis. Those in western Europe developed in situ, over a long 
period of time and in parallel with the evolution of western political concepts. Those in 
Africa and the rest of the world were to a greater or lesser extent imposed by western 
colonialism, both with regard to their positioning and with regard to the principles 
which underlay them. This vital difference is bound to have a substantial impact upon 
the nature of the boundaries and therefore also upon the study of them. 
Pre -colonial methods of dividing political space were not obliterated by the 
proliferation of linear boundaries. These earlier divisions continue to influence the 
patterns of ethnography, trade and language with which contemporary linear 
boundaries must contend. Some of these pre -colonial methods were undoubtedly more 
flexible and sensitive to geopolitical change than contemporary rigid boundary lines. 
The difficulties inherent in imposing one system of political division upon the multitude 
which already existed in East Africa will be one of the major themes in this work, 
while pre -colonial means of dividing political space will be considered in some depth in 
Chapter Five. 
Boundaries were imposed upon different parts of the colonised world in different 
ways. Although western- dominated international law has assured their legal basis, 
boundaries vary a great deal from continent to continent and also within continents. 
With regard to the study of African boundaries, the emphasis centres upon the 
adoption of colonial boundaries by successor states, and upon the difficulty or 
otherwise of imposing boundaries upon the existing African political landscape within 
the short timespan of colonial Africa. The United States -Mexico border apart, African 
boundaries are the most studied borders in the world. There are three main reasons for 
the different focus and intensity of approach: the fluid political character of 
pre -colonial Africa, the ways in which the western concept of political space was 
imposed upon the continent, and the relationship between the pre- colonial and 
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post -colonial maps of Africa. These factors will be recognised time and again 
throughout this study. 
In accepting that the western concept of international boundaries is the 
predominant contemporary model of dividing political space, it is important to 
recognise that these boundaries are not fixed and to some extent remain in flux. Even 
in Europe, only ten states had the same boundaries in 1989 as in 1899 (O'Dowd and 
Wilson, 1996: 10). In addition to modifications in boundary delimitation, two 
apparently contradictory developments have occurred simultaneously as there has been 
movement between internal and external boundaries. Most of the federal boundaries of 
the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia have become international ones, while it is 
becoming difficult to determine at which point the internal boundaries of the European 
Union will cease to be international divisions. Certainly, they have already lost some of 
the functions which have traditionally been associated with international boundaries, 
such as customs posts and passport control. The re- ordering of boundaries in Eastern 
Europe was the third major re- alignment this century, so there is nothing permanent or 
definitive about political boundaries. 
Associated with this, there is the possibility that globalisation is eroding the political 
foundations of the nation -state, as political and social activities increasingly transcend 
territorial boundaries (Anderson, 1995: 14). Many writers argue that modern 
boundaries are becoming obsolete: that they are becoming increasingly porous and so 
cannot fulfil their historic role as barriers to the movement of people, goods and ideas, 
and as markers of the extent of the power of the state (Wilson and Donnan, 1998: 1; 
Anderson, 1997: 2). Much has been written about the de- nationalising effect of the 
interne, and no doubt this process will continue. Boundaries have almost always been 
porous to some extent, but today there is more economic benefit in liberalising 
international flows. 
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There are many reasons for studying boundaries, but most centre around the notion 
that a country can best be understood through examining it in relation to its 
neighbours, and by studying how their populations interact. Wilson and Donnan claim 
that studying boundaries and borderlands shows the relative strengths of national 
ethnic identities. The gap between two neighbouring identities can become more 
visible when borders are open or closed (Wilson and Donnan, 1998: 16). Some go 
much further. Alvarez claims that the "borderlands genre is a basis upon which to 
redraw our conceptual frameworks of community and culture area" (Alvarez, 1995: 
447). This thesis will be a study of the evolution of state functions as applied at the 
boundary. Prescott (1965: 58) gives this as the third aspect of boundary evolution, 
following evolution in definition and evolution in positioning, and considers that it is 
important because: "Variations in political systems are often accompanied by 
variations in regulations concerning economic activity and the movement of people, 
goods and ideas" (Prescott, 1965: 90). 
Some borders have been the subject of particularly close scrutiny. The United 
States -Mexico boundary and the borders of Nigeria have received a lot of attention, 
partly because of the sharp economic and linguistic differentials which they indicate. 
Whether through warfare or the removal of economic barriers, borderlands are at the 
sharp end of international relations. They can be creators of goodwill or flashpoints for 
conflict. Nevertheless, even borders which appear relatively undivisive, such as the 
Dutch -German border, indicate many intangible differences in political attitude and 
social custom which are difficult to measure. There is always something worth 
studying. 
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Why study African boundaries? 
The 1960s were an ideal time to study African boundaries: many states had recently 
become independent and there was great debate over the acceptance of colonial 
boundaries. From the 1960s onwards Africa's boundaries were guaranteed by a 
combination of western and African interests, and also by a fear of change. It could 
therefore be argued that this is a subject whose time has passed. However, there have 
been signs in the 1990s that the status quo is breaking down. Ali Mazrui lists three 
taboos that were broken during this decade, opening the way for change. The taboo of 
recolonization disappeared with the United Nations' and American intervention in 
Somalia; the taboo of secession was broken by Eritrea; and the taboo of retribalisation 
has begun to be weakened by Ethiopia's search for a federal constitution based on 
ethnic autonomy (Mazrui, 1994: 60). Moreover, many of the key players in the wars 
around the Great Lakes believe that the time has come to change the colonial 
boundaries. At the 1998 Franco -African summit in Paris, the Rwandan president, 
Pasteur Bizimungu, stated, "The colonial borders have had their day" (Jeune Afrique, 
8 -14 Dec 1998). This may just be rhetoric and it is impossible to estimate how much 
the political map of Africa will change, but the possibility of change indicates that this 
is a subject whose relevance is certainly not decreasing. In addition, as cross -border 
co- operation increases in many parts of the world, greater co- operation between 
African states is one of the most obvious ways of improving the fortunes of the 
peoples of Africa. Organisations such as the Southern African Development 
Community offer useful pointers towards a happier, more co- operative, integrated 
future. 
The study of Africa's international boundaries is important. Political and 
socio- economic conditions in much of Africa are appalling and some of the difficulty 
arises from the nature of the continent's boundaries. However, it is easy to 
over -emphasize this point. Griggs is perhaps guilty of this when he writes that, "No 
22 
continent on earth has suffered more from bloodshed, war and misery arising from 
territorial disputes than Africa" and that these disputes normally arise because of the 
nature of Africa's boundaries (Griggs, 1995: 57). Apart from the doubtful notion of 
Africa being the continent to have suffered most from war, it is as easy to link all of 
Africa's conflicts to border disputes as it is to link them to ethnic conflict or 
colonialism. All of these issues are interlinked and there is no doubt that the partition 
of Africa is a major factor. What is surprising is that so many commentators are 
surprised by the unsettled nature of many African states. As far as this can be traced to 
borders, most of Africa's boundaries are only just over one hundred years old, and 
many are a good deal younger. It is unlikely that an entire continent could be divided 
into clearly defined cohesive polities within that time. Whilst it could be argued that 
this was achieved in North America, the boundaries of the United States and Canada 
moved westwards into territory that was almost devoid of people who mattered to the 
governments involved. African polities may not have counted for much with the 
colonial powers, but they did count for something. The frontiersmen of the North 
American continent were effectively moving into determined political space. Creating 
new polities out of an existing political landscape was a different matter entirely. 
Definitions 
The terminology surrounding border studies is subject to a certain amount of 
confusion. There have been numerous attempts to definitively determine the meanings 
of boundary, border and frontier, notably by J.R.V. Prescott (1965 and 1987), yet no 
accepted terminology exists which can reach across the academic disciplines, as well as 
across the North Atlantic. Frontier, for example, is used to refer to a line, an 
unconquered territory, a borderland, or an undeveloped area. As interest concerning 
boundaries has moved from linear features to the territories adjoining them, more 
recent boundary works, such as Malcolm Anderson's Frontiers (1997), have not 
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attempted such comprehensive definition. While it would be foolhardy to attempt to 
create yet another set of 'definitive' definitions, it would be useful to explain how these 
terms will be used in this work, and also to consider exactly what constitutes such 
features as boundaries and borderlands. 
The boundary is the dividing line between two polities and is therefore also the 
point of contact between two or more sovereign territories, unless it lies on the coast, 
although international maritime boundaries are increasingly being delimited (Blake, 
1987: xii). Boundary has only one meaning and its use as the preferred term for linear 
divisions is accepted as the norm by Prescott in his very useful survey of boundary 
studies (Prescott, 1965: 30). Various metaphors have been applied to it, of which 
Ratzel's vision of the state as the animal and the boundaries as the skin appears to be 
the most evocative (Prescott, 1965: 10), but such visualisations depict the state in 
isolation and do not appear to be particularly useful in boundary studies. 
As the boundary is that which divides political space into polities, it seems as well 
to define polity. J. Anderson's definition can be accepted for the purposes of this work: 
"territorially bounded sovereign political communities ", with a unified authority 
(Anderson, 1995: 14). However, even within the western concept of political space, 
there can be variation in the level of control within a territory (internal sovereignty) but 
not in the control of geographical extent (external sovereignty). For example, in Italy 
there is a great difference in the level of state control in Milan and in Palermo. The 
study of political space therefore involves two main factors: the level of control in a 
specific area, and the territorial extent of the area in question. Polity is a rather neutral 
term and therefore largely avoids the debate over the differences between states and 
non -states. In any case, this is not always a fruitful distinction to make.' 
1 Koponen explores this in the Tanzanian context (1988: 192 -209) 
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There seems to be little debate as to how clearly delimited and demarcated 
territories developed. Boundaries do not normally exist where one state ends and 
ungoverned territory begins, as it is the proximity of polities that requires the boundary 
to be determined, usually as the result of population pressure or conflict potential. 
Where there is a large gap between polities, a frontier exists and there is no need to 
define the edge of the state. The high population densities of Ancient Greece and 
Rome created closely packed settlements which were not generally separated by 
swamps, forests or uninhabited zones, and individual citizens and villages needed to 
determine the limits of their territory (Murty, 1978: ch5). This concept was carried 
across Europe by the Catholic church with its system of clearly defined parishes 
(Anderson, 1997: 14 and 17). Previously, the pattern had been one of a mish -mash of 
competing, localised authorities often with overlapping jurisdictions, all under the 
umbrella authority of Rome or the Roman church. According to Anderson, the 
previous concept of universal power in Europe became split between the Pope and the 
Holy Roman Empire, allowing nation -states to rise into the vacuum. They adopted the 
boundary concept of the church with the aid of the rise of record keeping and 
"introduced a precise sense of territorial identity and of territorial control" (Anderson, 
1997: 18 -25 and Murty, 1978: ch5). 
Although boundaries have both barrier and conduit functions (Nugent and Asiwaju, 
1996), they must have originally developed as barriers. As population density and 
resource competition increased, so did state organisation and the ability to impose 
taxation. Taxation was accompanied by tax differentials between states, and the 
benefits of cross -border trade and smuggling became apparent. Greater state control 
allowed greater variation in policy and practice, and differences became more 
pronounced. Wage, commodity, tax, lifestyle and a host of other differentials 
encouraged borderlanders to interact with their neighbouring territory and 
neighbouring borderlanders, to perhaps a greater extent than they would do with their 
compatriots living the same distance away. However, at the same time the polities 
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involved are not able to control cross -border movements as effectively as they would 
like to. To take the most extreme example, Griffiths writes that there are 50,000 miles 
of international boundaries in Africa, with 345 official crossing points, or one for every 
145 miles of boundary (Griffiths, 1996: 101). States bring people together within a 
state, extending commonality over a wider group of people than would otherwise have 
been the case. This creates sharp divisions at the fringes - divisions which 
borderlanders often do their best to undermine. 
The recent work by Nugent and Asiwaju, African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits 
and Opportunities, has much to say, as one would expect, on the subject of the conduit 
and barrier functions of boundaries. The book considers how borderlanders exploit 
their location for trade, and access to medical services and schools, and do not 
therefore wish to see a change in their circumstances (Nugent and Asiwaju, 1996: 
390). The topic is complicated by the fact that it is not always easy to predict the 
effects of official policy. In West Africa, all the colonial powers attempted to restrict 
the supply of modern firearms and strong alcohol to the African population. However, 
the extent of the restriction varied, thereby creating regional differentiations. This had 
the unexpected side -effect of stimulating cross -border trade at the very time that many 
of the colonial powers were trying to minimise it, and in the very goods whose supply 
they aimed to restrict (Nugent and Asiwaju, 1996: 3 -4). 
It is this western concept of political space which dominates today, and therefore 
European -style international political boundaries have become the norm. However, it 
would be incorrect to assume that the western notion of dividing political space did 
not exist outside Europe. It was common for many centuries among the Haya and 
Sukuma in north -western Tanzania, where the concept had entered the region from the 
Nile Valley (Austin, 1968: 6). There are countless other examples. The western 
concept was spread throughout the world by colonialism and then cemented by the 
creation of international organisations, such as the United Nations, and by international 
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law. Proof of general acceptance of this style of political division is provided by its 
adoption by colonial successor states, despite pre- independence condemnation and the 
emphasis upon international solidarity during the independence campaigns, most 
notably by Gandhi in India and Nkrumah in Africa. "In general it is remarkable how 
sacrosanct the former colonial boundaries became for African statesmen, despite their 
earlier nationalist criticisms of them as artificial and ethnically divisive" (Oliver and 
Fage, 1988: 260). In decrying the state formations over which they ruled, African and 
Asian political leaders would have removed the justification for their own positions. 
Border is a term which most authors fail to define, perhaps because it is so difficult 
to pin down accurately. Determining the difference between border and boundary is a 
very subjective matter, but one concrete difference is that border must refer to 
international divisions while boundaries can be either internal or international (Ajamo, 
1989: 37). Both refer to linear features which divide polities, although border has a 
tendency to allow for more breadth than boundary, an idea supported by Anderson 
(Anderson, 1997: 9). Border can therefore include all the paraphernalia of the most 
divisive boundaries: fences and ditches, customs posts and demilitarised zones, 
although in most cases even where demarcation structures are actually present, it can 
be very difficult to identify the boundary. It is often acceptable to use the two terms 
interchangeably, although there are exceptions. For instance, the difference between 
'crossing the border' and 'crossing the boundary' is merely that the former is more 
usual; the latter is not incorrect. The term boundary is normally used when one wishes 
to be more precise; for example, when discussing the division of political space, or in 
delimiting or demarcating a boundary. The idea that border has more depth to it is 
emphasised by the use of the term borderland rather than boundaryland, when referring 
to a territory directly adjacent to the boundary. 
The idea of natural boundaries is a discredited one. Even where suitable mountains 
or rivers exist, there is no intrinsic reason why a particular ethnic group should be 
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confined to one side of any particular topographical feature. Vegetation, rainfall and 
humidity differences are often far more effective obstacles than even the highest 
mountains (Prescott, 1987: 110). Indeed, "to mountain peoples, mountains do not 
necessarily constitute barriers. This is a concept of lowlanders" (Kirk, 1962: 156). In 
addition, rivers tend to facilitate contact not prevent it. Solomon writes that in the 
Mekong Delta, river dwellers often have much more in common with those living on 
the opposite bank, than they do with their terrestrial neighbours (Solomon, 1969: 18). 
In addition, the main proponents of the idea that 'natural' features should be the main 
determinants in locating boundaries, such as Ratzel (1897), Curzon (1907) and 
Holdich (1916), were writing at a time when military strategy was uppermost in the 
minds of political geographers, and when the concept of the static military defence had 
yet to be discredited. 
Although the concept of natural boundaries is neither in vogue nor particularly 
useful, it does have a powerful effect on people's minds and it is easy to see why the 
concept has been so popular. It played a key role in strategic thinking until the First 
World War. As well as being a political barrier, a border is often far more powerful 
and evocative as a mental barrier. For instance, the Cheviot Hills form a substantial 
barrier between England and Scotland, yet at the same time they help to draw the 
people of the Anglo- Scottish borderlands together in a common culture. As the 
concept of natural borders was popular at the time of the partition of East Africa and 
during much of the colonial period, it would be unwise to dismiss it out of hand 
entirely. 
The study of boundaries is intrinsically linked to that of borderlands: boundaries 
generally have to be studied within their territorial context, while borderlands can not 
be borderlands without boundaries. The borderland is the area next to the boundary; it 
lies within, and is part of a polity, and is often so marked by its proximity to another 
state that it develops a character different from the core territory of the polity. It 
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normally adjoins another borderland in a neighbouring polity. The term has only come 
into common usage in recent years, helped by the works of, among others, Asiwaju 
(1989, 1993). The boundary can be seen as the factor which divides polities, while the 
borderland can be perceived as an adhesive force, in that it encourages interaction 
across the boundary. The term borderland was certainly not current in colonial times, 
but it is commonly used in the field of border studies today and because it is the most 
accurate term, it will be used in this work. Borderlanders describes people living in 
borderlands, and is certainly preferable to the 'natives living in areas adjacent to the 
boundary' common in much colonial correspondence. 
The term frontier has been used to describe a variety of concepts, but the meaning 
which is used in this work is purely a territorial one; linear features are adequately 
served by border and boundary. Adejuyigbe writes that, "frontiers are features of the 
period before boundaries are delimited or fixed" (Asiwaju and Adeniyi, 1989: 28) and 
there is much to recommend this view. Most of the world's frontiers have disappeared 
as boundaries have been delimited, and as such are more likely to be involved in 
historical than contemporary studies. The frontier is an area of ungoverned land, which 
may or may not be sovereignly owned and which offers opportunities for expansion 
given favourable circumstances. Two types of frontier can be identified: open frontiers 
and restricted frontiers. Open frontiers are massive territories on the edge of polities, 
whilst restricted frontiers are areas of land lying between polities, and dividing them, 
but the main difference is a psychological one. All frontiers are ultimately restricted in 
that open land can never be limitless. Many of the borderlands of Tanganyika can be 
seen as frontiers - at least when seen through European eyes - as they were apparently 
without political control. Tanganyika as a whole can be seen as a frontier region in the 
Nineteenth Century, with people migrating into it from all sides. 
Four terms regarding boundary creation are used in border studies and require brief 
definition. The following descriptions are based upon those given by Murty: 
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- delimitation: allocation of territory. 
- definition: description of the boundary. 
- delineation: marking the line upon a map. 
- demarcation: physically marking the boundary upon the ground (Murry, 1978: 15). 
THE THESIS 
The Problematic 
The primary aim of this thesis is to fill a major gap in the historiography of 
Tanganyika - namely, there is currently no large -scale study of the territory's 
boundaries. There are also no major studies of individual boundaries in the region. 
McEwen's International Boundaries of East Africa (1971) is very useful, although it is 
not specifically concerned with Tanganyika and mainly restricts itself to legal and 
diplomatic issues. Heinz Schneppen, who was the German Ambassador to Tanzania 
until 1998, has written a pamphlet on the creation of the borders of Tanzania 
(Schneppen, 1998). It is a fairly accurate account, but relies on existing works rather 
than any primary research. Tanganyika Notes and Records contains various articles on 
the boundaries of the territory, and these have proven to be of great use in particular 
areas of this study. Kjerland's unpublished thesis on the history of abaKuria (1995), 
contains a wealth of references and discussion on the borderlands with Kenya. 
Despite the efforts of such works, the history of the territory's boundaries has yet to 
be addressed in its own right. Given the wealth of archival materials that are available, 
it seems that a major study is overdue. The main aim of this study will be to analyse 
the imposition of the western concept of dividing political space in Tanganyika 
between the initial colonial intrusion in 1884 and independence in 1961. Within the 
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framework of attempting to fill this gap, this thesis will tackle three main questions in 
order to focus the discussion: 
1) To what extent did colonialism successfully impose the western system of dividing 
political space upon Africa? 
2) To what extent were African political, economic and cultural systems affected by 
the boundaries? 
3) With reference to the boundaries, to what extent did the actions of the colonialists 
and the borderlanders influence each other? 
The issues surrounding each of these questions have been discussed earlier in this 
chapter, but there is some need for further comment. There is some overlap between 
each of them, but this may serve as an advantage rather than a problem, as it will help 
pull this work into a concerted whole. 
1) To what extent did colonialism successfully impose the western system of dividing 
political space upon Africa? 
The most central question to this work, this field of enquiry has already been 
considered in some depth in an earlier section. Political boundaries evolved in western 
Europe and were disseminated and imposed throughout much of the rest of the world 
through colonialism. Although linear boundaries were not unknown in pre -colonial 
Africa, they were merely one of many methods of dividing political space. What 
changed as a result of colonial rule, was that boundaries became the norm throughout 
Africa. Africans themselves have had much to do with the imposition. By maintaining 
the divisions following independence, African political elites have reinforced the notion 
of the linear boundary. The extent of the role of colonialism and the colonialists in the 
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imposition will be discussed in the case of Tanganyika. This work will examine the 
processes by which western -style boundaries were created, as well as the African 
response to the new divisions during the colonial period. Of course, it would be as 
foolish to generalise about Africa and Africans as it would be to do so about Europe 
and Europeans. However, as will be seen, there were certain similarities in African 
approaches to dividing political space, just as the system of linear boundaries is a 
broadly western European construct. 
2) To what extent were African political, economic and cultural systems affected by 
the boundaries? 
This study is not restricted to the theoretical niceties of the imposition of linear 
boundaries in East Africa. The impact of these boundaries is also a central pillar of the 
work. There can be little doubt that many African political, economic and cultural 
systems were disturbed, disrupted or destroyed by the new boundaries. The colonial 
political boundaries allied to colonial rule in general robbed existing African polities of 
their sovereignty and African political systems were almost totally undermined. 
Economic and cultural systems faired a little better. The imposition of the borders as 
economic barriers caused trade routes to be diverted and in some cases they 
disappeared altogether. Many pre -colonial cultural networks were divided by the 
boundaries, but links usually remained and in some cases the colonial authorities went 
to great lengths to avoid disruption. In other areas, however, division could be seen as 
an objective in its own right. This was particularly true with regards to pastoralists in 
the Kenya- Tanganyika borderlands, although the nature of the terrain, lack of 
manpower and the determination of the pastoralists usually scuppered any colonial 
attempts at control. 
One of the main points to be considered is whether the colonial boundaries had a 
fundamentally detrimental effect upon Africans living in borderland regions. Until the 
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1980s, most studies portrayed Africans either as being passive or as strongly resisting 
the partition. Various classifications of resistance techniques were devised, but all 
emphasized the divisive, negative nature of the colonial borders. The past decade has 
seen a growing acceptance of the idea that Africans were actually able to exploit the 
boundaries for their own benefit. This study forms part of that growing trend. The 
Maasai are a prime example of a group who used the boundaries in a variety of ways 
for their own benefit; they will be considered in depth in Chapters Ten and Eleven. 
Their lack of regard for the Kenya- Tanganyika boundary has been well documented, 
but the actual means by which they took advantage of the boundary between the two 
territories have received much less attention. 
3) With reference to the boundaries, to what extent did the actions of the colonialists 
and the borderlanders influence each other? 
Of the three questions, this is probably the most difficult to assess. During the early 
years of partition, the influence of African borderlanders was minimal as the 
colonialists sought to militarily impose their authority. Their influence grew in later 
years, as the colonial authorities and colonial officials on the ground developed border 
policies which they attempted to implement. In practice, the response of the 
borderlanders to these policies often caused the authorities to rethink their plans. For 
instance, repeated attempts by the British authorities in Kenya and Tanganyika to 
control Maasai movements across their common boundary were eventually abandoned 
as unworkable. By the 1930s, control centred on the movement of cattle. The spread 
of rinderpest was a massive problem for everyone, and so the Maasai co- operated to 
some extent with attempts to tackle it. In the same way, the willingness of some local 
African leaders to co- operate with smugglers prompted the Dar es Salaam government 
to offer rewards to the leaders for information. Resistance to colonial border policies 
was not usually dogmatic. Where policies brought benefits, co- operation often 
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developed. Where they brought hardship and disruption, resistance in one form or 
another could be expected. 
Strong political division could also benefit Africans. For several years German 
troops were unwilling to cross into Portuguese East Africa in pursuit of the 
rebel/resistance leader Machemba, who was therefore able to evade capture by 
utilising the boundary and the lack of Portuguese forces in the area. German forces 
eventually had to put the western concept of sovereignty to one side in their pursuit of 
Machemba. Also during the early years of colonial rule, borderlanders relocated across 
the boundary a short distance, in areas where one colonial authority imposed direct 
taxes and the other did not. There were very few occasions on which the colonialists 
were able to formulate a policy and impose it without problems. Interaction was very 
much the rule. 
Structure 
The core of this thesis is composed of an examination of political, economic and 
cultural aspects of the imposition. Under each of these headings, the pre -colonial 
situation will be considered before colonial policy and African responses are discussed. 
Part Two is concerned with the political effects and impact of the imposition. While 
this is neither a detailed study of the partition in East Africa nor a diplomatic history, 
the actual creation of the boundaries requires some assessment and will be the subject 
of Chapter Four. Chapter Five will consider the nature of pre -colonial African methods 
of dividing political space, before examining the impact of the partition upon African 
polities and African responses to the situation. Chapter Six will examine the 
development of cross -border international relations in the light of the partition. The 
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new territories of East and Central Africa were faced with a variety of major problems 
and had to interact together in a new political landscape. 
Part Three is a study of the economic concerns of partition. Chapter Seven will 
discuss the impact upon pre -colonial African economic systems and trade routes, while 
Chapter Eight will examine one aspect of trade that encompasses both the divisive and 
conduit nature of boundaries - smuggling. Previously legitimate trade became illegal 
with the partition of Africa, yet at the same time, tax, duty and policy differentials 
created opportunities for smuggling. This was one of the main challenges to the new 
borders and one of the methods that African borderlanders had of exploiting their 
position. This chapter will use Tanganyika's sea border with Zanzibar as its main case 
study. Chapter Nine will provide a concise examination of pro- active colonial 
economic policy relating to the territory's borders. It demonstrates how the colonial 
economic development of the territory and its boundaries played a major role in 
shaping the country and imposing the western state system. 
Part Four will consider one of the main cultural challenges to the boundaries - 
pastoralism. As a socio- economic system, it can be seen as the antithesis of settled 
colonial rule and fixed linear boundaries. Where pastoral peoples occupied 
borderlands, the colonial governments were faced with major problems regarding their 
economic and veterinary policies. Chapter Ten examines attempts to control pastoral 
borderland groups, while Chapter Eleven will concentrate upon veterinary restrictions. 
Together, the two chapters will analyse how pastoralists attempted to defend their way 
of life from boundary divisions. 
Chapter Twelve is the concluding chapter. Conclusions to the three main questions 
will be examined and the threads of the argument brought together, before the recent 
history of Tanganyika's borders is considered. The final conclusions centre upon the 
legacy for the African continent as a whole. 
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The division of the information into different chapters is partly artificial, and many 
case -studies could be placed into a variety of chapters. For instance, discussion 
between the Kenyan and Tanganyikan administrative officers on the movement of the 
Maasai could be placed in the chapter on international relations or that on pastoralism. 
As with the overlapping nature of the three questions, this can be seen as a strength 
not a weakness, as the chapters interlink and build upon each other. 
Why Tanganyika? 
Tanganyika offers a unique historical backdrop for this study. Firstly, it had wide 
exposure to colonial rule, from Arab, Omani and Zanzibari to Portuguese, German and 
British. It also contains a vast number of different African ethnic groups, and so was 
something of a melting pot of ideas and influences. Unlike other parts of East Africa, it 
possessed no large centralised kingdoms, such as Buganda or Bunyoro. Despite this, it 
gave birth to one of the greatest acts of resistance to colonial rule anywhere in Africa, 
the Maji Maji rebellion of 1905 -7. In addition, it was controlled by two different 
European powers, and the accompanying political changeover exacerbated the 
upheaval of the Great War. No other African country suffered so much directly or 
indirectly from that conflict. Lastly, the voluntary fusion of two sovereign states - 
through the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar - to form Tanzania, is a unique case in 
Africa. Tanzania is often considered to be exceptional in African terms with regard to 
its national cohesion and lack of ethnic conflict.1 All in all, Tanganyika offers a distinct 
colonial inheritance. 
The territory's control by two different colonial powers allows scope for assessing 
the imposition of linear boundaries by the West as a whole, rather than by one power 
1 See, for example, Gwassa, 1969: 86. 
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in particular. This study will not, however, attempt a direct comparison of British and 
German border policies. German policy is much more difficult to assess because pre - 
1914 rule was weaker in scope and intensity, and because the boundaries were less 
identifiable and definite. More space in the work as a whole is therefore given over to 
the British period. It is also difficult to place German border policy in global context, 
as their non -African colonies were tiny and tended to be islands. Britain, on the other 
hand, had a long history of colonial boundary- making, and a large body of work exists 
on British boundaries in India. In practice, however, the key objectives of the two 
powers were not so very different: the control of their African populations, the 
development of a colonial economy and the maintenance of peace with neighbouring 
colonies. 
Tanganyika was also a territory with a large number of international boundaries: it 
had eight neighbours during the British period, or nine if the sea boundary with 
Zanzibar is included. It has a variety of borders: from sea, lake and river boundaries, to 
watershed and astronomical boundaries lying in both lightly and densely populated 
borderlands. These borders divide a large number of ethnic groups, from the famous 
Maasai to the lesser -known Matambwe. It is also an excellent environment within 
which to study pre -colonial methods of dividing political space, boasting linear, zonal 
and ethnic examples, as well as combinations of all three. The long sea boundary is a 
particularly important component because it tied Tanganyika into the wider influences 
of the Indian Ocean. Links with Somalia, Oman and much of the Middle East remained 
strong throughout the colonial period, while trade with India increased greatly under 
British rule. This sea border also undoubtedly enabled a great deal of long distance 
smuggling, although, as Chapter Six will demonstrate, it was often difficult to 
distinguish whether contraband came from Zanzibar or from more distant lands. 
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Themes 
A number of themes run through this work, permeating the argument and pulling 
the chapters together into a concerted whole. First amongst equals is the very harsh 
environment which dominates much of East Africa and which provides the backdrop 
to this study: animal and human disease, tsetse, aridity, humidity and famine; all 
exacerbated by African and colonial warfare and slave- raiding; all working together 
and acting upon each other. Jeffi ey Herbst has explored the relevance of this for the 
development of polities and the division of political space (Herbst, 2000). He argues 
that the harsh environment is the main cause of low population densities in Africa. This 
in turn influenced the type of polities which developed, hindered the growth of cities 
and therefore also hampered the spread of European control through regional centres. 
Man's struggle to impose himself upon his environment has probably been greater 
in Africa than on any other continent. Relatively recent works, such as Iliffe's The 
Africans (1995), stake a convincing claim for this being the main theme of African 
history. A whole subfield has developed around the topic with works such as Kjekshus' 
Ecology, Control and Economic Development: the case of Tanganyika, 1850 -1950 
(1977) and Maddox et al's Custodians of the Land (1996), highlighting the role of 
disease and ecological balance in East Africa. In comparing the German colony created 
at the end of the Nineteenth Century, and the territory inherited by the British in 1919, 
the ecological disaster of the 1890s must be stressed. Rinderpest, smallpox and famine 
all struck with such effect, that areas of the country remain depopulated to this day. 
The extent of the disaster can be debated, but it undoubtedly had a profound effect on 
what was to come. 
The second theme to be considered, is that the imposition of linear boundaries upon 
Africa came about because of military superiority and was maintained by military 
occupation. It is fruitless to try to dress it up as anything else. There is nothing 
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intrinsically natural or superior about western-style linear boundaries over other means 
of dividing political space. In addition, the European colonies and boundaries were not 
created in isolation on an isotopic, sterile plain, but in a living, breathing, politicised 
environment, and the colonial administrators spent more time responding to events 
than shaping them. 
With regard to colonial rule itself, the dominant theme is of the remoteness and 
importance of the men on the ground. For example, the British Provincial 
Commissioner (PC) for Northern Province wanted to set up a post in the highly 
sensitive borderland occupied by the bad men' of the Maasai - the Purko and Loita. 
The man chosen had to be a bachelor, "for the first six months the situation will be 
delicate, and that bad political work might involve us in fighting; the area is so remote 
that I can really exercise no control over the officer stationed there, and we must 
therefore pick our man carefully ".2 As in most other cases, the man - for he was 
invariably a man - had to be a jack of all trades. The District Officer (DO) for Bugufi 
on the Burundi border emphasized the remoteness of many borderlands, when he 
wrote of his encounters with forest - dwelling pygmies who had never seen a white man 
(Lumley, 1976: 42). The same DO was forced to serve for seven years without a break 
during the Second World War; his term of duty was only brought to an end by a 
mental breakdown and physical exhaustion. 
The qualifications for such a job were an Arts degree from a major university, 
apparent robustness, resourcefulness and an aptitude for the outdoor life. Such a job 
attracted many dedicated men. Major Delmé -Radcliffe, wrote while on duty in 
northern Uganda, "for the Empire I'd stay till I dropped" (Beachey, 1996: vii) and 
indeed he refused all leave, even when under pressure from superiors to take it. This 
2 TNA: TS 10298/I: 94, 17th October 1927. Letter from PC Mitchell to the Chief 
Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
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seems extreme, but it is wrong to judge it entirely by the standards of today. Such men 
saw themselves serving a noble cause and had a "mystical faith in imperial destiny" 
(Beachey, 1996: viii). The actions of the men on the ground were crucial. Policy was 
formed in Dar es Salaam and in the metropolitan capitals, but a lowly administrative 
officer could be put in charge of a district of half a million people, and his decisions 
could influence the area for years to come. 
Problems 
Several problems were encountered in this study which should be mentioned at this 
point. Firstly, the statistics which are given in primary and secondary works present 
several difficulties. They are often impossible to check and it is easy to take apparently 
accurate figures at face value. The 1988 Tanzanian Census reached the pinpoint 
accurate conclusion that there were 341,146 abaKuria in Tanzania (Tanzania, 1988: 
175), yet many pages of the census upon which it was based were found to be blank 
(SENSA, 1988). Even where figures can be cross referenced, other problems emerge. 
For example, it is possible to check migration figures against census figures and 
plantation records, but many non -Tanganyikan Africans came to assume a 
Tanganyikan ethnic identity, particularly where they were closely related to 
Tanganyikan groups. These included many of the largest groups to migrate into 
Tanganyika, such of the Barundi and the Makonde (Alpers, 1975: 377). The report on 
the 1957 Tanganyikan Census stated that, "it is clear that many Africans may say that 
they belong to one tribe at the time of one census, and to another at the next" 
(Tanganyika, 1963). 
Confusion over the names of people and places has also proved to be a difficulty. 
For instance, the names of ethnic groups and the structure of groups and sub -groups 
are often confused, perhaps because several names are used for the same group or 
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because the name of a group has changed. Local studies are needed to cope with this, 
and still cannot be guaranteed to exclude inaccuracies. For example, the Bantu peoples 
speaking different dialects of igiKuria were variously named Wakuria, Watende, 
Bakuria and abaKuria in the colonial records. The Germans also used their totem name 
- the Elephant People - to refer to them. There is still some dispute amongst modern 
writers over correct usage (Kjerland, 1995: 7; Berntsen, 1976: 1 -11). Koponen writes 
that the problem is complicated by the abaKuria not conceiving of their inclusion 
within a 'tribe' (Koponen, 1988: 180). Where they do not believe in such labels, surely 
they are in the best position to judge. Moreover, European attempts at ethnic 
categorisation were hampered by the fluid nature of ethnicity in Africa. 
Place names are no less problematic. To take one example, the names of islands in 
Lake Nyasa were often changed. Papia island was previously known as New 
Heligoland and continues to have the alternative name of Mpuulu island (McEwen, 
1971: 197). On occasion, DO's even invented their own names for places, either 
because they believed none other existed, because of difficulty in pronouncing African 
names, or out of sheer whim. Several discrepancies were only detected after extensive 
research during this project, so it is more than likely that others remain. Overall, 
however, it is remarkable how often African names for features were adopted. Spelling 
difficulties range from simple spelling changes such as Taveita to Taveta, to 
differences associated with the interchangeability of '1' and 'r' in most Bantu languages, 
to differences in Bantu prefixes and suffixes, such as the use of Wakuria, Bakuria and 
abaKuria. 
The archival materials which provide the backbone of this study also present 
several problems, regarding the choice of information to be recorded, and by whom, 
and also the selection of materials to be destroyed. This is important, because to a 
large extent the case studies chosen have been determined by the availability of 
material and information. This is acceptable, providing that the availability is not 
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knowingly biased. The archival materials are, however, highly biased. The vast 
majority of printed materials are written by Europeans, while the vast majority of those 
affected were Africans. Most of the documentation is European, while African sources 
are usually written from memory (Austen, 1968: 1 -2). Even where African written 
statements exist, they are usually written under European conditions. The racism 
inherent in the colonial record often discounted Africans. For instance, a document 
may describe two soldiers crossing a border, causing problems and harassing natives. 
In reality, this can refer to two Europeans who may be accompanied by five, ten or 
thirty askaris. 
Boundary records are biased towards those borders which experienced most 
problems, or which were governed by DOs who took a particular interest in recording 
useful information. Most recorded cases are those which came to the attention of 
central government, and this depends to a very high degree upon which DO was 
involved. In addition, a large proportion of the archival materials have been destroyed. 
The German records in Dar es Salaam have been particularly badly hit by selective 
destruction. Those saved are mainly financial records, and this must be kept in mind in 
the assessment of material. For instance, most of the smuggling and criminal files were 
destroyed, along with many of the court records, so that most of those which remain 
relate to the payment of rewards to those detecting smugglers. Such files contain 
useful information on the nature of smuggling and so can be of great use, but their bias 
towards the financial expenditure of government departments is always a factor. 
Another difficulty apparent in this work is maintaining focus. A discussion of 
international boundaries inevitably turns to geopolitics, given that geopolitics is 
concerned with relations between polities, and that boundaries divide and link polities. 
There is therefore the danger of being pulled too far into the orbit of geopolitical 
theory. For example, borderlands are at the receiving end of any particular state's 
international policies, and relations between two adjoining borderlands are in turn a 
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major influence upon the formation of such policies. The danger is that this could lead 
to the study of relations between the two polities involved in general, and not just with 
regard to the boundary. The distinction between the two subjects is a fine one. 
In considering examples of the imposition of European rule and European concepts 
in Tanzania, it is very difficult to generalise. At the end of the German period, groups 
such as the Baha were still engaged in primary resistance, while others had experienced 
twenty years of European rule. Some African polities were defined by territory and 
others by population. Some European administrators were deeply concerned about the 
welfare of the Africans under their rule, others were more interested in their own 
careers. This work aims to draw some conclusions about the nature of the interaction 
between Africans and Europeans, and between African and European concepts at the 
time of the colonial imposition, but every case must be taken on its merits, and there 
are often many exceptions to any conclusion. 
Finally, there are great difficulties associated with the issues of ethnicity and 
statehood in Africa. One of the major disputes in pre -colonial African history is 
whether pre -colonial polities can be described as states and whether, indeed, this really 
matters very much. On balance it seems that there is no dividing line between states 
and stateless societies. Most African societies were not states in the European model, 
but some did exhibit many of the same characteristics, such as centralised 
bureaucracies. If the African groups of eastern Africa did live in stateless societies, this 
is not to say they were less advanced or sophisticated. States are generally not as 
flexible a means of human organisation as many forms of stateless societies. 
In this work, it is difficult to talk about a particular group without giving it a 
specific name - a label. This can act to give it a cohesiveness and singularity which may 
have been absent. Although it is open to debate, there was probably not, for instance, a 
collective pre -colonial Makonde consciousness. Colonialism and the associated British 
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policy of indirect rule with the promotion of tribalism, encouraged the growth of 
ethnic consciousness. 
One of the main effects of more fluid and flexible groups than those in Europe at 
the same time, is that it is often difficult to decide whether a particular group has been 
split by a boundary, or whether it has divided itself by partly moving across the line. 
Fluid African groups joined with other groups, split and reformed, so that although 
two neighbouring groups could have very similar systems of governance or lifestyle, 
they could also have very different ones. The one characteristic that they almost 
always shared was their adaptability. So where a boundary cut through a particular 
group, it may not have been especially homogenous in any case. What it lost was its 
flexibility. 
Literature Review: Primary Sources 
The subject of this research is a rather broad field of enquiry and far more relevant 
material exists than could ever be included. However, it is hoped that a representative 
cross -section of sources and aspects of the imposition has been considered. This work 
is largely based upon archival resources, with considerable support from secondary 
studies, and limited addition from personal observations. Many of the relevant archival 
files seem to have been unread, many others have been used only once or twice. 
Footnote references provide the relevant file, page in the file, correspondents and date 
of document. Where an impression is gained from the contents of a whole file, then 
only the file number is given. 
References and information on Tanganyika's boundaries are widely scattered. One 
source is boundary commission reports, which often contain references to obscure 
matters reflecting the personal interests of the writer, ranging from flora and fauna, to 
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game hunting, to African history. In an article about the Anglo- German boundary 
commission on which he served, G.E. Smith includes various comments useful to this 
work, such as observations on the African political and military balance of power in 
Maasailand (Smith, 1907). Material has been used from five archives and over two 
dozen libraries, while newspaper cuttings from the Yorkshire Post to the Vossischen 
Zeitung have provided a wealth of material on colonial matters. 
At the start of this research, it was assumed that the archives would contain 
references to cross -border service provision, but very little material was discovered. 
Education and medical provision was very limited, and even what existed was 
generally run by religious organisations. Some references to the use of Tanganyikan 
hospitals by inhabitants of Portuguese East Africa (PEA) along the Rovuma are 
included in this work, along with some information on famine relief, but otherwise 
there is little. This would be a more suitable field of enquiry in independent Africa, 
where borderlanders can and do exploit state differences. 
The Tanzanian National Archives (TNA) in Dar es Salaam contained a great deal of 
useful material. A large quantity of district files are kept in Dar es Salaam, but as 
matters concerning international boundaries tend to involve neighbouring states, they 
are usually refered to the central government and so are also found within the 
Tanganyika Secretariat files. One problem was that a lot of what was listed in the 
archive guides did not exist or could not be found by the archivists. It is difficult to 
estimate the proportion, but perhaps forty percent was unobtainable. This was 
somewhat worse with regard to the German records kept in the TNA. Half of all the 
files which related to borders concerned the Kenyan border and half of these related to 
the Maasai. Other popular themes included migration, border disputes, disease control 
and demarcation. Only twenty percent of the district files were present, and of those 
which were identified many were mixed up, dates were confused, and contents 
incorrect. Of the other material in Dar es Salaam, the East Africa section of the 
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university library was well stocked, and contained the excellent and renowned Hans 
Cory papers. 
The Zanzibar National Archives (ZNA) were well organised and presented, 
although much of the material was illegible. Many of the original record books had 
fallen apart, but a large -scale project to save the records had sealed each page in 
plastic. Despite these efforts, many pages were fragmented and faded, making much of 
the handwriting unreadable. In addition, many of the early German records had been 
written in shorthand or were hand -written in the original German script. Most of the 
material is from the German period, as Zanzibar is the main archive for Nineteenth 
Century colonial records. As in the former Potsdam and Berlin archives, the records 
are thorough, showing that the Germans had a great interest in record keeping. It also 
seems that they were more interested in the creation of the boundaries because they 
were surrounded by alien powers. 
The Reichskolonialamt records contain a massive amount of boundary material; 
there are over 250 files directly concerned with the subject, and the average size of 
each file is 3 -400 pages. The most studied boundaries are those with the Congo and 
British East Africa, and there is also a lot of material on the PEA border. The main 
files of interest are RKA: R1001 568 - R1001 638/2. Much of the information is 
concerned with demarcation, but there is a great deal else of more general interest. 
Apart from the RKA files, the Berlin department of the Bundesarchiv also contains the 
records of the Auswärtiges Amt (AA) or German Foreign Office. 
Some use was made of relevant files from the Kenyan National Archive (KNA) - 
several relevant papers had been photocopied and placed in the TNA, while the thesis 
by Kjerland had made great use of KNA material (Kjerland, 1995). Copies of other 
KNA documents were obtained for the author. The other archives which were used 
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include the Tanzanian Central Library, the University of Dar es Salaam Library, the 
Zanzibar National Archives, SOAS archive and Rhodes House in Oxford. 
Great use has been made of the primary materials contained within Hertslet (1909) 
and Brownlie and Burns (1979). Brownlie himself took a particular interest in the 
boundaries of Tanganyika, writing an article on the Tanganyika- Malawi boundary. 
Hertslet was the librarian at the British Foreign Office, and his three volume epic 
contains the numerous treaties and agreements by which Africa was partitioned, 
including many in translation. 
Literature Review: Secondary Material 
The main emphasis of African boundary studies has been upon the acceptance of 
colonial borders by independent African states, and upon the division of pre -colonial 
groups which this brought about. Boundary disputes have also been of great interest, 
but these are mainly a function of the first two areas. Early border literature largely 
ignored African boundaries. Lord Curzon concentrated upon Europe and the British 
Indian Empire in his famous treatise, despite writing at the end of the partition of 
Africa (Curzon, 1907). Later, African borders began to be examined from a Euro- 
centric point of view, with many studies of the diplomacy surrounding the creation of 
the boundaries (Asiwaju, 1985: v). Today, many African boundary studies are 
concerned with borderland socio- economics and tend to concentrate upon very small 
populations. Fewer writers are prepared to tackle the whole range of African 
boundaries in a single volume. 
The number of colonial powers involved in Africa means that the modern 
boundaries are real symbols of differentiation. Portuguese, French, English and Arabic 
are all major linguistic forces, and each has been accompanied by legal, political and 
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cultural traditions. This differentiation has been emphasized by the distribution of the 
colonies and the political map of colonial Africa produced a patchwork quilt effect 
with the exception of the French West Africa. A result of this has been to make cross - 
border co- operation more troublesome; linguistically, legally and in countless other 
ways. In addition, the internal weakness of many African states means that they regard 
border problems as even more of a difficulty. In this way, the history and pattern of 
Africa's borders certainly explains the concentration upon boundary disputes. 
Another effect of the number of colonial powers is in the methodology of research. 
Researchers must contend with various languages and legal and administrative 
systems. It is therefore much easier to examine a relatively small locality which 
requires coping with one or at most two systems and languages, or the whole 
continent, which does not require specialisation in any one region, than to study 
borders on a sub -continental scale. When cross -border African studies are attempted, 
they are mainly concerned with how one ethnic group is divided by a colonial 
boundary. Miles' Hausaland Divided (1994), Asiwaju's Western Yorubaland Under 
European Rule (1976) and Amenumey's The Ewe Unification Movement (1989) are 
prime examples. Such studies in other parts of the world tend to be concerned with the 
interaction between two ethnic groups and a boundary, such as Sahlins' Boundaries: 
The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (1989) - an excellent study of the 
historical development of a region influenced by two major states but very much 
retaining its own identity. 
Despite the number of colonial powers with connections to the continent, it appears 
that African boundary studies is a field dominated by Anglo -Saxon and African 
writers. While historians such as Benmassaud (1989) and Igue (1977) have examined 
aspects of the genre, the subject does not seem to have excited the passions of the 
francophone world as much as historians from the United States and United Kingdom. 
German and Portuguese writers appear to have paid even less attention to the field. 
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When boundary disputes on other continents are studied, there is very much a 
feeling that these problems are solvable, but much of the material on African boundary 
disputes gives the impression that they are just one part of the eternal turmoil of 
Africa, and that they are unlikely to become settled in the foreseeable future. This may 
or may not be an accurate reflection of the state of Africa, but again the historiography 
appears to reflect perceptions of the current condition of African borders. 
The selection of certain themes for close scrutiny in African boundary studies is 
usually a reflection of local circumstance. For instance, there have been many more 
studies of the relationship between pastoralists and boundaries in Africa, such as 
Markakis' Conflict and the Decline of Pastoralism in the Horn of Africa (1993), than 
elsewhere in the world. This is understandable, given that, "Sudan, Somalia and 
Ethiopia rank first, third and fifth respectively in the world in terms of pastoral 
population size" (Markakis, 1990: 218). While not specifically a boundary study, 
Markakis's work shines a great of light upon the nature of boundaries and man's 
relationship with them. Pastoralists do have some sense of territoriality, but not being 
sedentary can in itself be a challenge to political control and to linear boundaries. 
There are fewer pastoralists elsewhere in the world, so naturally there are fewer 
studies of pastoralists and boundaries. However, other differences in historiography 
are not so easy to explain. For example, there have been several studies of the use of 
African boundaries to prevent the spread of disease, such as Amutenya and van der 
Linden's study of the Nambia -Angolan border fence (1992), but the subject has 
received little attention elsewhere. It may be that the kind of anti -cattle border fence 
which has been constructed in the southern half of Africa has not been attempted on 
other continents. There may be other reasons, or it may be that most unhistorical of 
explanations - chance. 
Works which are directly concerned with Tanganyika's borders have already been 
mentioned, but a number of more general works have been a great help. Anderson 
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(1997) and Prescott (1965, 1987 and others) provide excellent general discussions on 
the nature of international boundaries - although they fail to reproduce any feeling of 
life in borderlands - while Kopytoff (1989) is the best introduction to pre- colonial 
African methods of dividing political space. Kopytoff draws examples from most of 
the continent and indicates the best awareness of the nature of pre -colonial African 
polities. Herbst's States and Power in Africa. Comparative Lessons in Authority and 
Control (2000), offers an interesting insight into the links between pre -colonial 
political systems and the continent's modern-day struggle with the nation -state. 
Tanzania/Tanganyika was one of the least examined African states until the 1960s; 
thanks in large part to the interest generated by Nyerere's policies, it is now one of the 
most studied (Kimambo, 1993: 1). Today, a large body of material exists on the pre- 
colonial, colonial and post -colonial history of the territory. However, most studies 
look at the creation of Tanganyika from the point of view of the independence 
movement and the creation of a national consciousness. Little has been written on the 
creation of Tanganyika as a political entity - the carving out of a new structure and its 
imposition upon Africa and Africans. Coulson (1982) is an excellent study of 
contemporary Tanzanian decision -making in the light of its colonial history, while 
Koponen (1995) and Iliffe (1979) provide two of the best country histories anywhere 
in Africa. Koponen appears to be the most widely -read and thorough of those 
historians specialising in Tanzania. Of the general histories in German, Tetzlaff (1970) 
seems to be the best, although it is now somewhat dated. 
The course of the research 
The reasons for choosing Tanzania were given earlier, but it must also be admitted 
that it was selected because it is one of the more peaceful countries in eastern Africa, a 
fact which was forcefully brought home by the various eruptions among Tanzania's 
neighbours during the period of the research. The research and writing up of this thesis 
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took four years. The first year was spent in Edinburgh, studying Tanganyikan history, 
preparing the research and learning languages. Short visits were made to the Public 
Record Office (PRO) and Rhodes House Library before three months were spent at 
the Berlin and Potsdam archives. A further three months were spent learning Swahili 
and preparing for the research period in Tanzania. 
The research in Tanzania itself was also archive based. Visits to border areas were 
made and some interviews were undertaken, but these were aimed at giving a feel for 
the areas in question, rather than as a mainstay of the research. It was not an attempt 
to provide what Elizabeth Isichei calls "a cosmetic veneer" of fieldwork for research 
essentially based upon archival materials (Isichei, 1997: 10). Fieldwork normally 
requires archival support, the reverse is not always the case. Spending some time in a 
borderland gives one person's experience of one place at one time, yet there can be no 
better way to get the feel of a place, and such experiences can therefore be invaluable. 
Following nine months in Tanzania, a similar period was spent studying in the PRO in 
London and in collating the collected material, before the thesis itself was written. 
Terminology 
Most of the problems concerning border and historical terminology and definition 
have already been discussed, but several miscellaneous terms will be defined here. 
Tanganyika is used to refer to the territory under both British and German rule. There 
are territorial differences between the two colonies, but it is useful to have one term to 
cover the territory for the entire colonial period. General colonial policies will be 
examined, so the separation of Rwanda and Burundi from Tanganyika does not 
prevent colonial comparisons. The term German East Africa or Deutsch Ost Afrika 
obviously refers only to the period of German rule. 
51 
Because it is not now fashionable to use the term tribe, and as the term has been 
much abused, it will not generally be used in this work. However, as the term was 
widely employed by the colonial authorities, it will be mentioned in certain contexts. 
Several terms can appear pejorative or patronising. For instance, it is debatable 
whether it is better to use subchiefdom or dependent territory or semi- autonomous 
region. It could be wrong to attach European political terminology to African 
concepts, but it is equally wrong to exaggerate the differences between European and 
African political structures by using different sets of terminology. This is not the place 
for a full discussion, but the term which seems most apt in each particular case will be 
used. 
The names of Tanganyika's neighbours have changed at various times since the 
partition of Africa, and it may be helpful to provide some notes here: 
a) Rhodesia as a whole came under British South African Company administrative 
control under Royal Charter in 1889, and remained so until 1923. British Central 
Africa Protectorate was the term used to describe Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
until 1897; following that year, it just refered to Nyasaland. In 1911, Northeast and 
Northwest Rhodesia were amalgamated to become North or Northern Rhodesia. The 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was composed of North Rhodesia, South 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It was set up in 1953 and dissolved in 1963. Nyasaland 
became independent in 1964 and changed its name to Malawi. Northern Rhodesia also 
became independent in 1964 and adopted the name of Zambia 
b) British East Africa (BEA) held the official title of the East Africa Protectorate until 
it was renamed Kenya Colony and Protectorate in 1920. 
c) The Congo Free State became the Belgian Congo and then Zaire, although it was 
generally refered to as the Congo in East Africa. 
d) Portuguese East Africa (PEA) was the colonial name for Mozambique. 
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e) Various spellings of Rwanda and Burundi were used, depending upon the period 
and the nationality of the writer or speaker. Ruanda and Urundi were the most 
common versions in the early colonial period. 
********************************************************************* 
This introductory chapter has examined the research within the context of border 
studies and the historical study of Tanganyika, as this work is located at the point 
where these two fields overlap. It has hopefully pointed out the need for a study of the 
international boundaries of Tanganyika. Firstly, although there is a large body of 
archival material relating to the boundaries of the country, it has largely been 
unexploited. Secondly, a large number of works discuss the development and functions 
of the borders in passing, and use can be made of them in this study. In addition, both 
Tanganyika and modern Tanzania provide interesting and worthwhile case -studies of 
the means by which the western concept of political space was imposed upon the 
continent of Africa. Finally, boundary and borderland studies is a growing and 
developing field, to which this study can hopefully make a small contribution. 
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PART TWO POLITICAL DIVISIONS 
The political division of East Africa was carried out on many levels, from European 
diplomacy on a grand scale, to local African and European manoeuvrings in the 
territory itself. The following three chapters seek to bring these strands together, not 
only in an attempt to explain how Tanganyika was carved out, but with the aim of 
analysing how international, national and local interests affected the actual 
implementation of the borders once their locations had been determined. Chapter Four 
will chart the actual creation of the boundaries, largely through European agencies. 
Chapter Five will analyse what effect the partition had upon African polities and 
politics in the newly determined borderland regions, as well as considering African 
responses to the division. Chapter Six returns to colonial geopolitics with an 
assessment of border relations between the colonial territory of Tanganyika and her 
neighbours. 
As the three chapters build upon each other, it will clearly be demonstrated that 
colonialism did successfully impose the western system of dividing political space upon 
Africa. A previously flexible, fluid political landscape with a variable hierarchy of 
sovereignties was replaced by rigid linear boundaries, where all states were meant to be 
politically equal. The colonial powers and the doctrine of colonialism were indeed the 
chief agents of this transformation. Broadly determined spheres of influence gradually 
evolved into more accurately delimited territories. Even where colonial ignorance was 
high and disputed territories were of no apparent value, boundary delimitation and 
demarcation was pursued. This was certainly a radical break with the African past. On 
the ground, African polities could and did influence the details of partition, including 
the location of the boundaries, as European and African actions influenced each other. 
Even here, the broad pattern of the colonial map was determined almost solely by the 
European powers; most African objections -led to relatively minor - though numerous 
- adjustments. Yet with the western notion of dividing political space replacing African 
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concepts, and with political sovereignty passing from African polities to European 
ones, it was always unlikely that African political systems and structures could survive. 
CHAPTER TWO: THE MAKING OF THE BOUNDARIES 
The broad outline of Tanganyika's boundaries was largely determined during the 
early years of German rule, although minor alterations were made throughout the 
colonial period. It was therefore during these years that African methods of dividing 
political space were overridden. The main agents of the creation of the boundaries 
were the British and German governments, and to a lesser extent, those of France, 
Belgium and Portugal. A substantial role was also played by the chartered companies 
involved. The German East Africa Company led by Carl Peters, and the Imperial 
British East Africa Company (IBEAC) led by William MacKinnon both campaigned 
for imperial expansion on a scale which far exceeded the colonial zeal of their 
respective governments. The main players in the partition, therefore, were non -African, 
and both the European governments and chartered companies can be seen as agents of 
colonialism. As will be seen in the next chapter, African polities certainly had a role to 
play in making local alterations to the positioning and functions of the boundaries, but 
- the Sultanate of Zanzibar excepted - none were of sufficient political, military or 
economic weight to influence the general partition. Whether or not Zanzibar can be 
described as an African polity is open to debate, but by the time of the partition, the 
political ties which had linked Zanzibar and Oman had been broken, so the Sultanate 
can certainly be described as an African -based power.1 
1 Zanzibar was not part of Tanganyika, but at the time of partition and during the early 
years of colonial rule, Zanzibar played a prominent if decreasing role in East African 
affairs. There is a Nineteenth Century Zanzibari saying: 
"When the pipes play in Zanzibar 
They dance on the lakes" 
(From several sources including Hollingsworth, 1953: 6, and personal experience on 
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This chapter seeks to examine the processes involved in the creation of 
Tanganyika's boundaries. It does not seek to undertake a root and branch study of the 
delimitation and demarcation of the borders. This type of diplomatic study can be 
found in McEwen (McEwen, 1971) and the treaties are given in full in Hertslet 
(Hertslet, 1909). For those interested in the nitty -gritty of boundary delimitation and 
demarcation, the RKA and the PRO contain a wealth of material on the creation of 
Tanganyika, and this chapter has been largely based upon documents from these two 
archives, supported by the German records in the ZNA.2 There is also a large historical 
literature concerned with the partition of East Africa. This chapter has made much use 
of Beachey's AHistory of East Africa, 1592 -1902 (Beachey, 1996). Coupland and 
Müller provide useful alternative perspectives (Coupland, 1939; Müller, 1959). 
Beginnings 
The way in which colonialism initially imposed western notions of political space 
upon Africa is a useful place to start this discussion. Many of the territorial and 
boundary claims were settled in the midst of Anglo- German colonial rivalry after 1884, 
when Bismarck endorsed German involvement in the colonial mission. Whether this 
rivalry was the result of genuine competition for colonies or the by- product of 
Bismarck's general diplomatic strategy vis -a -vis Britain and France is unclear. 
Domestic considerations, including electoral tactics, Germany's rapid industrialisation 
and the effects of the Great Depression all increased German colonial fervour - a 
fervour which was directed and channelled by German pro -colonial organisations 
(Iliffe, 1979: 88; Galbraith, 1972: 1 -2). Developments in Africa also played a role. 
Zanzibar). 
The Sultanate of Zanzibar maintained a claim to vast swathes of the coast. As will be 
discussed later, these were gradually eroded during the colonial period. 
2 Correspondence to and from the British Ambassador in Berlin during the 1880s, Sir 
Edward Malet, is of particular interest. 
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German trade in West Africa was threatened from 1883, and during the following year, 
Britain and Portugal seemed prepared to close the Congo to German traders. The 
pressure for German colonies grew and Bismarck had every incentive to encourage 
expansion, so undoubtedly the broader geo- political scene was important. Through the 
1884 seizure of South West Africa, Togo and the Cameroons, and the Carl Peters - 
inspired entry into East Africa in 1885, Bismarck gained a voice on the African stage 
and thereby the means to provoke tension between Britain and France (Iliffe, 1979: 
89). 
Although the British had been the dominant western power throughout East Africa 
in the years leading up to 1884, they did not press home their advantage. Gladstone's 
relatively anti -expansionist government of 1880 -5 discouraged the staking of a formal 
claim to the region, and German interest was allowed to grow. Following the election 
of 1885, Salisbury's more pro- active colonialists took power, with the fate of East 
Africa still to be determined. However, British attentions continued to centre upon 
relations with France. The French were pressing for a total British withdrawal from 
Egypt, and Salisbury hoped to gain German support against such a proposal. The 
wider geopolitical picture was of even more importance. The death of Gordon at 
Khartoum and the invasion of Afghanistan by Russian troops in early 1885 weakened 
the British position and forced her to cultivate relations with Germany (Arnold, 1979: 
79). In an attempt to secure Bismarck's goodwill, concessions were made over East 
Africa and Samoa (Kennedy, 1985: 97).3 The 1885 -6 division of spoils was totally 
bound up with Britain's position in the world at large. 
Meanwhile, British and German explorer -colonialists had been competing with each 
other to conclude treaties with African chiefs on both sides of the modern Kenya- 
3 For more on the balance of power between Britain, France and Germany at this time, 
see Crowe, 1970. 
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Tanzania border. Carl Peters made his first treaty on the 23rd November 1884 at an 
Ngulu village inland from Sadani, and within three weeks he had another twelve 
treaties covering a notional 140,000 square kilometres. Peters appealed to Bismarck to 
declare a protectorate. Bismarck waited until the Berlin Conference had finished, and 
within twenty -four hours the Kaiser had granted imperial protection to Peters' 
enterprise, resulting in the formation of the German East Africa Company (DOAG) 
(Peters, 1940: Ch2 -3; Iliffe, 1979: 88 -91). Bismarck may have been prompted to act as 
a result of Leopold's increasing demands in Central Africa, in the weeks leading up to 
the declaration of the protectorate (Arnold 1979: 76). With British acceptance of the 
notion of a German protectorate in the south of the region, the DOAG set about its 
plans with energy and ruthlessness. It was able to overcome armed resistance through 
the superiority of its firearms and the lack of co- ordination among the African groups 
which opposed its expeditions. 
The actual division of territory remained ill- defined, so the DOAG quickly 
established stations inland and pushed towards the sources of the Nile. Peters moved 
to Lake Victoria to break the power of the Arabs and to be on hand to act in Uganda. 
He claimed that the local Haya chiefs, Mukotani of Lesser Kyamutwara and Kalmigi of 
Kianja, both welcomed him with open arms as their deliverer from the Baganda, when 
at the same time both of these chiefdoms were appealing to the Baganda for aid against 
the Germans (Schweitzer 1898: Vol II: 41 -2 and 121). The British consul on Zanzibar, 
Sir John Kirk, persuaded Sultan Barghash of Zanzibar to accept German claims to the 
interior (Arnold, 1979: 77). Despite the support of the British government for German 
claims, British colonialists on the ground were not so supportive of the arrangement. 
MacKinnon wanted to set the boundary on the Pangani, offering to help the DOAG 
build a railway in return, but Peters objected, describing the Usambara Mountains and 
Kilimanjaro as a "conditio sine qua non" in the territory and boundary negotiations.4 
4 RKA: 8864, 20th September 1885. Peters to the German Foreign Office. 
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Partition 
The division of East Africa into British and German spheres of influence, allied to 
the existence of British territories in the surrounding region, meant that the boundaries 
of DOA were largely determined by bilateral agreements between the British and 
German governments. Despite the infamous false treaties which many European 
expeditions encouraged African rulers to sign, most African polities were ignored 
rather than tricked during the principal carve -up of territory. In many ways, African 
political systems became almost irrelevant. Major Anglo- German treaties were signed 
in 1886, 1890, 1893 and 1900, and scarcely a year went by from 1886 to 1914 without 
minor adjustments being agreed, often preceded or followed by boundary 
commissions. A treaty setting out the broad extent of British and German spheres of 
influence in East Africa was agreed in 1885 and signed the following year. However, it 
was not until 1890 that the main delimitation took place, and even after this time many 
changes were made. The boundaries were determined relatively quickly but it would be 
grossly inaccurate to state that they were drawn overnight during discussions in 
Europe. The general division of East Africa, with the British in the north and the 
Germans in the south, had been achieved by the end of 1886, but much remained to be 
decided, not least the fate of Uganda. 
Just as the concept of linear boundaries had been conceived in Europe, so the most 
important decisions on the positioning of East Africa's international boundaries were 
reached in the capitals of Europe's leading colonial powers. Despite the progressive 
development of the borders, it must be admitted that the boundary between British 
East Africa and German East Africa was largely set in 1886 at a series of meetings 
between Dr Kravel, a German Foreign Office official, and Lord Iddesleigh, the British 
Foreign Secretary. Agreement was reached and signed on the 29th October, and 
resulted in a boundary which has survived until today with only relatively minor 
alterations. This agreement was mainly concerned with the division of coastal 
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territories, but also fixed the border inland to Lake Victoria - a feat which was 
achieved with little dispute. Coastal territories were of greatest interest at the time and 
were also a prerequisite for expansion into the interior. The extension of the boundary 
inland as far as Lake Victoria was achieved with little dispute. One month later the 
southern border with Mozambique was broadly agreed with the Portuguese. The 
facility with which it was achieved, pointed to the weakness of the Portuguese position 
north of the River Rovuma, and to the general acceptance of major rivers as effective 
means of dividing territory. The poorly delimited boundary which was created was the 
cause of border disputes along the Tanganyika -Portuguese East Africa border almost 
continually until Tanganyikan independence in 1961. 
The years 1886 -1890 saw a lull in the treaty making, but these were perhaps the 
years of most frantic activity. DOAG sponsored expeditions reached out from their 
initial treaty territories to the north and south and especially into the interior, until they 
could reach no more. The level of resistance offered by African polities varied 
considerably, but in no area did the preservation of African political systems seem a 
possibility. The limit of westward expansion had already been fixed on Lake 
Tanganyika as a result of the 1885 agreement acknowledging the territorial extent of 
the Congo Free State,' but there remained the fear that the British would outflank the 
Germans in an attempt to fulfil the Cape -to -Cairo dream. However, the main focus of 
urgency lay to the north -west, where British claims were pressing, although many, 
including Peters, still hoped to extend German rule into Uganda. 
British colonialists in the field remained passionately supportive of the Cape -to- 
Cairo route, and despite the Berlin Conference 'hinterland' principle, still saw the 
possibility of making it a reality. They were so confident of the superiority of European 
arms and organisation, that the only question in their minds was how much territory 
5 For a description of the borders of the Belgian Congo, see Jentgen, 1952. 
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each power could collect. The imposition of European rule and European norms of 
dividing political space was taken for granted. The celebrated colonial diplomat - 
explorer Sir Harry Johnston had served in Malawi before moving to Uganda, and had 
explored much of the territory to the east of Lake Tanganyika (McEwen, 1971: 174). 
His overriding aim in eastern Africa was to protect the southern flank of Egypt, and 
this had no bearing on expansion east of Lake Tanganyika (Pakenham, 1991: 338), but 
he still hoped to link Uganda to British Central Africa and pressed the government to 
intervene in the region. Despite a campaign in the German press which alleged 
imminent British action to secure the area in order to develop telegraph and railway 
communications between her northern and southern possessions6, there was little 
likelihood of official British intervention. 
Firstly, despite the enthusiasm of such men as Johnston, Salisbury's attitude to the 
Cape -to -Cairo route remained sceptical at worst, and at best, uninterested. "I can 
imagine no more uncomfortable position than the possession of a narrow strip of 
territory in the very heart of Africa three month's distance from the coast ", he is 
recorded as saying in a parliamentary debate.? Secondly, in response to a request from 
Sir Edward Malet, the British Ambassador in Berlin, regarding Britain's position on the 
matter, he replied that he wished to "discourage annexation in the rear of any colonial 
power's sphere of influence ", and stated that where one colonial power had already 
staked a claim to coastal territories, "the other could not without consent, occupy 
unclaimed regions in its rear ".8 The hinterland doctrine was obviously therefore given 
some weight by the British government. As a doctrine, it can be seen as an European 
method of determining the control of political space, albeit one that had been designed 
specifically for use in Africa. It certainly did not have its roots in pre -colonial Africa. 
6 RKA: R1001 637: 78, 29th August 1993. Article from unnamed newspaper, entitled 
"Ein deutsch -englischer kolonial- konflikt ". 
7 H.L. Deb. 3s: 10 July, 1890, col 1268. 
8 FO403/142: 29, 14th June 1990. The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Malet. 
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Last, but by no means least, the wider geopolitical picture remained of overwhelming 
importance, and the British government had no wish to upset German sensibilities. 
There was no mistaking German desire for the region in question. Germany wanted 
access to Lake Tanganyika because it provided an entry point to the Congo, and the 
Congo was regarded as key to Central African trading prospects. If the British had 
driven a wedge between German territory and Lake Tanganyika, then German access 
to the Congo would have been thwarted. Despite the British resolve not to become 
involved, German fears of intervention continued until the mid- 1890s.9 
Needless to say, the legitimacy of African polities in the interior was never even 
considered. From decentralised economic groups such as the Nymawezi, to highly 
organised states such as Uhehe, military conquest - or at least conquest backed by 
military power - followed by occupation, was the accepted European method of 
judging the legitimacy or otherwise of their claims to sovereignty. Putting international 
boundaries to one side for a moment, the most common fate of African polities and 
political systems was destruction. Almost all groups retained a large measure of 
cultural and even economic cohesion, but their political power was sharply curtailed. 
The death of the Hehe leader, Mkwawa, in 1898, meant that the Germans controlled 
all the main population centres and lines of communication: now the aim was to extend 
authority over the many small -scale societies remote from the caravan routes - a very 
localised process (Iliffe, 1979: 116). Reaction by African groups varied: some like the 
Hehe resisted fiercely, others actually appealed for German intervention, often because 
of the local political situation. For example, disturbance on the eastern shore of Lake 
Victoria in the 1890s caused by the southwards migration of the Luo, caused a Kuria 
headman, Kibore Machera, and a Jita leader, Nyakulinga, to appeal for German 
support. 
9 RKA: R1001 637: 78. See note 6. 
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In parallel with events in the interior, the years 1886 -1890 also settled the fate of 
the one African state in German East Africa to be recognised by the West. These five 
years saw the steady erosion of Zanzibari power, so far as her mainland possessions 
were concerned. At the dawn of German and British colonial rule, Zanzibar extended 
its political, economic and cultural systems far beyond the islands. It is difficult to 
assess how much territory the Sultan actually lost during these years because the extent 
of his mainland dominions was rather vague. In any case, Zanzibar's position as the 
region's premier power was usurped by the arrival of the colonial powers and by the 
imposition of linear boundaries. In the interior, Zanzibar was synonymous with cultural 
and economic power rather than political influence. In particular, it was associated 
with Arab culture. Zanzibar was the greatest Arab powerbase in East Africa and the 
Swahili word for Arabness Ustaarabu was also the Swahili word for civilisation. The 
inland caravan trade with the islands was dominated by various entrepreneurs who 
were either nominally or actually servants of the Sultan. However, as Jonathon 
Glassman discusses in the seminal Feasts and Riot, these entrepreneurs did carry out 
political functions, often flew the blood red flag of Zanzibar and held the title of liwali 
(Glassman,1995: Ch2). As they were usually members of the various Zanzibari trading 
families (Sheriff, 1987: 184 -7), who were closely associated with the Sultan and his 
family, it may be best to place Zanzibar in a category of its own, and not to relate it to 
European notions of state and structure. This vague political -economic structure can 
certainly be seen as being closer to African than European notions of authority. 
In order to legitimise the colonial occupation of East Africa, a joint commission 
was set up in September 1885 in order to determine the territorial extent of the Sultan's 
possessions. Britain, Germany and France sat on the committee, and thereby finally 
relegated Portugal to the status of a minor colonial power, despite her long 
involvement in Zanzibar and the wider region. The commission's report was produced 
in June 1886 and although the commission had merely been set up to determine the 
Sultan's mainland possessions, because Sultan Barghash was weak, its role extended 
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far beyond that (Coupland, 1939: 450). The report restricted the Sultan's mainland 
possessions to a ten mile coastal strip, although the DOAG was to be given control of 
Pangani and Dar es Salaam (Iliffe, 1979: 90). This enabled the signing of the Anglo- 
German Agreement on the first of November 1886 and the general partition of the 
region (Hertslet iii, 1909: 882). Barghash hoped to preserve his remaining territory but 
the coastal strip was leased to the Germans in 1886 under diplomatic pressure. The 
Germans occupied Dar es Salaam within a year to demand control of customs. This 
was granted by the new Seyyid in April 1888 under British pressure. 
Apart from the influence of the British and German governments, Zanzibar came 
under pressure from two other sources. Economically, the Sultan made concession 
after concession to the DOAG and the British East African Association (McEwen, 
1971: 139). Politically, the Sultan was forced to give up territory to the Portuguese. 
Although Portugal had been excluded from the International Commission in 1888, 
Germany decided to support Portuguese claims in the south of the region. Although 
Portuguese territorial claims were very much like those of the Sultan - rather vague, 
but with kernels of truth - Germany backed them.10 It is difficult to explain why it did 
so. An examination of the German colonial archives failed to reveal the reason, but it 
may be that the Germans wished to bring the Portuguese into the equation in order to 
balance British interests around Lake Malawi. The Portuguese provoked a crisis by 
seizing the Zanzibar steamer, "Kilwa ", and appealed to Germany for help.11 Germany 
immediately backed Portuguese claims and placed all Portuguese citizens on Zanzibar 
under its protection. The speed of the diplomacy suggests that the matter may have 
been pre -arranged. 
10 RKA: R1001 614: 49, 5th June 1886. Article from the St. James Gazette, entitled 
"Sharp Practice in Diplomacy ". 
11 RKA: R1001 625: This file gives the details of the case in various pieces of 
correspondence. 
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Meanwhile, DOAG pressure on the Sultan for greater control of the coast resulted 
in the transfer of administrative powers from the Sultan to the company in 1888 in 
return for tribute, and the coastal strip was eventually bought in 1890 for £200,000. 
The role that Zanzibar played in the partition of East Africa was a major one. She 
was left with nothing on the mainland apart from a sense of cultural influence, but the 
manner in which her somewhat vague territorial possessions were eroded was a key 
component in the creation of Tanganyika and therefore in the creation of the 
boundaries. The relentless seizure of Zanzibari claims confirmed that a key element of 
the western concept of controlling and dividing political space was military might. 
The years 1886 -1890 also saw a strengthening of the British position. Whereas 
1885 had seen a series of crises and challenges to the pax -Britannica, the situation in 
1890 was much calmer and had resulted in a steadily strengthening British hand in East 
Africa. The main fruit of this improvement was to be the 'Pearl of Africa' - Uganda - 
falling into British hands. The details lie outside the scope of this study, but the British 
gain was a function of the broader picture. Peters had been earnestly competing with 
the British Frederick Jackson for Uganda, but Bismarck's fall from power in March 
1890 brought Caprivi to power in Germany, and he was content to concede British 
influence in Uganda (Arnold, 1979: 81). With this, the northern extent of German East 
Africa to the east of Lake Victoria was determined. Anglo- German relations had also 
been much improved by British co- operation during the German suppression of the 
Abushiri rising of 1888 -9. The strong British position also settled the general partition 
of central -southern Africa, where the Portuguese were "compelled by force majeure" 
to agree to British claims (Kennedy, 1985: 101). Northern Rhodesia was able to 
expand up to the limits of German territory, with the border being roughly determined 
as lying between Lakes Tanganyika and Malawi. One again, military strength proved 
decisive in the allocation of territory. 
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1890 was the year of delimitation. The spheres of influence which had been decided 
in the 1886 treaty were formally determined and the broad outline of Tanganyika 
which survives to today was decided.12 The 1890 treaty encompassed not only East 
Africa, but also Togoland, Germany's Far Eastern possessions and fate of the North 
Sea island of Heligoland. The fact that it is often known as the 'Heligoland Treaty' 
indicates that East African interests continued to be subsumed in the wider picture. 
The occupation of East Africa and the effect upon African political, economic and 
cultural systems was important to the people of East Africa, but only a minor factor in 
European international relations. The 1890 agreement looks as if it was decided 
entirely on European grounds and indeed European considerations were paramount. In 
some clauses of the act, avoiding the division of African groups seems to have been a 
consideration for its own sake. The 1890 treaty contained a certain level of flexibility 
with regard to the barely explored Mfumbiro area; if further exploration "show it 
appears that the territory.... belongs to Ruanda then the whole of that territory shall 
revert to Germany ".13 However, such factors were normally outweighed by the 
importance of the balance of power between Britain, France and Germany (Austen, 
1968: 27).14 The main points of note for East Africa within the treaty were German 
recognition of British influence in Uganda and Zanzibar. Boundary delimitation was set 
down in the treaty, but - with some recognition of their common ignorance - the two 
powers made provision for future alterations. Indeed, it is probably fair to agree with 
Holdich when he wrote that the 1890 Agreement, "did not establish a precise boundary 
in East Africa between adjacent territorial sovereigns. Instead it delimited spheres of 
influence and it sets up a warning to trespassers" (Holdich, 1916: 96 -7). 
12 The fate of Ruanda -Urundi had still to be decided, so it was not quite the outline of 
DOA. 
13 RKA: R1001 635: 181, 14th May 1910. Notes on the Anglo- German Boundary 
Commission of 1910, written by the Boundary Commissioners. 
14 See Hertslet, 1909: 899 for the treaty in full. 
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The resolution of disputed territory in the East African interior appears to have 
been achieved through the two Berlin Congo Conference criteria of the hinterland 
doctrine and the principle of effective occupation.15 Resolution of the hinterland of 
DOA brought two dreams into conflict: the Cape to Cairo scheme and the German 
Mittel -Afrika campaign, which sought to connect Dar es Salaam to the Cameroons 
(Gray, 1960: 281 -97). The treaty balanced the claims of both countries, perhaps 
slightly favouring Great Britain. It would have taken a massive counter -offer from the 
British in order to secure the territory to the east of Lake Tanganyika, and in the end 
Salisbury's disinterest dashed MacKinnon's dreams, and the British formally recognised 
German sovereignty as far west as Lake Tanganyika.16 "All in all it was a clear -cut 
agreement which pleased most of both sides" 17. It is important to differentiate between 
the general partition of East Africa and local disputes of boundary location. British 
interests in Uganda and Zanzibar were of considerable weight in the treaty 
negotiations; local boundary and territorial disputes were of minor importance in the 
grand scheme of things. In this way, colonial territorial ambitions were similar to pre- 
colonial African notions - the general extent of the area under control was normally 
more important than the precise location of the boundaries. 
In 1890, the sway of African polities in the interior remained negligible, so disputes 
were generally determined between British and German diplomats. The initiative rested 
with the British because of the improved geopolitical situation and because Heligoland 
acted as a sweetener. As a result, they made the most of any gains. The Germans gave 
up various bargaining chips in order to secure their main objectives in the negotiations 
(McEwen, 1971: 141). The Sultanate of Witu had been somewhat of an anomaly as a 
15 FO403/142: 29, 14th June 1990. The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Malet. 
16 The British made a brief attempt in 1894 to create the Cape -to -Cairo route to the 
west of the lake, through a proposed treaty with King Leopold (Louis, 1967: 27 -40; 
Austen, 1968: 109). It came to nothing. 
17 FO403/142: 29, 14th June 1990. The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir E. Malet. Also see 
Spellmeyer, 1931: 48 -50. 
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German possession on the British coast, and was duly transferred to Great Britain 
(Arnold, 1979: 81). As one step in the process of making neat boundaries that made 
territories easier to govern, this certainly was part of the process of colonialism 
imposing the western concept of political space upon Africa. 
The creation of linear boundaries was not always a smooth process. One of the 
main border disputes related to where the boundary was to meet the Indian Ocean. The 
River Umba had changed course, so the dispute centred on whether the boundary 
should follow the new route of the Umba or should be retained at the old point, now 
Ngobwe Creek. This is a prime example of the difficulties inherent in using water 
courses to define boundaries (Hardinge, 1928: 228 -330). Following claim and counter- 
claim by local officials, the German Imperial Government conceded to British wishes. 
Another criterion of boundary- making, based on water sources and commonly 
supported at the time, was put forward by Carl Peters. In the 1890 Treaty, Britain 
gained the town of Taveta, but by 1892 Peters was arguing that it really should belong 
to the Kilimanjaro concessions on the basis that, "it is about 70 English Miles from the 
nearest water supplies in the British area.'$" 
Geopolitical criteria may have been of primary importance, but western notions of 
dividing political space did allocate some weight to the idea of the natural boundary. 
Lake Nyasa was accepted as a natural boundary in the south. There had been a British 
presence on the lake since 1875, when a British steamboat, the Ilala, was launched 
there to support the first permanent Anglican mission. Although Germany had 
subsequently become interested in the lake, her decision to accede to most British 
claims led to it being excluded from the 1890 Agreement - a decision which was to 
have important consequences in the post -colonial period (McEwen, 1971: 178). The 
enthusiasm for 'natural boundaries' was widespread at this time, particularly because of 
18 RKA: R1001 633: 201, 10th August 1909. Report on the Taveta area by Methner. 
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ignorance of African politics and ethnicity, and the colonial powers were quick to seek 
a useful mountain, river or lake as a means of demarcating boundaries. For example, in 
1925 the Belgian authorities bemoaned the lack of natural boundaries between 
Ruanda -Urundi and Tanganyika (League of Nations, 1925: 10). 
The Treaty of 1890 left German East Africa more encircled by British territories 
than ever: four out of her six neighbours were British, five out of seven if Zanzibar is 
included. While this did not seem to be of great importance to Berlin, it must have had 
an impact on how the Dar es Salaam government perceived its territory's situation and 
therefore also on how they saw their international boundaries. At this stage, the actions 
of foreign colonialists had a far greater influence upon the DOA authorities, than the 
actions of African borderlanders. 
Although the rough outline of German territory had mostly been determined by the 
end of 1890, there was little effective occupation, and colonial disputes could have led 
to major challenges to the 1890 agreement. However, while local issues were generally 
settled peaceably, the wider geopolitical balance ensured stability, and metropolitan 
Anglo- German relations remained stable for most of the 1890s. Of the two power 
blocs created in Europe at this time, the British probably perceived the Franco -Russian 
Alliance as the greatest threat in the colonial field. Agreements were reached over the 
Suez Canal and the Pamirs, but nothing could diffuse the colonial tension between 
Britain and her two greatest colonial rivals in the way that the Anglo- German Treaty of 
1890 had achieved (Kennedy, 1985: 102). European grand diplomacy had certainly 
been transfered to an African context. 
With the German position consolidated vis -a -vis the British, the Dar es Salaam 
government felt strong enough to take a high hand with Portugal over a border dispute 
around the mouth of the Rovuma. The area which came to be known as the Kionga 
Triangle had been claimed by Portugal for centuries, but there appears to have been no 
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known Portuguese presence in the area before the 1880s. Zanzibari traders, however, 
had had permanent settlements there throughout the century, and the territory had been 
included in those lands transferred from the Sultan to German control (Thomas, 1951: 
47 -50). When German officials moved into the area, Portugal protested, and indeed 
insisted upon her claims to substantial territories north of the Rovuma. This was a 
turnaround in Luso- German relations from only two years previously when Germany 
had been supporting Portuguese claims. This reversal of German support for Portugal 
against Zanzibar can be explained by the improvement in Anglo- German relations. 
Germany had previously needed Portugal in order to check British expansion in the 
south, but now that Cecil Rhodes' push northwards had reached its limit, Germany felt 
able to seize what she believed she was entitled to. A vast correspondence exists on the 
matter in the Reichskolonialamt,19 and as one might expect, no value is placed upon 
the opinions of the people actually living in the Kionga Triangle. The extent of 
German, Portuguese and Zanzibari presence in the area are the only issues of 
importance. 
Portugal believed her entire Central African Empire to be under threat. It is 
probable that an Anglo- German plan for a re- division of Portuguese territory at the 
expense of Portugal existed in the 1890s, but the British backed out (Koponen, 1994: 
313). Earlier she had named the British, Os Ladrones - 'The Thieves'; now the term 
was applied to the Germans.20 Germany made clear that it would not back down and 
in the end Portugal gave in to German claims up to the Rovuma, although she 
continued to make representations to Berlin over the Kionga Triangle until 1914. Once 
Portuguese sensibilities over her northern border had been provoked, she began to 
dispute the sovereignty of the islands in the Rovuma. The changing pattern of the 
river's course and the islands which lay in it demonstrate the total inaccuracy of the 
19 RKA: R1001 623 -628. 
20 RKA: R1001 616: 39. Article from The Times on 31st March 1887, entitled 
"Portugal and Zanzibar ". 
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boundary delimitation, and the unsuitability of riparian delimitation in general. A 
settlement over the islands was reached in 1913, with islands above the confluence 
with the Somoni rivulet becoming German, and those below being retained by 
Portugal.21 However, minor disputes continued throughout the German and British 
periods and up until Tanganyikan independence in 1961. The idea of delimiting 
boundaries to the nth degree - despite the fact that nothing of value to the colonial 
powers existed in the disputed territory - is certainly proof that the new African polities 
were being determined according to western norms. 
The original boundaries were more closely determined in the years between 1890 
and 1914, often with the help of boundary commissions and demarcation, and several 
noteworthy changes were made. In April 1902, the Eastern Province of Uganda was 
transfered to Kenya to become Kisumu and Naivasha Provinces (McEwen, 1971: 147; 
Hertslet, 1909 is 385; Kjerland, 1995: 145). Uganda's border with DOA was now 
restricted to the west of Lake Victoria. Further west still, the boundary with the Congo 
Free State (CFS) underwent some changes. Rwanda -Burundi had been included in 
German territory as a result of the 1890 Treaty and other agreements, but German rule 
in the region was never anything but indirect. While the border between the CFS and 
DOA was not to become a Tanganyikan border, German activity along the boundary 
gives an indication of German border policy, and so is of relevance to this study. The 
original Belgo- German border had been determined in 1885, when the easternmost 
limit of the CFS was determined by an astronomical line.22 Ten years later, the German 
government asked for this to be replaced by a natural boundary, leading to the almost 
forgotten Kivu dispute which will be discussed in Chapter Six. A settlement was not 
reached until 1910 when the CFS -DOA boundary was fixed along Lake Kivu and the 
21 CO691: 109/5: 36 -42, 31st March 1930. Letter from the Foreign Office to the 
Colonial Office, no correspondents given. 
22 RKA: R1001 624: 60, 1885. Notes on the treaty of 8th November 1884 between 
Germany and the Congo Association. No author or specific date given. 
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River Rusisi (Deutsches Kolonialblatt, 1911: 613 -17). The British and German 
authorities co- operated in negotiations over the area and made representations to the 
Congo State with their claims at the same time, and the Boundary Commission of 
1911 -12 was marked by co- operation by all three colonial powers in the area.23 
The 1919 Paris Peace Settlement saw not only a change in colonial ruler in 
Tanganyika, but also a territorial break -up of the colony and therefore changes in its 
borders. Rwanda -Burundi became Belgian almost by accident. The Belgians had 
wanted a stake in DOA as a bargaining chip and so continued to occupy Rwanda, 
Burundi and parts of what was to become north- western Tanganyika. The original 
British plan for dividing the spoils had been to give Belgium part of northern Angola 
so that it could construct a deep water port for the Congo (McEwen, 1971: 151 -3). At 
the last minute, Belgium demanded monetary indemnity from Britain as a makeweight 
in the deal, but Britain refused and Belgium gained Rwanda -Burundi instead (Louis, 
1963: 233). The territory thereby lost one third of its population. In the south, 
Portugal was finally able to gain possession of the Kionga Triangle, an area which it 
had disputed with Germany since the German entry into Africa. Many South Africans 
wanted to give Portugal the southern half of DOA so they could take southern 
Mozambique, but the Portuguese refused. Mozambique stayed intact and gained its 
small addition (Iliffe, 1979: 246 -7; McEwen, 1971: 151 -3). African influence upon the 
initial transfer of territory and partial dismemberment of the territory was virtually nil. 
The transfer of Tanganyika from one colonial power to another following a peace 
treaty was certainly in line with previous events in Europe itself, such as in 1815 and 
1878. However, it is more than likely that such transfers also took place in fluid pre- 
colonial African politics. 
23 RKA: R1001 637: 22, 25th September 1912. Newspaper article from the Morning 
Post, entitled "Work on the Uganda Frontier ". 
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Although the award of the main part of Tanganyika to Britain appeared to be 
something of a fait accompli, its long -term future as a British territory was in some 
doubt. That Germany was to lose all its colonies was taken for granted. "Wartime 
propaganda had stressed German colonial brutality and made annexation acceptable to 
humanitarians" (Iliffe, 1979: 246). Some in the British establishment wanted to annex 
DOA to prevent it being used as a future submarine base, but the main thing was to 
keep it out of enemy or potential enemy hands. Tentative approaches were made to 
offer the territory to the United States, but these were rebuffed. The idea of 
Tanganyika as an Indian colony also arose and it received support from Kenya, South 
Africa and Australia, who were keen to solve the Indian emigration problem. The 
Secretary of State for India put the concept to the Indian National Congress, who 
considered it before it was vetoed by Gandhi (Iliffe, 1979: 264). 
British annexationists took up the idea of mandates to counter the anti - 
annexationist United States, and the idea was accepted. The terms of the mandates 
were not as restrictive as has sometimes been claimed, and Tanganyika could have 
become part of a customs or administrative union or federation, providing the other 
terms of the mandate were not broken. The Milner -Orts agreement of 30th May 1919 
settled it, the Supreme Allied Council accepted it on 7th August 1919, and the League 
of Nations council confirmed the terms on 20th July 1922. The lion's share of the 
colony came under British rule under mandate from the League of Nations and became 
known as Tanganyika Territory. Belgium received Rwanda and Burundi, also under 
mandate, while Portuguese full sovereignty over the Kionga Triangle was assured. The 
systems of mandates was new to both the West and to Africa, but the idea of 
redistributing territories from a defeated polity among the victorious powers was new 
to neither of them. 
From 1919 on, geopolitics and the balance of power became far less important in 
determining the boundaries of Tanganyika. The main decisions had been reached and 
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the big questions answered. It remained for the British to make the borders work in the 
ways that they wanted and to carry out the functions required. They could implement 
national and local policies in the knowledge that changes, while not impossible, were 
less than likely. It was during this later period that African polities were able to exert 
more influence. 
The Results of the Partition 
In order to assess the results of the partition of East Africa, it is worth considering 
the thinking behind the division of territory. Boundary identity along the lines of human 
identity, such as ethnicity or language, were totally ignored at this stage. As the table 
below shows, the principle of 'natural boundaries' predominated, with the use of 
mountains, lakes and rivers to demarcate the extent of the colony, with some 
astronomical or mathematical lines where no convenient relief feature existed. 
Astronomical lines, based upon degrees of latitude and longitude, and mathematical 
lines, based upon curves and distances from astronomical points had no tradition in 
pre -colonial Africa. However, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the use of relief 
features to delimit political space was fairly common. The 2633 miles of boundary 
passed through generally lightly populated areas, with the main exception of the north- 
west, where volcanic soils are capable of sustaining some of the highest population 
densities on the African continent. However, the rivers and lakes which make up many 
of Tanganyika's borders support higher than average population densities for the 
region. Higher population densities meant more people affected by partition. 
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Length (in miles) Type of Boundary 
278 Mainly mathematical related to relief 
260 Astronomical line 
130 Relief - various 
280 Relief - various, including mountains 
285 Relief - lake 
,atersheí ....,,..;a.:, 
The Rwanda and Burundi sections of the border with Tanganyika were not separated 
until 1964. All the boundaries were to some extent demarcated during the later years 
of German rule and early British administration. 
There are a number of problems inherent in attempting to assess the effect of the 
partition upon the many ethnic groups of the Tanganyikan borderlands. Firstly, it is 
impossible to divide boundaries into those where ethnicity was taken into account by 
the colonialists and those where it was not. It is all a matter of degree. Secondly, it is 
impossible to produce the type of complete ethnographical map of Tanzania which was 
in vogue in the 1960s. The map below indicates which ethnic groups lived near or 
along the borders during the colonial period, but this can only be used as a means of 
locating the groups which will be mentioned in the rest of this thesis. 
Thirdly, it is impossible to draw up a list of divided groups, although some authors 
- including Asiwaju - have attempted to do so (Asiwaju, 1984b). There is great 
difficulty in deciding which groups have been divided by the boundaries, and which 
have divided themselves by their movement since partition. The Nyakyusa, for 
example, are almost certainly an example of the latter. The fluid nature of most African 
polities and the widespread lack of a strong pre -colonial ethnic consciousness means 
24 Adopted from Reyner in Widstrand, 1969: 186 -189 and Barbour, 1961: 306 -7. 
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that it is very difficult to decide which is which. The drawing of a boundary through 
the middle of lands traditionally inhabited by a particular group may not have been 
considered a problem by the people involved because of the lack of cohesiveness 
within that group. In any case, the categorisation of all Africans into a series of tribes is 
today very much felt to be the product of colonial policy. Finally, an ethnic group may 
have several names or there may be dispute over the extent of a particular group. Such 
questions of ethnicity and ethnography will not be settled here, except where it is felt 
that an intelligent contribution can be made. In addition, some ethnic names have 
changed since 1880. Despite all these drawbacks, it would be useful to consider just 
how many groups are bisected by each of Tanganyika's boundaries. The list below has 
been compiled from sources ranging from 1885 to today, and it is therefore likely that 
it contains some mistakes regarding the names employed. 
Kenya: Segeju, Digo, Chagga, Maasai:, AbaKuria and Luo 
Burundi: Barundi/Baha, Batutsi 
Rwanda: Batutsi 
Democratic Republic of Congo: Rungu 
Zambia: Rungu, Lungu, Mambwe, Iwa and Lambya 
Malawi: Lambya, Nyakyusa and Nyasa 
Mozambique: Yao, Makonde and Matambwe 
The locations of many of these groups are given in the map on the next page. 
Of the various problems created by the partition of Africa, one should be mentioned 
at this stage. The Uganda -Tanganyika boundary was mainly formed by an astronomical 
line - the first degree parallel south - which produced several anomalies. The Kagera 
river snakes is way around the boundary, moving both to the north and the south of the 
line. The Kagera Salient was the name given to that portion of land lying to the south 
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Map 3: Pre -colonial language groups and peoples c.1890 (Koponen, 1988: 16 -17) 
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660 square miles had formerly been attached to the Buganda county of Buddu, but 
following partition, became incorporated into Bukoba District of DOA, as Missenyi 
chiefdom. The Kagera Triangle, comprising fifteen square miles on the shore of Lake 
Victoria, had formerly been part of the Haya state of Kiziba, which now lay in 
Tanganyika, but was itself now included in Uganda. West of Buddu, the Kagera Loop 
left 240 square miles of Ankole in DOA. As the British Kagera Triangle contained the 
port of Mizanda and therefore held effective control of the Kagera, many argued that 
an exchange of the Triangle for the timber resources of Missenyi would be a fair swap. 
The British boundary commissioner for the area, Colonel Delmé -Radcliffe 
described the Salient as, "a pitiless swamp, an expanse of virgin forest, and tsetse - 
infected, waterless, uninhabited jungle" (Delmé -Radcliffe, 1905: 76),25 yet still 
believed that an exchange of territory would create a more stable boundary.26 There 
was strong evidence that the two pieces of territory encouraged banditry, and there 
was a general feeling that the Kagera was a natural obstacle: it was impossible to cross 
without a boat and therefore a barrier to raids and border incidents (Brownlie, 1979: 
906). It is doubtful whether the river was such a natural obstacle to the African 
inhabitants of the area, but is probable that it made administration by European 
officials more problematic. Little attention was given to the wishes of local inhabitants. 
"Those living in the Kagera Salient, at that time about 3,000 people, are refered to as 
'of no particular value either to the British or the German Administration ' (McEwen, 
1971: 279 -280). Delmé -Radcliffe's recommendations did not prevail and these 
irregularities have survived along the boundary (McEwen, 1971: 280). 
25 It is a pity that Idi Amin did not share Delmé -Radcliffe's poor opinion of the area 
when he decided that it was worth fighting over. 
26 FO403/354B: 60 -1, 1st October 1900. Major Gibbons in London to the Marquis of 
Salisbury. 
78 
The most well -known issue surrounding the delimitation of Tanganyika's 
boundaries is generally misunderstood. The story runs that Kilimanjaro was given to 
Kaiser Wilhelm of Germany by Queen Victoria as a gift, and was therefore transfered 
from Kenya to DOA. This myth has been more than adequately debunked elsewhere, 
notably by G.W. Hatchell. Hatchell writes that the Queen and the Kaiser did not get on 
very well, and that, anyway, Wilhelm did not accede to power until four years after the 
boundary had been determined (Hatchell, 1956: 41). McEwen suggests that the myth 
gained currency following the Great War, when European settlers on the slopes of 
Kilimanjaro hoped to be transfered to Kenya. They believed that to get around the 
mandate, they would need to show that the mountain had originally been designated as 
part of Kenya (McEwen, 1871: 135 and 147). This is possible but not proven. It has 
also been suggested by Hertslet that Kilimanjaro was conceded to Germany in 
exchange for the British claim to the Mfumbiro range in Uganda.27 In truth, 
Kilimanjaro came to form part of DOA in much the same way as the rest of the 
territory: through treaties concluded with local rulers, often under duress, 
misunderstood, or concluded with the wrong rulers. It is possible that the story of 
Kilimanjaro as a gift gained credence because both the British and the Germans made 
treaties with chiefs at Taveta in 1885. Expeditions for the two powers tried to secure 
as many treaties as possible in order to strengthen their hands in the negotiations to 
come. The boundary came to bisect the area, with Moshi and Kilimanjaro lying on the 
German side and Taveta in the British zone (Johnston, 1886: 110). The 1886 treaty 
states that the boundary ran, "between Taveta and Chagga around the northern base of 
Kilimanjaro" (Hatchell, 1956: 41). 
There has also been some misunderstanding about the location of the boundary with 
Uganda. Several works on the period have been somewhat confused on their 
27 FO367/10, 17th April 1906. Series of unlabelled newspaper cuttings on the 
Mfumbiro problem. 
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description of its location during the early years of the Twentieth Century. For 
example, Elizabeth Hopkins in her chapter 'The International Boundary as a factor in 
the extension of colonial control', asserts that in the 1910 agreement, Britain's gain was 
the adjustment of the Ugandan -DOA boundary from the first degree south to the 
course of the Kagera (Hopkins, 1969: 212). Such an adjustment was never made. 
Attempts to make such a change will be discussed in later chapters. 
It is worth making some points about the Europeans who determined the nationality 
of millions of Africans. The people who created the colonies and boundaries of eastern 
Africa were a small group; the same names appear again and again, often first 
appearing in the historical record as explorers before resurfacing in the archives as 
administrators, engineers and boundary commissioners. For example, Sir Harry 
Johnston, who has already been mentioned, explored around Lake Rukwa before the 
formation of the German colony, and later served as an administrator in British Central 
Africa, before becoming Governor of Uganda. Work on the boundary commissions 
was akin to exploration work. The descriptions of their expeditions are often similar to 
those of the earlier explorers: the topography of the land was time and again very 
different to that expected, porters were seized by lions and cartographers fell into game 
pits. They often became involved in local politics and wars, occasionally having to fight 
military actions as they went. It was undoubtedly more difficult for the thousands of 
black porters carrying the creature comforts of the whites. 
European explorers and boundary commissioners inevitably made many mistakes. A 
British boundary commissioner, G.E. Smith, writes that, "The name Atoringini given to 
one of the mountains on the boundary was the Masai expression for 'I forget ' (Smith, 
1907). The Department for Foreign Affairs of the CFS was forced to admit that Lake 
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Kivu was marked on their maps as dry, much smaller than in reality, and in the wrong 
place.28 
Conclusion 
The European powers determined the general outline of the borders of Tanganyika 
amongst themselves with little regard for the inhabitants of East Africa. African 
colonies were generally merely pawns on the European chessboard. Bismarck said: 
"My map of Africa lies in Europe" (Beachey, 1996: 127) and even German interest in 
East Africa was subservient to the wider geopolitical picture. However, many 
arrangements existed such as that pertaining to the Zambia -Tanganyika boundary, 
which was created from the division of spheres of influence, but with provision for the 
rectification in accord with local requirements (McEwen, 1971: 218). L.S. Amery 
stated the British government's position in unusually honest and accurate terms in 
1935: "We are in Tanganyika by plain right of conquest and formal surrender, and shall 
remain there until someone stronger than ourselves takes it from us ".29 Might certainly 
was right. How much African pre -colonial polities played by another rulebook is not 
the subject of this work, but how much they were effected by and had an influence 
upon the positioning of the boundaries, is the subject of the next chapter. 
It is interesting to consider why Germany and Britain wanted the territory and 
thereby created and maintained the boundaries. For Germany, the reason for holding 
the colony was its potential for creating economic wealth. With regard to the German 
state, however, it could be argued that the debacle of Deutsch -Ostafrikanische 
28 RKA: R1001 623: 158, 21st November 1899. Report by the Foreign Office of the 
Congo State on treaties relating to Lake Kivu. No author given. 
29 TNA: TS 11459/I: 249 -50. "Report on the British Government Position ", no author 
or date given. 
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Gesellschaft (DOAG) rule had left it with no option but to take control of the territory 
and thereby avoid further embarrassment. As will be examined later, the inability of the 
DOAG to maintain control during the 'Arab Revolt' forced the Berlin government to 
intervene with military support. Political control passed into the hands of the German 
government, while the DOAG maintained only economic control. 
Geopolitical considerations lay behind British control of Tanganyika, although it 
mattered not so much what Britain could gain, but what others could be prevented 
from gaining. Tanganyika was claimed to be useful in protecting communications with 
India, but many other territories were used for this purpose. More importantly, 
German ownership of Tanganyika had proved to be a thorn in the side of the British 
during the First World War; it had highlighted the soft underbelly of British control of 
the Indian Ocean. British possession of Tanganyika was therefore not so much a 
geopolitical advantage for Britain, as the removal of a geopolitical disadvantage. 
Whatever reasons the two colonial powers had for taking the territory, they both 
expected the extent of their sovereignty to be accurately determined and the level of 
their sovereignty to be absolute. African political systems and means of dividing 
political space had therefore been superseded to the same extent that African polities 
had ceased to hold sovereignty over the land and people of Tanganyika. During the 
years of boundary creation, the actions of African borderlanders had a very limited 
influence upon the actions of the colonialists. The opinions and actions of the colonial 
authorities across the border were of far more importance. The level of influence which 
Africans were able to exert locally during the later years of political partition will be 
considered in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE IMPACT UPON AFRICAN POLITIES: THE THEORY 
AND THE PRACTICE 
The imposition of European colonies upon the existing African political landscape 
was not a neat transition from one political map to another. The two political 
structures operated in tandem over most of the continent, but more often in conflict 
than in co- operation. Most Africans continued to look to their own political leaders 
rather than the colonial rulers. They were helped in doing so by the weakness of 
colonial rule, and also initially by the total lack of colonial administration over vast 
areas of the continent. However, as effective occupation became more tangible, the 
division of African polities by colonial boundaries become more and more of a 
problem. As Table 1 demonstrated in the previous chapter, an enormous number of 
African groups lived on or near the new boundaries. Whilst it is difficult to distinguish 
between economic, ethnic, political and linguistic ties in pre -colonial Africa, there was 
undoubtedly a political component involved in the cohesion of most of these groups. 
However, because many of these groups were not nearly as cohesive or as fixed as the 
colonialists believed, the impact of their division was not always traumatic. It is 
possible to view the impact of the partition upon African polities from two 
perspectives: firstly, on a theoretical level, as a clash between European and African 
methods of dividing political space, and secondly, on a practical level, by examining the 
impact upon individual African polities and peoples. This chapter will attempt to 
consider each of these in turn. Although this work is concerned with Tanganyika, few 
studies have been made of pre -colonial African methods of dividing political space, and 
so examples from the wider African scene will be employed where applicable. 
Section One will examine African pre -colonial methods of dividing political space. 
The only way to understand how and why colonialism successfully imposed the 
western system of boundaries upon Africa, is to fully comprehend what this system of 
bordered territories actually replaced. This is also a vital component of examining the 
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impact of the boundaries upon African political systems. Not only were African 
systems different to those in the West, but the very principles upon which they were 
founded were startlingly different. The Gogo, for instance were able to combine fixed 
territorial entities with transient populations. Such idiosyncratic systems could never to 
hope to survive the standardisation of colonial rule. In contrast, this section will also 
highlight some similarities in western and African notions; in particular, many states in 
both regions were founded on economic links. 
SECTION ONE: THE THEORY. 
This section compares East African pre- colonial methods of dividing political space 
with those of the West. An examination of both is central to this work: it is as vital to 
understand the nature of the boundaries which have been imposed, as it is to realise 
how radically they differed from what they replaced. Both western Europe and Africa 
are currently divided by the same model of political boundaries, but those in Africa are 
radically different from pre- colonial systems in that continent. It should also be pointed 
out that although this work is more concerned with external than internal sovereignty, 
the two are closely linked: the nature of rule within a polity often determines its level 
of territorial fluidity. Even so, the western state system has never operated so that 
political power was bounded by international borders. Geopolitics and the international 
political economy have seen to that. 
An assessment of the extent to which African political systems were affected by the 
boundaries, must begin by acknowledging that there are no specifically African 
methods of dividing political space. Pre -colonial African polities were divided and 
governed by various methods, most of which were not related to western -style linear 
boundaries. It is difficult to differentiate between internal and external sovereignty in 
the pre -colonial African context, as a ruler's territory was often defined by the limits of 
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what his subjects occupied at any one time (Herbst, 1989: 680). According to Jeffrey 
Herbst, this was because of low population density and because land had no added 
value as agriculture was rain -fed (Herbst, 2000: 36). In addition, a ruler's subjects 
often broke away to form their own polity, joined another one, or avoided political 
control altogether. Igor Kopytoff has painted a picture of this very fluid situation, with 
states expanding, contracting or being absorbed into another polity ( Kopytoff, 1989)1. 
Kopytoff builds upon the earlier ideas of Davidson, who writes that people repeatedly 
moved and spread their numbers, often in very small groups; "there they would settle 
and begin a new life, work out new rules of law and order, redefine their morals and 
beliefs" (Davidson, 1978: 69). However, where Kopytoff argues that this leads to the 
commonality of ideas, Davidson writes that this explains the sharp variation in systems 
and beliefs of African polities, when it was quite usual for a state to have a completely 
different system to its neighbours. The truth probably lies somewhere between the two 
views. African pre -colonial division of political space took place in a very difficult 
environment and so there was more need for flexibility, yet the constant ebb and flow 
of political authority must have encouraged the spread of ideas. This again ties into the 
debate over the differences between states and non -states, and the lack of long- lasting 
African empires. "The notion that some special virtue lies in the politically 'small' 
becoming the politically 'large', whether by absorption or conquest of neighbours, may 
fit the conventional traditions of Europe and America: it has seldom fitted those of 
Africa" (Davidson, 1978: 75 -6). Flexibility was the key in Africa. 
This notion of ephemeral boundaries is not recognised by everyone. Apata argues 
that even if inhabitants had to flee for a long time, they still recognised the old 
boundaries upon their return (Apata, 1989: 11). Such differences in opinion probably 
arise from differences in the location of fieldwork, and emphasize the extent to which 
1 The concept of fluid African polities has also been accepted by such writers as 
Prescott and Anene, who both take for granted the fact that pre -colonial African states 
were elastic and ephemeral (Prescott, 1965 and 1987; Anene, 1970). 
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African concepts varied. As with so much else in African history, environmental 
differences probably played a large role. 
Traditional African political divisions were often related to social and economic 
relationships (Moseley and Asher, 1994: 297). Cultural similarities and languages 
tended to develop between villages which traded together and political authority often 
evolved out of these links, as was the case with the Hausa (Kopytoff, 1989: 195 -211), 
or in the Tanganyikan context, the Nyamwezi (Abrahams and Forde, 1967). This not 
only occurred where resources were plentiful enough for large -scale trading, but also 
in harsh environments, where it related to control of wells. Even in more cohesive 
polities, the division between protected subjects and those outside was based upon 
people rather than upon territory. Yet pre -colonial Africans did not lack the concept of 
territoriality - it was merely expressed mentally rather than cartographically. For 
example, the Asante measured distance 'anthropometrically' by the number of days 
travel from one point to another. Greater Asante was defined as being forty days travel 
in all directions from the capital (Wilks, 1992: 182 -3). 
This is not to say that precise delimitation between the territories of neighbouring 
polities was unknown. Modern -day Tanzania provides a wealth of examples, especially 
among the Haya and Sukuma of the north -west, where the concept had been common 
for centuries and which appears to have entered the region from the Nile Valley 
(Austin, 1968: 6). Although existing trees and bushes were normally used, there are 
examples of rows being planted, such as in Uhaya, where trees were placed every 
twenty -five feet (Oldaker, 1957: 129). Throughout East Africa, vegetation was used as 
territorial markers (McEwen, 1971: 4). Nomadic pastoralist societies could be 
considered to be the antithesis of the clearly delimited polity, yet according to Alan 
Jacobs there is strong evidence to counter this assumption (Jacobs, 1963: 38). The 
Maasai were composed of sixteen sub -ethnic groups, each with a clearly defined 
territory and individual water and pasturage claims. These territories rarely overlapped 
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although they were adjacent to each other, and were often divided by topographical 
features. 
There is also evidence that the idea of authority being determined by territory rather 
than by people was becoming increasingly popular in some areas of East Africa. For 
example, it appears that the concept spread into Ufipa from Katanga about the year 
1700, and then into other areas of the Great Lakes Region. The Fipa adopted it before 
they had any real central administration, implying that the notion had more to do with 
the territory and prestige of the king, than anything to do with economics (Willis, 
1968: 83 -4). Again, Ufipa's external boundaries were determined through reference to 
physical features, such as ridges and rivers. Even quite small streams were used, 
indicating that these borders did not develop out of any real physical obstacles, but 
rather out of a conscious desire to determine territorial extent. Despite this, African 
methods still differed from modern western practices, which demand to know exactly 
where in the river or on the mountain the border lies. 
African perceptions of defined territoriality were neither restricted to Tanzania nor 
always demarcated by topographical and natural features. The Yoruba, for example, 
used man -made mounds to compliment the use of lakes and hills as markers 
(Adejuyigbe, 1978: Chs 1 -2). Precise territorial awareness can also be identified in 
other ways. In the Congo, it was standard practice for European missionaries and 
explorers to be accompanied throughout a kingdom, from their point of entry until 
their precise point of departure; it would have been politically unwise for their guides 
to go beyond the limits of their own kingdom (Morel, 1909: 97). A.A. Oldaker, an 
enlightened British administrator, made a careful study of African concepts of 
territoriality in Tanganyika. He wrote that boundaries were usually not demarcated 
artificially, and that any marks which were made tended to be ephemeral (Oldaker, 
1957: 129). He cites the example of Kasulu on the Tanganyika -Burundi border where 
the custom of beating the bounds was employed to provide later evidence of land 
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ownership. Although this example refers to individual land holdings, it indicates a high 
level of territorial awareness. 
All these examples could be taken together to promote the case for the widespread 
existence of clearly bounded polities in pre -colonial Africa, but this would be incorrect. 
It would be more accurate to describe these cases as being examples of clearly marked 
points of contact or short stretches of contact between two polities, often employing 
trees or streams in some places and nothing at all in others. They rarely refer to states 
clearly demarcated for the entire length of any supposed boundary. Perhaps a more 
representative example comes from Abyssinia. In the Nile Valley, the Abyssinians 
identified exact points which marked the limits of their jurisdiction, but to the east in 
much more open country, the border remained undetermined (Crawford, 1950: 82). In 
addition, the vast majority of examples of clearly bounded pre -colonial African polities 
refer to boundaries between subdivisions of a closely related ethnic group. With regard 
to the Somali, Sukuma, Haya, Maasai, Fipa and Yoruba, there is evidence of 
demarcation between their various sub -groups, but little proof of the existence of clear 
divisions between them and other ethnic groups. This supports the idea that self - 
conscious ethnic identity was rare in pre -colonial Africa. Where Yoruba polities met 
Dahomey territory, there was a zone rather than a line of contact (Person, 1972: 22). 
While many ethnicities may not have thought of themselves as being a single cohesive 
ethnic group, commonly held belief structures encouraged the adoption of similar 
political structures, and therefore groups with close ties could more easily adopt the 
same methods of dividing political space. One of the few examples of a boundary line 
being employed between different ethnic groups, is that between the Maasai and the 
Kikuyu. Some stepping stones across the Nyrobi stream formed the traditional 
boundary between the two groups (Tunstall, 1999). This raises the question as to 
whether both groups had equal access to the stones. 
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While there is no single traditional African method of dividing polities, it is also true 
that the norms associated with political space in the West cannot be transferred to 
pre -colonial Africa. Even the two concepts of investing sovereignty in people and 
territory can be employed simultaneously in the most unexpected ways. The Gogo of 
central Tanzania evolved a linear grid system, dividing their subcheftainships (yisi) by 
definite boundaries (mbeyu) (Rigby, 1971: 395 -8). Despite the boundaries, the 
population moved from one area to another where they had kinship links or could 
prove them, and there was no tradition of fixed settlements. At the same time, there 
was no land inheritance, which would normally be expected to be associated with the 
linear boundary system. From a western standpoint, it is difficult to marry fixed 
territorial entities with transient populations; Rigby defines political association in this 
case in terms of "ritual affiliation" (Rigby, 1971: 399). 
The lack of written and other sources has led to some misunderstandings. It has 
been written that the Somali, for example, cut marks in the bark of trees to divide the 
fixed territories of various clans (Lewis, 1955: 43), while other writers have cited the 
Somali as the supreme example of flexible territorial control. Prescott, for example, 
states that as their herds grew or declined, so the area of pasturage and therefore polity 
grew or declined (Prescott, 1965: 45 -6). The truth probably lies somewhere in- 
between, and the confusion may stem from the misuse of western concepts in an alien 
situation. Somali clans may well have reduced their territorial range in times of 
difficulty, but his does not mean that they would welcome the intrusion of another 
group into territory that they had traditionally used as pasturage. It is also important 
not to draw western associations from foreign words. As was discussed in the first 
chapter, the English word border is loaded with negative divisive connotations. The 
Swahili word for boundary, mpaka, also means 'until' and is much more positive. It 
indicates something that reaches out or goes as far as a set point. Where Africans did 
adopt the idea of a boundary of exclusion, this was often a boundary between order 
and disorder, along the Chinese model, rather than between separate polities. The 
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Oromo states of the Horn of Africa, for example, were bounded by the rnoga, an 
uncultivated strip which was inhabited by brigands who were encouraged by the 
Oromo rulers to attack common enemies and recapture escaped slaves (Huntingford, 
1955: 116). 
Four major differences between African and European notions of political space 
have been highlighted by Nugent (Nugent, 1996: 53 -6) and these shall be considered in 
turn. Firstly, whereas European sovereignties bordered upon each other, African 
centralised polities were normally separated by a sea of unruled territories and various 
decentralised polities. This notion is certainly valid. Many centralised states were 
surrounded by a series of client states, which existed within a relationship of 
interdependence with the core entity (Kopytoff, 1987: 3). Notable examples are the 
Nuer of the Sudan and the Tiv of Nigeria.2 The next difference to be considered, is 
that whilst European boundaries were fixed, African boundaries were fairly fluid. 
However, the condition of African boundaries varied widely; a variety of fixed African 
boundaries have already been referred to, while many were indeed highly fluid. Also, 
during the latter half of the Nineteenth Century, European boundaries were only fixed 
in between periods of change, with boundary alterations being made in waves, usually 
following military conflict or as the result of unification. However, it is valid to state 
that the vast majority of Europeans knew where their local borders were. 
The third distinction is that whereas Europe sees a broad link between states and 
peoples, Africa had very few polities that could claim to be nation -states. This meant 
that the loyalty of a people to a state was not fixed; people moved in and out of a 
polity's territory without feeling any sort of allegiance to the central authority. 
However, although the term 'nation- state' can be applied to many European states, it is 
2 See E.E. Evans -Pritchard, The Nuer (London: Clarendon Press, 1940) and Paul 
Bohannan, The Migration and Expansion of the Tiv, Africa 24: 2 -16, both quoted in 
Kopytoff, 1989: 3. 
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not applicable to the USA or to much of the rest of the western world. This 
proposition therefore requires some modification. The West certainly sees the 
alignment of state and people as being favourable, so that even where it does not exist, 
such as in the melting pot of the United States, the creation of a national identity to 
cement state cohesion is seen as advisable. This was certainly not a general 
characteristic of African polities. Indeed, it can also be argued that many African 
societies, such as the Gogo were not states at all, because of their lack of a central 
authority. Many writers, such as Isichei (Isichei, 1997: Chl) and Asiwaju (Asiwaju, 
1983: 44) strongly disagree with the division of African groups into states and stateless 
societies. They argue that such a distinction implies some inferiority on the part of 
African polities. It must be admitted, however, that the flexible nature of many African 
polities marks them out as being different to the bounded western European states of 
the same period. It does not therefore seem unfair to use the broader term polity when 
discussing most pre -colonial African political units. 
Some African academics have described the Africa of 1880 as being composed of 
states and polities that were fully sovereign (Boahen, 1987: 1). Yet they often 
indirectly acknowledge that the territorial awareness of these sovereign states was not 
as great as that of European states and colonies. The political map of Africa in 1880 in 
African Perspectives on Africa, by Boahen is typical of many. On it, African states are 
only circled with a dotted line, in order to emphasize the inaccuracy of the polities' 
borders. The European colonies of the time, however, are represented by solid shapes 
with definite border lines and are shaded in (Boahen, 1987: 3). This is surely an 
indication of the indefinite extent of many African states, but it certainly does not 
indicate that societies with states are somehow worth more those without. 
The final difference between western and African concepts of political space listed 
by Nugent, is the western expectation that sovereignty should be as strong at the edges 
of a state's territory as it is at the centre. In Africa, there was usually a great difference 
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between power at the centre and in the provinces. While it may overstate the case to 
argue, as Herbst does, that few Africans had allegiance to any institution larger than 
the village (Herbst, 1989: 679), communication difficulties did restrict the level of 
internal sovereignty. Large polities tended to operate on a basis of devolved power, 
with authority divided by region rather than according to field of government. For 
instance, the Fipa had one overall chief, with several minor chiefs controlling the 
various regions of his kingdom, each dealing with relevant domestic and foreign affairs 
(Willis, 1968). The West had used similar political structures at one time, but modern 
western ideas of government are very different, involving the centralisation of power, 
which is then divided into national ministries. This requires precise knowledge of a 
polity's extent, and was enabled by technology, such as the telegraph, telephone and 
the railways. African polities did not have this option. However, internal sovereignty 
was not uniform in Europe at the time of partition, and even today, there is a great 
difference between the power exerted in Milan and in Sicily, for example. Nugent also 
mentions the idea of shared sovereignty in Africa, and gives the example of a border 
town between the Oyo kingdom and Ijesha, where the chief was appointed alternately 
by rulers of these two states (Nugent, 1996: 56). This is certainly not incompatible 
with western practice. Andorra, for example, is ruled jointly by the French president 
and a Spanish bishop. 
Another difference between European and pre -colonial African concepts of political 
space can be added to this list. The West considers it necessary for the cohesion of a 
political entity, that there is a state monopoly of military power. This was often not the 
case in pre -colonial African states, where the king may have vassals or even vassal 
states under him, each with their own military force and the will to use it independently 
(Kopytoff, 1989). The Ekie kings maintained power through the use of a 
core -periphery arrangement. They personally controlled the core of the state, whilst 
vassal rulers used their independent armies to control peripheral regions, although in 
these out -lying districts the people were subjugated rather than governed (Fairley, 
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1989: 93). Supra -tribal units such as the Ngoni kingdoms or Mirambo's empire were 
created through military power and tended to last only until the death of the founder. 
However, this difference is only valid with regard to modern western states. The 
pattern of subject vassal and military states fits western Europe very well for much of 
the Middle Ages. It also applies to much of the rest of the pre -colonial world. Solomon 
portrays the use of this model in Indochina and, highlights the importance of the core 
territory over the peripheral provinces (Solomon, 1969: 20 -23). 
Indeed, it is not difficult to identify many similarities between western and African 
concepts of political space; similarities which indicate that the perceptions of political 
space throughout the world may not be so very different. Apart from the limited 
African use of defined boundaries, the origins of the development of polities in both 
regions are mainly economic. The modern western concept of political space was 
largely arrived at through the concept of economic space, the industrial revolution and 
the development of the nation -state. This was reinforced culturally by language 
development and the growth of national identities. Pre -colonial African states were 
also based on economics and trade, with common links being reinforced by culture. 
The early Omani sea -based empire finds a parallel in the Freisan culture of the North 
Sea, and at its peak possibly bears comparison with the Hanseatic League.3 The main 
differences were the longevity and stability of European polities in comparison with 
those of Africa. Geopolitics could create cross -border political linkages at least as 
effectively in Africa as in Europe. The Haya of north -west Tanganyika had no 
centralised kingdoms, so Buganda and Rwanda exploited this by turning the Haya 
kingdoms into satellite states (Temu, 1979: 108). For example, Kiziba became a client 
state of Buganda in the 1870s.4 It appealed to Buganda for help but received none, 
while Karagwe alternated between Buganda and Rwanda. The Germans also initially 
3 The difficulties inherent in assessing territorial awareness in sea -based empires would 
be worth a thesis on its own. 
4 In 1891, Kiziba became the first Haya kingdom to resist the Germans. 
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used a system of client states to bring the area under German rule, so African and 
European political methods were not so very different. 
The various pre -colonial African boundaries and frontiers were generally marked by 
their flexibility through migrations, nomadic pastoralism, trade and wars, indeed many 
of the same mechanisms as in Europe. Major upheavals such as the Fulani jihads and 
the Ngoni wars brought about the establishment of new polities or the major expansion 
of existing ones (Asiwaju, 1983: 48), in much the same way as successive European 
wars toyed with the fate of Belgium and Poland, and led either to the expansion or 
contraction of Germany and France. There are also parallels to be drawn between the 
stateless Kurds and the Igbo, whilst the Cattle Fulani of West Africa have always 
straddled several polities in a similar way to the Lapps of the far north of Europe 
(Asiwaju, 1985: 237 -8). The main difference is that the concept of linear boundaries 
was imposed upon the Lapps many years before their African counterparts were 
partitioned. 
This section has hopefully established several points. Firstly, that the political 
landscape of pre -colonial Africa was often fluid, with the division of political space 
determined by a variety of sophisticated means. Secondly, that while linear boundaries 
were not unknown in pre -colonial Africa, the western system of boundaries delimiting 
territories in their entirety was something new. These two points demonstrate one of 
the essential effects of colonialism: that a revolutionary change was brought about 
when the flexible and piecemeal pattern of pre -colonial African states and ethnicities 
was overlaid with a rigid, determined system of colonies and colonial boundaries. 
Colonialism certainly was successful in imposing the western system of political space 
upon Africa. How this was achieved in practice will be discussed in the next section. 
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SECTION TWO: THE PRACTICE 
The Upheaval of the early years 
In the previous chapter, it was demonstrated that the original partition of East 
Africa was brought about by European strength and competition for colonies and by 
the relative weakness of African opposition. Although German East Africa suffered 
instability and internal warfare until 1907, the actual implementation of the boundaries 
had begun in the 1890s. Partly in an attempt stamp their authority upon the colony, and 
partly in an effort to extend their territory where matters remained to be resolved, 
German officials made great efforts to impress upon African political leaders in 
borderland areas, that they were now living in German territory. 
With the British authorities making similar efforts in their new colonies in the 
region, it became apparent to many African groups that the boundaries passed through 
the middle of their territory. As African methods of dividing political space were rarely 
as divisive as those in the West, the difficulties surrounding such division may not have 
been immediately apparent. In addition, German forces were still in the process of 
campaigning against 'disloyal' tribes, and so African leaders were not in the best 
position to negotiate. It was not until the British take -over of Tanganyika, when 
colonial rule in a peaceful sense become more apparent, that African leaders began to 
attempt to influence the boundary arrangements. This section seeks to examine the 
interaction between African polities and the colonial boundaries: how the boundaries 
affected them and how they affected the boundaries. The colonial perception of the 
problem of divided groups will be considered before several case -studies are analysed. 
Before beginning to assess the political impact of the boundaries, it is worth 
considering the political map on the eve of the European colonial invasion. As a result 
of the fluid nature of polities in the region, it is impossible to provide an accurate 
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snapshot picture of East Africa in the Nineteenth Century. It would be useful however, 
to indicate the types of polities which were operating in the future borderlands. At the 
coast, the Zanzibari Swahili were the dominant group. As was explained in the 
previous chapter, the Zanzibar empire was primarily an economic entity, with a core of 
political control at its heart. Territorial control over stretches of the coast was strong, 
while the Blood Red flag of the Sultan continued to fly as far inland as the Great 
Lakes. Zanzibari sovereignty often overlapped with that of other polities in the interior, 
particularly with that of the stateless Nyamwezi, who dominated much of the interior. 
The relationship between the Swahili and the various Nyamwezi groups was very much 
built upon trading links. At various times during the Nineteenth Century, the 
Nyamwezi were gathered together under a succession of military leaders into a Greater 
Unyamwezi, which stretched as far as Lake Tanganyika and up to the modern 
boundaries with Rwanda and Burundi. The extent of their sovereignty and the level of 
cohesion within the group fluctuated according to the personal and military power of 
their leaders. For much of the time, there was no overall leader of the Nyamwezi and 
so no polity of Unyamwezi. 
In the north- western borderlands of the future Tanganyika, the situation was very 
different. The polities of Buganda, Burundi and Rwanda were all strong centralised 
polities, while the smaller neighbouring Haya groups within the boundaries of the 
future territory exhibited far less cohesion. However, because many of the leaders of 
these smaller groups were ethnically related to the Baganda and Batutsi chiefs and 
kings, there was a large amount of interference in each other's affairs. As was 
examined in the previous section, the Haya states of Kiziba and Karagwe became client 
states at various times of Buganda and Rwanda (Temu, 1979: 108). Such 
arrangements were generally temporary and many of the smaller entities regularly 
switched allegiance. 
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In the north, the Maasai and other pastoralist groups had developed societies based 
upon cattle and cattle -raiding. With fluid political structures, based upon the strength 
of the various clans, the Maasai nevertheless recognised some linear boundaries.5 The 
state of the Maasai in the 1880s and 1890s will be examined in more depth below. To 
the east of the Maasai plains, in the upland regions around Kilimanjaro, the more 
sedentary Chagga had developed highly sophisticated systems of cultivation. Investing 
heavily in their land, they could be expected to be a more centralised, territorially 
aware group. Yet although they had a paramount chief, political ties and allegiances 
were very loose, and they exhibited few of the signs of a western -style state.6 
The far south, along the River Rovuma, was dominated by the Makonde, who 
rarely had political allegiance to any unit larger than the village. There is no evidence 
either of linear boundaries or other methods of dividing political space in the region, 
probably because land was plentiful. In much of the rest of the south, it is difficult to 
attempt any description of political structures. Since the 1840s the Ngoni had forced 
their way northwards in a series of conflicts associated with Zulu expansion in South 
Africa. The interior of the southern third of future Tanganyika was in a state of chaos 
as Ngoni incursions uprooted whole societies. Refugees from Ngoni attacks often took 
territory from other groups. The situation was just beginning to settle down when the 
first DOAG parties were making their way towards the Great Lakes.? 
One of the colonialists' greatest mistakes was to assume that the political map of 
East Africa had a regular or fixed pattern. If African polities had one common 
characteristic, it was that they were liable to change. Both the decades leading up to 
the original partition, and the changeover from German to British rule, were periods of 
5 For more on the Maasai see Berntsen, 1976: 1 -11. 
6 For a detailed study, see Stahl, 1964. 
7 For more information on the Makonde see Liebenow, 1981; for more on the Ngoni 
see Redmond, 1985. 
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great upheaval in East Africa. Warfare, disease, plagues of locusts and a series of other 
catastrophes struck the region, and none were more affected than the Maasai. 
Maasai expansion during the early and middle decades of the Nineteenth Century 
had been considerable, "displacing or incorporating other farming groups" 
(Homewood, 1996: 122 -3).8 Different branches of the Maasai - notably the Loita and 
Purko - began to compete with other groups and with each other for domination of the 
modern -day East African borderlands. This culminated in the Iloikop Wars which left 
the central Rift Valley grazing grounds in the hands of expansionist Maasai groups. By 
the early 1880s, however, the Maasai were already in trouble, and were gradually 
losing control of stock and grazing lands (Waller, 1976: 532), as the Kamba, Kikuyu 
and Kalenjin made inroads into Maasailand. 
This may have been a short-lived downturn in Maasai expansion, but the region as a 
whole was ripped apart by a combination of human and animal pathogens. Rinderpest 
entered sub -Saharan Africa in 1887 at Massawa9 (Scott, 1996: 204) and by late 1890 
the Maasai were raiding the coastal stock routes of East Africa to replenish their herds. 
They took cattle from their Kamba neighbours, but these had already been infected by 
cattle stolen near Lake Rudolf. Within months the Loitokitok herds had been wiped 
out, and several commentators estimate Maasai cattle losses at between ninety and 
ninety -five percent (Ford, 1971: 138 -9; Waller, 1976: 530). 
Problems were exacerbated by red locust attacks in 1893 and 1895 and the return 
of smallpox after an absence of perhaps twenty years (Coulson, 1982: 28). The lack of 
cattle turned pasture into tsetse infested woodland, while warfare between Maasai 
clans had weakened them overall and encouraged renewed opposition from their 
8 See Being Maasai- Ethnicity and Identity in East Africa, edited by Thomas Spear and 
Richard Waller (1993). 
9 With cattle bought in India for the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. 
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neighbours. The increased level of raiding helped further spread livestock disease, 
while famine and population movements helped to spread smallpox and other human 
diseases. This massive disaster is known as Emutai by the Maasai. 
It cannot be doubted that rinderpest aided colonialism. A British visitor to 
Maasailand in the 1890s wrote, "Powerful and warlike as the pastoral tribes are, their 
pride has been humbled and our progress facilitated by this awful visitation" (Reader, 
1997: 625). "The Maasai nation was so weakened that the British were able to extend 
their rule over the interior of Kenya without the risk of war" (Ofcansky, 1981: 32). 
Despite this, the Maasai were the only Kenyan group that made an agreement as a 
nation with the British government.10 When colonial administrators first ventured into 
Maasailand in the 1890s, they began to classify the Maasai into German and British 
Maasai. Some administrators optimistically believed that this division "will have less 
effect as time goes on, and the Masai gradually return,to their old homes as the process 
of recovery from the great rinderpest and small pox proceeds ".11 This was to 
underestimate the power of the boundary; and indeed most administrators were 
attempting to impose this division of the Maasai. 
It was difficult for the colonials to decide how much the scattered patchwork and 
ever -changing distribution of the Maasai throughout southern Kenya and northern 
Tanganyika was due to traditional distribution, recent developments or the scattering 
of the Maasai in the 1890s. Also, where the Maasai were increasing the size of their 
herds, it was impossible to determine whether they merely regaining their former 
numbers. The colonial policy of attributing particular resources to particular groups 
10 CO822 2000: 1, November 1961. Report entitled "Secretary of State's Visit to 
Kenya - November, 1961. The Maasai Problem." The pages of this file are poorly 
numbered. 
11 TNA: TS10298 /I: 3, 13th July 1927. Memorandum on Tanganyika -Kenya boundary 
problems by PC Mitchell of Northern Province, sent to the Chief Secretary at Dar es 
Salaam. 
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became important. "A harder -edged definition of Maasai identity emerged as 
boundaries became fixed and the question of who was or was not Maasai became for 
the first time an important determinant of right of access to scarce resources" 
(Homewood, 1996: 123). 
Both the Germans and the British tried to estimate the extent of Maasailand based 
on a snapshot picture - and a picture at a highly irregular time. In addition, seasonal 
migrations for pasturage and water vary over twenty years or more. Whether or not 
the Loita were present in one area in 1895 or 1916, did not determine whether it was 
their 'ancestral lands'. The subsequent dispersal of the Maasai came relatively soon 
after their expansion, so any concept of a natural Maasai homeland is misplaced. At the 
same time as the Maasai had been pushing southwards, the militarised Ngoni had 
advanced northwards into the region, forcing other groups to move on out of their 
previous territories. Simultaneously, Yao and Swahili slave traders and raiders, such as 
Tippu Tip, became so powerful that they developed semi- autonomous personal 
empires in the interior. Their power bases grew and declined, often in conjunction with 
their economic fortunes, and this in turn had an influence upon their local allies and 
enemies. 
In addition to all this, the German period was one of general social and economic 
upheaval. As Coulson writes, "Trade turned agriculturalists and craftsmen into porters; 
disease wiped out most of the cattle; and the fighting and turmoil between 1890 and 
1920 depopulated large areas of the country" (Coulson, 1982: 27). All this was topped 
by various wars with the Germans and the accompanying scorched -earth policy. The 
outcome of all this was massive loss of life. It is estimated that three- quarters of a 
million people died of famine between 1895 and 1899 alone, and as a result some 
Ngoni areas remain under -populated to this day (Coulson, 1982: 29 -31). Into this 
devastated landscape erupted the volcano of the Maji Maji rebellion. African political, 
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economic and cultural systems may have been affected by the boundaries, but they 
were affected by much else besides. 
Divided tribes? 
The debate over whether colonial boundaries split some African polities in two, or 
whether many of them divided themselves has already been discussed. The abaKuria on 
the Tanganyika -Kenya boundary provide an excellent example of confusion regarding 
'divided tribes'. Following the First World War, British administrators in the area 
believed the division of the tribe to have been a great mistake. H.C. Stiebel, the PC for 
Mwanza District complained in 1927 that the Tanganyika -Kenya border had been 
drawn, "without any consideration of ethnological or physical conditions. The result is 
that tribes are cut up and chaos in Administration is the result ".12 In particular, he 
notes that the abaKuria have been, "distinctly hurt by an alleged order given to their 
people on the Kenya side that in the event of trouble with Masai they were not to assist 
their brothers across the border." "They have been arbitrarily split up by the straight 
line boundary", leaving 12- 15,000 in Kenya and 40,000 in Tanganyika.i3 Stiebel, his 
successors and his DCs almost all wanted an exchange of territory with Kenya in order 
to reunite the abaKuria,14 but were prevented by Kenyan unwillingness to consider a 
change and Dar es Salaam's timidity in pursuing the matter. 
12 TNA: TS10588: 1 -2, 27th May 1927. Letter from the PC Mwanza, to the Chief 
Secretary at Dar es Salaam. 
13 TNA: TS10298: 61, 22nd July 1927. Letter from PC H.C. Stiebel, to the Chief 
Secretary at Dar es Salaam. 
14 TNA: TS10588: 8 -10, 28th June 1927. Memorandum from Acting PC Northern 
Province on Discussions at Longido. 
KNA: PC/NZA/3 /7: 92. Report entitled "Boundary South Kavirondo ", 1926. 
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This view was held despite the trouble which the abaKuria caused the British 
administrators. Internal abaKuria wars broke out intermittently in the 1920s and when 
not fighting amongst themselves, they fought with the Maasai (Kjerland, 1995: 160). 
The Kenyan DO for North Mara wrote in 1926 that it was easy for, "wrongdoers and 
those who are in debt [to] slip from one side of the border to the other "» In response 
to a Tanganyikan request for a boundary change, the same Kenyan DO wrote to his 
DC, that Tanganyika, "already has 2/3 of the troublemakers [abaKuria], why should 
they be so keen on administering the entire group ?" 16 Both the Kenyan and 
Tanganyikan governments forced non -abaKuria chiefs upon the various sub -groups in 
order to minimise the endemic stock theft along the border (Kjerland, 1995: 95). 
Despite all this, British administrators came to the area, saw abaKuria on both sides 
of the 1902 boundary, and because of the assumption that African 'tribes' had 'natural 
homelands', assumed that the boundary had cut through them. AbaKuria territory was 
assumed to lie between the Migori and Kuja rivers as these were the "natural 
boundaries" to the area.17 However, a recent thesis by Kjerland, based on extensive 
fieldwork with the abaKuria demonstrates that this was not the case (Kjerland, 1995). 
The abaKuria had, "divided themselves by moving across the border after it was 
established in 1902" (Kjerland, 1995: 92). Although Kjerland is not able to be certain 
why some sections of the abaKuria crossed from Kenya into Tanganyika, it may have 
been a case of taking advantage of the border by avoiding taxes and such like. 
A similar problem exists with the Luo, who are neighbours of the abaKuria. They 
began to migrate from BEA to DOA at around the time of the partition, but the exact 
15 KNA: PC/NZA/3 /7, 28th July 1926. Report entitled "Early Days in Kisii ". 
16 KNA: PC/NZA/3 /7, 28th July 1926. See Note 15. 
17 KNA: PC/NZA/3 /7, 28th July 1926. See note 13. 
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date cannot be ascertained.18 Whether they were divided by the boundary or divided 
themselves across the boundary is open to debate. 
Even where migrations had not recently occurred, the colonial authorities had 
difficulty in determining the political make -up of many areas. The first degree south 
boundary between Tanganyika and Uganda left a considerable area of Buganda and 
Ankole in the German sphere. "The Buganda here continued to look to their chiefs in 
the British sphere, and Baganda rebels found it a congenial place to flee to; they could 
be among their own people but under the umbrella of German protection. British 
officials in Uganda emphasized the Kagera line as the natural frontier for southern 
Uganda as it would greatly assist in solidifying the 'Waganda', in checking an illicit 
trade in slaves, arms and powder and in halting German encroachment into British 
territory" (Beachey, 1996: 292). The Germans, for their part did not govern the 
Kagera Salient as part of their Buziba district, but constantly referred to it as German 
Buddu; Buddu was the name for the territory to the north, within British Uganda 
(Thomas, 1951: 78). 
The complex of relationships, including client states and breakaway states, which 
existed around the Kagera, posed problems for the British, and these problems were 
exacerbated by the fact that the each African polity had a different perception of the 
political breakdown of the area. In attempting to adjust the Uganda- Tanganyika 
boundary, Ugandan officials attempted to determine the southernmost extent of 
Buganda. The Baganda claimed the Kagera Salient and much of the territory to the 
south of the river to be within their jurisdiction.i9 All the African groups now lying in 
Tanganyikan territory disagreed with this. In addition, the area was claimed by the old 
18 CO822/1297, 17th March 1958. Report entitled "Enquiries concerning the Jatus 
Tribe Tanganyika" by Mr Mathieson. 
19 TNA: TS13022: 211 -16, 14th January 1926. Letter from W.F. Gowers, Govenor of 
Uganda to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
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Kingdom of Ankole, which lay to the west. The Governor of Uganda, W.F. Gowers, 
came to the conclusion that the Baganda exercised jurisdiction and collected taxes 
from the Babumbiro within the Salient, but they only levied tribute on the Buhaya and 
Baziba to the south. It is difficult to decide which is true. Undoubtedly Buganda 
exercised some control over territories to the south of the Kagera: Karagwe, Kiziba, 
Buzinga, Serembe, Usui and others - the great problem is that this relationship was not 
fixed (Thomas 1951: 47 -50). 
In support of the employment of the Kagera as the boundary, it should be 
mentioned that the name 'Kagera' means 'the divider',20 but in reality, the British had 
been seeking a pre -colonial linear boundary where none existed. African political 
relationships were more complicated than that. Patterns of responsibility, allegiance 
and domination changed over time, and any particular chiefs view of the 'normal state 
of affairs' could be expected to differ from his neighbours perception. Kopytoffs vision 
of the fluid African political scene certainly seems to ring true in the Uganda -DOA 
borderlands (Kopytoff, 1987). Whatever the rights and wrongs of the issue, the case 
demonstrates that wherever the colonial boundaries were placed, they were going to 
cause resentment and partition. In most areas, Africans did not have a uniform picture 
of the political landscape of Africa or of their locality. 
The Makonde pose a similar yet more simple problem, in determining whether or 
not the Tanganyikan Makonde and the Mozambican Maconde were one group prior to 
partition. In common with many commentators, Brownlie (Brownlie, 1971: 360) 
writes that they were one group, living alongside and bound together by the River 
Rovuma. They were then bisected by the arbitrary political boundary which was 
created along the river, yet in the same year as Brownlie was writing, Berry considered 
20 WO181/252: 2, 28th October 1924. Letter from Maury to Colonial Winterbottom, 
concerning boundary delimitation on the British -Congolese boundary. 
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them to be two separate groups (Berry, 1971: 113 and 168). Throughout the colonial 
period, there had been constant interaction, and even if they were two separate 
peoples, such a situation is bound to lead to intermarriage and the building up of 
relationships on a personal scale.21 Indeed, most conflict between the two groups 
centred upon jealousy caused by intermarriage.22 If it is impossible to determine the 
difference today, it is difficult to blame the colonial authorities for any mistakes they 
may have made. In the most in -depth study of the question, Liebenow writes that 
differences in colonial rule emphasized the differences between the two halves of the 
Makonde, but did not create them. They had been different in pre -colonial times 
(Liebenow, 1971: 34), and in the absence of further evidence, it seems best to give 
Liebenow the benefit of the doubt. 
British policy 
The British policy of Indirect Rule influenced colonial perceptions of divided 
African polities. The basic tenet of Indirect Rule was to channel rule through existing 
'native authorities', but these were not to be adopted lock, stock and barrel, and the 
government encouraged the fusion of native authorities where they were small and /or 
decentralised. The success of such attempts varied from the Bahaya, who embraced it 
with success (Hatch, 1972: 92) to the Gogo, who rejected it outright. It is interesting 
to note that the British ended up by adopting the pre -colonial yisi (borders) of the 
Gogo which were commented upon earlier (Rigby, 1971: 396), so that pre -colonial 
African methods of dividing political space were credited with some validity. Apart 
from inventing new tribes and the gross inaccuracy of identifying each African by his 
21 RKA: R1001 627: 89 -91, 8th October 1901. Letter from Jose Maria Martins Pereira 
of the Portguese Government, to the Governor of Deutsch Ostafrika. 
22 RKA: R1001 627: 177, 2nd February 1904. Report entitled "Portugisische 
Grenzsache; Mavia Einfall ", by DO Ewerbeck and sent to the Imperial Government at 
Dar es Salaam. 
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tribe, the disorder of the colonial changeover meant that the 'legitimate chief could 
often not be found. Charles Dundas, who occupied various roles in the Tanganyikan 
administration and who was a keen student of African cultures and languages, wrote 
that, "where we did not find such authorities we created them. In tribal areas in which 
there were no conspicuous leaders, almost any man who brought himself to notice or 
made himself useful might become a chief' (Dundas, 1955).23 For example, the man 
who became Paramount Chief of the Kikuyo had been the donkey boy of an 
administrator. Indirect Rule preserved, or in some cases invented, African structures 
and traditions in so far as they did not offend European ideas or obstruct colonial 
schemes for development. It was in this context that British administrators attempted 
to settle delicate and complicated matters pertaining to African political structures in 
the borderlands of Tanganyika. 
The Tanganyikan -Northern Rhodesian borderlands were populated by various small 
and intermingled groups which the British attempted to bring together in a series of 
Tribal Native Authorities. For example, the Nyakyusa occupied a mere handful of 
villages during the Nineteenth Century, but the British established a council of chiefs to 
rule a number of groups in the area in 1933 and the name Nyakyusa was applied as a 
collective name. Many of these groups had links across the border in Northern 
Rhodesia, and therefore the Nyakyusa are often perceived as being a divided group 
(Iliffe, 1979: 332). Indeed, African groups were cut through along the entire length of 
this boundary,24 and particularly so in Rungwe, Mbeya and Ufipa districts. 
The original delimitation and demarcation of the DOA -BCA boundary had allowed 
for rectifications in accordance with local requirements (McEwen, 1971: 223 -4). In 
1898, a demarcation party led by Captain Close recognised a series of anomalies along 
23 Quoted in Hatch, 1972: 90; no page reference is given. 
24 TNA: TS34050: 8, 3rd June 1947. Memorandum by the Chief Secretary, Dar es 
Salaam. 
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the boundary, but were more concerned with mistakes in the location of pillars 
(McEwen, 1971: 223) than with the social impact of the demarcation. Close made a 
detailed study of the African groups and their location along the boundary, and 
discovered, for instance, that the Wanamwanga under Chief Mfumu Mkoma had been 
divided, although he was little concerned with the division of groups. He wrote that it 
was too difficult to determine exact tribal divisions: "Villages of alien tribes are found 
in many places, and villages of mixed tribes have sprung up" (McEwen, 1971: 224). 
Villages of mixed peoples were probably not as unusual as Close assumed. Additional 
demarcation work ended in 1937, but it was more concerned with informing Africans 
where the boundary lay then with rectifying any local problems (McEwen, 1971: 225). 
Although there has been no study of the pre -colonial map of this region, the archives 
are full of references to the division of African groups in the area.25 
Chief Mkoma - probably a descendant of Chief Mfumu Mkoma - requested a 
readjustment of the boundary in 1946 26 because his people had been split in two. One 
part was ruled by his niece, Waitwika, in Isoka District of Northern Rhodesia,27 while 
he ruled the remainder in Mbeya District of Tanganyika. Some of Waitwika's people 
had crossed the River Mpemba into Tanganyika within days of the Tanganyika -North 
Rhodesia Boundary Commission of 1932,28 precisely so they could come under the 
sovereignty of Mkoma.29 The Wanamwanga lived three or four miles over the border 
and such a claim may have been supportable. However, since Mkoma's claim stretched 
forty miles south of the boundary, a change was very unlikely, and both the 
25 Although there are several socio- economic studies of the area; notably Konter, 1974 
and Charsley, 1969. 
26 TNA: TS34050: 4 -6, 21st June 1946. Internal memo, no correspondents given. 
27 TNA: TS34050: 32, 4th November 1949. Memorandum by the Chief Secretary, Dar 
es Salaam. 
28 CO691/131/9: 19, 29th November 1933. Letter from Government House, 
Livingstone, Northern Rhodesia. Correspondents unknown. 
29 CO691/131/9: 40, 31st July 1932. Report "Suggestions for the Amendment of the 
Boundary", by an unknown Assistant Surveyor. 
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Tanganyikan PC, Oldaker, and the North Rhodesian Governor, Battershill, turned him 
down.30 Mkoma then surprised the authorities by appealing the United Nations under 
the terms of the mandate,31 although this matter was not relevant to mandatory status. 
The mandate stated that the territory had to be administered in the interests of "the 
material and moral well -being and the social progress of its inhabitants" (Harlow and 
Chilver, 1965: 692 -4) but there was no reference to maintaining or not infringing upon 
existing African structures.32 At that time development equalled development along 
western lines in the minds of many; a situation which is not so very different today. 
According to Howe, the PC of Kasama, Mkoma made the claim because the Native 
Authority of Isoka had been reorganised, thereby reducing Mkoma's power.33 A 
colonial official wrote that the Wanyamwanga, the Wiwa, "the Mixed Tribes of the 
Luangwa Valley and those of the area bordering Tanganyika and Nyasaland.... have 
spontaneously and unanimously formed a Superior Native Authority" with all the 
groups in the area having equal status.34 Mkoma therefore lost prestige in being made 
a coequal instead of paramount chief, and responded by vastly exaggerating the extent 
of his influence across the border. He had previously led the British to believe that he 
had been the Paramount Chief in the area, and so perhaps he was also making himself 
out to be more than he really was within Tanganyika itself.35 It is difficult to determine 
whether Mkoma had exaggerated his status, or whether the other chiefs in the area had 
taken the opportunity brought about by Indirect Rule to reduce his power. It is also 
difficult to know whether to take this an example of an African leader responding to 
30 TNA: Dist. Acc.77: 5/6: 8, 31st March 1933. Letter from Acting PC J.L. Berne, to 
the Land Officer, Dar es Salaam. 
31 TNA: TS34050: 32, 4th November 1949. Memorandum by the Chief Secretary, Dar 
es Salaam. 
32 The requirement for the colonial mandatory to develop the territory could have been 
taken as encouragement to change African political authorities. 
33 TNA: TS34050: 41, 22nd February 1950. Letter from unnamed PC, to the Chief 
Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
34 TNA: TS34050: 41. See note 29. 
35 TNA: TS34050: 41A. See note 29. 
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the opportunities provided by Indirect Rule, or whether it was just another act in the 
fluctuating fortunes of Mkoma, along the lines of traditional African pre- colonial 
politics. 
The United Nations did not back Mkoma's claim, but Oldaker reached an 
arrangement with the North Rhodesian administration whereby Mkoma could visit his 
people in the neighbouring territory, "provided that he did not interfere actively in her 
administration "36 and that he only exercised influence over the true Wanyamwanga. 
One of the main reasons for the consolidation of African ethnicities was to enable 
the administration of tax collection. Several discrepancies in borderlands were hidden, 
as a result of assessing the number of people liable for tax to each Native Authority. In 
1952, four to five bomas of Wakwavi people with 4 -5,000 cattle at Katemba, originally 
believed to be in Lushoto district, were discovered to be five miles inside the Kenyan 
border.37 The reason for this ignorance was that the people of Katemba paid tax to the 
Lushoto Sub Chief of Mbaramo, as they recognised him as their Native Authority. The 
Tanganyikan and Kenyan governments had therefore always assumed that the people 
of this remote area lay inside Tanganyika. African political arrangements were 
occasionally able to survive partition, whether through cases such as that of the 
Wakwavi, or because of arrangements allowing cross -border access by chiefs to their 
people. 
36 TNA: TS34050: 32, 4th November 1949. Memorandum by the Chief Secretary, Dar 
es Salaam. 
37 TNA: Acc.4: 723 /III: 364, April 1952. "Note on Impounding, in March 1952, of 
500 cattle at Katemboi by DC Voi." No author given. 
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Colonial considerations 
Colonial recognition of the complexity and difficulties posed by the African political 
and ethnic make -up of Tanganyika, and by the western -style linear boundaries, 
gradually improved with time. During the early years of colonial rule in East Africa, 
appreciation of the level of difficulty posed to African groups by the boundaries was 
limited. A few rare examples are provided by missionaries operating in the south of the 
territory. J.W. Moir, who preached near the Nyasaland border, objected to the Anglo- 
German boundary along the 'Stevenson Road' from Lake Nyasa to Lake Tanganyika: 
"The road runs right through the very heart of several tribes, and it would be absurd to 
allow one half of such a tribe, because situated south of the road, to be British, while 
compelling the other half to submit to the Germans ".38 At this stage of boundary 
determination, both the British and Germans had other priorities. 
The Germans were prepared to investigate and accept the extent of indigenous 
African polities, but only when it benefited them. When the British complained about 
German incursions into Uganda in 1900, Governor von Liebert replied that he believed 
that British territory only encompassed that of Buganda, and therefore did not reach 
the first degree of latitude south, as had previously been agreed as the interim 
border.39 At the same time, however, there were a few examples of British concern for 
the division of African groups without apparent ulterior motive. Following the 
delimitation of the DOA -BEA boundary, some British officials wanted to change the 
boundary line to follow the River Umba near the coast, and as far inland as the 
Sorgoroto Hills. Salisbury consulted Mr Smith of the recent boundary commission4° 
38 FO: Confidential Print 881/6146: 42, 20th June 1890. African Lakes Company to 
the Marquis of Salisbury. 
39 RKA: R1001 625: 164, 9th July 1900. Letter from DO Ebert, to the German 
Governor, Dar es Salaam. 
4o RKA: R1001 575: 46, 9th April 1897. Letter from the British Embassy in Berlin, to 
Baron von Marschall. 
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and Smith advised that under present arrangements, villages had been cut off from their 
plantations, but free access was allowed on a daily basis. Should the boundary follow 
the river, then people would be cut off from their plantations. Salisbury took Smith's 
view on board and the original boundary agreement stood. That matters could be 
referred to the highest authority and be determined along the lines of preserving 
existing African systems, shows that disruption of African arrangements was a criterion 
in local border agreements. However, in this particular case there were no other 
pressing colonial considerations, and that is the real reason behind Salisbury's decision. 
The Kenya- Tanganyika border was another area of divided African groups, but 
even when 'African' considerations were valued highly, it was sometimes impossible to 
determine which African interests were of paramount importance. A Tanganyikan 
government report on boundary problems stated that they had "favoured tribes" 
throughout the territory, but that along the Kenyan border, two of these tribes had 
conflicting claims.41 The Chagga were admired for their economic skills, but the 
Maasai were the "pride of the plains." The dispute occurred around the farm at 01 
Molog, where Maasai from Kenya and Chagga groups claimed grazing land as their 
own. The government's decision was that the Maasai could stay for a time because of 
drought across the border in Kenya, but that the area should gradually be taken over 
by Chagga overspill. This would also help to discourage border crossing in the long 
term. 
41 TNA: TS 10298/I: 15, 30th June 1927. "Memorandum of Discussions at Longido on 
27th, 28th and 29/6/27 on Kenya- Tanganyika Masai Boundary Question." 
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Case -studies in the Borderlands 
The Chagga are very rarely mentioned in the secondary literature when it comes to 
divided groups, although they were very much partitioned by the Kenya- Tanganyika 
boundary. The 1888 agreement states that the boundary "passes directly through the 
territories of Taveta and Chagga ",42 and the 1890 treaty confirmed the line. The bulk 
of Chaggaland was placed in Tanganyika, but Wachagga were left at Lasit and in the 
Rombo, now in Kenyan Maasailand, and also around Taveta. The Chagga Council 
appealed for a change in the boundary during the 1950s, but the matter was not 
seriously investigated by the colonial authorities, because the Chagga had not 
previously complained and because the German records contained no references to the 
matter.43 However, an investigation by the Kenyan authorities revealed that Mr 
Jeremiah of Taveta, a member of the Kenyan Legislative Assembly, was in fact a 
Chagga.44 In 1953 the people of Taveta sent a petition to the Royal Commission on 
Lands and Population, requesting to be rejoined to Chaggaland: they believed this to 
be easy because Britain ruled both Kenya and Tanganyika. Investigations concluded 
that they had continued to use grazing and grass- cutting rights to the east of the 
present boundary, at least until the Boundary Commission of 1906 had constructed 
boundary pillars.45 They had now indeed lost access to that land. However, because of 
the longevity of the division, the two governments concluded that it was better for the 
boundary to maintain a more divisive nature, and the Chagga request was rejected. 
42 RKA: R1001 633: 65, 19th May 1909. Notes on the Delineation of the Deutsch 
Ostafrika- Uganda boundary, by the Boundary Commissioners. 
43 TNA: Acc.69: 7 /III: 62, 65, 2nd April 1955. Letter from the DC Moshi, to the 
Member for Local Government, the Secretariat, Dar es Salaam. 
44 TNA: Acc.69: 7/II1: 62a, 2nd April 1955. This is from a four page unnumbered, 
untitled report placed between pages 62 and 63 in the file. It is attached to the letter in 
Note 39. 
45 TNA: Acc.69: 7/III: 62d. See Note 40. 
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The Maasai proved a far more difficult case for the colonial governments to deal 
with. The Maasai as pastoralists will be considered in depth in Part Four, but it is 
worthwhile considering them here from a political point of view. Whether or not the 
Maasai were organised politically to any great extent was a matter of some debate for 
the colonial administrators. The instigator of Indirect Rule as an official policy in 
Tanganyika, Governor Cameron, considered in 1926 that the division of the Maasai 
between Kenya and Tanganyika was not as much of a problem as other divided groups 
in Africa, because the Maasai were, "a tribe of pure nomads, occupying and owning no 
one particular area of land" and "they were not even under one single tribal authority - 
this essential to tribal cohesion was lacking ".46 The PC of Northern Province, P.E. 
Mitchell, agreed with Cameron: "it would be very desirable that the Masai should sort 
themselves out by sub -tribes, so that homogenous units remained in each territory".47 
The view that the Maasai were not already politically organised, contradicts sharply the 
research carried out by Alan Jacobs which was referred to earlier in this chapter 
(Jacobs, 1963: 38). 
During the 1930s, it became apparent that the Maasai were the most important and 
problematic example of a divided group in East Africa. Indeed, several administrators 
came to believe that they were the only example. For instance, W.J. Lloyd, the Acting 
DO of Maasai District, wrote that, "the situation is unique in that we have a tribe 
which has been divided by an imaginary line ".48 Such exaggeration developed out of 
the almost unceasing trouble which DOs faced from Maasai cross border movements. 
Most of this trouble cannot be termed political in nature, but the Europeans came to 
46 CO691/86/6: 16, 11th June 1926. Report entitled "Masai Questions ". No author or 
correspondents given. 
47 CO691/100/21: 22nd November 1927. "Note of the conversation at the Office of 
the Chief Native Commissioner, Nairobi, 22nd November 1927 - l0am" by P.E. 
Mitchell, Acting PC for Northern Province. 
48 TNA: TS10298/II: 479, 24th January 1935. Letter from W.J. Lloyd, DO for Masai 
District, to the PC for Northern Province. 
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recognise that the Maasai were organised into various subsections, and that the 
majority of these subgroups crossed the boundary in order to graze or water their 
cattle. Many even lived across the boundary for several years at a time. The challenge 
for both Kenyan and Tanganyikan DOs was to try to identify which subgroups were 
mainly based in Kenya and which in Tanganyika, and to try to constrain them within 
these territories, thereby creating 'Kenyan Maasai' and 'Tanganyikan Maasai.' Another 
difficulty lay in determining the true range of the Maasai. This was an impossible task 
given the volatile situation prior to colonial rule which was discussed earlier. There 
was no clearly definable 'Maasailand' as recognised by the Maasai, but even the most 
limited concept of a Maasai homeland, placed it around the Kenya -Tanganyika 
boundary. 
Mitchell, the PC for Tanganyikan Maasailand, attempted to treat Maasai cross - 
border movement on a par with that of any other people, with no favours granted 
because of their pastoral lifestyle.49 This proved to be totally unworkable, as much 
because of the tiny number of colonial administrators in the area, as because of the 
activities of the Maasai. Maasai political, cultural and economic structures were closely 
intertwined, and were mainly based upon survival in a very difficult and changeable 
environment. Where the division of agricultural groups could mean having to find new 
farming land, grazing land and salt licks were not replaced so easily, and the pattern of 
rainfall could not be influenced by the boundary. Various local arrangements were 
made which will be considered in Part Four, but it was not until the early 1950s that 
attempts were made to negotiate boundary arrangements with the Maasai as a whole 
on a political basis. The Boundary Committee first met on the second of November 
1952, and consisted of Kenyan Maasai Chiefs, representatives of Tanganyikan Maasai 
Native Authorities, mainly from the Longido Council area, and Kenyan and 
49 TNA: TS 10298/I: 1 -16, 30th June 1927. "Memorandum of Discussions at Longido 
on 27th, 28th and 29/6/27 on Kenya- Tanganyika Masai Boundary Question ". 
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Tanganyikan DCs.50 By this time, however, veterinary restrictions had been agreed by 
the Maasai along the border, and this encouraged acceptance of the line as a political 
reality. There were now grounds for negotiation. 
The African political make -up of north -west Tanganyika also posed problems to the 
colonial governments; in large part because although the region contained areas of 
little centralised authority, the centralised polities across the boundary exercised some 
sway. The problem of Bugandan influence along the Kagera has already been referred 
to, and indeed the general political orientation of the region was towards Buganda. 
From the Fifteenth Century onwards, the Bito dynasties in modern Uganda gave rise to 
a number of Haya kingdoms in modern north -west Tanzania. The most important of 
these, Karagwe, survived until the 1890s when it was badly affected by the rinderpest 
outbreak and by an accompanying series of violent succession struggles (Austen, 1968: 
9 -10). Despite its downfall, political links between the area and Uganda were 
maintained. To the south, from about 1700, people from Ruanda and Burundi had 
migrated into the lands of western Tanzania, and had come to dominate the people of 
Buha, Uvinza and Ufipa (Daley, 1993: 10). In the north -west, Kasulu and Kigoma 
districts continued to be subject to Tutsi hegemony until well into the colonial period. 
When it became apparent that the German -Congo border would fall within this 
area, it was obvious that there would be problems in placing a boundary anywhere 
within the region. Dr Richard Kandt wrote in the Vossischen Zeitung in 1889 that, 
"The carving up of such a unified, organised kingdom as Rwanda contains in my 
opinion, the greatest dangers, should we think of actually exercising our rule in 
Rwanda" 51 However, in 1900, the German DC, Ebert, admitted that artificial 
boundaries in the north and north -west were unavoidable.52 
50 TNA: Acc.69: 7/III: 519, 9th November 1953. Letter from DC Masailand, to PC 
Northern Province. 
51 RKA: R1001 623: 80, 21st February 1889. The current author's translation. Kandt 
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In the event, the delimitation of boundaries in the north -west did not have a very 
great impact upon African polities because of the weakness of German administration 
in the region. Communications were poor and personnel too few to have much of an 
impact (Gwassa, 1969: 92), and an almost pure form of Indirect Rule was practised in 
Rwanda and Burundi, as the Tutsi monarchs of the two states were left in almost 
complete control. Tax collection and the recruitment of labour had not even begun by 
1914, but Germany had great plans for coffee cultivation and had decided to extend 
the central railway line into Rwanda (Koponen, 1994: 74). The First World War 
intervened and German rule in the north -west left only a slight impression. This lack of 
intervention together with the weakly implemented boundaries, enabled an easy 
dismemberment of DOA between Britain and Belgium in 1919. 
The original post -war partition of DOA led to the separation of the district of 
Kissaka from the Kingdom of Rwanda (McEwen, 1971: 154). The British had wanted 
to attach the district to Tanganyika, in order to enable the construction of the proposed 
Cape to Cairo railway through the territory. Following strong protests, apparently 
from the people of Kissaka, Great Britain agreed to a League of Nations request for 
the return of the district to Rwanda and therefore to Belgium on 31st August 1923 
(McEwen, 1971: 155). The chairman of the League of Nations' Permanent Mandates' 
Commission, Marguis Reodoli, argued that the border was "hardly justifiable from the 
point of view of the well -being, political order, stability, and economic development of 
an African community already well organized. "J3 The final transfer of 4,000 square 
is an interesting commentator on the period, but his knowledge of the location of 
African polities leaves a lot to be desired. For example, he places Uhehe in the Congo. 
52 RKA: R1001 625a: 148, 29th June 1900. Letter from Governor Eibert to the 
German Foreign Office. 
53 Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the 2nd Session, 14th Meeting, 9th 
August 1922, Annex 8: 72. See also Correspondence Regarding the Modification of 
the Boundary between British Mandated Territory and Belgian Mandated Territory in 
East Africa, Cmd 1974. 
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kilometres and half a million people brought about the reunification of all the territory 
formerly under the sovereignty of Musinga, the King of Rwanda (Callahan, 1999: 88). 
It took several years and treaties before the final delimitation was achieved, 
although customary fishing rights were enshrined within a 1926 agreement. 
Demarcation proved problematic - the Kagera river passed through papyrus swamps - 
and was not finished until 1931 (McEwen, 1971: 156). The treaty was signed in 1934 
and came into force on 19th May 1938: all in all it was a very long and drawn -out 
process. In the event, the British were quite keen to hand the territory back. Despite 
good relations between British and Belgians officials on the border during the early 
1920s, as they struggled to impose the boundary: "Murderers, political refugees and 
cattle -lifters used the inaccessible mountain frontiers to evade justice and create bad 
feeling ".54 However, the catalyst for the transfer was not banditry, and Touval is right 
to cite this as an example of ethnic considerations overcoming colonial politics 
(Touval, 1972: 9 -10). It is, however, unlikely that the territory would have been 
handed over had a Cape -to -Cairo railway actually been projected to run through it. 
Ethnic considerations were real enough but did not carry as much weight as other 
factors. 
On the Tanganyikan side of the new border, Watutsi continued to control African 
groups. D.K. Lumley was the first British DC in Bugufi55 and later moved to the 
neighbouring district of Kibondo. He describes the local Bugufi people as Barundi, and 
their chiefs as Watutsi (Lumley, 1976: 24 and 32). "There are men of their strain 
among the ruling clans in Uganda and eastern Zaire, but they are most in evidence in 
western Tanganyika, Ruanda and Burundi, where they have supplied the rulers of 
nearly every tribe" (Lumley, 1976: 24). In 1948, the question of the status of Bugufi 
54 WO181/252: 2, 28th October 1924. Letter from Maury to Colonial Winterbottom, 
concerning boundary delimitation on the British -Congolese boundary. 
55 Bugufi is known as Ngora today. 
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arose. Mwambutsa, the Mwami of Bugufi, claimed that it was part of Urundi, but 
counter petitions were submitted by other people in the area. In the end, the colonial 
powers decided that most of the population wanted to maintain the status quo, 
although it is not known whether they made any substantive investigations into the 
issue (McEwen, 1971: 158). 
The migrations from Rwanda and Burundi into Tanganyika, which had produced 
such great links between the territories, have continued to the present day. The 1948- 
57 census years revealed that the Barundi increased in number by 35% in ten years, the 
greatest increase in Tanzania. There were an estimated 46,000 Barundi in Kasulu 
District alone in 1956.56 Moreover, colonial officers had difficulty in detecting the 
newcomers because the Barundi and Baha shared a common language and culture 
(Daley, 1993: 20). The DC at Kasulu wrote that, "Linguistically the border elements at 
both sides are closer to each other than they are to their fellow tribesmen of fifteen 
miles distance.57 These links have also encouraged refugees to flee to the region 
following the series of massacres and upheavals in Rwanda and Burundi (Wayne, 
1975: 316 -32). Political boundaries can never prevent such population flows in areas 
like north- western Tanganyika. 
Resistance to International Boundaries 
Apart from appealing for changes in the location of the new boundaries, Africans 
responded to political division by using the boundaries and borderlands to protest 
against colonial rule. This idea has already been considered by Asiwaju, when he 
56 TNA: Acc.225: PA8.06A: 2nd February 1956. Letter from DC Kasulu to the PC 
Nothern Province, at Arusha. The number of this file does not accord with other files. 
It presumably comes from an older system that has not been updated. 
57 TNA: Acc.225 PA8.06A: 2nd February 1956. See Note 51. 
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examined migration as a form of revolt in West Africa (Asiwaju, 1976: 577 -94). Just 
as Africans migrated out of a polity during pre -colonial times, so they left French 
colonies in West Africa for a perceived better life in the British colonies of the region 
(Asiwaju, 1976: 578). Not only was French rule harsher, but higher taxes and military 
conscription encouraged mass exodus. Asiwaju even writes that French administration 
was much more aggressive in its reaction to existing African political systems 
(Asiwaju, 1976: 583). This was probably the result of the more direct pro- active style 
of French rule. Similar migrations occurred in eastern Africa, such as the movement of 
the abaKuria over the Tanganyika- Kenyan border, but the region also exhibits another 
phenomenon - that of using boundaries and borderlands to physically oppose colonial 
rule. 
The idea of resistance is everywhere in Tanganyika: both in a physical sense and in 
a psychological sense. It is in the villages and in the towns, in the minds of the people 
whose lives have been shaped by the resistance of their forefathers. The whole history 
of the territory has been based around domination of one type or another, and around 
the resistance of African peoples which this has provoked. From Abushiri and Bwana 
Heri in the so- called Arab Revolt, to the biggest of all African anti -colonial uprisings - 
Maji Maji - to the peaceful anti -colonial speeches of Julius Nyerere, the legacy of 
resistance in the country have given birth to Tanzania's national identity and national 
cohesion. Resistance to boundaries went hand in hand with resistance to political 
domination in general, but it is possible to identify many examples of resistance 
specifically attributable to, or directly exploiting, the colonial boundaries. 
As John Iliffe writes, many students of African responses to colonialism identify 
three types of resistance: armed resistance, negotiation and collaboration ( Iliffe, 1979: 
105). In the Tanganyikan context, however, it is impossible to isolate these methods or 
to classify the response of each African group by one of these methods. The more 
militarised peoples, such as the Ngoni and the Maasai were not necessarily more likely 
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to resist militarily. The reasons behind the adoption of the various methods are largely 
localised and mostly unknown. Iliffe's depiction of each group having its hawks and 
doves fighting for domination seems likely ( Iliffe, 1979: 105 -7), and it is impossible to 
know for sure the ins and outs of the political debate in each case. 
The coastal uprising led by Bwana Heri and Abushiri bin Salim was named the Arab 
Revolt by the Germans in an attempt to attribute it to slave traders. As Glassman 
argues, the original German claim for formal control of the territory cited the need to 
suppress slave trading, which was organised by Arab merchants who operated 
throughout East Africa (Glassman, 1995: 6, 177). In fact, the most united stand 
against the German forces was at Saadani, a town which had also resisted Arab rule 
during the 1870s and 1880s (Glassman, 1995: 6). Moreover, many strands of coastal 
society came together to oppose the extension of German rule into the ten mile coastal 
strip, and as such can be partly seen as resistance to the erosion of the recently drawn 
up boundary.58 
Once German rule had been established, effective rule was so limited that 
borderlands could be exploited in order to continue resistance. When a German army 
came south to Lindi, they summoned many African leaders to visit them. A chief 
named Machemba on the Makonde Plateau replied, "I have heard your words, but I do 
not see any reason why I should obey you. I would rather die...If it is a matter of 
friendship I shall not refuse today and always, but I shall not be your subject I shall 
not come. If you are strong enough, come and get me" (Müller, 1959: 455 -6). Several 
German expeditions were sent to the hinterland behind Lindi and Mikindani to destroy 
his power, as the Germans were keen to secure the economic potential of the south- 
east. They met with varied success, but were never able to defeat him, until he fled 
58 For example, escaped slaves at Kikogwe joined Abushiri at Pangani (Iliffe, 1979: 
93). 
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over the Rovuma in July 1899 to live in the DOA -PEA borderlands (Ingham, 1965: 
179). Although most of his people gave themselves up to the Germans, he was able to 
exploit the Grenzwildnisse and the boundary to raid both the Germans and the 
Portuguese. The Germans built a post on the Rovuma, but the two colonial powers 
were not able to cross the boundary in pursuit of Machemba, so he was able to avoid 
capture by using the division.59 
In 1904 -5, the Portuguese promised to co- ordinate a military expedition against 
Machemba with a similar German attack, but they failed to do so. It appears that lack 
of resources and the heavy rains put them off, but there was also a large uncontrolled 
trade in gunpowder in northern PEA borderlands which led the local Portuguese 
commander to fear that Machemba was well armed.60 Not only were the early colonial 
borderlands beyond political control, but also beyond economic control. 
The upheaval brought about by the First World War encouraged several African 
groups to rebel against European rule, and the opportunities provided by the 
international boundaries figured widely in their actions. The Kionga people in Uganda 
had caused the British authorities a great deal of trouble during the early years of 
colonial rule. When news reached them that the local DC was on his way to meet 
them, they often fled over the border to DOA to avoid taxes and political control. 
Shortly after the Great War broke out, they moved their cattle into DOA and sat on 
the border hilltops in order to shout abuse at British forces in the area (Hopkins, 1969: 
229). Simultaneously, some Batutsi chiefs in Uganda formally defected to DOA and 
moved across the border. The British responded by announcing that the ringleader, a 
man called Nyindo, would never be allowed to return to Ankole (Hopkins, 1969: 234- 
235). 
59 RKA 289/186. Full reference lost. 
60 RKA: R1001 628: 136, 23rd March 1905. Letter from Sturmann, in the German 
Foreign Office, Berlin, to the Imperial Government, Dar es Salaam. 
121 
Conclusion 
African responses to the colonial boundaries varied as much as colonial responses 
to partitioned African groups. Some Africans were able to resist colonial rule and the 
colonial boundaries by crossing the borders, and occasionally - as Machemba did - by 
fighting the colonial invaders. African polities were also able to retain some measure of 
identity and cohesion through their incorporation in the structure of colonial 
administration. Some boundary alterations were made because of the impact upon 
African states, as in Rwanda, and colonial administrators sometimes had an interest in, 
and sympathy for, partitioned African groups. As such, Africans could exert some 
influence over colonial policy. Ultimately, however, the majority of boundaries which 
had been determined during the early colonial phase were maintained intact, and the 
long list of bisected African groups which was given in the previous chapter was not 
shortened by a single name during the period of colonial rule. European decisions and 
requirements outweighed those of the indigenous peoples, as Britain and Germany, like 
all the colonial powers, extended their military superiority to encompass a moral 
superiority. They were far stronger than the African polities, so their political systems, 
methods of rule and morals must also be superior. As Galbraith wrote, "Civilized men 
did not need to rationalize their possession of lands occupied by lesser beings" 
(Galbraith, 1972: 2). 
In the clash of African and European political systems and methods of dividing 
political space, there was only ever going to be one winner. Where existing African 
authorities were not suitable, new ones could be created, as it was not the adoption of 
African political authorities which mattered to the British, but the appearance of it. 
Existing polities were only allowed to exercise some control in order to limit the 
financial expense and physical requirements of attempting to closely govern the entire 
territory. As they only retained that level of control and those functions which the 
European powers granted them, they had lost all real power. African political systems 
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were no longer of a great deal of relevance politically speaking, although they often 
held a large amount of sway locally as cultural entities. 
The colonial authorities did interest themselves in African politics, partly because of 
the demands of Indirect Rule, but also sometimes in the interests of settling matters 
amicably. Whether or not they tried to be even handed or even in the least bit 
concerned, depended upon the men on the ground. Oldaker, for example, does seem to 
have been concerned, and the evidence of his research indicates that he was not 
unknowledgeable about African affairs (Oldaker, 1957). Indeed, most of the PCs and 
DCs whose opinions and actions are recorded in the colonial records seem to have 
been interested in local African politics, but this may create an inaccurate impression. 
Those not interested may not have referred local problems to the Dar es Salaam 
administration, or even recorded them in their own records. Maasai problems always 
came to the attention of the central government because of the amount of interest in 
that boundary, but it is to be wondered if Mkoma's problems would have come to the 
attention of the Governor had Oldaker not been the PC concerned and if Mkoma had 
not appealed to the United Nations. How the points discussed in this chapter affected 
relations between Tanganyika and her neighbours is one of the subjects of the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Coping with African political structures was not the only political aspect of the new 
boundaries which faced the colonial powers. While the Germans, and later the British, 
attempted to increase their control over Tanganyika and therefore to impose the 
boundaries which had been created, the same process was being undertaken in the 
colonial possessions to the north, west and south. Incidents of conflict and co- 
operation naturally occurred as the neighbouring colonial powers attempted to push 
their political control to the limits of their territories. In addition, relations between 
Africans across the new boundaries occasionally caused the colonial powers to become 
involved with one another. The development of European style cross -border diplomacy 
demonstrates the success of the colonial imposition of the western system of dividing 
political space. This chapter seeks to examine these international relations, to assess 
the role of the borders in these relations, and to discuss differences in approach and 
policy between the British and German administrations. Government border policies 
are greatly influenced by government foreign policies, but local factors such as the high 
level of autonomy of many colonial administrators and the actions of African 
borderlanders, meant that cross -border relations were to a considerable extent out of 
the control of central colonial administration. Interaction between the colonialists and 
the borderlanders influenced international relations to a greater extent than might be 
imagined. 
Three main factors brought about differences between German and British rule in 
Tanganyika: the isolation of DOA; variation in the level of political stability in the 
region; and the difference between the territory's colonial and mandatory status. Yet an 
assessment of these factors highlights how the policies of both powers were built firmly 
upon western notions of political space. To take the first factor, DOA was surrounded 
by foreign possessions: Portuguese, Belgian and, above all, British. British Tanganyika, 
however, bordered four other British possessions, or five if Zanzibar is included, and 
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therefore great differences in approach are to be expected. However, although Kenya 
and Tanganyika were both governed by Britain, competition along their common 
border was, if anything, greater than along Tanganyika's other borders. Such 
competition was hardly likely to lead to war, as the German- Congolese conflict nearly 
did, but it was a very important feature of political rule in the borderlands of 
Tanganyika. It is probable, however, that the Germans saw their boundaries as being 
more restrictive than the British, largely as a result of this British encirclement. 
Another major difference between the British and German periods was in the level 
of political stability in the region. All the colonial powers were loathe to become 
involved in a neighbour's territory, but the newness of the European partition in the 
German period, allied to geographical ignorance at the time of the partition, meant that 
changes to the boundaries and intervention in neighbouring colonies was more likely 
before the First World War than after it. Finally, Germany ruled Tanganyika as a 
colony, whereas the British ruled as the mandatory power. The influence of this 
difference upon international relations will be analysed after relations with each of 
Tanganyika's neighbours had been considered. The boundaries will be considered 
methodically one by one and chronologically, but reference will be made to other times 
and places as and where appropriate. Another lesser difference was the number of 
administrators in the field. There were never more than eighty German DCs, while this 
increased to 120 under the first British Governor Byatt and had risen to 185 by 1932 
(Austen, 1968: 149, 203). However, because of the sheer size of Tanganyika, the 
benefits of this increase would not have been substantial. In addition, the African 
population increased markedly over the same period and British DCs rarely stayed in 
one district for long, so they had less opportunity to build up lasting relationships. 
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Deutsch Ost Afrika- British East Africa 
As a result of the competitive nature of the scramble for territory in East Africa, it 
could be expected that Anglo- German border relations would be rather strained. 
During the earliest years of colonial rule this was indeed the case, with several 
instances of pettiness marring relations. For instance, a British boat, the Aramatta,1 
which was on its way to Australia, became stuck on a sandbank off the coast of DOA. 
The Germans attempted to charge transit duties, but the British refused, claiming this 
was ridiculous.2 However, in the years leading up to the First World War, co- 
operation between colonial officials increased and the British came to have more 
sympathy for the position of their German neighbours. It must be noted that before 
1902, the DOA -British East Africa (BEA) border was somewhat shorter than it is 
today: the eastern provinces of Uganda on the eastern shore of Lake Victoria were 
only transferred from Uganda to BEA in that year. 
To judge by the numerous references to African migration from the DOA side of 
the border to the BEA side, it seems likely that German rule was perceived to be the 
harsher of the two. Kjerland has studied the case of the abaKuria who moved across 
the border in great numbers during the early years of colonial rule, and she reports 
abaKuria people describing German cruelty as the main reason for fleeing to BEA. 
(Kjerland, 1995: 143). German resources were too limited to prevent this emigration 
and the British made no attempt to stem such an influx. There was widespread belief 
among British officials in the crudity of German rule (Lugard, 1903: 543 -4). In the 
Autumn of 1910, two women from Sarungu in BEA went to fetch spring water across 
the border and were promptly arrested by a German border guard. The husband of one 
of the women tried to bribe the guard and was shot on the spot. The British Governor, 
The spelling of the Aramatta is uncertain. 
2 ZNA: AL2 /55/1: 50, 31st December 1889. Newspaper Article from the 
Hannoversche Courier, No. 609. 
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Sir Percy Girouard, wrote to the Dar es Salaam authorities to question the severity of 
the crime.3 The German man on the ground "exercised full jurisdiction over 'natives "; 
punishments were legally determined, but he decided for which offences they were 
applicable (Iliffe, 1979: 119). DOA rule was generally based upon force and few 
administrators travelled without armed escorts. That "their offices were massive bomas 
sited to command the best fields of fire" (Iliffe, 1979: 119), says much about the 
reactions which they expected to provoke. African borderlanders had little influence at 
this time. 
It was often difficult for British objections over a particular border incident to reach 
the German authorities in Dar es Salaam within a reasonable amount of time, as 
communications remained a great problem. There was no direct cable between the two 
colonies and telegraph messages had to go via the Zanzibar station, which was not 
always in operation. The Germans did want to build a cable across the border to link 
Tanga with Mombasa but the British rejected the scheme on grounds of cost (Brode, 
1911: 31). Poor communications discouraged referral of local matters to higher 
authorities, and the importance of the man on the ground remained extremely high. 
The colonial records contain numerous similar examples. As a result of a series of 
border shootings by guards on both sides, the British abandoned the practice of 
employing border guards along this boundary - the crimes which they deterred or 
detected were of little note.4 Several administrative stations had been set up along the 
boundary during the 1890s, and as a result of cross -border friction between German 
appointees and the local people, the British closed their station at Karungu in 1907 and 
moved it further away from DOA to Kisii. Recognition of the agreed boundaries (by 
3 From Kjerland 1995: 143 -5. KNA: DC/KSI /3/3, 1910. Report entitled "The History 
of the District ". No author given. 
4 Again, from Kjerland, 1995: 143 -5. KNA: DC/KSI /1 /1, 1908. South Kavirondo 
District Annual Report. 
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DCs on the ground) made it unnecessary for the DCs along the border to operate 
almost within sight of each other, enabling such withdrawals. The boundary as an 
unseen barrier had been accepted by both sides. 
When resources allowed it, the Germans introduced The Fugitive Criminals 
Surrender Ordinance in 1908 in order to restrict migration from DOA to BEA, by 
having an excuse to turn individuals back at the border. The British did not follow suit 
and this clearly infuriated the Germans. Crampton, the British DC for South Kavirondo 
District wrote in 1911: "The policy of our German neighbours occasionally gives rise 
to trouble and [is] a little difficult to understand. Their ostensible reason for the 
restrictions on Natives crossing the border is to prevent the spread of sleeping 
sickness, but in reality it appears to be directed towards putting a stop to border tribes 
emigrating to British territory".5 
While the colonial records continue to cite instances of border incidents until the 
First World War, British attitudes towards the Germans seem to soften during the later 
years. One of the major instances of cross -border co- operation occurred in 1905 when 
German troops were transported to Mwanza via the British railway in order to fight in 
the Maji Maji War (Austen, 1968: 53). The slightly more relaxed German rule which 
followed Maji Maji may also have improved Anglo- German relations. Following the 
movement of 700 abaKuria to British territory in 1911 in order to avoid bushclearing 
work aimed at combating sleeping sickness, the BEA DC wrote: "I think we should 
endeavour to stop the continual influx from the German territory. It must make it 
difficult for the German authorities to enforce their orders, if the natives can find 
refuge in this District when they please ".6 
5 KNA: DC/KSI/1 /1, 1995. See Note 4. 
6 KNA: DC/KSI/1 /1, 1911. See Note 4. Also from Kjerland, 1995: 147. 
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Deutsch Ost Afrika- Uganda 
To the west, in Uganda, Anglo- German relations were rather more tense, and 
border incidents much more numerous. According to Austen: 
"Around Lake Victoria the Germans and British not only respected each other's 
boundaries but actively assisted one another in the mutual task of keeping control over 
large African populations through frequent exchanges of information, supplies and 
even munitions" (Austen, 1968: 31 -2). 
This section seeks to disprove the accepted view of relations along this, albeit, little 
studied boundary. Although Austen's notion of respect does contain some measure of 
truth regarding the final years of German rule in East Africa, it has not been borne out 
by a thorough examination of the literature upon which this chapter is based.? 
While the British and Germans were gradually increasing their grip on the new East 
African colonies, there remained much uncertainty over the precise location of the new 
boundaries - nowhere more so than along the Uganda -DOA border. Both sides became 
exceedingly worked up when the other party attempted to exercise their authority on 
the wrong side of the line. This precious attitude towards territorial sovereignty is 
inherent in the western system of linear boundaries. The colonial records abound with 
examples. During 1899 -1900 German officials gave German flags to African chiefs in 
Utegi and Karungu, well within Buganda, with orders to fly the flags at all times.8 
They proceeded to collect taxes in the form of food or labour in the same area and 
when sufficient taxes were not raised, proceeded to kill forty people in a punitive raid.9 
When the Ugandan administration objected, the Germans advised the British not to 
involve themselves in German territorial matters. Such confusion is understandable 
7 See FO403/173 in particular. 
8 RKA: R1001 627: 54R, 7th February 1900. Letter from Lieutenant von Wulffen at 
Schirati, to the Stations Chef at Port Ugowe. 
9 RKA: R1001 627: 4. From Hauptmann, to the Government Representative, at 
Bukoba. 
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when even the official maps of the area which were in use at this time vary wildly from 
each other. A German map of 1895 shows Koki and Ankole as being in German 
territory, when earlier agreements placed them deep inside the British protectorate 
over Uganda (Dietrich Reimer, 1895). Competition and not just ignorance fuelled 
conflict, and when a gold reef was discovered on the eastern side of Lake Victoria, the 
Germans did not hesitate to attempt to push the boundary northwards. 
British incursions into German territory were also numerous. For example, shortly 
before his survey of the northern half of Lake Victoria, Captain Whitehouse visited the 
village of Shirati in German territory, gave the chief a medal and assured him that he 
was under British protection (Beachey, 1996: 292 -3). Shirati was the German border 
post and actually named in a series of agreements as being in German territory. While 
both parties sought to extract the maximum possible territorial advantage from the 
situation, British policy was generally to abstain from setting up posts where any doubt 
surrounded an area, partly no doubt on grounds of cost, whereas the Germans always 
placed a post in disputed districts in order to support their claim. 
During the lifetime of DOA, a large proportion of DOA -Ugandan communication 
concerned territorial encroachment by one side or the other - normally by DOA 
representatives and normally relating to exacting tax from British subjects or setting up 
bases on the British side. For example, in 1899, the British complained to the German 
government in Berlin that German forces had established a fort nine miles north of the 
boundary at Kakuto, in the Kikumbiro District in Uganda. I° They had used the fort as 
a base for cutting timber, which was then sent back to DOA.11 The Governor of 
Uganda, Sir Harry Johnston told the German commander in the area that they could 
10 RKA: R1001 624: 19, 13th November 1899. Letter from the British Embassy in 
Berlin, to Count von Bülow 
11 RKA: R1001 623: 139 -140, 13th October 1899. From Franck Lascelles at the 
British Embassy in Berlin, to Count von Bülow. 
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have timber if they asked for it, but should not steal ít.12 Similar encroachments were 
made to the east of Lake Victoria. Johnston also wrote to this German counterpart to 
complain that although the German base at Schirati is six and a half miles south of the 
boundary, the German Commandant was attempting to exercise his authority up to 
twenty miles north of it.13 Johnston refrained from removing German flags or placing a 
post in the area to protect British African subjects, in the hope that the German 
Governor could sort it out. By early 1900, the Germans claimed to have withdrawn 
from the Kakuto post,14 but at the same time a force of 250 German rugaruga had 
occupied Southern Koki, some thirty miles north of the border. 
The second major cause of poor Anglo- German relations was the activity of 
various African criminals, rebels or freedom fighters, depending on your point of view. 
A man named Gabriel who had been chief adviser to the Baganda king fled Uganda 
and began living as an outlaw in the borderlands of DOA. In one raid into Uganda, in 
1900, he killed ten men and stole forty loads of merchandise from a trader named 
Ahmed bin Salim. The British attempted to extradite him under the Anglo- German 
Extradition Treaty of 1894.15 Probably as a result of poor relations between German 
and British officials along the border, the Germans replied that Gabriel was a political 
refugee and could not therefore be arrested. This became an intergovernmental matter 
with Salisbury appealing directly to Berlin, but Gabriel continued to shelter in Bukoba 
under German protection.16 This also led to the most important example of a British 
incursion into DOA. In pursuit of Gabriel and his allies, British troops entered DOA 
12 RKA: R1001 625: 125 -8, 5th January 1901. Letter from Harry Johnston at Entebbe, 
to the Marquess of Lansdowne. 
13 RKA: R1001 627: 41, 30th April 1900. Letter from DO von Liebert to the German 
Governor. 
14 RKA: R1001 626: 30, 14th April 1900. Letter from Harry Johnston in Entebbe, to 
Lieutenant von Beringe in Bukoba District, DOA. 
15 RKA: R1001 625: 62, 30th April 1900. Letter from Franck Lascelles to Count von 
Bülow. The German word for this type of treaty is Auslieferungsgesetzvertrag. 
16 RKA: R1001 624: 45, 23rd December 1899. Memorandum on British -German 
relations on the Uganda- Deutsch Ostafrika boundary, by the British Embassy in Berlin. 
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where they robbed the Liwali Mhamed bin Ibrahim Turki, killing several people, 
including one of Gabriel's brothers, in the process.17 When Juma Wadi Sinde was 
accused of stealing 1000 rupees from the DOAG and fleeing to Uganda with it, the 
British refused to hand him over to the German authorities. They insisted that Gabriel 
must be given to them first. "Obviously the law of extradition must work both ways: if 
you refuse to extradite our Uganda criminals [sic], we cannot be held bound to return 
to you the persons charged with crimes who escape German territory". 18 European 
norms of border protocol and extradition were quickly being transfered to Africa. 
Obtaining the extradition of criminals or criminal suspects who had fled across the 
border was an ongoing saga in most East African borderlands. There are numerous 
examples of Africans and Arabs escaping across a border because they were wanted by 
the colonial authorities. They either returned after a time, stayed in the neighbouring 
territory, or continued to oppose the state from afar. Sometimes communication 
problems meant that they were not even informed that an 'offender' was at large in their 
district. For example, the experience of World War One caused fear among the 
population when the British began to seek recruits at the start of the Second World 
War. Many Wafipa vanished across the border into Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo 
(Kyczynski, 1949: 345 -6; Kaniki, 1980: 335). Even on such a large scale, DCs in 
Rhodesia did little to encourage the men to return, probably because of a lack of co- 
ordination and communication among British possessions. What is not clear is how 
much neighbouring territories acquiesced in the use of their borderlands as centres of 
refuge and rebellion. 
17 RKA: R1001 626: 79 -83R, 10th October 1900. Protocol entitled "The case of 
Liwali Mhamed bn Ibrahim ", from Leutenant von Trotha, Usumbiro, to the Station at 
Bukoba. 
18 RKA: R1001 624: 175 -6, 23rd April 1900. From Harry Johnston at Port Alice in 
Uganda, to Cramer at Mwanza. 
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The cases of Gabriel and Sinde demonstrate that suspects were less likely to be 
returned when the colonial administrations in question were from different countries. 
Another example involves Marealle, who was paramount chief of the Chagga and had 
been a great ally of the Germans during the 1890s. The Germans were told by his 
enemies that he was likely to rebel. This was probably untrue and he was informed by 
friendly missionaries that he would be arrested and so fled to Kenya for a time. He 
returned later as chief of Marangu, but he never regained his paramountcy (Iliffe, 1979: 
121).19 There is no record of the Germans appealing to the British to extradite him, 
nor any of the British offering help, so it seems that the Germans were content for him 
to be outside their portion of Chaggaland. 
To return to the Ugandan section of the border, Harry Johnston wrote a report 
early in 1901 on border disputes with the Germans during the preceding eighteen 
months.20 It leaves the reader in no doubt that colonial relations were strained. For 
example, Arab slave raiders under German protection entered Uganda and attacked 
the Kingdom of Ruzumburu ruled by Chief Makboré. Makboré forced the invaders 
out, so the Germans responded with a punitive raid by 200 askari led two by German 
officers. Johnston wrote that there had been numerous raids of this type across the 
border, and that the Germans knew they were transgressing the line, prompting him to 
appeal on several occasions for the German Governor to intervene. That the German 
Governor sometimes paid damages or changed personnel indicates some 
acknowledgement that German forces were mostly to blame for the friction.21 It also 
seems probable that German officials on the border were acting in a manner which was 
not known to the Governor in Dar es Salaam. 
19 RKA: 700/93: 5.3.1905. Full reference lost. 
20 RKA: R1001 625: 125 -8, 5th May 1901. Letter from Harry Johnston at Entebbe, to 
the Marquess of Lansdowne. 
21 RKA: R1001 625: 122, 3rd May 1900. Twelve page report from the journalist 
Decle at Umtali in Southern Rhodesia, to The Daily Telegraph, London. 
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The German Governor accepted Johnston's appeal that something be done22 and 
replied that much of the misunderstanding resulted from confusion over whether the 
first degree south parallel or the River Kagera formed the boundary, as well as general 
geographical ignorance.23 The setting up of a boundary commission was agreed and 
the Germans admitted to Johnston's claim that they had been acting as if it had already 
been moved to follow the course of the Kagera.24 The Germans withdrew their 
Kakuto post and it was agreed that the Sultan of Kukika should fly both German and 
British flags until the boundary commission had reached a decision.25 
Incidents continued until the boundary commission completed its work in 1904. In 
one case, an unspecified group of Africans had their cattle seized in DOA during a 
German anti -rinderpest campaign. The Africans then crossed into Uganda and told the 
British that they had been robbed while in Uganda. The British took up the matter with 
the German authorities and an argument continued until the truth came out and 
Johnston had the good grace to apologise.26 DCs from both sides of the border were 
involved in the boundary commission and this closer contact seems to have improved 
relations enormously.27 This was achieved despite antagonism between the leaders of 
British and German parties, Delmé -Radcliffe and Schlobach respectively (Delmé- 
Radcliffe, 1947: 15). 
22 RKA: R1001 625: 170 -1, 18th August 1900. Letter from Franck Lascelles, to Herr 
von Derenthall. 
23 RKA: R1001 627: 62, 31st August 1900. Letter from Lieutenant von Wulffen at 
Shirati, to Harry Johnston, British Commander -in -Chief at Entebbe. 
24 RKA: R1001 626: 25R, 3rd October 1900. From Hauptmann at Dar es Salaam, to 
the Colonial Department of the German Foreign Office, Berlin. 
25 RKA: R1001 626: 78, 10th November 1900. From Hauptmann, Dar es Salaam. To 
the Colonial Department of the German Foreign Office, Berlin. 
26 RKA: R1001 627: 5 -6, 30, 28th March 1901. From Hauptmann, to the Government 
Representative, Bukoba. 
27 RKA: R1001 586: 5, 22nd April 1904. Letter from G.E. Smith, H.M. Commissioner 
on the Anglo- German Boundary, Kisumu, Uganda, to Hauptmann Schlobach, Kisumu. 
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Deutsch Ost Afrika -Congo 
The early history of the DOA -Congolese border is dominated by nearly continual 
disorder and an almost forgotten colonial encounter: that of the German- Belgian 
confrontation in the Lake Kivu region - a prime example of a western -style border 
conflict. The RKA files contain a vast body of material on this subject, including 
British, Belgian and German official correspondence, articles from numerous 
periodicals, and cuttings from newspapers as obscure as the Yorkshire Post.28 There 
are perhaps 5- 10,000 pages in all, highlighting that more attention was paid to this case 
than to any other DOA foreign policy matter. Despite this, secondary works very 
rarely mention the subject Iliffe (1969; 1979) and Koponen (1994) make no mention 
of the dispute and German authors are similarly disinterested or ignorant. Only 
Beachey's recent work (1996) makes more than a mere passing reference. 
The 1884 -5 negotiations and agreements which brought the Congo Free State 
(CFS) into being, set the DOA -CFS boundary at the 30th parallel, which would have 
placed Lake Kivu well inside Congolese territory had its existence been known by 
Europeans.29 However, it was not until the 1894 -5 German expedition led by the Graf 
von Götzen that either the Germans or the Congolese became aware of the existence 
of Lake Kivu, so it was not mentioned in the 1885 treaty.30 Von Götzen informed the 
Imperial government that Leopold had taken the western part of Rwanda and advised 
that Lake Kivu and the River Rusisi should be taken as the line of the new border. The 
Germans asked for negotiations, but the area was occupied by Congolese troops in 
1896. 
28 This material is concentrated in RKA: R1001 620- 638ii. 
29 Note: throughout the German and British archives, the Congo Free State is referred 
to as Belgian territory and the administration and military forces as being Belgian 
rather than Congolese. 
30 RKA: R1001 623: 119, 4th August 1899. Article from The Times, entitled 
"Germany and Lake Kivu ". 
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That the lake remained undetected for so long demonstrates that both the lake and 
the boundary lay in an area more -or -less untouched by the European occupation. This 
made the area attractive to criminals of various types, to mutineers from the European 
armies and to numerous others who wished to avoid colonial rule. The area's isolation 
from German influence was ensured by it being flanked by Rwanda and Burundi, both 
of which were little influenced by the period of German rule in East Africa. In addition, 
Congolese military recruitment methods encouraged mutiny and rebellion. Most of 
their soldiers were conscripted, were involved in extremely violent and brutal actions 
and were usually drawn from the ranks of rebels and criminals. As the government of 
the CFS operated as a private company and exploited its territory with a private army, 
it should come as no surprise that sections of the army mutinied and tried to set 
themselves up in their own private kingdoms. The region can certainly be seen as a 
frontier region in true Kopytoff -style during this period. Yet the desire of DOA and the 
CFS to seize the area meant that it was only a matter of time before the frontier was 
closed and a linear boundary set up. 
The first rebellion took place in 1895, when a Balouchi named Radjab refused to 
recognise Congolese rule and defeated or avoided several expeditions sent against 
him.31 The first reports of Congolese soldiers robbing and plundering in German areas 
appeared in 1895, but the first major rebellion occurred in 1897, when the Belgian 
commander, Dhanis, attempted to lead an expedition to the Upper Nile. His men 
revolted and attempted to set up their own state in the area between Lake Tanganyika 
and the Luamo River (Gann and Duignan, 1979: 111). Several Belgian expeditions 
against them were defeated until they achieved success in 1899. The mutineer's chief 
was killed and the remaining rebels sought refuge over the DOA border. The Germans 
were said to be in regular communication with the rebels and threatened on two 
31 RKA: R1001 622: 113a, 1897. Series of correspondence on the Magid Affair, some 
of it written by the Congolese Foreign Office. 
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occasions to arm them against the Belgians and British.32 A German expedition under 
Captain Bethe reached Lake Kivu by mistake and staked a claim to the area, despite 
the threat of punishment from his superiors, although at that stage German forces 
made no attempt to occupy the area.33 This was the first German attempt to link the 
activities of rebels in the area and their own claims over Congolese territory. 
A further mutiny occurred in 1898, and the Belgian post of Uvira on the north- 
western shore of Lake Tanganyika was occupied by mutinous troops.34 The Belgian 
commanding officer committed suicide and his successor fled to German territory, 
triggering further mutinies (Beachey, 1996: 241). The rebels, who became known as 
the Batetela mutineers, captured and burnt the Congolese posts at Lubenga and 
Luahilimta on the east shore of Lake Kivu.35 Lieutenant Glorie, as the only Congolese 
officer remaining in the area, moved against the rebels but lost fourteen dead and thirty 
wounded. The rebels numbered at least 600, and seized a large amount of firearms and 
ammunition.36 The German press blamed the poor quality of the Belgian askaris for 
their failure to put down the rebellion.37 
The Germans made the most of the Belgian difficulties. Claiming that the rebels had 
crossed the border and attacked the German Usambara post, German forces moved 
into Belgian territory (Beachey, 1996: 241). According to the British Foreign Office, 
the Congo rebels had never been within thirty miles of DOA, but the Germans had 
32 FO403/354B: 3, 16th May 1900. From Declé at Usumbura to the Foreign Office. 
33 FO403/354B: 3, 16th May 1900. See Note 32. 
34 RKA: R1001 630: 15, unknown date. Report "Ubersicht über die historische 
Entwicklung der Kivu- Grenzstreitfrage ". No author given. 
35 RKA: R1001 623: 119, 4th August 1999. Article entitled "Germany and Lake 
Kivu ", from The Times. 
36 RKA: R1001 623: 6, 1 lth August 1899. Letter from DO Fonck at Ujiji, to the 
Government at Dar es Salaam. 
37 RKA: R1001 623: 80a, 22nd February 1889. Second part of a series of articles in 
the Vossischen Zeitung, entitled "An der Grenze Deutsch -Ostafrikas und des 
Kongostaates ", by Dr Richard Kandt. 
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merely exploited the opportunity to push westwards to the Rusisi valley and Lake 
Kivu.38 This may be true with regard to the 1898 mutineers, but previous mutinies had 
crossed into DOA territory, and mutineers were undoubtedly involved in some of the 
rebel groups which raided DOA from across the border. Many groups began to co- 
operate with each other, and because of the volatile situation, the remote location and 
limited communications, it is possible that the German and Congolese authorities did 
not know who had raided what and when. 
The German commanding officer at Ujiji took 400 men and moved towards Kivu in 
order to re- impose European contro1.39 By the time 500 Congolese troops were 
rushed to the area under Commandant Henneberg, German forces were securely 
encamped along the line of the Rusisi and Lake Kivu. That this force was sent against 
the Germans rather than the mutineers indicates who was perceived as being the 
greatest threat.4° The Times reported that German and Belgian forces faced each other 
and were ready to fight, but the Berliner Tageblatt denied it four days later.41 The 
Belgian force attempted to reclaim the area but were soon forced back (Beachey, 
1996: 241), although there is no record of the number of casualties. It is difficult to 
decide if the lack of control on the Congo's borders was really such a problem for 
Germany. British forces did not attempt to intervene on this scale or at this time 
although the rebels were also operating from Ugandan territory. Although the Germans 
were keen to seize territory which had been assumed to lie within the territory of the 
CFS, because they were dealing with a nominally European power, they felt the need 
to recognise national sovereignty as an issue. They also felt the need to justify 
intervention on the grounds that the African inhabitants of the area would welcome a 
38 See file FO403/354B for more details. 
39 RKA: R1001 623: 6, 11th August 1898. Letter from DO Fonck at Ujiji, to the 
Government, Dar es Salaam. 
40 RKA: R1001 623: 119, 4th August 1899. Article from The Times, entitled 
"Germany and Lake Kivu ". 
41 RKA: R1001 623: 119, The Times, 4.8.99; Berliner Tageblatt, 8.8.99. 
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transfer to German rule because of the brutality of Congolese rule.42 In early 1900, 
Congo officials complained about German occupation of Congolese territory and the 
flying of the German flag by Chief Kakari within the CFS.43 They added that the 
original reason for the German presence had gone because Congolese troops were now 
firmly in control. 
At this point the Germans dropped the pretence of intervening to keep the peace 
and claimed the territory as their own. They were able to use uncertainty over which 
map had been referred to in the 1884 treaty, and claimed that Friedrichsen's map, 
which placed the boundary along the line of the Rusisi, had been the map employed in 
the treaty.44 In fact, all the official German maps from 1885 to 1895 place the 
boundary at the 30° parallel. Moreover, the map in the treaty is not Friedrichsen's map, 
and neither the Rusisi nor Lake Kivu are marked on it.45 Nevertheless, Germany tried 
to persuade the Congo to give up the area, and offered to compensate them with 
territory elsewhere. Both the Congolese and British authorities objected to the 
proposal. The British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Edward Malet, wrote to the German 
government that Britain had previously attempted to obtain Congo territory for their 
Cape to Cairo railway project but Germany had, "objected to the alienation of any 
portion of the Congo State without the express consent of the Treaty Powers. If this 
principle held good then, it must be equally be valid now ".46 
On the ground, events forced a change in German policy. In May 1900 the total 
number of rebels had been estimated at 2 -300, but by August that year German forces 
42 RKA: R1001 623: 83, 23rd July 1899. Article from a German newspaper, No. 171. 
Title unreadable, but the subject covers relations between DOA and the Congo State. 
43 RKA: R1001 630: 26, 18th November 1899. Letter from DO Hecq of the Congo 
State to the Captain of German Forces at Ujiji. 
44 From an article in The Times, 24th January 1900. 
45 RKA: R1001 624: 94, 24th January 1900. Article in The Times, entitled "Germany 
and the Congo State." 
46 RKA: R1001 624: 94, 24th January 1900. See Note 45. 
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reported that their numbers had swelled to 2- 2,500,47 possibly because of a number of 
smaller groups coming together in order to provide more effective opposition to the 
colonial forces heading towards the region, but also because of the addition of various 
bandits and local people, attracted by the mutineers' level of success. The Congolese 
and German troops joined forces because of the increased threat and under von 
Münchausen moved against the rebels on both German and Belgian soi1.48 According 
to The Times, British troops moved into the Kivu region from south -western Uganda 
in order counter any attempted move towards their protectorate.49 
Increased co- operation on the ground encouraged Belgium and Germany to sort 
the matter out and a protocol was signed before the end of 1900, but here is no doubt 
that Germany was attempting to use its superior military strength over a weaker 
neighbour in order to seize territory, in much the same way as all the colonial powers 
had used their military strength to occupy the territory of African polities. The Daily 
Telegraph journalist, Decle, wrote at the time that: "Had the Germans acted towards a 
great European power as they have acted towards the Congo Free State, war would 
have been inevitable ".50 Germany also took over Rwanda at this stage, under the 
pretext that the ruler wanted German protection as the Belgians had abandoned the 
territory. Burundi and its king, Meuzi, had already submitted to Captain Bethe. Meuzi 
rebelled in 1903 but was defeated again by a German expedition sent against him 
(Beachey, 1996: 241). 
47 RKA: R1001 626: 16, 12th August 1900. Report "Bericht über die Entwaffnung der 
auf deutsches Gebiet übergetretenen Kongo- Rebellen" by Freiherr von Münchhausen 
at Ishangi. 
48 RKA: R1001 626: 16, 12th August 1900. See note 47. 
49 RKA: R1001 628: 7, 21st April 1904. Article in The Times, "The Congo State." 
50 RKA: R1001 625: 113, 3rd May 1900. Twelve page report from Daily Telegraph 
journalist Declé, written in Southern Rhodesia and intercepted by German authorities. 
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Once the Belgian forces had backed down and the Germans were left in control of 
the east bank of the Rusisi and the eastern shore of Lake Kivu, colonial attention 
returned to the rebels. The Congolese at last attempted to introduce some level of 
administration but their grip on the region remained rather tenuous (Gann and 
Duignan, 1979: 111). In 1901, the Ugandan rebel, Gabriel, and his men joined the 
Congo rebels.51 The Belgian Secretary General of the Congo appealed to the German 
Emperor for a full demarcation of the boundary in order to aid suppression of the 
rebels.52 It seems likely, however, that fears over German motives may have been the 
primary reason for his request. A German Foreign Office report listed all the problems 
in the Kivu area in 1905 in preparation for the boundary commission of that year. The 
report paints a picture of continuing instability in the area. The island of Kwisjui53 in 
Lake Kivu was singled out by Congolese soldiers who repeatedly raided the island, 
killing and stealing as they went.54 They also forced the inhabitants of the island and 
the eastern shoreline to fly the Congo flag, and it seems to be the flying of flags - as 
symbols of sovereignty - rather than the murder and theft which upset the German 
authorities. The Belgian Commissioner on the 1905 Boundary Commission admitted 
pillaging on the border by both his own army and by the mutineers. The askaris of both 
sides contributed to the general disorder, disrupting the work of the commission, and 
in one incident, a drunken German askari hit a Belgian officer.55 Meanwhile, 
Congolese deserters who fled over the border into DOA in small groups were hunted 
down and carried back into the Congo by loyal Congolese soldiers who operated on 
both sides of the border. Although intermittent disorder continued for some years, the 
51 RKA: R1001 626: 133, 20th April 1901. Report "Uebertritt von Kongo -Rebellen" 
by von Götzen, sent to the Colonial Department of the German Foreign Office. 
52 RKA: R1001 623: 37 -40, 22nd April 1899. Letter from the Secretary of State, in 
the Foreign Office of the Congo State, to Comte d'Alvensleben, the German 
representative in Brussels. 
53 Kwisjui island is now called Idjiwi. 
54 RKA: R1001 629: 157 -163R, 1905. Report "Uber die Grenzzwischenfälle in 
sogenannten 'streitigen Gebiet' an der Grenze Deutsch -Ostafrikas und des 
Kongostaats." 
55 RKA: R1001 629: 163R, 1905. See Note 54. 
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frontier had been closed and there was a new line upon the map of East Africa. DOA 
was now entirely defined by linear boundaries and African political systems had been 
subjugated by colonialism. 
Deutsch Ost Afrika- British Central Africa 
International relations along the DOA -Nyasaland/Rhodesian border were marked 
by the area's isolation from centres of colonial control. This isolation often led to a 
high level of co- operation between the British and German administrations on the 
either side of the border. Sovereignty remained defined by the boundary but the lack of 
causes for dispute and the sheer loneliness of the local officials, encouraged cross - 
border friendly relations. That Rhodesia was ruled by the British South Africa 
Company (BSAC), rather than directly by the British Crown seems to have made little 
difference to relations, except perhaps that the Company's officials were prepared to be 
more direct and pro- active in their actions. Communications between Dar es Salaam 
and the area were almost non -existent, so the Dar es Salaam government acquiesced in 
allowing German officials to rely heavily upon neighbouring British territories. Pre- 
colonial transport links and trade in the German borderlands were orientated towards 
the British territories rather than towards the rest of DOA and this arrangement 
continued throughout the German period (Hartmann, 1991: 19). The German taxes 
were mainly paid in the form of cattle, which German administrators then sold in 
Nyasaland (Zencke, 1925: 403). A German Berzirksamtmann at Tukuyu only found 
out about the outbreak of the First World War when his British colleague across the 
border told him about it (Hodern, 1941/I: 170; Iliffe, 1979: 119). Co- operation worked 
both ways. The Nyasaland administration borrowed the German steamer on Lake 
Nyasa for an expedition against Arab slave traders operating around the northern 
shores of the lake and on both sides of the boundary (Johnston, 1923: 299). 
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How well the two sides of demarcation commissions were able to co- operate was 
often important in setting the tone for colonial administration in borderlands. Some of 
the personnel involved were often stationed in the area as DCs. Captain Close wrote 
that German members of the DOA -BCA Commission were unco- operative and brutal, 
and often stole supplies. Such poor relations affected relationships on the border, but a 
change of personnel quickly improved the situation (McEwen, 1971: 220). On the 
other hand, at a meeting of the Royal Geographical Society on 7th May 1906, the 
leaders of the 1904 -5 Anglo- German boundary commission - G.E. Smith and 
Hauptmann Schlobach - came together to discuss their work. The President of the 
society summed it up: "During that expedition of a year and eight months the most 
perfect harmony existed between the German and British sections of the 
expedition it is one more proof that Englishmen and Germans, when not incited by 
over -zealous newspapers, can work together just as harmoniously as they did in the 
days of Frederick the Great" (Smith, 1907: 269). The first part of this line is almost 
certainly an exaggeration, and the second part a piece of poetic license, but the fact 
that the two men could come together after spending a year and a half almost 
constantly together indicates that relations must have been fairly friendly. 
Many of the recorded instances of dispute revolved around anti - slavery actions 
along an undemarcated and uncertain border. One example of the pro- active nature of 
the BSAC administration occurred in 1896. An Arab caravan with slaves and ivory, 
and led by a man called Feruzi evaded two BSAC stations in order to avoid paying 
duties.56 A BSAC party under one Mr Drysdale set off in pursuit, crossed the River 
Songwe which marked the border and captured the caravan. It was able to seize a 
number of slaves in chains who they promptly set free, and 1000 pounds of ivory was 
also taken. The German authorities found out about this violation of their territorial 
56 RKA: R1001 624: 26 -9, 3rd October 1896. Letter from Alfred Sharpe, Acting 
Commissioner, Zomba, British Nyasaland, to the Acting Administrator, German 
Nyasaland. 
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sovereignty,57 and the German officer at Langenburg wrote to the BSAC at Blantyre 
to complain.58 The BSAC did not accept the complaint, and because of poor 
communications two further years passed before von Götzen wrote to W.H. Manning, 
the Commissioner and General -Consul at Zomba in Nyasaland.J9 The matter passed to 
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in London, who in turn put pressure on the 
company to agree compensation. Eventually compensation of £650 was agreed in 
1903, for Faffer Somar, one of those who had lost properly.60 Mainly as a result of this 
and other lesser incidents caused by confusion over the location of the boundary, the 
BSAC persuaded the DOA government to act with them in the 1898 detailed 
demarcation of the boundary (McEwen, 1871: 223). Full territorial sovereignty was 
one of the many functions of international boundaries which the colonialists imposed. 
There was no dispute over the Lake Nyasa boundary at the time, probably because 
neither side wished a confrontation. It was noted that uncertainty existed over the 
possession of islands in the lake, but the earth was poor and opportunities for 
development limited, so neither side attempted to settle the matter (Praeger, 1905: 
153). Uncertainty over whether the boundary lay at the midpoint of the lake or on the 
shoreline was to prove a source of strife in the immediate post -colonial period. 
57 RKA: R1001 624: 30, 29th March 1899. Letter from Deputy Administrator, British 
South Africa Company, Blantyre, to the Administrator, the Imperial German 
Government. 
58 RKA: R1001 628: 26, 21st July 1904. Letter from Graf von Bülow, to the German 
Foreign Office. 
59 The Commissioner was the official government representative for British Central 
Africa. RKA: R1001 627: 81, 22nd August 1901. From von Götzen, Dar es Salaam, to 
W.H. Manning, British Commissioner at Zomba. 
60 RKA: R1001 627: 134, 11th January 1903. Letter from unknown author to the 
German Embassy in London. 
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Deutsch Ost Afrika- Portuguese East Africa 
The DOA -Portuguese East Africa (PEA) border was also marked by its isolated 
location and lack of colonial administration. German administration in the area was 
limited to Lindi on the coast, while it can be argued that there was virtually no 
Portuguese administration in the area. The Makua on the border only became aware of 
the permanent Portuguese presence in East Africa around 1905 (Eliot, 1905: 250), 
although the Portuguese had claimed sovereignty over area for some 400 years. 
According to Portuguese sources, it was only during the First World War that the 
Portuguese authorities occupied the Maconde plateau to the south of the Rovuma, and 
it was not until 1922 that they began to administer it (Dias and Dias, 1964: 23). 
German -Portuguese communications on a local level were therefore almost non- 
existent. Moreover, the Rovuma valley which defined most of the boundary was a very 
difficult area to administer. The course of the river changed repeatedly as mudbanks 
emerged or islands were washed away. There were countless islands in the river, and in 
the 1890s the Germans began to tax the Matambwe who lived on many of them.61 The 
western idea of a linear boundary dividing one polity from another can only be said to 
have existed in a most vague sense. The 1909 Boundary Agreement and 1913 treaty 
pay testimony to difficulties in determining the geography of the area. The nature of 
the borderlands encouraged their use as a refuge for rebels and bandits, and further 
complicated border disputes which arose between Germany and Portugal. Most of the 
intergovernmental correspondence relates to a series of disputes, followed by 
agreements and then followed after perhaps a two year interval by a delimitation and /or 
delimitation commission. With so little territory in dispute, it is incredible how many 
times the two colonial authorities were able to clash over the position of the border. 
61 RKA: R1001 576: 100, 25th July 1907. From the Governor, Dar es Salaam, to the 
German Foreign Office, Berlin. 
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The dispute over the Kionga Triangle was referred to in Chapter Two, and 
negotiations over the disputed territory dominated Luso- German relations in East 
Africa from 1892 until the end of the Great War. During the period of Luso- German 
co- operation which oversaw the carve up of the southern Zanzibari possessions, 
Portugal had merely used German influence - they had certainly not been real allies. 
Portugal viewed the British colonialists as thieves of its African Empire.62 Likewise, 
Germany had used Portugal's ancient claims to East Africa as a tool in its efforts to 
dislodge the Sultan from the mainland. As such, it was a rather blunt instrument, for 
Portuguese claims were vague and indistinct enough to be barely visible. However, 
western claims were certain to outweigh African or Arab claims, just as German 
erosion of Portuguese territory could not have been halted by Portuguese efforts alone. 
Article II of the 1886 Luso- German Treaty decreed that the boundary should follow 
the line of the Rovuma, but German desires on the potential of the Kionga area for 
port development caused the Germans to revive previous Zanzibari claims to the area. 
All the proceeds from the dismemberment of firmly established Zanzibari mainland 
possessions had passed to Germany and the German authorities therefore concluded 
that the Kionga Triangle should also be theirs. 
While German claims to the area stretched credulity, Portuguese insistence upon 
their own effective occupation proved equally unlikely. While the Portuguese claimed 
to have withdrawn their civilian and military personal to allow an unbiased 
investigation into the ownership of the parcel of land, it seems that no withdrawal was 
necessary because their presence in the area fluctuated between minimal and non - 
existent.63 Diplomacy over border disputes involved many of the niceties, 
exaggerations and bluffs of diplomacy in general. Even once the area had been annexed 
by the Germans in 1894, trouble over the Triangle continued to dominate Luso- 
62 Commercio de Portugal, 21st July 1894: 495. 
63 RKA: R1001 573: 17 -17R, 30th August 1894. Letter from the Comte de Bray, 
Lisbon, to Ribeiro, President of the Council of Ministers. 
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German relations along the border.64 During 1902, following the handover, 
Portuguese soldiers seized German flags at Matakadan,65 while at Lilhute in DOA, 
officials of the Portuguese Nyasa Company demanded hut taxes.66 
Such actions heightened German suspicions that the Portuguese authorities 
condoned or even supported the guerrilla campaign which the Yao leader, Machemba 
was carrying out against DOA from the Portuguese side of the border. Machemba's 
forces had repeatedly crossed the river on slave raiding expeditions.67 The Portuguese 
lacked a post in the area, so the Germans suggested that the Portuguese set up a 
district police post at Mchichira, as well as one on the edge of the Kionga. German 
reports claimed that Portuguese state employees and askaris led the raids, and so 
Germany reminded Portugal that she was a signatory of Article Nine of the Congo Act 
and Article Three of the Brussels Antislavery Act which forbade slave raiding. German 
pleas for Portuguese action increased in intensity from 1902 until 1905, during which 
time Machemba had been causing havoc deep into DOA. The German administrator 
Sturman believed that Portugal was incapable of governing the area,68 and so sent a 
strong expedition to the German side of the border in 1905.69 Despite the strained 
relations, the expedition continued to respect Portuguese sovereignty and did not cross 
the boundary. Even in PEA's Niassa Province, control was not assumed until 1912 
because of armed resistance by Yao slave and ivory traders. This explains the lack of 
activity between Germany and Portugal in local administrative correspondence 
(Justino, 1936: 563 -75). 
64 It was not demarcated until 1908 and not ratified until 1909. 
65 RKA: R1001 612: 12, 26th August 1905. Telegram from DO Zencke, to the 
Governor, Dar es Salaam. 
66 RKA: R1001 576: 100, 25th July 1907. See Note 61. 
67 Some documents refer to the Machemba or Matschemba as a people; presumably in 
reference to those people led by Machemba himself. RKA: R1001 627: 93 
68 RKA: R1001 628: 136, 23rd March 1905. Letter from Sturmann of the German 
Foreign Office, Berlin, to the Imperial Government, Dar es Salaam. 
69 RKA: R1001 612: 4- 5,14th July 1905. Letter from the DO at Neu -Langenburg, to 
DO Schulz. 
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Numerous other incidents continued to plague relations along the border. In 1901, 
two Portuguese soldiers were seized in DOA by the Chief of Matakadou; their 
weapons were seized and they were released. The Portuguese wrote to request the 
return of the arms and claimed that the men had merely been lost.70 This was often 
trotted out as an excuse for soldiers operating in neighbouring countries, so the 
Germans investigated the case and found out that the Portuguese soldiers had been 
trying to extract taxes from the people of the area.71 One of the main functions of 
international boundaries was to delimit the extent of range of those officially 
sanctioned to bear arms, and to enforce the state monopoly of military power. It 
therefore forbidden throughout colonial Africa for soldiers and police of one territory 
to act in the neighbouring territory. 
While Portuguese -German tensions were often brought about by the actions of their 
askaris on the border, African conflicts also destabilised the region. When Chief 
Mtarika of Sasawara, the Yao Sultan of Kandulu, died in June 1903, the Portuguese 
named his son, Said, as the new Sultan. Mtarika's brother, Kwirasee and his nephew, 
Mtarika II, contested the succession and war broke out. In one battle, an estimated 
900 men were put into the field on each side, and Kwirasee lost fifty -two dead.72 
Mtarika's territory included land on both sides of the border, and the war encouraged 
Germany to become involved. Bezirksamtmann Ewerbeck at Lindi led enquiries into 
discovering who was the rightful heir. The Portuguese, however, continued to support 
the pro- Portuguese forces. Although the final outcome is not known, the case 
demonstrates that German officials were prepared to take African polities and politics 
into account, despite the mildly negative effect that it had upon German- Portuguese 
70 RKA: R1001 627: 89, 8th October 1901. Letter from José Maria Martins Pereira, of 
the Portuguese government, to the Governor of DOA. 
71 RKA: R1001 627: 90 -1, 8th October 1901. See Note 69. 
72 RKA: R1001 627: 177, 2nd February 1904. Report "Machemba- Leute" by DO 
Ewerbeck, sent to the Imperial Government, Dar es Salaam. 
148 
relations. The Germans may, of course, have become involved just in order to rile their 
Portuguese neighbours. 
World War One 
While the soldiers and police of one power occasionally crossed into the territory of 
another, apart from the Belgian -German conflict over the Kivu region, it was not until 
the First World War that colonial armies crossed the international boundaries of East 
Africa in any number. The great fear had been that conflict in Europe could develop 
out of African disputes, but in the event the reverse happened. The Great War in East 
Africa has been the subject of some academic attention, but there is surely a need for 
an up -to -date full- length monograph on the topic. This section, however, will merely 
restrict itself to making some comments about the role of international boundaries in 
the conflict. 
First and foremost, it would be inappropriate to discuss the colonial boundaries 
during the conflict without placing the importance of this topic into some sort of 
perspective. The idea of the East Africa First World War campaign being the last 
gentleman's war, as if in some kind of a colonial game,73 is total nonsense. The 
German scorched earth policy, the incredibly high mortality rate of African porters and 
soldiers, and the ensuing cauldron of famine and disease killed perhaps 500,000 
Africans.74 The disregard for African life and African lives was incredible. 
It could be argued that the results of the colonial partition of East Africa were one 
of the main causes of this high casualty rate. DOA was surrounded by enemies on all of 
73 For example in Lettow -Vorbeck, 1920; Schnee, 1919. 
74 See Iliffe, 1979: 269 -72. 
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its five borders: the British and Belgians and later the Portuguese.75 This persuaded 
the German Governor in 1914 that the colony was indefensible ( Iliffe, 1979: 240 -1) 
and convinced the head of the army, General Lettow -Vorbeck, that only a guerrilla 
campaign could hope to keep the German forces active for long enough to keep a large 
number of Allied troops occupied in East Africa. As a result the campaign lasted the 
entire course of the war. Major engagements were few and far between, but the 
constant movement of troops and the supply caravans which enabled this, acted as an 
agent of disease and killed porters in droves. 
The boundaries were used during the war as they would have been in Europe. All 
borders and borderlands were placed under military command during the war and 
freedom of movement was heavily curtailed. People living close to the border in some 
areas, such as at South Kavirondo in BEA, were forced to leave their homes and were 
unable to return during the course of the war (Kjerland, 1995: 188). The first border 
raid came as early as August 1914, when Lettow -Vorbeck seized Taveta (Iliffe, 1979: 
241 -2), although the first blow had come on the eighth of that month when the British 
had shelled a wireless station near Dar es Salaam. In September 1914, the town of 
Kisii in the BEA borderlands was taken by German forces, although British troops 
arrived after several days and ejected them (Kjerland, 1995: 187). German raids into 
BEA continued throughout 1914 and early 1915, but seem to have inflicted much more 
harm upon Africans than upon the British - for example, at Isebania in January 1915, 
where German askaris burnt African houses and raided stock.76 The only attack over 
the DOA north -western border by German troops was a thirteen hour attack on an 
Anglo- Belgian installation in Kigezi in October 1914. If nothing else, it caused all the 
petty jealousies between Britain and Belgium in the area to dissolve as they came 
together to fight the common enemy, although there were rumours that Belgian 
75 This takes British Central Africa to be a single entity. 
76 KNA: DC/KSI/1 /2. Nyanza Province Annual Report 1906/07. 
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soldiers told borderlanders not to help or supply British forces in any way (Hopkins, 
1969: 219). 
The lake borderlands of DOA quickly fell into British hands and as German forces 
were gradually forced southwards, the Allies positioned a large number of soldiers 
along each of the boundaries to prevent Lettow -Vorbeck crossing into another 
territory (Iliffe, 1979: 242). Towards the end of 1917, the Germans were pushed 
towards the Rovuma and PEA. The Portuguese army advanced into Newala District of 
DOA (Justino, 1936: 563 -75; Martins, 1935) and "While the Germans were still some 
distance to the north the Portuguese had spoken confidentially of being able to resist 
them, but when Lettow -Vorbeck crossed the Rovuma their confidence ebbed rapidly" 
(Ingham, 1965: 259). Part of the British forces pursued the Germans into PEA while 
the remainder tried to secure the Rovuma to prevent the Germans from re- crossing. 
However, the length of the boundary, its remote location and the relatively few men 
involved enabled Lettow -Vorbeck to slip back into DOA and then out again into 
Northern Rhodesia. By this time the war had ended and Lettow -Vorbeck surrendered. 
While thousands of Africans enlisted or were forced into all of the armies involved 
and the clearances removed Africans from many border areas, Africans were involved 
along the borders of DOA in other ways during the conflict. Some abaKuria enlisted as 
Kariokoo (Carrier Corps) or Kinyume (spies) along the border, because the Germans 
had raided their cattle and they wanted to look for them across the border. The 
Germans discovered that two of the Kinyume, Makori Nyakobosa and Burure Mwita 
were acting as spies for both sides and publicly executed them in Shirati. The British 
uncovered Chacha Wangige as a double spy but the British merely responded by 
withdrawing his pension. Wangige became known locally as Musika Mbili, or the man 
with two identities (Kjerland, 1995: 188). Further west, the Germans hung Ntale, the 
King of Karagwe, when he appealed to the British for help, yet on other occasions, no 
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action was taken against Africans suspected of giving information and supplies to the 
British across the Kagera (Austen, 1968: 113). 
Notions of territoriality changed somewhat during the war. The Allies were very 
keen to prevent the violation of their borders, although it would probably have been 
easier to defeat the Germans had they faced them on their own territory, in BEA, BCA 
or in the Congo. The borders became militarized and depopulated, and the Allies 
perceived the invisible boundaries as lines of defence. There was no specific reason to 
choose the boundaries as points of defence, especially where German troops were 
hundreds of miles away, but the military situation heightened perceptions of 
territoriality. The Germans, on the other hand, realised that they could not hope to 
hold any of their own territory because they were heavily outnumbered and so 
wandered throughout East Africa, crossing and re- crossing borders as they went. 
Without a sense of secure space - a sense of territoriality - the idea of linear boundaries 
became much less relevant. This supports the notion that boundaries are normally the 
product of a sedentary lifestyle. 
Also, both sides expected the Africans who lived on their side of the border to 
show loyalty, although they could only be termed 'British' or 'German' Africans by 
accident of birth and by the force of the partition. Territoriality was deemed to contain 
a sense of belonging and loyalty in occupied peoples. The war also contains a 
wonderful example of the use of flags in neighbouring territories. Just after the 
outbreak of the war, two Afrikaners named Pretorius and Marais crossed from PEA 
into DOA and raised the British flag, attempting to persuade local Africans to give up 
German rule in the process.77 The flag was merely symbolic, but it was perceived as a 
77 RKA: R1001 637: 147, 1st February 1915. Report " Grenzzwischenfälle in 
Deutschafrika im August 1914 ". Sent from Dr Reuter at the German Consulate 
Lourenco Marques, to Reichskanzler von Bethmann Hollweg, in Lisbon. 
Also noted in the Lourenco Marques Guardian, 19th October 1914 and the 
Johannesburg Evening Chronicle, 4th December 1914 and 7th December 1914. 
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violation of German territory and German sovereignty and was therefore a strike 
against the enemy. 
Tanganyika -British East Africa/Kenya 
Following the end of the war, relations between the new British administration in 
Dar es Salaam and the Nairobi authorities may be expected to have been co- operative 
and friendly. In fact, relations between the two territories were marked by disputes and 
disagreements, and there seems to have been far more inter -territorial correspondence 
and disagreement then there was between DOA and BEA. There are several reasons 
for this. Firstly, relations were expected to be close; they were both British territories 
and many in the Tanganyikan government and administration had previously worked in 
Kenya. This expectation allowed competition between the two to produce 
disagreements on a regular basis. Secondly, the border between the two was plagued 
by problems such as smuggling and cattle disease prevention relating to the Maasai and 
other groups. These border problems were the chief cause of poor colonial relations. 
Thirdly, the two governments were able to disagree so regularly because there was 
no great threat to the British position in the region. A settled, peacetime situation can 
produce such squabbling, and it is perhaps most accurate to picture the bickering as 
sibling rivalry. The boundary was seen as less divisive than boundaries between 
different colonial powers. Both in colonial correspondence and on colonial maps, the 
boundary is consistently referred to as an 'inter -territorial' border rather than an 
international one.78 It is normally marked with a dashed line as opposed to the solid, 
78 For example, TNA: Acc.4: 723 /III: 366. "Note on Impounding, in March 1953, of 
500 cattle at Katemboi by DC Voi ", from the Member for Lands and Mines, to the PC 
for Arusha. 
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thick lines which represent international borders.79 It is difficult to draw parallels 
between this type of boundary and those in the West, as the two territories concerned 
were colonial territories owned by the same power; but it must be recognised that the 
boundaries were less than international as they did not divide two sovereign powers. 
However, the competition and precisely defined division of sovereignty which the 
boundaries engendered, is surely indicative of the western concept of dividing political 
space, from which boundaries are drawn. 
On one major border issue the two powers were entirely in accord, possibly 
because it was organised by the Foreign Office. An Anglo- German Treaty regarding 
relatively minor modifications to the Kenya -DOA boundary had taken many years to 
prepare and had been drawn up and agreed in 1914, only for the war to intervene to 
prevent signature. In 1925, Britain confirmed to the League of Nations that it wished 
the treaty to stand,80 and both territories agreed to make the relevant alterations to the 
administration and demarcation of the boundary. This was as far as the concord 
stretched. 
Kenya- Tanganyika relations became consistently soured when Cameron took over 
as Governor of Tanganyika in 1926. He maintained his authority and continued to 
implement his own innovative policies, in the face of the expectation in Nairobi that 
East African affairs should dance to the Kenyan tune. At the 1926 meeting of East 
African Governors, the distinction between Kenyan and Tanganyika Maasai policies 
was hotly discussed. The Kenyan Governor, Grigg, made it clear that it would be 
easier if all Maasailand was transferred to Kenya but Cameron responded angrily, 
denouncing Kenyan Maasai policy as unfair. Kenyan Maasai taxes were high at twenty 
79 Such as is contained in TNA: TS13569. 
80 RKA: R1001 308: 14 -15, 11th November 1925. Communique "Frontière entre la 
colonie du Kenia et le territoire du Tanganyika ", from the Secretariat of the League of 
Nations to its members. 
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shillings per person, yet the next highest in Kenya was twelve shillings. Cameron also 
believed that it was unjust that the Maasai were banned from carrying their traditional 
weapons, and adds that it was not his problem if the Maasai cross the border in order 
to enjoy the more liberal Tanganyikan policy.$' Personality and ideological differences 
undoubtedly affected border relations at the top as much as between DCs. 
Relations deteriorated in 1927, and Kenyan restrictions on the cross -border 
movement of the Maasai prompted the PC for Mwanza to write to Cameron: "Our 
policy is to reunite rather than disintegrate tribes and I beg to suggest that the matter 
be woken up with the Government of Kenya ".82 Conversely, Cameron was angry with 
the lack of Kenyan quarantine measures along the border.83 This proved to be the 
greatest source of dispute and will be discussed in Chapter Nine. In 1927, Tanganyika 
agreed to allow Kenya Maasai access to Tanganyikan water, grazing and salt licks 
along the border, but as a result of poor veterinary practice in Kenya, many of these 
concessions were withdrawn in 1934.84 The Kenyan authorities responded by writing 
to Dar es Salaam, stating that they had enjoyed better relations with DOA than with 
the British Tanganyikan government.85 The Kenyan -DOA agreement which allowed 
Maasai of both sides access to traditional resources had been a "friendly 
arrangement ".86 The matter provoked a rapid exchange of letters and was eventually 
referred to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The tone of the letters is cordial and 
in line with administrative protocol, but there is a strong underlying sense of 
81 CO691/86/6, 11th June 1926. Report entitled "Masai Questions ", no author or 
correspondents given. 
82 TNA: TS10588: 1 -2, 27th May 1927. Letter from the PC for Mwanza to the Chief 
Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
83 CO691/86/6: 10, 11th September 1926. "Memorandum in regard [sic.] to the Masai 
Question ". No author given. 
84 TNA: 10298/II: 430A, 28th July 1934. "Extract of a demi -official 
letter addressed to Mr Fontaine by Mr Mitchell." 
85 TNA: TS 10298/II: 462 -6, 26th November 1934. Letter from the Acting Colonial 
Secretary, Kenya, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
86 TNA: TS 10298/II: 466, 26th November 1934. See Note 84. 
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exasperation with each other. From the correspondence it is difficult to tell whether it 
is local or national officials who are pushing the dispute, but local correspondence is 
somewhat more heated and the men on the ground seem to be fuelling personal 
antagonisms at a higher level. 
Other disagreements, such as the competition between the two railway networks 
for trade from the Arusha and Moshi area (Brett, 1973: 96 -9), occurred throughout 
the 1920s and 1930s but never reached the level of that over veterinary and Maasai 
policy. From 1936 on it seems that relations improved and annual meetings were set up 
between PCs and DCs along the border. This coincided with reduced tension regarding 
differences in veterinary practice and also with a change in personnel.87 Throughout 
the period, however, the impression remains that the two administrations could come 
have together in the event of a greater threat and that they were all Britons acting out 
the imperial mission in the face of great difficulties. The impression also remains that 
resources and manpower were severely limited and that DCs in borderlands, as 
elsewhere, were faced with an incredibly hard job. When World War Two began, 
Africans fled from Kenya to Tanganyika or to islands in Lake Tanganyika and Lake 
Victoria in order to avoid conscription. There was little opportunity or will to force the 
men back, despite the common enemy which had emerged to finally drive the two 
governments together (Kjerland, 1995: 203). 
Tanganyika- Uganda 
Relations along the Tanganyika- Uganda border were not characterised by anything 
like the same problems as on the Kenyan- Tanganyikan border during the British 
87 TNA: TS10298/II: 496, 27th January 1936. Letter from The Secretariat, Nairobi, to 
the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
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period. Disputes and opportunities for co- operation occurred from time to time, but 
relations were generally cordial. The main cause of dispute was territorial: Uganda 
claimed north- western Tanganyika while Tanganyika had a more modest claim - to two 
small areas north of the Kagera. At the 1926 Governors' meeting which was referred to 
earlier, the Ugandan Governor, Gowers, put forward a strong argument for the 
transfer of north -west Tanganyika to Uganda.88 He pointed out the close relations 
between the people of Bukoba District in Tanganyika, and the Banyoro, Batoro and 
Banyonkole of Uganda, and considered that on ethnological, economic and 
administrative grounds they should be transferred. Just as Grigg had done, Gowers 
strongly advocated maintaining the territorial and administrative integrity of African 
groups when it suited him. Even if the area was not transferred, he added, Uganda 
should have economic rights over the exploitation of the Kagera salient and its newly 
discovered mineral resources.ß9 Both Uganda and Kenya seem to have viewed the 
transfer of Tanganyika from German to British rule and the creation of its mandatory 
status as a green light to take what they wanted from the territory. It was not viewed 
as an equal partner. They may have succeeded in the demands had not Cameron been 
appointed Governor of Tanganyika. He proved to be an able and generally popular 
governor, and he was adept at defending Tanganyika's interests. Uganda tried again in 
1929, arguing that as Dar es Salaam and Nairobi were so far from Lake Victoria, that 
the latter should come under Ugandan administration. The "placing of the whole 
littoral under the control of one administration would promote from every point of 
view the well being and prosperity of the inhabitants of the lake basin both indigenous 
and non -native ".90 Once again, the benefits for Africans were used as an argument for 
transfer, and once again the request was rejected out of hand. 
88 TNA: TS13022: 211 -6, 14th January 1926. Letter from W.F. Gowers, Governor of 
Uganda, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
89 TNA: TS13022. 
90 TNA: TS10856/III: 662, 21st January 1932. Letter from W.F. Gowers, Governor of 
Uganda, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
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Disagreement between the two territories and dispute over the sovereignty of the 
north -west continued until 1932 when Cameron retired from the governorship and his 
successor, Symes, went to meet the Ugandan governor personally.91 Relations on the 
ground had generally been rather better than those at government level, but the level of 
cross -border co- operation increased markedly after 1933. To take one example, game 
wardens on both sides of the border co- operated in a 1933 campaign to save rhinos 
and prevent ivory smuggling across the border.92 
Tanganyika- Belgian Colonies 
While African groups on the Ugandan- Tanganyikan border were greatly 
interrelated, the links were probably even greater between north -west Tanganyika and 
Rwanda and Burundi. This has already been discussed in Chapter Three, but it had a 
dominating influence upon the actions of the colonialists in the area. These borderlands 
were very remote from centres of colonial power, and in spite of their high population 
density, the number of colonial officers was even lower than normal. DC Lumley in 
Bugufi region was the only British administrator in an area with a population of 
hundreds of thousands. In general there seems to have been less cross -border contact 
between the DCs than on other borders and there also seem to have been few major 
problems. Administrators in the area were faced with such massive responsibilities and 
heavy workloads that they had little time for petty jealousies. 
91 TNA: TS13022: 283 -6, 10th September 1932. Letter from the Acting Chief 
Secretary, Entebbe, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
92 The wardens on both sides seem to have been passionate about preventing the 
depopulation of rhino in the area, but their work was merely to save the rhinos for 
European guns. Talk of conservation and sustainability belong to another time. TNA: 
TS13595: 24, 23rd June 1933. From an Acting Game Warden, to the Chief Secretary, 
Dar es Salaam. Also TS13595: 30, 19th June 1933. From C.R.S. Pitman, Game 
Warden (Uganda), to the Game Warden, Arusha. 
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On a territorial level, links were rather limited. The major source of dispute was 
Belgian claims for compensation from Britain for territories in north -west Tanganyika 
occupied by Belgium during the Great War and then transferred to Tanganyika. 
Belgium had been granted commercial 'sites' at Dar es Salaam and Kigoma,93 but she 
pressed her claims for reimbursement of the costs of administration during the years 
1917 -20 and for the cost of improvements made to buildings, mainly in Kigoma. The 
case dragged on and on during the 1920s and 1930s, with Britain eventually paying 
747,327 Belgium Francs.94 This matter apart, intergovernmental correspondence was 
rare. During 1930 -1, the Belgian authorities indicated that they would like greater co- 
operation between the two territories, and made a series of suggestions relating to 
medical, veterinary, agricultural, communication and transport matters.95 An exchange 
of visits followed and some plans for a central African railway across the continent 
drawn up, but apart from improved road links, few concrete benefits came out of 4.96 
Apart from the compensation matter, the only real point of dispute occurred over the 
meaning of the "mid- stream of the Kagera" in the demarcation of the boundary in 
1928.97 The general cordiality of relations was referred to in the League of Nations 
1924 Report on the two mandates, which mentions that the two administrations had 
co- operated over a series of minor border incidents (Société des Nations 1925: 10). 
The improved road links on the ground referred to a single road built through 
Bugufi in Tanganyika to the Ruanda -Urundi border. The DC for the area, Lumley, 
surveyed, planned and designed the road and supervised its construction by local 
Africans (Lumley, 1976: 46). Lumley's relations with his Belgian counterparts were 
93 CO691/95/6: 37. "Note on History and Present Position of Belgian 'Old Claim' in 
respect of permanent Improvements ", by the Colonial Office. 
94 With an exchange rate of 55BFr = £1 at that time. 
9' CO822/37/15: 16 -19, 11th January 1937. Note on the Governors' Conference of 
1930. No title or authors given. 
96 CO822/6/6: 20 -23, 21st November 1927. Letter from Maxwell, Governor of 
Northern Rhodesia to L.S. Amery at the Colonial Office. 
97 See file CO691/99/6: 68. 
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amicable but limited. Barundi in Ruanda -Urundi destroyed four out of the seven 
boundary pillars by taking the cement for pottery making in 1929. A chief on the 
Tanganyikan side of the boundary told Lumley who had destroyed them, so Lumley 
suggested that the Belgian government impose collective punishment.98 This was 
achieved by punishing the chiefs and forcing Barundi to repair the pillars. During the 
same year, Lumley's Belgian opposite number, André de Beys, helped him to stop, or 
at least restrict, ivory smuggling in the area. Rhino horns were being smuggled from 
Burundi into Tanganyika to avoid taxes.99 
Problems developed, however, during the series of famines which struck Bugufi 
during the 1920s and 1930s. During one undated disaster, according to Lumley: "The 
drought and accompanying famine had spread over Burundi and Ruanda even more 
savagely and starving tribesmen were coming to our side for food.... Although the 
Belgians were operating their own relief across the border, many of these people 
slipped to our side to be fed. These intruders were soon detected and sent back. Every 
available pound of food had to be reserved for our own people" (Lumley, 1976: 37 -8). 
The slow Belgian response to the famine annoyed Lumley, and his expulsion of 
Barundi refugees brought about attempts upon his life. Lumley's road from Bugufi to 
Biharamulo was partly built to enable future famine relief (Lumley, 1976: 44).100 
During the 1930 boundary survey and adjustment relations remained good. The 
leader of the boundary commission, Laws, wrote that, "it was only through the spirit of 
cordial co- operation and goodwill with which the Belgian representatives approached 
98 TNA: TS 12907. 
99TNA: TS13595: 1 -2, 28th June 1929. Letter from André de Beys, Belgian Consul, 
to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
TNA: TS13595: 13 -14, 29th August 1929. Leeter from E.K. Lumley, Assistant DO 
for Bugufi, to the Acting Director of Game Preservation, Kilosa. 
Mc) This road remained the main road link between Tanganyika and Ruanda -Urundi 
until it was partly washed away during the floods of November 1997; as witnessed by 
the author. 
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each problem that we were able to reach a wholly satisfactory agreement" (Laws, 
1932: 244). It is interesting to note that relations on the Belgian- British borders seem 
to have been more friendly than along wholly British inter -territorial borders in East 
Africa. 
Anglo- Belgian relations to the west of Lake Tanganyika seem to have been solely 
channelled through Rwanda and Burundi. The boundary through Lake Tanganyika had 
been poorly determined, but this caused no problems during the colonial period. 
According to McEwen, the absence of a detailed lake boundary may be because the 
lake lay within the watershed of the Congo Basin and was therefore free for 
navigation. International law presumes in favour of equal rights, and therefore the 
median line, in the absence of any treaty stipulations ( McEwen, 1971: 226). 
Tanganyika- British Central Africa (BCA) 
Relations between the British and Tanganyikan administrations and those in 
Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were much more friendly than those on the northern 
boundaries of the mandate. This may partly be attributed to good relationships between 
the respective DCs and PCs, and also partly to the lack of difficulties in the area. The 
boundary had been delimited in 1901 but was not to be demarcated until the 
exploitation of copper and tin deposits made it necessary in the early 1930s (Laws, 
1932; Peake, 1934; Prescott, 1965: 70). The appeal by Chief Mkoma for the transfer 
of the village of Tontera and a rectification of the boundary which has already been 
mentioned, does not appear to have affected inter -colonial relations in any way. Minor 
alterations were made to the boundary in 1935 and 1937 with little disagreement 
between the two parties. 
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The unusual delimitation of the boundary in Lake Nyasa first came to light in 1951. 
Colonial officials could not believe that Nyasaland was responsible for landing places 
on the Tanganyikan shoreline, and decided that there must have been a mistake.1°1 
The East African Railways and Harbours Commission had improved the facilities at 
Mwaya (Itungi) on the northern shore of the lake without any complaint by the 
Nyasaland authorities. The Colonial Department Corporation's maps placed the 
boundary in the lake, but rather nearer the Tanganyikan than the Nyasaland 
shoreline.102 The PC for Lindi Province pointed out that the islands of Mbamba and 
Lundu in the lake are not administered by either Tanganyika or Nyasaland. He wrote 
that: "I do not think we need take matters up with the Nyasaland Government as no 
incidents have arisen ".103 No action was taken, but the matter continued to be 
discussed during the 1950s in an academic fashion rather than as a matter of any 
urgency.104 It is easy to point out with the benefit of hindsight that such complacency 
was misplaced, but as the border was an inter -territorial one between two 
administrations on friendly terms, it is perhaps understandable that no action was 
taken. 
The importance of the men on the ground has already been mentioned. DCs very 
often acted almost autonomously because of problems of distance and 
communications, and the most remote areas of Tanganyika - the areas most distant 
from Dar es Salaam - were the borderlands of the territory. Although matters had 
improved immeasurably since German times, when orders could take months to reach 
officers in borderlands (Iliffe, 1979: 119), the diaries and autobiographies of such men 
101 CO1015 /411, 9th January 1952. From M.A.Willis in London, to F.W. 
Winterbottom of the Colonial Development Corporation. 
102 CO1015/411, 9th January 1952. See Note 100. 
103 TNA: TS34207: 39, 12th August 1953. Letter from the PC for Lindi, to P.H.W. 
Haile, Local Government Branch, The Secretariat, Dar es Salaam. 
104 CO822/1555: PE 5/1, 29th June 1959. "Opinion: On the Tanganyika/Nyasaland 
border on Lake Nyasa ". No correspondents given. 
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as Lumley reveal the isolation of many DCs (Lumley, 1976). They lived almost as 
chiefs themselves, although usually without any military support. The nearest European 
neighbour to a DC could often be a Belgian or Portuguese DC over the border, and 
co- operation between officers was vital. On Lake Tanganyika, the Nyasaland 
government vessel Ilala II was only in use fifty percent of the time, so use of the boat 
was given to the Tanganyikan government.105 This was the type of co- operation which 
might be expected to have been the norm between British colonial administrations, but 
which was often lacking between Tanganyikan officials and their northern neighbours. 
Tanganyika -Port guese East Africa (PEA) 
Tanganyikan- Portuguese administrative contacts were much more substantial than 
DOA -Portuguese links had been. Portuguese activity in the north of their colony allied 
to more widespread implementation of improved means of communication, such as 
motor vehicles, saw a marked increase in Portuguese influence on and around the 
Makonde Plateau and the Rovuma River (Alpers, 1984: 370; Justino, 1936: 563 -75). 
This in turn led to more normalised western -style cross -border relations, although this 
is not to say that relations were cordial. Relations between the two administrations 
were generally not particularly friendly: the British regarded Portuguese rule as 
incompetent and brutal, while the Portuguese believed that the British were 
undermining their rule south of the Rovuma. Three matters affected relations: the 
ongoing dispute over the sovereignty of islands in the Rovuma, migration from PEA to 
Tanganyika throughout the colonial period, and the support of Tanganyikans for 
Mozambican independence towards the end of the colonial period. In addition, as on 
all colonial borders, differences in policy were regularly exploited by Africans. For 
105 TNA: Dist 11/271 Lindi: 19, 21st August 1950. Letter from the PC for Lindi, to 
the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
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example, the mwabvi poison ordeal was made illegal in British territories under 
witchcraft legislation, but continued unmolested across the Rovuma (Wilson, 1993: 2). 
Also, taking credit from Indian traders was periodically banned and then re- legalised by 
the two governments: differences in policy enabled borderland Africans to obtain credit 
across the border at times when it was unavailable to them within their own territories 
(Wilson, 1993: 4). 
The PEA authorities often complained to the Tanganyikan government about the 
level of migration over the border. Migrants came to Tanganyika because of a 
combination of harsh Portuguese policies and better economic conditions in the British 
mandate. The British authorities were generally favourably inclined towards such 
migration: it helped to repopulate areas devastated by the First World War, and the 
migrants easily fitted in because they were Makonde, like those living in the 
Tanganyikan borderlands.106 Problems arose when touts for such organisations as the 
Tanganyikan Sisal Labour Bureau (Silabu) began to operate in PEA, irritation of 
local oficials.1Ó7 The Portuguese began to patrol the Rovuma in order to prevent 
Mawia1Ó8 labour from crossing the river and to discourage the activities of Silabu 
recruiting agents. In one instance during 1951, thirteen Tanganyikans were robbed, 
beaten and detained by Portuguese Police at Chikundi in the sub -district of Mocimboa 
do Rovuma.10 The captives overpowered their guards after one and a half days and 
escaped. They reported the incident to the British DC at Newala, claiming that they 
were going to buy castorseed and riceseed, and to get rice for the Maulidi celebrations 
from their relations in PEA. Intermarriage and interaction across the border was 
commonplace, as all the people of the area were Wamatambwe, a branch of the 
Makonde. The attempt to disrupt this interaction was a clear attempt to disrupt 
106 See file C0691/124/14. 
107 See F0371/97238 for more information. There are no page numbers on the 
documents, but its a thin file. 
108 Mawia is and was the derogatory term used for the Portuguese Maconde. 
109 See F0371/97238. 
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existing cultural systems. The DC for Newala approached his Portuguese counterpart 
in an attempt to restore friendly relations and to reach an amicable settlement. Even if 
the detained men had been Silabu agents, it is likely that the DC would have supported 
their story, but the outcome is not known. 
Portuguese fear of emigration stemmed from insecurity, a lack of control and a loss 
of taxable population. In 1922, reports from Dar es Salaam and Zomba cited 
"maladministration and ill -treatment" as the main causes of the large numbers of 
Makua, Yao and Nyasa fleeing Portuguese Nyasaland for British Nyasaland and 
Tanganyika.110 Similar reports appeared during later years. In 1933, the PC of 
Southern Province of Tanganyika wrote to Dar es Salaam that, "oppressive measures 
adopted by neighbouring Authorities ", including, "the seizing of Native womenfolk," 
was causing considerable movement of Natives across the Rovuma into the Tundura 
District" (Alpers, 1984: 370). At the same time on the coast, a senior Matengo 
headman 
Portuguese. 111 This seems to be another example of Asiwaju's concept of migration as 
rebellion (Asiwaju, 1983). It is also an excellent example of the way in which the 
actions of the colonialists and African borderlanders influenced each other. Harsh 
Portuguese colonial rule encouraged Portuguese Makonde to migrate into Tanganyika; 
this in turn provoked the Portuguese into increasing the function of the boundary as a 
line of division. 
Further proof of the lack of Portuguese control of its borderlands is provided by 
Portuguese attitudes to the presence on their soil of those wanted for crimes in 
Tanganyika. In East Africa as a whole, examples of neighbouring colonial officers, 
police or military, co- operating in order to extradite suspected criminals are extremely 
11° CO691/55: 400 -401, 27th May 1922. Letter from the Acting Governor, Dar es 
Salaam, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
111 TNA: TS21484. 
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rare. Sometimes neighbouring states did not help to apprehend 'criminal fugitives' in 
their territory because of the lack of resources or even of any active administration. 
This was partly to blame in the Portuguese borderlands. During the 1920s, a man from 
the village of Natuno in the south of Tanganyika killed his wife and fled to 
Mozambique where he lived unmolested for three years (Lumley, 1976: 105). There 
was no effective Portuguese administration in the northern provinces of Mozambique 
at that time, but the level of political will must also be questioned. 
For several years after World War Two, the Portuguese relaxed their labour laws 
and increased wages in PEA in order to attract workers back. Luxuries were also more 
readily available in PEA at this time because of Portugal's ample dollar reserves 
(Alpers, 1984: 374), and so large numbers of PEA Africans re- crossed the Rovuma to 
find work in PEA. However, this flow of migrants did not last for long. From 1950 
onwards, sisal and cashew production rose dramatically in Tanganyika (Iliffe, 1979: 
451 -54) and the resulting labour shortage encouraged Tanganyikan plantations to 
compete to offer the best working conditions. A flood of Wamatambwe re- entered 
PEA and the PEA authorities became concerned about the large numbers who did not 
return (Alpers, 1984: 376). Again they stepped up controls on the border. 
The story of PEA migration to Tanganyika was not simply one of British 
encouragement and Portuguese opposition. As part of the border dispute over the 
ownership of the Rovuma islands in 1932, the Portuguese authorities threatened to 
restrict the rights of Tanganyikan citizens to cross the river for salt and fishing.112 
Governor Symes was not a supporter of immigration from the south: "an epidemic of 
burglaries and assaults invariably ensues on their arrival ",113 and responded by 
threatening to prohibit the large number of PEA immigrants from working on the sisal 
112 CO691/124/14: 18, 17th October 1932. Letter from Governor Symes in Dar es 
Salaam, to Sir Philip Cunliffe- Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
113 CO691/124/14: 18, 17th October 1932. See Note 111. 
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plantations. The Portuguese quickly backed down as the remittances which the 
workers brought home were the mainstay of the local economy. The Portuguese 
needed the migrant workers but did not like the way that their colony appeared to be 
dependent upon the British. They may have had political sovereignty up to the 
Rovuma, but the Tanganyikan economic area stretched well over the border. 
The 1913 DOA -Portuguese Agreement guaranteed the rights of Africans along the 
border to fish, fetch water and take salt on either bank.114 At the end of the First 
World War, the Portuguese had occupied all the islands in the Rovuma, and as they 
were of no real use to the British, no attempt was made to reclaim them.115 However, 
when the Portuguese threatened the rights of Tanganyikans on the river, disputes 
began to arise over the location of the boundary as a result of changes in the course of 
the river (McEwen, 1971: 213). These problems soured relations along the border for 
many years, but when MacMichael assumed the Tanganyikan governorship in 1935 he 
concluded that the Tanganyikan Wamatambwe wanted to maintain their access rights 
to the south bank in order to smuggle. He agreed to negotiate favourably with the 
Portuguese, much to their surprise, yet had no sympathy for the Portuguese, writing 
that "it is difficult to contemplate the local Portuguese authorities taking the initiative 
over anything ". 116 The boundary agreement reached in 1938 closely mirrored the 1913 
German- Portuguese Treaty, and the inhabitants of both banks retained all rights vis -a- 
vis fishing and transport. The Portuguese seem to have been so surprised by British co- 
operation that they conceded many British requests. The case indicates that the 
114 CO691/124/14: 26. No date or author given. Gives Governor Cameroon's view of 
the Tanganyika -Portuguese East Africa border dispute. 
115 CO691/109/5: 36 -42, 31st March 1930. From the Foreign Office to the Colonial 
Office. No author given. 
116 CO691/143/17: 2 -3, 15th March 1935. Unlabelled notes without any 
correspondents. Subject: the rights of the inhabitants of P.E.A. to use the waters of the 
Rovuma. 
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colonial authorities were prepared to put a great deal of time and effort into defending 
existing African practices where there was no other pressing influence. 
The post -war years were relatively quiet on the Rovuma, but the lead -up to 
Tanganyikan independence highlighted Portuguese fears of isolation, and British 
acquiescence with most African nationalist and independence movements led to a 
severe deterioration in relations. Many of the Mozambican migrant workers in 
Tanganyika were influenced by Tanganyikan trade unions and the dream of 
independence. Ideas were particularly easily transmitted by the large numbers of 
workers who normally lived in PEA but who worked in Tanganyika. Many were 
members of the Tanganyikan African Workers Union and the Mozambican African 
National Union. The Portuguese police arrested those with membership cards if and 
when they tried to re -enter PEA. Such tight controls and restrictions indicate the 
enormous increase in presence by the Portuguese authorities in comparison with the 
pre War years the early days of the British mandate. The increased 
presence was undoubtedly partly caused by fear. Tensions increased in March 1960 
when a Tanganyikan African policeman, Martin Petro, who was investigating robberies 
in Tanganyika by Mozambican natives, crossed the border and brought the suspects 
back with him.i17 This was undoubtedly illegal. 
Matters came to a head role on the 10th June 1960 when some 2 -5,000 Maconde 
who had previously worked in Tanganyika held a meeting outside the Maeda District 
office in PEA to protest for independence. The Portuguese army and police moved in 
and 152 were shot dead. The Portuguese authorities responded to British 
condemnation by blaming Tanganyikan revolutionaries and the high level of freedom of 
speech in Tanganyika.i18 No less than 300 other Africans were killed in subsequent 
117 CO822/2877: E16, 13th June 1960. Letter by F.H. Crowther, Consul General, to 
the Governor General Lourenco Marques. 
118 CO822/2877: E17, 6th July 1960. Letter which appears to be sent by K. Unwin to 
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shootings. British DCs in the area still hoped for good relations between Tanganyika 
and PEA;119 but the tone of Tanganyikan -Portuguese relations during the 
independence period had been set. The boundary had become more of a dividing line 
than ever and the western system of dividing political space had undoubtedly been 
imposed by the colonial authorities. 
Deutsch Ost Afrika/Tanganyika- Zanzibar 
There is little of note regarding relations between the Sultanate and the mainland 
colonial authorities - Zanzibari relations with the Great Powers were of far more 
importance. Zanzibar -DOA correspondence largely concerns the erosion of the 
Sultan's mainland possessions which has already been dealt with. Zanzibar- Tanganyika 
correspondence is dominated by the issue of smuggling, and will be considered in 
Chapter Six. It would be ill-judged, however, not to point out that the neighbour with 
whom Tanganyikans had the most contact was Zanzibar. The ethnic origins of most of 
the population of Zanzibar lay on the mainland, and even after World War Two 
perhaps twenty percent of the population of the islands had been born in Tanganyika 
(Kaniki, 1980: 370 -2). Such close blood ties inevitably brought about a great deal of 
trade, not withstanding the pivotal role that Zanzibar had played in the East African 
pre -colonial economy. In 1902, Zanzibar still took sixty -seven percent of DOA's 
exports and supplied fifty -seven percent of its imports (Iliffe, 1979: 128). Pre -colonial 
political ties may have been severed between the mainland and islands, but cultural and 
economic links survived into and beyond the colonial period. 
F.H. Crowther at Lourenco Marques. Sent do the British Embassy in Addis Ababa. 
119 CO822/2877: E14, 7th July 1960. Telegraph from an agent in Lourenco Marques 
to the Foreign Office, on disturbances in P.E.A. (File closed until 1991). 
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The Role of the Mandate 
One factor which is often cited in discussions about the international relations of 
Tanganyika is its status as an international mandate under the League of Nations and 
later as a trust territory under the United Nations.120 The mandate is considered to 
have prevented political union in East Africa, or indeed any transfer of territory 
involving Tanganyika. This subject has been widely considered elsewhere but this 
section aims to consider the relevance of Tanganyika's mandatory status to its 
international boundaries. Wilson's stand at Versailles, with the, "optimistic message of 
hope for the eventual freedom of colonial peoples in the Middle East, Africa, and the 
Pacific Ocean" (Dumbuya, 1995: xiii) may have challenged the acceptability of the 
colonial mission, but it did nothing to challenge the international boundaries which 
colonialism had created. Neither their legitimacy as a means of dividing political space 
nor their actual positioning was effected by the mandatory system which came out of 
the spoils of the First World War. The legal status of mandates was different to that of 
colonies or protectorates, but in practice they were ruled in more or less in the same 
way.121 Differences are difficult to pinpoint, but the lack of urgency with which 
mandates were governed certainly marks them out. 
The unification of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika would have either removed 
Tanganyika's international boundaries, or more likely, it would have altered their status 
from international or inter -territorial boundaries, to provincial divisions. The mandate 
has generally been perceived to have prevented a union which was favoured by many 
politicians and administrators at that time. During the 1920s Ugandan and Kenyan 
administrators pushed for closer integration or union with Tanganyika. Indeed, Sir 
Edward Grigg had been appointed Governor of Kenya with that intention in mind 
120 See Chidzero, 1961; Dumbuya, 1995; Callahan, 1999. 
121 
They had been allocated by the Victorious Great Powers in May 1919, not by the 
League of Nations which was not founded until 1920 (Ingham, 1965: 545). 
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(Ingham, 1965: 588). The Tanganyikan Governor, Cameron, however, fiercely fought 
his corner in maintaining the mandate's political integrity. "His opposition to closer 
union, which grew steadily, was based upon his fears of its effect upon his own 
programme in Tanganyika and more particularly upon his native administration policy" 
(Ingham, 1965: 588). He could not, however, prevent economic dependence upon 
Kenya, a fact which is widely perceived to result from his disinterest in economics 
(Coulson, 1986: 96). 
The world -wide recession of the 1930s had varied effects upon the clamour for 
union. The Ugandan governor, W.F. Gowers, agreed with the Kenyan governor, J. 
Byrne, and with the findings of the Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East 
Africa when he wrote in 1932 that the development of East Africa, "as a whole can 
best be assured by each of the three territories continuing to develop upon its own 
lines ".122 The expense of unification coupled with Tanganyikan opposition probably 
brought about this change of mind. At the same time, however, Kenyan economic 
interests began to push for much closer integration in order to increase the size of their 
markets, thereby softening the blow of the economic depression. The 1934 resolution 
of the Association of Chambers of Commerce of Eastern Africa, based in Nairobi, 
sums up opinion: 
[The] "time has now arrived when the community of economic and social interests 
of the territories of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika demands a completely unified 
system of administration, under which the welfare of them all may be the more 
certainly assured This Association therefore urges the Imperial Government to 
constitute the territories of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika into a customs 
122 TNA: TS10856/III: 660 -9, 21st January 1932. Letter from W.F. Gowers, 
Governor of Uganda, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.. The records do not 
mention Zanzibar as a potential state for federation; it was generally not seen in the 
same light as the other East African territories, possibly because it was ruled indirectly. 
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union.... provided that the measures....do not infringe the provisions of the Tanganyika 
Mandate" .123 
The reference to administrative union seems designed to overcome Tanganyikan 
government opposition. This appeal indicated that the mandate was an obstacle to 
union, but that it could be overcome. Opponents of union consistently made reference 
to the terms of the mandate as a reason for denying closer integration. 
The effect that the mandate had on Britain's ability to act in Tanganyika has been 
much discussed. The British government accepted that the primary obligation of the 
mandatory powers was "to promote to the utmost the moral and material welfare and 
social progress of the inhabitants of the territories themselves ".124 This did not 
however impede the British from federating Tanganyika with her other territories in 
East Africa, a fact which was admitted on several occasions by the Foreign Office. 
Article Ten of the League of Nations mandate stated that, "The Mandatory shall be 
authorised to constitute the territory into a customs, fiscal and administrative union or 
federation with the adjacent territories under his own sovereignty or control; provided 
always that the measures adopted to that end do not infringe the provisions of this 
mandate ".125 The union of East Africa need not have infringed upon the other articles. 
The situation did not change markedly after the Second World War. Although more 
attention was given to the "vigorous application of the principles of tutelage and 
international accountability" (Chidzero, 1961: 133), the British government remained 
free to include Tanganyika in any union of its East African possessions. The terms of 
123 TNA: TS10856 /III: 761 -2, 8th December 1934. Letter from the Association of 
Chambers of Commerce of Eastern Africa, Nairobi, to the Chief Secretary, 
Tanganyika. 
124 TNA: TS 1145911: 72, 27th April 1936. Extract from the Official Report of 27th 
April 1936 on Mandated Territories, from the House of Commons. 
125 Article 10, British Mandate for East Africa, League of Nations C.449(i) 1922 
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Article Ten of the League of Nations Mandate were repeated in Article Five of the 
1946 United Nations Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Tanganyika.126 
However, as a result of the vested interests of the colonialists of each of the British 
territories in the region, union seemed less likely than before the war. With hindsight, it 
is possible to see that the most likely time for union was during the immediate 
aftermath of Tanganyika's transfer from German to British rule. 
The original source of the belief that the mandate prevented union is unknown, but 
the Permanent Mandates Commission itself surprisingly ruled in 1933 that Britain was 
not authorised to include Tanganyika in an East Africa Federation (Dumbuya, 1995: 
154). In addition, one effect of the mandate was to open British policy up to 
international scrutiny, and according to a recent study by Dumbuya, the German 
colonial associations formed in the 1920s to campaign for the return of their pre -war 
colonies were a leading cause of the failure of the federal scheme in 1933 (Dumbuya, 
1995: 153 -5). 
Whatever the origin of the belief that union was forbidden by the mandate, fears of 
Kenyan domination consistently outweighed any perceived benefits. That Tanganyika 
remained largely underdeveloped was largely the result of the lack of exploitable 
resources, of better opportunities for entrepreneurs elsewhere in the British Empire, 
and of the pull of Kenyan economic interests, but uncertainty over Tanganyika's future 
because of its mandatory status undoubtedly played a role in discouraging investment. 
Its role in discouraging political union is a matter which requires further research. 
African views on union are more difficult to gauge, although two examples help to 
give a taste of opinion. As part of the Hilton Young Commission on integration in 
126 United Nations Trusteeship Agreement for the Territory of Tanganyika (1946), 
Article 5. 
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1927, a delegation was sent from Tanganyika to London to express local opinion. This 
delegation contained three Africans: one Muslim, one Christian and one 'animist' - all 
three were dead set against integration.i27 The only opinion polls on the matter with 
any relevance for the colonial period were carried out in 1963 and 1965 (Marco 
Surveys Limited, 1965). They demonstrate that support for union was high throughout 
East Africa at around ninety percent, but this is probably more a reflection of pan - 
Africanist sentiment than of the desire for closer ties with Kenya. 
The mandate was also a factor in border alterations. Changes in border delimitation 
were considered too troublesome to contemplate because of the mandate although 
there was some pressure for the alteration of the section of the Kenya- Tanganyika 
border which divided the abaKuria. However, despite the support of the local DOs 
throughout the 1930s and 1940s, the Kenyan and Tanganyikan governments blocked 
change, citing the mandate on each occasion (Kjerland, 1995: 92 -5). In November 
1946, the PC Lake Province (Tanganyika) wrote to the DO of North Mara concerning 
the problems of the mandate: "I have to inform you that after discussion of the matter 
during my recent visit to Dar es Salaam, it has been agreed that the difficulties involved 
in the transfer of a portion of Kenya are so great that it is not worth pursuing the 
problem further" (Kjerland, 1995: 94). The mandate may have been perceived to be a 
genuine obstacle to change, but more often than not it was merely used as an excuse by 
the territorial governments who zealously guarded their possessions and whose petty 
jealousies sometimes prevented co- operation. 
127 Although bearing in mind that Cameron was Governor at the time, the three men 
may have been chosen because of their views on union. 
174 
Conclusion 
The imposition of boundaries continued throughout the period of colonial rule. The 
creation of European -style sovereignties led to the development of western-style cross - 
border diplomacy. Once the region had been partitioned and the boundaries had been 
determined, the new colonial governments had to live alongside one another. In the 
few areas where the borders had not been settled, as on the DOA -CFS boundary, then 
conflict could still develop. As with European occupation of the continent, military 
strength was always the determining factor. It is interesting to note the unlikely 
grounds upon which the colonial powers based their territorial claims. For instance, the 
Germans based their claim to the 'Conga Triangle upon Zanzibari territorial claims 
which all the colonial powers had previously dismissed as vastly exaggerated. 
Generally, the British could afford to be more relaxed in their dealings with 
neighbouring states because of their more secure geopolitical situation. The German 
authorities, on the other hand, had generally more uneasy relations with their 
neighbours, with the except of the far south -west, where the isolation of both the 
British BCA officials and their German counterparts led to almost continually good 
relations. Perhaps because of mistrust between colonial officers, one aspect of western 
style cross -border diplomacy which never took hold was the principle of extradition. 
During the First World War, the boundaries were used as they had been in Europe. 
As a result of heightened wartime tensions, awareness of territorial sovereignty grew 
markedly and borderlands became much more sensitive and militarised zones. 
Boundaries became symbols of statehood and troops were placed along the borders 
even where the British knew that there were no enemy forces for hundreds of miles. 
Such symbolism mirrors the use of flags during the early years of partition. Along the 
DOA -BEA border, for instance, the British and Germans played a game of cat and 
mouse, setting up their respective flags in borderland villages in order to stake their 
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respective claims. Where there was uncertainty, they somehow felt that a national 
symbol supported their case. 
Some Africans responded to the colonial boundaries and harsh colonial rule by 
voting with their feet and migrating. The governments involved attempted to control 
border crossings, but the lack of manpower and nature of the terrain meant that any 
determined emigrants were likely to succeed. Although African borderlanders were 
able to exert some influence upon colonial border policy, the actions of neighbouring 
colonial governments had far more influence than any African polities upon the 
Tanganyika colonial authorities 
Relations between Tanganyika and her British neighbours were certainly more 
friendly than those between DOA and her neighbours. In a political sense, the 
boundaries were not really international boundaries at all, but rather inter -territorial 
divisions. What is most striking, however, is that British inter -territorial relations were 
not more friendly. The lack of direction from London and the freedom which colonial 
governors and governments were given over policy allowed each territory to develop 
its own character and objectives. The experience of the First World War, when British 
and Empire troops invaded DOA from Kenya, may have given weight to the 
impression that DOA was being taken over by Kenya. Cameron did not accept this, 
and his stance, together with the impact of Tanganyika's mandatory status, ensured 
that the territory stayed politically independent. Great Britain may have ruled all three 
of the East African territories, but this did not prevent the continued imposition of the 
political division, and the independence of the three governments guaranteed the 
survival of the colonial boundaries. 
********************************************************************* 
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CONCLUSION TO PART TWO 
Pre -colonial East Africa was composed of hundreds of different polities, many of 
them interlinked and some of them owing allegiance to the Sultanate of Zanzibar. They 
were divided by a variety of means, but were generally characterised by their fluidity 
and adaptability. The colonial powers took them over by a variety of means, all of 
which were backed by military power. African methods of dividing political space 
continued to exist within the framework of Tanganyika but were subject to gradual 
erosion. In fitting African states into the colonial structure, the colonial authorities 
removed much of their African character by standardising them and placing them 
within a single system. As divisions between pre -colonial groups came to matter less 
and less, the political boundaries between Tanganyika and her neighbours became 
increasingly important. With regard to these issues there was little difference between 
British and German rule. The greatest result of the imposition of the colonial 
boundaries at the expense of the pre -colonial boundaries was the creation of a new 
territorially- bounded country. Tanzania has changed somewhat following the union 
with Zanzibar, but its land boundaries essentially remain those of the colonial partition. 
The creation of Tanganyika and the other successor states in Africa is perhaps the 
greatest legacy of colonialism in Africa. 
One great similarity between the development of European and African polities in 
the continent stands out. African polities often expanded along the lines of trade 
routes, so political connections followed in the wake of trade links. In East Africa, the 
IBEAC and DOAG not only opened the region up to western influences, but actively 
encouraged the involvement of their respective governments in taking political control 
of territory. The territories which they targeted formed the cornerstones of the later 
sovereignly owned lands of their governments. 
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The broad brushstrokes of the division of Africa were determined almost solely by 
the colonial powers. To put it bluntly, it was Europeans and Europeans alone who 
determined that the northern part of East Africa would be British and the southern half 
would be German. This in conjunction with the transfer of sovereignty from African to 
European polities, meant that African political systems were almost entirely overridden 
by colonialism. However, the situation on the ground in the borderlands was markedly 
different. African polities were able to influence the location of the boundaries in some 
areas and to some extent. The influence of African borderlanders grew throughout the 
colonial period, even though the ability of the colonial powers to impose policies also 
grew over time. The British government as a whole even became convinced that the 
division of pre -colonial African ethnic groups and policies was something to oppose. 
They did take some steps to prevent division, but only where there were no other 
issues at stake. On the other hand, the broadly African system of flexible, fluid polities 
did not survive the partition, although some would argue that it is attempting to 
reassert itself today (Herbst, 2000). 
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PART THREE- ECONOMIC DIVISIONS 
One of the principal reasons for the development of boundaries throughout the 
whole world, was as a means of controlling the import and export of goods from any 
particular polity. Control of the movement of goods enables governments to impose 
duties and taxes, and thereby increases their income. In Tanganyika, as elsewhere, the 
colonial authorities were eager to promote this as a function of the new borders. As 
such, economic considerations played a large role in the political division of East 
Africa: they provided much of the impetus for colonialism and were major factors in 
the imposition of the borders. It should not be forgotten, however, that trade duties 
were nothing new to East Africa. The African system of bongo required traders to pay 
duties to the rulers of polities through which they passed, either in the form of _goods 
or money. The main difference between European and African duties was that the 
payment of European duties was normally arranged at the border, while hongo tended 
to be paid in the capital of a polity. Chapter Five will consider the impact of the 
boundaries upon existing African trade routes and economies. Often previously 
legitimate trade was made illegal by the colonial occupation and the new boundaries. 
The introduction of the colonial economy, customs duties at ports and on borders, 
allied to western technology and an economy heavily weighted towards European 
traders, often left Africans with little option but to trade by smuggling. Chapter Six will 
examine the nature of this smuggling, discuss the methods by which it was carried out 
and consider European responses to illegal trade. On this issue, the actions of the 
colonialists and African borderlanders were by far the most important influence upon 
each other. The role that the creation of the colonial economy had in reinforcing the 
boundaries will be the subject of Chapter Seven. This chapter will also consider the 
idea that borders between two territories with the same colonial power were less 
divisive than those ruled by different powers. The western system of dividing political 
space does not generally recognise international boundaries as existing within the 
territories of one sovereign power. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE IMPACT UPON PRE -COLONIAL ECONOMIES AND 
TRADE ROUTES 
Introduction 
The impact of colonial boundaries upon African economies and trade routes was 
profound but was only one component of the impact of the western -dominated 
international economy. The ivory and slave trades had begun to change the economy of 
the interior before the first European colonialists arrived in East Africa, and western 
products had already begun to make indigenous goods uncompetitive. Once colonial 
rule had been imposed and East Africa partitioned, trade was re- routed as the colonial 
powers sought to develop colonial economies which would be of most benefit to the 
metropolitan states. African borderlanders also suffered more localised effects as 
villages became divided from their crops and taxes were demanded by a different 
colonial government to that which ruled them. A wealth of literature exists on pre- 
colonial East African trade routes, such as that by Gray and Birmingham (1970), 
Isichei (1997) and Koponen (1988). When the pre -colonial history of Tanzania first 
began to attract widespread attention during the 1960s, various local and large -scale 
studies of trade between the interior and the coast were undertaken. There is no need 
to repeat their conclusions, but this chapter will briefly consider the nature and 
development of pre -colonial trade before turning its attention to the impact of the 
colonial boundaries. 
Juhani Koponen was quite rightly scandalised when he read in a 1961 World Bank 
report that, "The history of modern economic development in Tanganyika is extremely 
short, having begun in 1884 when Karl Peters founded the Union for German 
Colonisation ".1 Although somewhat on the periphery, Tanganyika had long played a 
1 Koponen, 1994: 9 and World Bank, 1961: 19 
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role in world trade. Some writers, such as Alpers (1969: 48), trace the origins of the 
caravan trade to the 1820s, but such estimates are based upon Zanzibari records, and it 
is likely that caravans had traded between the coast and the interior since before that 
time. Until the Eighteenth Century, the East African interior was one of the most 
isolated parts of Africa, but further west, the Kongo kingdom - which had long traded 
with Europe - was exporting the ivory of 3 -4,000 elephants and up to 40 tons of 
copper per year in the Eighteenth century. Such levels would qualify as mercantile 
autonomy in Europe, but were achieved in Africa without the trappings of such 
European developments (Feierman, 1993: 179). Before the Eighteenth Century it is 
likely that most goods which were traded between the Great Lakes and the coast 
passed through several hands (Ishichei, 1997: 435), but during the Eighteenth Century, 
the Yao and then the Nyamwezi began to carry goods as far as the coast (Isichei, 
1997: 431). Salt, iron and iron products such as hoes were both the chief commodities 
and main currencies. The Nyamwezi, amongst others, used hoes to pay hongo and to 
buy food (Liebenow, 1971: 19; Alpers, 1969: 50 -1).2 
During the Nineteenth Century, coastal entrepreneurs took control, as two main 
commodities began to dominate the caravan routes: ivory and slaves. Ivory was the 
most important of the two. Slaves were traded in their own right, particularly for 
labour on the islands, but were often used to transport the ivory. It was only then that 
the coastal Swahili began to take control and so Zanzibari records naturally begin to 
speak about regular caravans to and from the interior from this time onwards.3 By the 
1870s an economic system based upon ivory and centred on Zanzibar reached out to 
cover modern -day Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, eastern Zaire, northern Zambia, 
Malawi and northern Mozambique. The strength and importance of this system is 
indicated by the level of cohesion in this area today. Many links remain, from patterns 
2 For more on pre- colonial trade, see Richard Gray and David Birmingham, 1970. 
3 For more on this, see Roland Oliver, "Africa on the eve of partition ", in The 
Cambridge History of Africa (1965). 
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of labour migration to the use of Swahili as a regional lingua franca (Kaniki, 1980: 42). 
Only Rwanda remained outside this system, playing the role of the China of central 
Africa - rejecting long distance trade and closing itself to most foreign influences 
(Iliffe: 1995: 183). As Swahili and Arab traders came to replace the Yao and the 
particularly the Nyamwezi, and "the commercial policy of the Sultan of Zanzibar 
turned them into the porters, rather than the financiers or entrepreneurs" (Coulson, 
1982: 27), it could be argued that this was no longer an African economic system. 
However, just as the African influence in Ancient Egypt has been underestimated, so 
the generally African origin of the Swahili traders has often been lost in the tales of the 
'Arab East African Coast'. The autobiography of the most famous trader of them all, 
Tippu Tip, seems to depict an African with some Arab ways, rather than an alien to the 
continent (Tippu Tip, 1966).4 In addition, the Yao continued to control long distance 
trade around Lake Malawi, where their domination was only broken by the armed 
intervention of colonial forces. 
It is, however, possible to overestimate the importance of the caravan trade to the 
economy of East Africa as a whole. Elizabeth Isichei estimates that even long distance 
traders accrued more benefit from local trade than interior -to -coast trade (Isichei, 
1997: 431). Many African groups who were perceived as 'advanced' by the West did 
not take part in long distance trade. For example, the Chagga traded locally, but were 
more interested in their banana groves and irrigation systems than contact with the 
coast or lakes.5 Isichei is probably correct when she writes that the exaggerated 
domination of the caravan trade probably results from the fact that most contemporary 
commentators were based at the coast (Ischei, 1997: 433). Nevertheless, it seems that 
there was some economic cohesiveness within the wider East African region; a 
4 This autobiography is an excellent source for the history of the region and of the 
period. 
From Isichei, 1997: 431 and from personal conversations with Chagga elders in Dar 
es Salaam and Moshi during 1997. 
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cohesiveness that did not sit easily with the colonial partition of the region. It was into 
this combination of local trading systems and long distance caravan routes, already 
greatly influenced by western trade at the coast, that the colonial powers attempted to 
carve up the region and to regulate patterns of trade to their own advantage. 
The Colonial Impact 
While the imposition of linear boundaries played a major role in disrupting African 
and Afro -Arab trade patterns, the intrusion of western economies and trade was 
altogether on a much grander scale. Pre -colonial economies did not die overnight, 
although the introduction of mass -produced goods such as iron hoes did bring about 
collapse in certain sectors. This occurred without the support of colonial rule, but 
colonialism hastened the deterioration and encouraged it in all areas of production, not 
just with regard to manufactured goods. Many agricultural techniques and the 
production of textiles, iron and salt were all destroyed by a combination of colonisation 
and an increasing number of imports. "Trade turned agriculturists and craftsmen into 
porters; disease wiped out most of the cattle; and the fighting and turmoil between 
1890 and 1920 depopulated large areas of the country" (Coulson, 1982: 27 -8). The 
thirty years of upheaval wrought by an alliance of famine, disease and war hastened 
economic change. The volatility and change of those years affected indigenous 
economies and made change seem inevitable. Despite this, it took German and other 
European traders over forty years to gain control of the entire economic area from 
Zanzibar to Katanga (Sheriff, 1979: 42 -3) and the smelting of iron survived among the 
Bemba and Fipa into the 1920s.6 
6 From personal communication with Roy Willis of Edinburgh University. 
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German interest in East Africa was largely fuelled by the economic potential of the 
region. As DOAG expeditions moved towards the lakes, German control spread out 
along the lines of pre- colonial trade routes. Stations were set up at key trading points 
such as Tabora, and by 1912 the DOAG as a company had expanded into pre -1885 
Zanzibari spheres of influence to the west of Lake Tanganyika (Rodney, 1979: 140). 
Arab and Swahili traders in the area who wished to avoid German control were cut off 
from their ivory markets in Zanzibar and were confronted by the Congo Free State. In 
DOA_ African chiefs feared the loss of the caravan tolls between one chiefdom and the 
next known as hongo (Alpers, 1975), and African control of political and economic 
space was replaced by European boundaries, duties and taxes. Along international 
boundaries, Africans who had their fields separated from their villages, or who had 
become detached from the main part of their village, group or polity, were generally 
given six to twelve months to return to harvest their crops, collect property and claim 
compensation. This period was actually legally fixed at six months for problems caused 
as a result of boundary changes in the 1890 Treaty.? 
The actual details of the economic impact of the international boundaries would 
make an interesting topic for local, detailed studies, but it is worth citing several case 
studies here which were typical of the information gathered. The BEA -DOA boundary 
offers many examples, possibly because it has been the subject of much attention in 
general. The BEA -DOA boundary at the coast offers two contradictory examples of 
the use of western communication to aid cross -border links. African and Arab traders 
at the coast were largely dependent upon the trade winds to move their goods any 
considerable distance up and down the coast. Western traders disturbed this trade as 
they did not need to rely on the winds. The larger Swahili boats lost their role although 
smaller vessels continued to dominate local trade. Overland trade also existed along 
7 RKA: R1001 635: 182, 14th May 1910. Notes on the Anglo- German Boundary 
Commission of 1910, by the Boundary Commissioners. 
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the coastal strip, mainly between Mombasa and Tanga. The journey took four days but 
it was cheaper than paying the cost of a sea journey. In 1916 the DOA and BEA tried 
to set up a postal service between the two towns, with runners meeting at the border 
to exchange post. It was quickly abandoned, however, because of the regular 
movement of African traders, both overland and at sea, who were able to carry post 
(Brode, 1911: 30). The colonial authorities were prepared to incorporate some aspects 
of pre -colonial trade in their new economies. Despite this, the general colonial opinion 
of cross -border DOA -BEA trade remained that, "it is limited merely to an occasional 
exchange of the daily needs of the natives, and remains uncontrolled" (Brode, 1991: 
33). 
The major pre -colonial trade route in the north of DOA passed through Taveta on 
its way from Lake Victoria to Mombasa, and so Taveta was one of its key targets in 
the area. Following partition, the route crossed the border into DOA on its way to 
Taveta. However, the British and German authorities tried to direct trade flows to 
remain wholly within their territories and began to implement duties on a more 
effective basis. Random patrols caught many unwary merchants, sometimes putting 
them out of business. This route therefore become much less important as goods 
bypassed the area, and Taveta lost its importance to the British. Its remote location 
made it something of a burden.8 
While the colonial authorities actively sought to break up trade routes which 
crossed boundaries, they were sometimes prepared to act to preserve local means of 
production. The 1890 DOA -BEA boundary commission had determined that a small 
woodland near the Losaoyai River, assumed to be in the DOA, should be transferred to 
BEA because the nearby Wataveta of BEA hung their beehives there.9 The transfer 
8 RKA: R1001 633: 201 -2, 10th August 1909. Report on Taveta area by Methner. 
9 RKA: R1001 587: 181R, 22nd August 1898. Letter from Kaiserliche Stationschef 
Johannes, to the DOA government, Dar es Salaam. 
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was carried out but in 1898 the Germans requested that the land be returned on the 
grounds that it would simplify the boundary. Compensation would be paid and the 
Wataveta would have the opportunity to cross the border to become German 
citizens.1° The outcome is unknown, but from conversations with people from Moshi 
it seems that this area of land was transferred back to DOA, although the famous 
beekeeping Wataveta remained in BEA. It seems that both colonial powers were 
prepared to support African economic access if it supported their own case. The 
German authorities backed a Chagga claim for more land to the north of Kilimanjaro. 
They did not have enough grass to cut for their cattle and considered that they had 
been cut off from their traditional lands.11 Also, some of their traditional watering 
places lay twelve to fifteen miles north -east of the boundary. The Germans requested 
the transfer of all the land in question, arguing that it would save the British the trouble 
of trying to administer such a remote area. Needless to say, the German offer was 
rejected. 
Further west, on Lake Victoria, African trading vessels were hit in much the same 
way as at the coast. Despite Stanley's assertion that he had been the first to recognise 
the trade potential of the lake in 1878 (Stanley, 1878: 223), by 1882 the Baganda were 
transporting ivory and slaves across the lake to Kagei near Mwanza (Wilson and 
Felkin, 1882: 189) and it seems reasonable to expect that this trade pre -dated Stanley's 
arrival in the area. Also in 1882, Arab dhows of Said bin Saif were spotted on the lake 
(Ashe, 1890: 43). Large -scale African trade, however, was decimated when a steamer 
was launched on the lake by a company called Boustead and Ridley (Ford, 1955: 19); 
several others arrived within five years. European competition and the impositition of 
duties between Uganda and DOA badly hit the dhow trade, and this was compounded 
10 RKA: R1001 587: 39, 22nd October 1905. Report by G.E. Smith on the Anglo- 
German Boundary Commission. 
11 RKA: R1001 637: 115 -6, 11th March 1914. Letter concerning border disputes from 
the DOA Governor, to all DOs. 
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by the suppression of the slave trade and the construction of the British Uganda 
railway. The only way to compete was on a small scale and by avoiding the main ports. 
To the south -west, a pre- colonial trade route mainly used for transporting ivory led 
from the Congo Free State through Kivu area and into Rwanda.12 The Belgian 
authorities made no attempt to stop the trade despite having administrators on the 
ground.13 However, by the early 1890s, European ivory hunters were using the route 
to carry ivory into DOA and BEA. The envy of Belgian officials at the great profits 
which this illegal trade brought to the Europeans involved increased until 1895, when 
an ivory trader named Stokes had his goods seized and was murdered by Congo Free 
State officials.14 Pre -colonial trade routes could be used by Europeans and Africans 
alike, and colonial objections seem to have been determined on a case -by -case basis, 
rather than through any inherent support for all European trade per se. 
One of the great pre -colonial trades was slave- trading, although it could be argued 
that large -scale slave -trading and raiding was partly the product of Zanzibari colonial 
rule. Anti- slavery sentiment, as personified by Livingstone, had been one of the 
primary catalysts behind European involvement in East Africa. However, despite 
military campaigns by the colonial powers against 'Arab'15 and Yao slave traders, 
localised slave trading continued, and often seems to have made use of the new 
boundaries. Africans from one group could be seized and carried across a border and 
sold to another group. The difference in jurisdiction and sovereignty made it difficult to 
reclaim a lost wife or child. In one notorious case, a wife of the Sultan of Kigoma was 
captured and taken to Belgian territory.16 There is no record of her ever being 
12 As an ivory route, this may have been relatively new trade route. 
13 RKA: R1001 630: 14R, date unknown. Report "Ubersicht über die historische 
Entwicklung der Kivu -Grenzstreitfrage ". No author given. 
14 RKA: R1001 630: 14R. See Note 13. 
15 The term Arab was often mistakenly applied to Arabs and Swahili people. 
16 RKA: R1001 622: 112b, 1897. Report by the Congolese Foreign Office on the 
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returned. Lack of manpower and resources during the early years of colonial rule 
prohibited colonial intervention. In one of the few cases of the prosecution of slave - 
traders, a Swahili called Magid ben Said was put on trial for his role in slave trading to 
the east of Lake Tanganyika. Documentation from his interrogation by DOA soldiers 
and subsequent trial provide a great deal of interesting information about life in the 
borderlands of DOA.17 His courtroom statements confirm the general impression of 
lawless borderlands, where rebels against colonialism, slave traders, mutineers and 
bandits were very often one and the same. As with the case of Gabriel in Uganda, 
which was discussed in Part Two, Magid ben Said was outlawed because of slave 
trading, and later became caught up in the series of mutinies of Congolese troops in 
Kivu region, which dominated political and military policy along the north- western 
borders for several years.i8 Whether such figures are seen as African nationalists, 
fighting the colonial oppressors with whatever means were at their disposal, or as 
outlaws and bandits out to get what they could, they did exploit the existence of the 
new borderlands. These borderlands, however, had more in common with the pre- 
colonial African frontiers portrayed by Kopytoff (1987) than with western -style linear 
boundaries. The African frontier died hard. The weakness of colonial rule made the 
borders zones rather than lines, and these borderlands were exploited by various 
Africans in various ways, whether economic or political, for good reasons or for bad. 
On the BCA -DOA border during the 1890s, British commentators consistently 
mention German economic exploitation and brutality as the reason behind African 
migration into BCA, and record various instances of moving economic assets into 
BCA to avoid seizure by the German authorities. Unfortunately, there are no German 
Magid Affair. 
17 RKA: R1001 622: 111 -143, 1897. Series of documents on the Magid Affair: a 
mainly printed copy of court evidence. Many of the documents are written by the 
Congolese Foreign Office. 
18 Photocopies of all the above -mentioned documentation are in the possession of the 
author. 
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or African witnesses to balance the picture, and this must be borne in mind when 
considering the following examples. Captain Close, whose observations have already 
been mentioned, cites the example of the Chief of Kaponde keeping his cattle on 
British territory, although Kaponde lay in German territory.i9 The Germans had not 
introduced taxation at that time, yet Close writes that the chief has already been 
flogged for not producing enough rubber and feared the loss of his cattle. Chief 
Chikanomalino of Namwanga, the most influential chief on the border, followed suit 
and moved his cattle across the border. While Captain Close was in the area with the 
Demarcation Committee, the chiefs of Luma, Zwalo and other groups asked to be 
transferred to British territory, as under the boundary agreement, Africans had a period 
of ten months to settle where they wanted to. Close wrote that, "Zombe, the Chief of a 
group of villages south of the Kalambo River, displayed the greatest anxiety not to fall 
into German hands....and a considerable exodus from German into British territory" is 
expected.20 There does, indeed, appear to have been some level of movement from 
DOA into BCA, but probably not on the scale predicted by Captain Close. As was 
mentioned in Chapter Five, with regard to the village of Tontera on the same border, 
people often wished to change from the authority of one colonial power to that of 
another, but by moving the border, rather than by leaving their current site for another 
across the border.21 African ties to land and awareness of territoriality were often 
considerable. This would certainly make an interesting topic for further, localised 
research. 
19 FO881/7115: 34, March 1899. "Report by Captain Close R.E., on the Delimitation 
of the Nyasa- Tanganyika Boundary in 1898 ". An excellent thirty -five page report full 
of information on the geography and peoples of the border area, as well as technical 
details on boundary delimitation. 
20 FO881/7115: 34, March 1899. See Note 19. 
21 CO691/131/9: 19, 29th November 1933. From Government House, Livingstone, 
Northern Rhodesia. Correspondents unknown. 
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Pre -colonial economic links encouraged the preservation of ties between various 
regions. For example, the links between southern Tanganyika and PEA had been great 
- Yao traders had operated throughout the region, creating a network of trade routes. 
According to Alpers, Makua from the Cabo Delgado hinterland had traded over the 
Rovuma as well as trading with the Portuguese- controlled Ibo since the early 
Nineteenth Century (Alpers, 1984: 371) and Makua elephant hunters had travelled 
throughout east and central Tanganyika throughout that century (Alpers, 1975: 12 and 
183 -5). Even the Makonde, whose territory has been described as the, "Cinderella 
region of a Cinderella territory" (Liebenow, 1971: 1), were drawn into inter -regional 
trade as the demand for their gum copal and wild rubber increased from 1880 onwards. 
Makonde exports of these goods had been unknown in 1874.22 Such trade continued 
under colonialism, and the problems which this created between the colonial authorities 
has already been discussed. Trouble in the region was usually caused by the boundary 
and by the attempts of the colonial powers to divide the people along the line of the 
Rovuma. This manifested itself in differences in colonial policy. For example, following 
the transfer of the Rovuma islands to PEA, British pressure forced the Portuguese to 
back down23 and accept customary rights, when the Portuguese wished to prevent 
Tanganyikan Africans from fishing in the Rovuma lakes in PEA and also from 
gathering salt on the PEA side. 
Differences in colonial policy could also provoke dispute between Africans. In 
1903, a Makonde raid from the Portuguese side of the Rovuma upon their Liwali who 
lived on the DOA bank, was investigated by the German authorities.24 According to 
22 See file FO84:1453. 
23 CO691/140/2: 1 -3, 7th September 1934. Memorandum on problems on the 
Tanganyika - P.E.A. boundary. Untitled and with no author, but sent to Sir C. 
Bottomley. 
24 RKA: R1001 627: 158, 9th October 1903. Report entitled "Portugisische 
Grenzsache; Mavia Einfall", from DO Ewerbeck to the Imperial Government, Dar es 
Salaam. 
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the local German administrator, the liwali had chosen to live on the northern side of 
the river and had taken some of his people with him. The Makonde who stayed in PEA 
did not like their relatives in German territory being forced to pay the German hut tax, 
part of which went to the liwali. Differences in German and Portuguese policy - in this 
case, between high and low taxes, or high and no taxes - coupled with the wholly 
unsuitable method of ruling through alien liwalis, created problems on the border. 
Border differentials could provide opportunities, such as for the DOA chiefs who kept 
their cattle in British territory, but they could also promote discord and dispute within 
African groups. 
In addition, as many Africans came to pay taxes to the colonial administrators 
instead of tribute to their African rulers, it seems safe to assume that this was a great 
loss to African rulers. Although some income was sometimes channelled back to them, 
many must have been resentful, especially when taxes were paid to colonial authorities 
across the border. Unfortunately, no examples have been unearthed and so this point 
cannot be taken any further. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, pre -colonial African trade routes and structures were greatly 
disrupted and impeded by colonial boundaries and colonial policies. Some adjustments 
and local instances of co- operation to prevent the extent of this disruption becoming 
too great have been recorded, but in the final analysis, a requisite of colonialism was 
the construction of territorially based economies. Africans could do nothing to prevent 
the colonialists from imposing economic boundaries. Pre -colonial trade which involved 
more than one colony was not welcomed by the European powers, especially where it 
crossed from the jurisdiction of one power to that of another. How Africans were able 
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to use the boundaries for their own economic advantage is the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CHALLENGES 1: SMUGGLING 
Introduction 
Smuggling was an undoubted challenge to colonial rule and to colonial boundaries. 
The level of resources used to counter it bear testament to that. Much that was 
considered smuggling was merely pre -colonial trade made illegal when the boundaries 
were introduced, and trade duties and restrictions were imposed. However, a large 
proportion of smuggling developed as a direct result of the opportunities provided by 
the creation of the boundaries and the functions applied at them. The perception of 
smuggling and the level of anti - smuggling activity are highly relevant because they 
provide excellent indicators of government attitudes towards their territorial borders. 
This chapter seeks to achieve three things: firstly, to assess how Africans attempted to 
oppose the western boundaries; secondly and linked to the first point, it aims to 
consider how African economic systems tried to overcome the borders; and finally, it 
examines how the actions of the smugglers and colonial anti - smuggling forces 
influenced each other. 
In many ways, Tanzania is a paradise for smugglers. It has long land borders with a 
variety of neighbouring states, which are "almost impossible to police effectively, and 
many widely dispersed ports serving an extensive range of countries, as well as three 
major lakes with a shoreline, shared by adjacent countries" (Maliyamkomo and 
Bagachwa, 1990: xi). When the rather limited scale of colonial and post -colonial anti - 
smuggling forces and the knowledge that eastern -central Africa's pre -colonial trade 
routes almost all led to Tanzania are added to the brew, it can be seen that smuggling 
in the area is and was very difficult to prevent. 
It would be wrong to assume that there was no smuggling in pre -colonial times. 
Smuggling occurs where duties are imposed and so had certainly occurred for 
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centuries in East Africa. The Sultanate of Zanzibar imposed duties at the coastal ports, 
while various African polities demanded hongo from caravans and other traders. Some 
traders would undoubtedly have attempted to avoid paying these duties. The 
imposition of the colonial boundaries, however, almost certainly increased the potential 
and the motive for smuggling. Linear boundaries demarcate different authorities and 
laws, and therefore create tax, duty and price differentials which in turn create 
opportunities for either trading to make money, or for softening the blow of 
government taxes. 
Little attention has been paid to the history and methods of smuggling in 
Tanganyika. Most major histories, such as Iliffe's A Modern History of Tanganyika 
(1979), ignore the subject entirely. MacGaffey has written a number of works on 
modern smuggling in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1991, 2000), but colonial 
smuggling has received very little attention.' Despite this, the Dar es Salaam and 
Zanzibar archives provide a wealth of primary sources concerning smuggling across 
the borders of Tanganyika. By far the most popular location for this is the sea border 
with Zanzibar, and a thorough survey of the files concerned reveals that fifty percent of 
all smuggling references related to this border. Whether this is a fair reflection of the 
true level of illegal cross -border trade or merely the result of better record keeping on 
this border is impossible to ascertain. What seems beyond doubt, however, is that the 
high level of pre -colonial trade across this border coupled with the ease of transporting 
goods large distances over water, enabled more smuggling across this border than 
across any other. 
As with most subjects, matters regarding smuggling only tended to come to the 
attention of the central government in Dar es Salaam when payments were required to 
1 One very useful document in the research for this section has been a list of laws and 
duties applied to cross border trade; Laws of Tanganyika, 1928: Volume 1, Chapter 
57. Customs 
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be made out of government resources, or when relatively large amounts of money 
were added to government resources as the result of the sale of cargoes seized by the 
anti -smuggling authorities. As a result, most documentation approaches the subject 
from a financial point of view. Moreover, under British and Tanzanian administration, 
subject areas which were deemed to be of low importance were periodically destroyed. 
Sadly, German smuggling records - including court records - have been destroyed, so 
little evidence remains from the German period. The bulk of the non -financial British 
smuggling documents - including most court records - have also been destroyed in 
these periodic culls. As a result, this chapter will concentrate upon the British period.2 
Government expenditure relating to smuggling includes the payment of rewards to 
informers, to policemen and to customs officials; the employment of coastal guards; 
and the purchase of equipment for these guards. Luckily, in discussing the payment of 
rewards, government administrators often included details or even whole reports on 
particular instances of smuggling, as well as discussion of smuggling in general and the 
fight against it. Such limited records inevitably portray a somewhat one -dimensional 
picture of smuggling in East Africa. Rather more petty smuggling will have been 
excluded where no rewards were paid, as will any larger scale activities that were too 
efficient to be identified, or intercepted, or which received support from corrupt 
officials. The problematic relationship between smuggling and the smuggling record 
are much the same as that between modern crime and crime figures. It is unlikely that 
much smuggling was connected to high ranking government officials. The colonial 
government wrote many of its laws as it went along, and so could raise or lower levies 
and taxes as it wished. It is however, highly likely that smuggling which was carried 
out at the expense of neighbouring territories could be overlooked. 
2 Interviews were carried out with several elderly men in Zanzibar who claimed to 
have been smugglers and /or customs officials. The information used in these interviews 
has been used as background information, but will not be used directly in this chapter. 
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This chapter will consider the nature of smuggling in Tanganyika during the British 
period and will consider examples from each of the territory's borders. The central 
case -study, however, will be the Zanzibar- Tanganyika border. As well as being the 
most popular area for smuggling and the best documented case, it has been possible to 
cross -reference the documentation in the Tanzanian and Zanzibar archives in order to 
build up as accurate a picture as possible of smuggling activity. Many documents refer 
to smuggling from the sea; in practice, this almost exclusively refers to smuggling from 
the islands of Zanzibar. There was probably some level of smuggling across the Indian 
Ocean but as the official record rarely distinguishes between that from Zanzibar to the 
mainland, or that from India or Indonesia, it is difficult to estimate the level. What is 
certain, is that until the later years of colonial rule in East Africa, Zanzibar was the 
most important port after Mombasa in East Africa, so many of those cargo ships and 
dhows which put in on the Tanganyikan coast from Zanzibar had actually started their 
journeys much further afield. As far as the Tanganyikan customs officials were 
concerned, it mattered little whether contraband had been taken on board in India, 
Oman or Pemba. Apart from cross -sea smuggling, the other main form of illegal trade 
during the colonial period was that of cattle smuggling. This will be considered in some 
depth in Chapter Ten. 
The German Period 
For most of the German period there is little recorded evidence of smuggling, but 
this is more a reflection of the lack of efforts to check it and the lack of records, than 
of an absence of smuggling. In fact, the sheer weakness of colonial rule in all the 
colonial territories of eastern Africa suggests that many Africans continued to trade as 
before, and in borderlands this could easily mean trading with those on the other side 
of the line. During the early years of the colonial occupation, the German authorities 
complained about smuggling on the eastern side of Lake Victoria and therefore wanted 
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the Boundary Commission to determine the boundary to aid control.3 Far to the east, 
as was mentioned in Chapter Seven, Taveta lay on a pre -colonial cross -border route 
which crossed the boundary.4 In correspondence concerning German efforts to prise 
the town away from the British, the German authorities in Moshi make it clear that 
German possession would make it easier to suppress smuggling in the area. 
For the years leading up to the First World War, instances of smuggling in the 
colonial records are far more numerous. Undoubtedly there were more colonial 
officials to identify and counter illegal activity, but increasing colonial efforts at 
economic exploitation also meant that taxes and duties encouraged some forms of 
smuggling. In 1910, overland trade between Bukoba District and Uganda passing 
through the military station at Kifumbiro was estimated at a paltry £200 per annum: 
mainly salt, bark cloth and a little ivory. The German Vice -Consul at Entebbe was 
convinced that additional unmonitored trade by- passed the post and also the duties, but 
he had no resources to investigate or intervene (Brode, 1911: 61 -2). 
On the other side of Lake Victoria, there were practical reasons for not paying 
duties. The abaKuria in Kenya were far from markets in Kenya, but near to the 
Tanganyikan market in Tarime, North Mara (Kjerland, 1995: 193). The amount of 
registered trade was small, but this does not mean trade was low level. The South 
Kavirondo District Annual Reports for the years 1908 -12, indicate a high level of 
smuggling, with the result that enormous number of English Rupees ended up on the 
German side of the border.5 The 1912 and 1913 Annual Reports from Nyanza 
Province and South Kavirondo District Reports 1910, 1912 and 1913 "all mentioned 
smuggling and trade along the border.... Cattle were cheaper on the Tanganyika side of 
the border; the difference was estimated to be 30% in 1913. Large quantities of 
3 RKA: R1001 627: 56, 28th February 1900. Letter from Lieutenant von Wulffen at 
Shirati, to Harry Johnston, British Commander -in -Chief at Entebbe. 
4 RKA: R1001 633: 202, 10th October 1909. Report on Taveta area by Methner. 
5 Kjerland, 1995: 194; KNA: DC/KSI /1/1. South Kavirondo District Annual Report 
1908. 
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English Rupees were in circulation on the German side and it was believed that 
'natives' had a central position in this trade ".6 The First World War and vastly 
increased border tensions and borderland activity probably put an end to this 
flourishing trade. 
Smuggling along traditional trade routes and newly inspired by the international 
boundaries, could be perceived as a form of resistance, as protest against colonial rule 
and colonial boundaries. Certain borderlands were lawless enough to be able to be 
used by rebels and criminals alike. During the 1890s, the DOA -Uganda -Congo 
borderlands were ruled by three colonial powers and ruled effectively by none. They 
provided a ready asylum for raiders, smugglers and outlaws whose crimes would have 
rendered them outcasts in any political authority. They attracted those of a criminal 
nature and anyone opposed to European colonialism (Hopkins, 1969: 279). In 
addition, the physical location of the DOA -Uganda border was ambiguous. "Despite a 
general spirit of Anglo- German co- operation in such major concerns as the Uganda 
uprising and mutiny of 1897 -99, criminals, smugglers, slave traders and rebels also 
found the border zone a useful device for escaping apprehension. "7 Of the African 
rulers who did rebel against colonial rule, the vast majority were those who had the 
most to lose. It was not so much protest against colonial, alien or European rule, as 
protest against the loss of their power, loss of face and a fight to maintain their 
economic power and prestige. Maintaining existing trade in the face of colonial rule 
often meant smuggling. 
The Uganda -DOA border was the scene of various disturbances between 1896 and 
1902, including attacks by dervish raiders who operated with Kabarega, King of 
6 Kjerland, 1995: 186; KNA: PC/NZA/1 /1/6. Nyanza Province Annual Report 1911. 
KNA: DC/KSI/1 /1. See Note 5. 
7 From an unpublished paper by Ralph Austen entitled "The Kagera Boundary: History 
versus Nature ", in the possession of the author. 
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Bunyoro. Mwanga, King of Buganda, had been convicted in December 1896 of 
smuggling ivory into the German sphere, "in a moment of aberration under evil advice 
so he claimed" (Beachey, 1996: 288).8 He was fined and his finances were placed 
under close surveillance. He disliked this immensely, "and he was soon conspiring with 
Gabriel, his Mujasi (head of police) and with Manyuema raiders in western Uganda, to 
join him in common cause against the European." The Commissioner in Uganda, 
Colonel Colville, sent troops to Buddu. Mwanga fled and was declared an outlaw; his 
infant son Daudi Chwa was named as his successor. Successful military operations 
forced him to flee to German territory, and "the Germans, embarrassed by this 
unwelcome guest, placed him under restrictive residence at Mwanza" (Beachey, 1996: 
288). In December 1898 he escaped with 250 Sudanese mutineers who had taken 
refuge there. They were gradually defeated by the British, and Mwanga and Kabarega 
were exiled to the Seychelles. That Mwanga and Kabarega, two sworn enemies, could 
give up their respective kingdoms and fight a united struggle against colonial forces, 
indicates that they had something important to fight for. Whether or not this was 
African independence, such actions can be cited today as instances of African primary 
resistance against oppression. Most smuggling, however, had one aim only - profit. 
Nature of Sm ggling 
It is worth considering the nature of smuggling in Tanganyika. A 1985 ILO report 
on the Informal Sector in Africa found that smuggling was much more common away 
from urban centres throughout Africa, although it supplied many of the goods sold in 
towns (ILO: 1985: 11). Maliyamkomo and Bagachwa agree, and conclude that, 
"border populations tend to ignore rules of international trading transactions" 
(Maliyamkomo and Bagachwa, 1990: 74). Opportunity and distance from metropolitan 
8 The information in this paragraph is largely drawn from Beachley, 1996: 288. 
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control are surely the main causes of this. They add that most transactions involving 
smuggled goods do not pass through well known border markets. "Rather there are 
several hidden smugglers' routes which in fact outnumber official border posts. 
Smuggled goods may be transported by caravan, or by boats across rivers and lakes, 
by head or by mules across uncontrolled territory at night. They may also go through 
officially controlled posts through collusion with border -post officials" (Maliyamkomo 
and Bagachwa, 1990: 102) The exploitation of international boundaries by 
Tanganyikans took many forms, but smuggling above all could be widely and easily 
exploited by borderlanders. 
The means of smuggling were many and varied. With regard to most small scale 
smuggling, people merely walked over their local boundary with whatever goods they 
wished to trade. With regard to the colonial record, dhows or other traditional sea- 
going craft were the preferred form of transport. In some cases, dhow passengers were 
arrested, but the crew and owner were not. As dhows could be used to transport 
various people and goods at the same time, it seems possible that the crew were not 
involved. In many of these cases, playing cards and other small goods were smuggled, 
but in one case in 1939, a man was convicted of smuggling sugar on a dhow.9 Canoes 
are often mentioned, although it is unclear if they travelled directly from Zanzibar to 
the mainland, or were used to transport goods from a dhow to the coast.1° The type of 
canoes called ngalawa are still used on the open sea between the islands and the 
mainland, and so could certainly have been used for the longer voyages.11 In one case, 
a taxi was used by a smuggler to transport goods over a short distance, but it can 
safely be assumed that this was not the norm.12 
9 TNA: TS 12402/II: 65, 24th April 1939. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs to 
the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
10 TNA: TS12402/II: 40, 6th November 1940. Letter from the Acting Comptroller of 
Customs, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
11 From the author's own observations. 
12 TNA: TS12402/II: 13, 16th October 1948. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs 
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Research for this chapter in the Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar archives has revealed 
the following items as the most commonly smuggled contraband: matches, playing 
cards, salt, sugar, earthenware pots, gold, khangas, tobacco, tins of dates, whisky, 
bundles of wearing apparel (presumably clothes), jewellery, bangles, betel leaves, 
gramophone records, dried fish, ivory, skins and hides, spices and distilling 
apparatus.13 The most popular items throughout the German and British periods were 
matches, sugar, ivory and playing cards. A great deal of attention was paid in 
correspondence to the import of distilling apparatus.14 Bearing in mind the ease with 
which various forms of incredibly strong liquor are produced throughout Tanzania 
without imported distilling equipment, this level of attention seems misplaced. 
The only secondary work with which this list can be compared is Maliyamkomo and 
Bagachwa's account of smuggling in post -colonial Tanzania (1990). Although a study 
of a slightly later period, this work has much relevance for the pre -colonial period. 
Smuggling patterns in the mid -1960s almost certainly correspond to those from the 
1950s, although those in the 1920s were a great deal different. The main difference is 
that from the 1970s, consumer goods began to make up a large proportion of the 
goods smuggled. The following list of what is smuggled where, has been gleaned from 
Maliyamkomo and Bagachwa (1990): 
Zanzibar and Pemba: exit routes for spices, cloves and fish going to Kenya and 
elsewhere. 
Dar es Salaam: ivory, hides and skins, gold, diamonds and sea food to Europe and 
elsewhere. 
Lindi and Mtwara: supply ivory, hides and skins to Dar es Salaam for onward 
shipment. 
to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
13 From various files, mainly TNA: TS12402/I-III. 
14 eg. TNA: TS11950/I: 285 -7, 22nd October 1935. Letter from the Acting Chief 
Secretary to the Commissioner of Police, Dar es Salaam. 
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Tanga: spices (particularly cardamom), fish and other seafood and coffee to Kenya 
and around the Indian Ocean. 
Arusha and Moshi: centres for delivering hides, skins and livestock, maize, beans, 
ivory, gemstones and gold to Dar es Salaam, Nairobi and Arusha for transhipment. 
Bukoba and Kagera are centres for smuggling coffee to and from Uganda, Rwanda 
and Burundi. 
Kigoma ships ivory, skins and fish to Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire. 
Mbeya and Rukwa ship rice, maize, coffee and fish to Zambia. 
The two lists of smuggled goods given above have two things in common - most of the 
goods had traditionally been traded in the region and most were of relatively low value. 
This indicates that most smuggling was merely an attempt to preserve pre -colonial 
economic systems and to make some money. As such it did run counter to colonial 
attempts to restrict cross -border pre -colonial trade routes and to secure import and 
export duties. 
Reward and punishment 
An examination of the means by which the government attempted to prevent 
smuggling provides an excellent case study of the means by which the colonial 
authorities attempted to impose western -style boundaries. As was stated earlier, 
available records concerning smuggling in colonial Tanganyika are largely composed of 
reward and expenditure correspondence. The following section has therefore largely 
been based upon such material, and mainly relates to smuggling from Zanzibar to the 
Tanganyikan coast. Given the long history of trade between Zanzibar and the coast it is 
no wonder that smuggling occurred on a large scale - it was merely the continuation of 
pre -colonial trade. Even though one of the major trading goods - slaves - had been 
outlawed, trading routes had been set and the coast remained the obvious outlet for 
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goods to the rest of the world. Colonial duties on the mainland may have encouraged 
trade, but duties had long been imposed at the coastal ports by the Sultan, so this was 
not a new phenomenon. In addition, it was probably easier to smuggle on the sea 
border than on land over any great distance, but it was probably also easier to detect. 
This probably explains the larger number of smuggling references to this border than to 
any other in the official record. 
The colonial anti - smuggling forces were composed of a number of different groups: 
customs clerks, customs police, baggage room clerks, customs watchmen, water 
police, Dar es Salaam C.I.D. and the police. There was no single co- ordinating 
authority for these groups, but all rewards linked to smuggling were meant to be 
referred to the Comptroller of Customs in Dar es Salaam, so he must have had as good 
an idea about the situation as anyone. The records of successive comptrollers have 
been consulted for this chapter. The vast majority of anti - smuggling personnel were 
located at the coast, and not surprisingly most apprehensions were made there. 
However, it is not certain whether fewer cases are recorded from the land borders 
because there was less smuggling elsewhere, or because detection rates were lower, or 
because cases elsewhere have not been recorded as faithfully. It seems likely to have 
been a combination of all three factors. 
The Comptroller of Customs determined the level of the reward, and the Governor 
was officially meant to sanction them (Tanganyika, 1928/I: Ch57), although in practice 
it seems that all appeals by officials for their men to be rewarded were granted. Many 
rewards were made to customs police and to civilian employees such as baggage 
handlers, most of whom appear to be of Indian origin, and some names appear time 
and time again as recipients of rewards. The most popular in the Dar es Salaam records 
is Mr J.K. Gohil, a Grade IV Baggage Clerk at Dar port, who seems to have been the 
bane of Swahili coastal smugglers. A 1931 document lists at least nineteen instances of 
smuggling detected by Mr Gohil which had netted 480/- worth of goods and 1931/- in 
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fines, probably all in the same year.15 Mr Gohil is awarded a reward of 100 /- for his 
efforts of that year; not a particularly large sum in view of his efforts. Whether this was 
because of his rank, the fact that he was a civilian, or because he so regularly caught 
smugglers, is difficult to ascertain.16 It was not only at the coastal ports that sharp 
witted officials gained substantial rewards. Mr Joshi, a customs officer at Kigoma 
caught a gold smuggler with goods to the value of £162, for which he was given a £10 
reward. The reward was so high because the value of the goods was high and because 
his vigilance was so good.17 
Certain members of the government seem to have been naive in the extreme. 
Following years of steadily increasing anti -smuggling measures and ever -greater 
seizures along the coast, the Government Auditor, H.N. Lee suggested in 1934 that 
perhaps there might be some smuggling from Zanzibar to Tanganyika, and that fines 
should possibly be increased so that informers could be paid. That this practice had 
been being pursued for several years shows that some government officials were totally 
out- of- touch.18 The massive amount of attention paid to rewarding those employed to 
catch or deter smugglers, points to the dishonesty or at the very least the inactivity of 
government employees. There seems to have been great effort put into securing a 
balance between the rewards paid on the one hand, and the value of the goods and the 
fines paid by those convicted on the other. Again, this indicates the dishonesty of 
government employees and the realistic nature of government policy; anti -smuggling 
15 TNA: TS12402/I: 10, 20th August 1931. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs, 
Dar es Salaam to the Chief Secretary. 
16 TNA: TS12402/I: 12, 27th August 1931. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs, 
to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
17 TNA: TS 12402/II: 9, 10th November 1948. Letter from the Comptroller of 
Customs. Unknown recipient. 
Where files have been given an updated page numbering system, this has generally 
been employed in this work. However, for this file (TNA: TS 12402/II) the updated 
system is difficult to decipher, so the original pagination will be given. 
18 TNA: TS12402 /I: 38 -9, 15th January 1934. Letter from J.H. McQuade, 
Comptroller of Customs to the Auditor. 
204 
employees were, in effect, paid a percentage of the contraband seized. The Dar es 
Salaam Comptroller of Customs wrote in 1934: "In the Kenya- Uganda Customs 
service a reward of 25 per cent of the value of goods seized is invariably 
recommended, and approved. It has not hitherto been the practice in Tanganyika to 
reward Customs officers made in the ordinary course of their duty, but such rewards 
have been approved in cases in which exceptional intuition and intelligence has been 
shown ".i9 In many cases, it is difficult to identify any exceptional intuition or 
intelligence in the actions of officials. 
At the start of 1935, the Comptroller of Customs, Dar, wrote: "The District Officer 
proposed to make widely known throughout the district the fact of the payment of 
rewards in [smuggling] cases....I consider that the general dissemination among Coast 
natives of the knowledge that substantial rewards may be paid for information leading 
to the detection of smuggling is the most valuable, and probably the only practicable, 
means of checking the smuggling which is undoubtedly endemic on the whole littoral 
between Dar es Salaam and Tanga ".20 Other measures were introduced in 1935: 
policemen were to pay no hut or poll tax,21 and HMS Azania was to be used to help 
with anti -smuggling duties in addition to its main duties of ensuring the safety of 
international shipping on the coast. 
Despite the Comptroller's protestations to the contrary, the Kenyan- Ugandan model 
was generally followed from 1935 onwards, as part of increased anti -smuggling 
efforts. Rewards were not to be more than twenty -five percent of the value of the 
goods, but they should be set at levels which appeared substantial to the recipients. 
This indicates that the income, rank and status of the recipient was indeed a major 
19 TNA: Smg/2824, 28th August 1934. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs to the 
Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
20 TNA: Smg/107: 54 -5, 10th January 1935. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs 
to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
21 TNA: Smg/107: 55, 10th January 1935. See Note 20. 
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factor in determining the level of rewards.22 For example, when the Jumbe of Kaole, 
Mwalimu Musa Pishok single -handedly caught a smuggler with cloth, shoes and 
playing cards, a 150/- fine produced a 50/- reward. The Comptroller of Customs 
wrote: "The reward is generous, but justified by the courage and presence of mind 
which was exhibited by the captor, and will no doubt encourage local natives in anti - 
smuggling activities ".23 Upon receiving the Comptroller's letter, the Assistant 
Secretary to the Governor, D.W.I. Piggott, wrote: "The Jumbe no doubt deserves a 
more generous reward than a plain native who would get only about Shs 10/2.24 
Rewards to messengers in the customs service were actually set at twenty -four 
shillings each, "in view of the comparatively low scale of pay drawn by them ".25 One 
point comes to mind: if the level of rewards for a particular individual were known, 
then smugglers must have known the level at which to set their bribes: this could have 
been an advantage when dealing with headmen and customs officials. Even a single 
reward equal to 25% of the value of the seized goods, would not be worth as much as 
a regular 5% bribe to a customs official. 
As a result of the very dry nature of many of the reports of anti -smuggling actions, 
it is difficult to decide whether or not these were only given for exceptional actions. In 
one case, Constable Yessak of the Customs Police and Constable Nooli of the Water 
Police were commended for preventing the illegal removal of 124 packs of playing 
cards from customs' premises.Z6 This hardly seems like outstanding work, especially 
given that it was their job. One interesting point about this case is that although the 
government were very keen to prevent the circulation of playing cards among the 
22 TNA: Smg/107: 55, 10th January 1935. See Note 20. 
23 TNA: Smg/4678: 89, 4th November 1938. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs, 
to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
24 TNA: Smg/4678: 89, 4th November 1938. See Note 23. 
25 TNA: Smg/107: 58, 21st January 1935. Letter from the Acting Chief Secretary to 
the Comptroller of Customs. 
26 TNA: TS 12402/I: 23 -4, 12th March 1932. Letter from the Supervisor of Customs, 
to the Comptroller of Customs, both Dar es Salaam. 
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populace, the cards were sold off at auction for a total of 103/90 to an unnamed 
bidder. Where reward exceeded the standard percentages, the seizure was either 
particularly daring or the reward was partly given in recognition of a series of smaller 
seizures. When Corporal Mohamed discovered a goldsmith called Alabakhas 
smuggling thirty -one gold earrings he was given a reward of 25/- based upon a fine of 
50/- and the sale of the earrings for 150/94. In most cases, informers were generally 
awarded lower rewards than those given to government employees. In 1928 two 
Indian informers were paid 50/- as a result of two Indian smugglers being fined 2000/ - 
each.27 
The counter side to rewards was the punishments meted out to miscreants who 
were apprehended. These usually composed a fine, a combination of fine and 
imprisonment, or more often than not, a choice between imprisonment or fine. In the 
case of a smuggling ring handling goods from as far afield as Java, the two ringleaders 
were given 500/- fines or 5 months imprisonment.28 They paid the fine, although less 
wealthy smugglers often had to go to jail. The choice between imprisonment or fine 
was not always as easy as it might seem. Even where the smugglers could have raised 
the necessary funds to pay off the fine, it was sometimes perceived as better business 
to save their money and accept the term of imprisonment. In one case in 1929, Mrisho 
bin Hamis of Zanzibar, the owner of a dhow which had brought sixty -five 218 pounds 
bags of sugar ashore at Mnanjani, seven miles south of Tanga, was sentenced to six 
months' hard labour or a 1000 /- fine. He seems to have chosen the prison sentence 
because he could not face more losses following the loss of the 680/- worth of sugar, 
as well as suffering the seizure of his boat which was worth 300/ -.29 That the cargo of 
27 TNA: TS12402 /I: 7 -8, 29th June 1928. Letter from John L. Woodhouse, DO for 
Bagamoyo to the Comptroller of Customs, Dar es Salaam. 
28 TNA: Smg/4258: 29, 22nd March 1933. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs to 
the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
29 TNA: TS12402 /II: 30 -1, 4th April 1941. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs, 
to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
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sugar had more than twice the value of the dhow indicates the value of sugar. The 
seriousness of different crimes is not easy to assess; even such classic contraband as 
ivory smuggling did not always attract particularly harsh punishments. For example in 
1940, Salim bin Abdulla was caught putting six rhino horns onto a dhow in Dar 
harbour without going through customs, and received a fifty shillings fine or thirty days 
imprisonment.3o 
Smuggling defences 
Smuggling through the major ports had a character of its own. Crews often held 
contraband in their stores, aiming to dispose of them as and when the opportunity 
arose at the various ports that they passed. This was as true on the Great Lakes as it 
was on the east coast and in the islands. In Dar es Salaam harbour, valuable goods 
were either concealed on the person or in light hand baggage in order to take them 
past customs officials.31 If an opportunity arose, they could also pass goods directly 
from boat to dockside. Most articles were of a high value and carried in small 
quantities, such as perfume, liquor and gold. In one case, seventeen bottles of Goa 
Liquor and three bottles of perfume were brought on the S.S. Karanja from India to 
Dar es Salaam. The goods were hidden in a shore boat and were collected by a local 
Goanese resident.32 This form of smuggling was combated by a variety of measures: 
day and night patrols on the harbour front, examination of baggage in the Baggage 
Room and 'rummaging' of dhows, ngalawa and other small craft in and around the 
waterfront - exactly the same methods, indeed, that are employed at Dar es Salaam 
3o TNA: TS12402/II: 42, 25th June 1940. Letter from the Acting Comptroller to the 
Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
31 TNA: Smg/1119: 69 -71, 9th MArch 1938. Report "Smuggling in Dar es Salaam 
Harbour" by L.J.D. Smith, sent to D.W.I. Piggott, Assistant Secretary. 
32 TNA: Smg/4678: 89, 4th November 1938. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs 
to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
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harbour today. As efforts to counter smugglers increased through the course of the 
1930s, the number of surprise checks rose sharply. One major problem particular to 
Dar es Salaam and Kigoma harbours was the existence of Belgian concessions. These 
were effectively pieces of Belgian territory, the equivalent of embassies - a curious 
form of sovereignty that had no known parallel in pre -colonial Africa. There were, 
however, no fences between these pieces of territory and the rest of the ports in 
question, and as customs controls were handled by two different sets of officials, 
neither could be aware of all cargoes that were passing through the port at any one 
time. As a result, smuggling across the two jurisdictions was rife.33 
While smuggling into the main harbours was a popular pursuit because the main 
coastal harbours were also the main coastal towns and therefore also the main coastal 
markets for contraband, the numerous creeks and inlets on the coast continued to be 
the main entry points for both large scale organised smuggling as well as more petty 
operations. The intricate network of waterways in the Rufiji, more than anywhere else, 
"makes customs preventive work difficult ".34 When J.D. Smith became Comptroller of 
Customs in 1938, he recognised that while anti - smuggling forces were concentrated at 
the main ports, the lion's share of smuggling occurred in the most isolated places on 
the coast between Dar es Salaam and the Kenyan border. Customs police and 
watchmen were posted at the four main ports: Dar itself, Tanga, Pangani and 
Bagamoyo, with watchmen at Moa, Sadani and Mbweni.35 Apart from that, the whole 
300 miles of coastline was vulnerable. He devised an ambitious and faintly comical 
scheme for a chain of watchmen on bicycles to patrol the previously unguarded 
sections of coast, and thereby link existing defences together. 
33 TNA: Smg/1183: 72, 12th March 1938. Addition to letter given in Note 32. 
34 TNA: TS12402/II: 36, 4th April 1941. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs to 
Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
35 TNA: Smg/1924: 83, 3rd May 1938. Report "Customs Coastal Patrol" by L.J.D. 
Smith, Comptroller of Customs, sent to all PCs. 
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W.S. Marchant, the Acting P.C. for Coast Province commented that he believed 
that the watchers should be watched, further confirming problems of the reliability of 
employees - or at least, perceived problems. He also foresaw problems in the use of 
bikes as the coastline was broken by creeks and mangrove swamps at regular intervals. 
The modern coastline seems to support Marchant's reservations. Although track -like 
roads trail the coast to the north and south of Dar es Salaam, they normally lie a couple 
of miles inland and so would not serve Smith's plan.36 In the event, the new patrols 
were introduced, but the Second World War intervened, so there was little time in 
which to determine their effectiveness. The few cases which did come to light as a 
result of the increased manpower, reveal collusion between smugglers and local 
headmen on remote stretches of the Swahili coast. In one case, four tusks were seized 
at Bagamoyo, leading to the arrest of headman Hamisi Vuwaji.37 Overall, the bicycle 
watchman scheme was not an effective means of imposing the western system of 
dividing political space. 
The policing and suppression of smuggling in colonial Tanganyika was often carried 
out with the help of the native authorities. This obviously often depended upon 
whether the authority in question was benefiting from a trade route or particular 
transaction. To take one example, the native authority at Kitopeni near Bagamoyo 
caught a man smuggling twenty -five gross boxes of matches. He was handed over to 
the police and rewards were paid through the headman.38 By the same token, 
smuggling could even be organised by native authorities. In one case in 1934, a large - 
scale smuggling ring was broken which had supplied goods from as far afield as Java. 
Lorries were used to deliver and collect goods on Zanzibar and at Msasani Bay, north 
36 TNA: Smg/1924: 88, 6th May 1938. Letter from W.S. Marchant, Acting PC, to the 
Comptroller of Customs, Dar es Salaam. 
37 TNA: TS12402/II: 57, 29th June 1939. Letter from the Chief Secretary, to the 
Comptroller of Customs, both Dar es Salaam 
38 TNA: TS12402/I: 48: 11th August 1934. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs, 
to the Chief Secretary, both Dar es Salaam. 
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of Dar es Salaam, while a dhow was used to transport the goods across the sea. A 
distribution network was used to disperse the goods on the mainland. Superintendent 
Hornett of Dar es Salaam CID wrote to the Dar Commissioner of Police, "It 
would be idle to pretend that the Native Authority at Konduchi or along the coast is 
not conversant with what is taking place ".39 
According to the colonial records, askaris and customs officers were rarely hurt 
during the course of operations. Even in organised gangs, smugglers seemed to give 
themselves up quite easily. This seems a little unlikely, but interviews with elderly men 
on Zanzibar seemed to confirm that violence with the authorities was rare, even 
amongst criminals. It is possible that the memories of old men remember the good 
times and forget the bad. However, as there is no evidence to counter their argument, 
they must be taken at their word. 
Regional Examples 
Now that smuggling and anti - smuggling has been examined in general, each of the 
borders can be considered in turn. The previous paragraphs have largely been based 
upon smuggling from Zanzibar, but a few points are worth making about smuggling on 
Zanzibar itself. There is an almost total lack of smuggling cases in the Zanzibar court 
files; either they are not recorded, have not been retained by the Zanzibar archives, or 
smuggling was almost all one way, that is, from the islands to the mainland. A few 
cases begin to appear in the records from 1958 on, mainly concerning high value 
goods. For example, in 1958, there was an instance of merchants smuggling wirelesses 
39 TNA:12402/I: 44, 16th February 1934. Letter from Superintendent C.A.T. Hornett, 
Criminal Investigation Department, to the Commissioner of Police, both Dar es 
Salaam. 
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from the mainland to Pemba, avoiding the duties current at that time.4° Apart from 
such cases, the Zanzibar smuggling records seem more concerned with the wrong- 
doings of customs staff, than with the activities of smugglers. Subjects include 
pensions for retired customs officers, a few theft cases by employees, and above all, 
mentions of customs officers being drunken and disorderly. The main smuggling 
activity involved Zanzibar's main crop: cloves. Cloves were moved around the harbour 
or along the shore to boats at anchor in order to avoid duties.41 This did not directly 
affect Tanganyika as the cloves were not taken there. However, the clove smuggling 
problem in the 1950s led to more customs patrols, including the use of motor boats, 
and it is likely that this helped to check smuggling to the mainland by dhow.42 
Cattle culture and pastoralism will be considered in Chapters Eight and Nine, but 
this section would be lacking if it did not mention cattle smuggling. Pure pastoralists 
were a small minority of the East African population, but a substantial proportion of 
the population - perhaps the majority - were involved in cattle raising to some extent, 
and often invested the bulk of their wealth in this portable commodity. As Tanganyikan 
prices were generally lower than in Kenya, it was natural that cattle would be taken 
from Tanganyika to be sold in Kenya. Following the Great War and the British take- 
over, smuggling of cattle was considered to be widespread along the whole length of 
the border. A Kenyan DC wrote in 1925: "I am informed that cattle running from 
Tanganyika to this Territory is on the increase and cattle are openly sold in the trading 
centres. It was found impracticable to patrol the enormous boundary between this 
District and Tanganyika and the Tribal Retainers who were from time to time 
employed on this work were taken off'.43 
4o ZNA: ÁB43/36: 14th May 1958. Letter from A. Bishop, Comptroller of Customs, 
to the Chief Secretary, Zanzibar. 
41 ZNA: AB43/29, 28th January 1927. Letter from G.D. Kirsopp, Comptroller of 
Customs. Unknown recipient. 
42 ZNA: AB43/29: 89, 28.1.27. See Note 41. 
43 KNA: DC/KSI/1 /3. South Kavirondo District Annual Report 1927. 
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Kenya officials estimated that fifty percent of stock slaughtered in Kenya in 1937 
came from Tanganyika.44 This is probably an exaggeration, but the fact that such a 
figure could be considered indicates the scale of the problem. Pastoralism will be 
considered in the next part, but it is as well to debunk one myth that has survived in 
modern literature. Maliyamkomo and Bagachwa write of smuggling of livestock over 
the Kenya -Tanzanian border being carried out smoothly, as by nomadic Maasai 
pastoralists, "sometimes unaware that they are indulging in illegal transactions" 
(Maliyamkomo and Bagachwa, 1990: 102 -3). This cannot be true. They must have 
known it was illegal under colonial law; they either didn't recognise the law or were 
prepared to take the risks. Many other items were smuggled over the same border, 
including maize, sisal and cloth. For example, sisal was cheaper in Kenya than 
Tanganyika by a large margin: ten shillings a unit as opposed to twenty -five in 
Tanganyika, demonstrating that price differences could work both ways.45 Smuggling 
was easier for some groups than others. The abaKuria and Luo lived right on the 
boundary and so often smuggled goods bought and sold by other groups, such as the 
Kisii, who were without their knowledge of and access to the boundary (Kjerland, 
1995: 195). However, cattle were such a key part of society for many of the peoples of 
the area, that smuggling from Tanganyika to Kenya was probably of most importance 
overall, both economically and socially. 
Problems of stock smuggling continued throughout the colonial era and beyond. "In 
the 1950s border committees were established to deal with the difficulties. Various 
attempts to solve the situation was [sic] tried out. In 1957, for example, it was 
suggested at a Border Committee meeting that a special court be established which 
could bear trans -border jurisdiction and which can enforce its judgements in cattle theft 
44 Kjerland, 1995: 194; KNA: DC/KSI /1/4. South Kavirondo District Annual Report 
1937. 
45 KNA: DC/KSI /1/12. South Kavirondo District Annual Report 1950. 
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cases" (Kjerland, 1995: 95). "Their effectiveness was hampered by lack [sic] of legal 
means of enforcing their decisions" (Prazak, 1992: 82). 
Although Tanganyika had no land border with the Congo, social and economic 
interaction between the two was vibrant, with Lake Tanganyika acting as an ideal 
conduit for trade and for smuggling, much as it does today. The archives contain 
countless examples of customs' seizures but two examples give the flavour of most of 
them. In 1937, Customs Watchman Shabani bin Imiri caught a man smuggling matches 
which were being transported on the Congo steamer S.S. Duc de Brabant, at Kigoma. 
He was given 5/- for his troubles. It later emerged that an Indian shopkeeper was 
working through Africans to smuggle matches to Kilwa.46 The organisation and 
geographical reach of this scheme, indicate that matches were a valuable product and 
one certainly worth smuggling. On various other occasions, luxury goods were seized 
as duty had not been paid upon them. Sixty -four gramophone records were seized on 
the TRS Mwanza at Kigoma by Idi bin Ibrahim, a crew member and Sadiki bin 
Songwe, a customs watchman. As a customs informer, it seems surprising that 
Ibrahim's name was publicised, particularly as a fellow crewman was involved.47 It is 
not recorded if he kept his job. Smuggling by canoe on Lake Tanganyika was also very 
popular: matches, cards, earthen pots and the ubiquitous "wearing apparel" were the 
chief contraband which were seized.48 Again, most smuggling was merely the 
continuation of pre -colonial trade. Unlike with the suppression of African political 
systems, it proved impossible for the colonial authorities to clamp down on trade 
routes they disapproved of. There were surely many instances of successful smuggling 
for every example of seizures. 
46 TNA: Smg/4678: 65, 18th April 1936. Letter from the PC for Eastern Province to 
the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
47 TNA: Smg/4678: 72, 12th March 1938. Report "Smuggling in Dar es Salaam 
Harbour" by Smith, Acting Comptroller of Customs, to Piggott, Assistant Secretary. 
48 TNA: TS12402/II: 65, 24th April 1939. Letter from the Comptroller of Customs to 
the Chief Secretary, both Dar es Salaam. 
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There are several instances of the usual matches and cards being seized on the 
Tanganyikan border with Rwanda- Burundi,49 but most attention was paid to the 
smuggling of rhino horn into Tanganyika. The last rhino in Rwanda was probably 
killed during the early 1920s; they were at any rate, very rare after the First World 
War.J° Despite this, 820 kilos of horn were exported through the post at Muhinga in 
1928 alone. It was therefore believed that most ivory exported from the Belgian colony 
to Tanganyika must have originated in Tanganyika,51 particularly as horns and ivory 
were freely admitted into Rwanda -Burundi. Tanganyikan game wardens believed that 
they were shot in Tanganyika, smuggled into Rwanda -Burundi in order to obtain an 
Export Declaration52 from Belgian Customs officials; then re- exported to Tanganyika 
to avoid controls and duties.J3 The DC at Bugufi, Lumley, confirmed that the trade 
was common, and added that it employed the new road that he had built across the 
border. He recommended the setting up of a customs post on the road at the Chizange 
River, and wrote that there were rhino around Bukoba, in Tanganyika, and that these 
must be the source of the horns. The Chief Secretary refused his request for a post. 
The border was 350 miles long and in very rough country, so smugglers could have 
circumvented the road anyway.54 In such remote areas, there was little opportunity for 
colonial control of the borders. 
Game scouts were withdrawn from Bukoba District in 1932 - one of the effects of 
the cuts caused by the world -wide recession from 1930 - thereby giving the poachers 
and smugglers carte blanche to kill rhino. The scouts had been used to patrol 
49 TNA: Smg/2193: 78, 23rd May 1938. Letter from Comptroller of Customs to the 
Chief Secretary, both Dar es Salaam. 
50 TNA: TS13595: 30, 23rd June 1933. Letter from C.R.S. Pitman, Game Warden, 
Uganda, to Game Warden, Arusha. 
51 TNA: 13595: 30, 23rd June 1933. See Note 50. 
52 Called an Acquit de Déclaration a l'Exportation by the Belgian authorities. 
53 TNA: TS13595: 1 -2, 28th June 1929. Letter from André de Beys, Belgian Consul, 
to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
54 TNA: TS13595: 13 -14, 29th August 1929. Letter from E.K. Lumley, Assistant DO 
Bugufi, to the Acting Director of Game Preservation, Kilosa. 
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smuggling routes and watch the borderlands themselves.55 Many of the smugglers and 
poachers were Europeans, including two Italians who were convicted of poaching in 
Bukoba District in the 1920s, and were caught again in the early 1930s by undercover 
scouts under a European captain. Tanganyikan police wrote that rhinos were shot, "in 
Karagwe, taken over to the Congo and registered, and produced back in this country 
as Congo rhino ".56 Unfortunately, nothing else could be discovered on this subject. 
The undercover scouts were probably police who carried out this kind of operation on 
an occasional basis, as it is highly unlikely that a dedicated force would be used for this 
matter, when there was only one DC or administrator for the entire region of nearly 
half a million people. 
Government employees sent to the border for other work were sometimes asked to 
keep an eye open for smuggling. For example, on the North Rhodesian border, an 
office messenger named Shabani Kunguni was sent to supervise road work on a road 
across the Northern Rhodesia border from Ufipa, and asked to check for illegal 
imports at the same time. The goods are not named, beyond being "piece goods ".57 
This border was also a popular transit route for Europeans carrying goods from 
southern to eastern Africa, and on occasion they were also caught smuggling. The 
Conference of East African Governors in 1943 discussed the smuggling of luxury 
goods, such as cosmetics, scents and silk stockings, from the Belgian Congo to North 
Rhodesia via Tanganyika. The Chief Secretary to the Governor of Tanganyika wrote: 
"All ranks are warned that they should not buy goods in one territory for the deliberate 
55 TNA: 13595: 24, 23rd June 1933. Letter from the Acting Game Warden, to the 
Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
56 TNA: TS13595: 26, 21st January 1933. Letter from Game Ranger, M.S. Moore, to 
Superintendent of Police, Bukoba. 
TNA: TS13595: 29, 27th July 1933. Letter from the Acting Game Warden to the Chief 
Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
57 TNA: TS12402/II: 53, 5th August 1939. Letter from the DO for Sumbawanga, 
Ufipa, to the PC for Western Province, Tabora. 
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purpose of taking them into another territory, except such as they have to purchase of 
necessity for their own personal use ".58 Smuggling occurs whenever duties are applied 
at borders, and smugglers come from all backgrounds. 
The border with Portuguese East Africa was involved in a very high level of 
smuggling, partly because of the strong ethnic links across the border and partly 
because of the lack of colonial control. German control of the Kionga Triangle before 
the First World War gave them great control over exports and over the prevention of 
smuggling from DOA, but they also gained Portuguese trade. "Safaris used to come 
regularly from as far as Mataka's country mainly with ivory, tobacco and beeswax, 
which was smuggled across the Portuguese border, and sold to the Germans at 
Kionga" (Thomas, 1951: 50). The Germans acquiesced in this trade because it 
benefited them. Such smuggling had been more difficult before the transfer of the 
Triangle from Portuguese to German rule, because it required boats to cross the 
unfordable river. The Germans at Kionga paid better prices than the Portuguese, and 
they paid in German silver which could be used anywhere. The Portuguese had lost 
their outlet to the sea in the area, and rather than pay the area's very high porter costs 
which resulted from a shortage of labour, most traders - Europeans, Africans and 
Indians - sold their goods to the Germans on the Ruvuma or smuggled them into 
Kionga District. This smuggling continued into the war years (Thomas, 1951: 50 -1). 
The imposition of the boundaries was not always as important as economic benefit 
during the early years of colonial rule. 
This was also an elephant hunting area. Several Europeans were convicted of 
smuggling ivory from PEA into Tanganyika. One individual under investigation was 
Mr. J.R. Woods, who had been hunting elephants in PEA for over two years, 
58 TNA: TS31744: 1, 4th October 1943. Letter from the Chief Secretary to the 
Conference of East African Governors, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
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importing it into Tanganyika and then selling it. He had not been following the 
regulations, and moreover, had been working with a man called 'Dynamite Dan' 
Eldridge of the Ruvuma, who had been deported two years previously by the 
Tanganyika police, and who was a prohibited immigrant. The previous DC at Songea 
had issued Certificates of Ownership to Woods, but the new official, H.C. Baxter, 
recognised that this wasn't legal, and that the ivory had to go through a customs post 
at either Manda on Lake Nyasa, or at Lindi, both of them many days travel distant.59 
As the previous DC had cleared the trade, it was decided to only charge Woods on a 
"technical charge ", and he escaped imprisonment. His ivory stocks were seized, but as 
he was alleged to be virtually destitute, most of them were returned to him. It is hard 
to overcome the feeling that an African - destitute or not - would not have been treated 
in such a lenient manner. 
The later years 
A 1947 customs report on smuggling gives a good picture of the post -war 
situation.60 During the first eight months of the year, income of £3,000 from seizures 
and fines had been accrued, while five percent of this, some L150 had been paid out as 
"a good investment" to customs personnel and informers. This was far less than the 
Kenyan and Ugandan norm of twenty -five percent, despite the apparent adoption of 
this level by the Tanganyikan authorities during the mid- 1930s, indicating that rewards 
continued to be paid in only a minority of cases. "The number of successful cases has 
greatly increased, largely (I consider) by reason of the impression which seems to have 
been created that rewards will be paid for reliable information received." These 
informers are described as being a "secret weapon ", although "somewhat unsavoury." 
59 TNA: TS20495: 2 -27, 23rd Jyly 1931. Letter from J.H. McQuade, Comptroller of 
Customs, to the Director of Game Preservation, Kilosa. 
60 TNA: 040/88: 21. Customs Report on Smuggling in Tanganyika 1947. 
218 
After 1945, all informants' names are withheld in the archives, so it is impossible to 
discover much about them. Departmental officers continued to be rewarded where 
exceptional initiative or vigilance were shown. During the same year, one of the largest 
recorded seizures was made when an Inspector and Sergeant Major of the Customs 
Preventive Force received twenty and ten pounds respectively for their role in the 
seizure of goods worth £789. Unfortunately, the type of goods was not mentioned.61 
An interesting smuggling case came to light just as the days were being counted 
down to Tanganyikan independence. It involved the Katangan bid for independence, 
and as a case study it could just as easily be placed under international relations.62 The 
Katangan 'state' complained to the Tanganyikan government in mid -1961 about the 
activities of Congolese soldiers operating out of Tanganyika. They feared that 
Tanganyika was being used as a launch pad for an invasion of Katanga, and that these 
forces were being aided by TANU. There is absolutely no evidence that this was true. 
According to British colonial records which had remained closed for over thirty years, 
the men in Tanganyika were actually Congolese deserters and had been smuggling 
arms in Tanganyika to sell. They were conveyed over Lake Tanganyika by an unnamed 
African who had a fleet of six canoes fitted with outboard motors. A Belgian named 
Houart, employed by the Katangan government on anti- smuggling operations, is 
believed to have machine -gunned a number of Tanganyikans, but no trace of this 
incident could be found in the Tanzanian archives. Despite British certainty that no 
invasion was being launched or planned from Tanganyikan soil, they promised to stop 
any smuggling in both directions. 
61 TNA: TS12402/II: 25, 7th July 1947. Report by the Inspector of the Customs 
Preventative Force 
62 CO 822/2074: 8, 9th August 1961. Telegram from Governor's Deputy to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
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Conclusion 
The effectiveness of anti -smuggling measures is difficult to assess, although 
smugglers were caught on a regular basis. The efforts of the coastal police and 
customs officials more than covered the costs, and the efforts of men like Baggage 
Clerk Gohil certainly brought the Treasury a tidy profit. There is, however, no 
backdrop against which to set these efforts, no perspective in which they can be set, as 
it cannot be estimated how much smuggling went undetected and unobserved. Anti - 
smuggling efforts were substantial and could have been even greater, but as J.H. 
McQuade, the Comptroller of Customs wrote: the smuggling is, "practically confined 
to sugar, matches, playing cards and tobacco, and is not therefore considered to be of 
such magnitude as to justify the considerable expense necessary for the organisation of 
even a moderately efficient preventive service ".63 That smuggling of high value goods 
was perceived to be a matter of some concern, while customs avoidance with common 
or garden contraband was seen as of lesser importance, indicates that smuggling was a 
problem mainly because it reduced treasury income, rather than for any notion of 
violating the boundaries. In addition, that Kenya and Uganda felt able to operate a joint 
customs department when they felt unable to countenance many other moves towards 
union or federation, indicates that it was not a strong symbol of sovereignty. 
Colonial attempts to curtail pre -colonial trade routes which involved crossing 
boundaries, together with the imposition of duties, was an obvious strand of the many - 
layered attempts to impose the western system of dividing political space upon Africa. 
It is true that boundaries define political space, but much of the motivation behind 
wanting to control territories with boundaries is connected to economic control. It 
allowed the Tanganyikan government to raise income and to protect its own infant 
63 TNA: TS12402/I: 38 -9, 15th January 1934. Letter from J.H. McQuade, 
Comptroller of Customs, to H.N. Lee, the Auditor. 
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production of certain articles if it so wished. Africans did attempt to preserve existing 
economic systems through smuggling and this could never be entirely eliminated by the 
authorities. Indeed, the introduction of new anti - smuggling staff and policies is proof 
of the influence that African borderlanders had upon the colonialists. However, as will 
be seen in the next chapter, the colonial economy quickly came to be of more 
importance to the territory as a whole than any amount of smuggling. Colonial trade 
routes never entirely overrode pre -colonial routes, but they did come to overshadow 
them. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE MAKING OF THE COLONIAL ECONOMY 
Introduction 
The economic implications of the colonial boundaries are discussed in various 
chapters of this thesis; this chapter is purely concerned with border aspects of the 
development of the colonial economy. Building on the chapter on international 
relations, it will examine the idea that the borders between Tanganyika and other 
British colonies mattered less than those elsewhere because of the relatively close 
integration of the British territories. This is surely one of the basic tenets of the 
western system of dividing political space - namely that boundaries are only truly 
international boundaries when they divide different sovereignties. The British 
colonialists were therefore right to describe the Tanganyika- Kenyan boundary, for 
instance, as an interterritorial border, rather than an international one, because it was 
less divisive. Both Tanganyika and Kenya were ultimately ruled by Great Britain 
In order to examine the relative importance of the boundaries to the colonial 
economy, it is necessary to discuss the nature of the colonial economy. One of the 
primary reasons for setting up the colonies was to bring economic benefit to the 
metropolitan power, and the colonial governments generally put most of their efforts 
into developing the economies of their respective territories in order to achieve this. As 
was discussed in the previous two chapters, the international boundaries were used to 
contain economic development within the territory, and cross -border trade by Africans 
was generally discouraged. Large scale trade, whether by Africans, Europeans or 
others, was only encouraged where it would bring benefit to the territory in question - 
normally through taxes and duties. Colonial economic development policies were 
chiefly aimed at the development of export goods; these goods were usually crops, 
such as rubber, sugar and coffee in the case of Tanganyika. They were grown in one 
part of the country and exported via Tanganyika's ports, normally in either an 
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unprocessed or semi- processed state. They were then often shipped to either the 
metropolitan power, or perhaps to another of the power's colonies, where processing 
would take place. It was at this stage that much of the value was added. 
The production of these crops within Tanganyika was largely undertaken by private 
European companies and individuals, although several crops were also produced on a 
large scale for export by Africans. Government policy was therefore aimed at removing 
obstacles to the production of these crops and preventing their export via the ports of 
other colonies, particularly where export duties could not be imposed. Above all, it 
was aimed at developing the transport infrastructure to enable the movement of goods 
from areas of production to the ports and then overseas. It was vital that enough 
produce was transported along the transport system to recoup the initial investment 
and running costs of the system. The transport networks of Tanganyika and the other 
territories of East Africa therefore developed internally, and took the form of river 
systems, with the international boundaries appearing as watersheds. The road and rail 
patterns linked many areas of the territory, reaching out towards the borders but rarely 
crossing them. This was a major factor in the development of the colonial territories as 
independent entities, and made for territorial cohesion and international differentiation. 
These colonial routes superseded the pre -colonial trade routes which had crossed the 
new boundaries, but which survived in various forms. 
There were two great differences between the development of the British and 
German economies in Tanganyika. Firstly, the German colonial economy and 
infrastructure had to be imposed upon an already vibrant African economy. Most of 
the crops, roads and railways which the Germans constructed, formed the basis for 
British colonial economy, which did not have such strong African structures to 
overcome. Secondly, the proximity of other British territories to British Tanganyika 
was in marked contrast to the isolation of the German colony. As has been seen in 
relation to political matters, the British colonies of East Africa did not co- operate 
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nearly as much as might be expected. There was however, much more co- ordination 
between the development of the Kenyan and Tanganyikan economies under the British, 
than there had been between BEA and DOA in German times. British Tanganyika not 
only bordered four other British territories in the interior, but faced an Indian Ocean 
packed full of British colonies, protectorates and trading posts, from Zanzibar, 
Mauritius and the Seychelles, to India, Singapore and Australia. All offered potential 
markets and trading partners which were favoured by the Foreign and Colonial Offices 
in London. There was often dispute between Kenya and Tanganyika, however, as it 
was generally perceived within the Empire that Tanganyika should be developed in 
order to benefit Kenya. 
Excellent economic studies on colonial Tanganyika exist elsewhere'; indeed 
Tanganyika is usually studied historically from an economic point of view. This short 
chapter will make no attempt to follow or explain the entire economic development of 
the territory. It will however consider the boundary implications of the development of 
the colonial economy and vice versa. 
The Colonial Economy 
For better or worse, Tanganyika received little colonial economic development in 
comparison with many colonies around the world, and even in comparison with the 
other East African colonies. The limited number of German colonialists certainly made 
a big impact in the territory during the thirty or so years of German rule, but there was 
little private investment in DOA. There were several reasons for this. The DOAG, 
which initially governed the colony and later maintained economic control, did not 
have the resources for widespread investment, and Carl Peters limited the number of 
' See Coulson, 1982; Iliffe, 1979; Koponen, 1995. 
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shareholders in order to maintain his control. Secondly, East Africa was little known to 
German financiers, while industrialisation was underway in Germany itself and there 
were great profits to be made there. Finally, the failure of other colonial companies 
discouraged German and European entrepreneurs (Kimambo and Temu, 1969: 104), 
while the production of export goods by Africans themselves was discouraged. Even 
when the German government assumed sovereignty of the territory, the DOAG 
retained economic rights and maintained its protectionist stance. 
As has been discussed, by 1920 mass -produced imports had destroyed most 
traditional craft skills in Tanzania (Coulson, 1920: 70), while large quantities of iron 
hoes and clothing had been imported from India since pre -colonial times. This trade 
continued throughout the German and British periods, and was accompanied by even 
cheaper Japanese exports. Within the British Empire, Tanganyika was seen as 
providing a market for goods from elsewhere, notably Kenya and India, and most 
branches of the economy were not protected. During the early decades of the colony, 
protectionism within certain key industries was vital. The British economy did not have 
the vigour to transform the territory; it was only one out of many territories and Britain 
could no longer expand. Oil or major gold reserves would have attracted investment, 
but British entrepreneurs had a vast array of imperial territories to choose from, and 
moreover a large proportion of their investments were made outside the empire. 
British economic development policy in Tanzania did not go far beyond attempting to 
balance the books, and "Continuing poverty was British Tanganyika's leading 
characteristic" (Iliffe, 1979: 261). What effort went into making the economy benefit 
the colonial power encouraged Tanganyika's development as a satellite of Kenya. 
Those sectors which were developed were generally those which produced raw 
materials on European plantations, while support for African production varied over 
time, but was rarely very high. Cameron wanted advancement in the material 
conditions of Africans, to improve health, education and security, but believed that this 
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was best achieved through agricultural development. He considered that 
industrialisation would destabilise Tanganyika altogether (Cameron, 1939: 165 -6). 
Little attention was therefore given to the development of industrial enterprise, and 
those goods which were prohibited or restricted were those which were perceived as 
threatening disorder. A list of such items from 1935 includes alcohol, opium, certain 
types of matches and distilling equipment.2 
The Development of Ports and Railways 
The railways of Tanganyika were to be the main means of transporting export 
goods from the regions to the ports. The development of the railway system was 
therefore a vital component in the development of the state and the development of 
economic sovereignty. Three main ports developed in East Africa to enable the export 
of goods: Dar es Salaam and Tanga in Tanganyika, and Mombasa in Kenya. Each had 
a hinterland which supplied produce for export. There was a little overlap between the 
hinterlands of Tanga and Mombasa, but the absence of railways or reliable roads 
during the early years of the colonies prohibited a great deal of competition. The 
situation changed when the Uganda Railway reached the shores of Lake Victoria in 
1901. Many African and European producers in the north and north -west of DOA had 
easier access to Mombasa via the new railway than they did to either Tanga or Dar es 
Salaam, and so Uganda and Kenya effectively impinged upon Tanganyika's economic 
sovereignty. Much of the valuable coffee production around the southern shore of 
Lake Victoria had previously been exported via Kenya because of the ease of export 
via Lake Victoria, and this fact encouraged the construction of the railway. The 
2 TNA: TS11950 /I: 5, 22nd October 1935. List showing prohibited and restricted 
imports and exports. Sent to the Dar es Salaam Commissioner of Police by the Acting 
Chief Secretary. The list in this document also contains one inexplicable oddity: 
"shaving brushes manufactured in or exported from the Empire of Japan." 
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railway captured the whole of this market and the lack of protection for the DOA 
economy helped to siphon off even more of Tanganyika's exports (Coulson, 1982: 38). 
The railway authorities marketed their line aggressively and by 1909 the contest had 
become very unequal. The transit of DOA goods through Uganda and BEA was worth 
£323,109 to the Uganda railway, equal to twenty percent of its income (Brode, 1911: 
65), so that northern Tanganyika, in an economic sense, had become part of its 
northern neighbours. 
The German authorities in DOA responded by speeding up the construction of the 
Usambara Railway in DOA, which was to link Tanga with the sisal plantations of 
Usambara, then to Moshi and Arusha nearer the Kenyan border. Until the Usambara 
railway reached Moshi just before the Great War, only ivory was worth exporting from 
Tanga in any great quantities (Brode, 1911: 44), but the Kenyan authorities still 
perceived their position to be under threat: it was only due to, "the wise tariff policy of 
the Uganda Railway that this line can still compete with the Usambara Railway" 
(Brode, 1911: 44 -5). Such attitudes assumed Kenya's right to compete within DOA. 
Under British rule the situation did not improve. Even once the Usambara line had 
been completed, connecting to both Tanga and Dar es Salaam, pricing on the Kenyan 
railways meant it was as cheap to send goods to Mombasa as to Dar. In addition, the 
Kenyan line was extended into Northern Tanganyika, demonstrating that Kenya had 
the right compete for Tanganyikan exports but not the other way round. This would 
surely not have been permitted under German DOA rule, and can be seen as a 
weakening of the divisiveness of the border. As economic development in East Africa 
had centred upon Kenya, there were more processing plants in Mombasa, and a greater 
number of ships departed from there, so where tariff charges were equal, Tanganyikan 
producers often continued to choose Mombasa ahead of their domestic ports 
(Coulson, 1982: 75). 
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A proposed extension to the Tanganyikan Central Line to Mwanza was mooted, 
but this was blocked because of the threat to Kenyan trade (Coulson, 1982: 40). The 
official reason given was the technical difficulties inherent in building such a line, yet 
the construction of the Central Line to Kigoma in 1914 had been a far greater feat. The 
real reason was protectionism; Kenyan development and Kenyan economic sovereignty 
were certainly favoured above that of Tanganyika. Cameron became Governor of 
Tanganyika in 1926, and had a somewhat more positive attitude towards development, 
showing some interest in the Mwanza extension. At the Governors' Conference of 
1926, however, he was asked by the Kenyan and Ugandan governors to block 
construction of the railway line to Mwanza, on the grounds that it would adversely 
affect the revenues on the Kenya- Ugandan railway. (Cameron, 1939: 124 -5). 
Other proposed railways were also turned down. The celebrated geographer 
Gillman proposed a railway to link Dar es Salaam with Manda on Lake Nyasa, the first 
of many proposals to link Dar es Salaam or the Central Line with the south -west 
(Hoyle, 1987: 186). As late as the 1950s, the construction of such a line was proposed 
to aid the burgeoning trade with Northern Rhodesia. Considerations of cost and lack of 
enthusiasm for cross -border co- operation scuppered the project (Hoyle, 1967: 93), and 
it was not until the Chinese -sponsored TAZARA scheme that the line was finally 
completed in 1975. 
After the Second World War, Tanganyikan inferiority in the economic and 
infrastructural development of East Africa was maintained with the setting up of the 
East African Railways and Harbour Administration (EARH) with its headquarters in 
Nairobi. Under this organisation, the railways and ports of the three East African 
territories operated as one system, which were largely dominated by Kenyan interests 
(International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 1961: 283). This 
was an important and long -lived example of cross -border co- operation in East Africa. 
"The unified system is financially stronger, the utilisation of its rolling stock and 
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equipment is better, the administration, staff establishment, offices and other services 
are cheaper and tariffs lower than would have been the case if the systems had 
continued as separate identities" (IBRD, 1961: 284). As an example of pooled 
sovereignty, this is another indication that the internal East African boundaries were 
inter -territorial, rather than international in nature. 
Despite the presence of this body, the greatest effect of the pattern of transport 
infrastructure in East Africa until independence continued to be the use of the Ugandan 
railway to export goods from north -west Tanganyika. Coffee, cotton and other exports 
were transported via Bukoba, over Lake Victoria to Kisumu and on to Mombasa. 
They could have been transported as easily via Mwanza to Dar, but were not (Hoyle, 
1967: 94). The Uganda Railway transported the produce at a very favourable rate and 
export duties across the border were small or non -existent. For the entire period of 
British rule in East Africa, and for much of the German period, much of the benefit of 
the agricultural production of the highly populated and highly fertile north -west was 
accrued by Kenya Colony and by the Ugandan Railway. The revenues which were paid 
helped to support the railway and thereby also aided other development, while the 
processing of exports such as coffee took place in Mombasa. It is true that there was a 
shortage of railway rolling stock on the Tanganyikan Central Line and that superior 
facilities were available at Mombasa, but this was at least as much an effect of the use 
of the Ugandan railway by Tanganyikan exporters, as a cause, and also resulted from 
the total lack of protection for the territory's infant economy and infrastructure during 
the early years of colonial rule. In the 1960s, the hinterlands of Dar es Salaam and 
Mombasa continued to overlap. Moshi and Arusha were both within the economic 
orbit of Nairobi rather than Dar es Salaam, and coffee continued to be exported via 
Mombasa rather than Tanga. 
There was some correlation between the distance of each of Tanganyika's ports 
from Mombasa and its ability to develop. Tanga's expansion was limited by the 
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proximity of Mombasa, but it was located in an economically developed area, and 
grew to become the territory's second largest port. Dar es Salaam expanded a lot 
during the post -war years. Although the influence of Mombasa retarded its 
development, it was the main entrepot between Mombasa and Mozambique, and it was 
connected to Lake Tanganyika via the Central Line. It therefore came to be used by 
Northern Rhodesia, the Belgian Congo, Rwanda and Burundi (IBRD, 1961: 288). In 
an attempt to develop the southern third of Tanganyika and to provide margarine for a 
hungry empire, the infamous Groundnut Scheme was devised in the 1950s. A deep - 
water port was built at Mtwara to supply the needs of the scheme, but the collapse of 
the project left the port almost redundant. The lack of development in Portuguese East 
Africa (PEA) meant that there was little opportunity for Mtwara to fulfil the role in its 
hinterland that Mombasa did further north. Despite the economic nationalism of the 
Estado Novo, the weakness of Portuguese administrative and economic presence in the 
north of PEA prevented the pursuit of an aggressive economic policy in the region. 
Afrik. R 
As has already been discussed, initial trade links between BEA and DOA were 
affected by the somewhat strained nature of BEA -DOA relations. To take one 
example, five African traders were travelling from the interior of BEA to the BEA 
coast in 1892, and passed through Moshi on the main trade route. They were assailed 
by German authorities on Chagga land, which was governed by Carl Peters, but under 
Article IV of the General Act of Berlin of February 26th 1885 they should have been 
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free from duties3 Although such pre -colonial trade routes were forced out of legal use, 
'legitimate' cross -border trade developed in the 1890s.4 
Most trade involved agricultural production: BEA exported ghee from Jubaland 
and potatoes from the highlands near Nairobi, while DOA exported grain, especially 
rice, and sugar, salt and tobacco. It also exported hides, skins, ivory and rubber to 
BEA for re- export (Brode, 1911: 32 -3), establishing the pattern of BEA domination of 
processing in the region. Most goods were taken by sea as transport links across the 
border were poor. The relative advantage which BEA had over DOA in economic 
development meant that the German authorities were not keen to improve links, 
thereby helping to protect their trade. Until the construction of the railways, and even 
then with regard to small -scale trade, the main border crossing point between BEA and 
DOA was at Taveta, between Voi and Moshi (Brode, 1911: 41). Most traffic between 
the two towns was by cart, with donkeys used as relays on the British side and 
replaced by oxen on the German side. Porters had been used in the earliest years of 
colonial rule, but the carts proved to be cheaper. During the first decade of the 
Twentieth Century, various schemes to start a regular motorcar connection across the 
border were attempted, but without any sustained success. The British government 
spent a lot of money on its portion of the route, but loose sand and bad foundations 
created poor roads on the German side. The state of the roads was a function of 
German protectionism. A German trader who had traded in BEA for over ten years, 
tried to set up a transport company but lacked capital and received no support from the 
DOA government. At least with regard to production around Moshi, the lack of good 
roads drew trade away from the Uganda Railway and to the Usambara Railway 
(Brode, 1911: 41 -2). 
3 RKA: R1001 570: 89, 18th January 1892. Letter from G. Portal, German Diplomatic 
Agent, Zanzibar, to Baron von Soden, the German Governor. They were also free 
from duties under Article VIII of the Anglo- German agreement of 1st July 1890. 
4 Much of the information in this section is taken from Brode, 1911. 
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There is little recorded information on the state of cross -border trade between 
Uganda and DOA. An Anglo- German agreement on the Uganda -DOA border in 1910 
made provision for the free movement of population with goods over the boundary 
within six months of the end of boundary demarcation, but was not signed before the 
outbreak of the First World War (McEwen, 1971: 273). Overland trade between 
Bukoba District and Uganda was estimated in 1910 at £200 per annum passing 
through the military station at Kifumbiro - mainly salt for bark clothes and a little ivory 
(Brode, 1911: 61). Official trade was rather limited, but this had rather more to do 
with lack of opportunity than government restrictions. 
DOA's most important trade partner was Zanzibar. It provided roughly half of 
DOA's imports in the 1890s and took about half her exports.5 DOA even used 
Zanzibari currency. Such reliance upon Zanzibar by DOA did not seem unnatural given 
the former's recent status as regional heavyweight. The German government made no 
attempt to establish its monetary sovereignty, and it was left up to the Zanzibar 
government to make the break. In 1903, the German rupee ceased to be accepted by 
the Zanzibari government because of its slightly lower silver value. (Brode, 1911: 11- 
2). Another factor in the slackening of relations was the outbreak of plague in Zanzibar 
in September 1905, which caused the German government to issue regulations 
prohibiting the dhow traffic between Zanzibar and the coast. When trade was finally 
resumed, it never assumed its former importance. Between 1899 and 1904, more than 
2,000 German dhows a year called at Zanzibar; by 1906 it had fallen to 286, and the 
following three years registered figures of 772, 1120 and 1020, and the Deutsche 
Ostafrika Linie moved its headquarters from Zanzibar to Dar es Salaam (Brode, 
1911:14). Financial difficulties on Zanzibar caused by reduced trade with the mainland 
5 Zanzibar imports: Rs. 10,823,082 and exports Rs. 6,705,040 in 1892 (Brode, 1911: 
8). 
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saw the general import duty of five percent increased to seven and a half percent in 
1908, which further deterred trade. 
Kenya, Uganda. and Tanganyika relations 
Despite the lack of German investment in Tanganyika, the range of production 
achieved by the Germans during World War One was not matched until the 1960s. In 
the meantime Nairobi and Mombasa became the leading centres of industrial growth in 
East Africa (Coulson, 1982: 73). What industrial development did occur with 
Tanganyika, tended to be either related to agriculture or run by Kenyans, or both, and 
it very often failed. To take one example, the government of Tanganyika supported a 
firm called Meat Rations Ltd, which was owned by Kenyan settlers (Coulson, 1982: 
76 -7). It received enormous support: £15,000 of its £30,000 start-up capital came 
from the Colonial Development Fund; it was given a 5000 acre farm at Maswa, near 
Mwanza, by the government; and it was awarded a monopoly on meat processing in 
the Lake area. Despite all this help it was wound up in 1935 with losses of nearly 
£6000. Moreover, British policy was to discourage non -British and non -agricultural 
associated industrialisation, including that of Asians, so that a proposed clove -oil 
factory was blocked on Zanzibar in 1924. 
During the German and early British periods, Tanganyika imposed small tariffs on 
imports to raise revenue, but they were too low to protect her own infant industries 
(Coulson, 1982: 73). Kenya, by contrast, imposed protective duties at this time on 
products which it thought it could develop, such as wheat, sugar, meat, dairy produce, 
beer and tea. The Government of Tanganyika "was persuaded to impose the same 
duties, and to abolish duties at the Kenya- Tanganyika border." Tanganyika formally 
joined the Kenya and Uganda customs union in 1927, but there were effectively no 
tariffs on the Kenya- Tanganyika border from 1923 until 1967. This is certainly an 
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example of less division at the boundary. "Throughout this period, Tanganyika suffered 
because of the greater degree of industrialisation in Kenya" (Coulson, 1982: 73). The 
loss of revenue from the Kenyan border duties alone was estimated to be 1,200,000 
shillings in 1931. By the late 1930s Japanese imports had begun to replace many 
British ones, and some duties were imposed: twenty -two percent on blankets in 1935, 
and up to sixty percent on some woollen goods (Coulson, 1982: 74). 
To take another case -study, maize from Kenya was being imported into Arusha and 
other areas in northern Tanganyika in 1930 via the railway, and was effectively 
flooding the market.6 Kenyan maize had cost between twelve and eighteen shillings per 
bag the previous year, but this had fallen to six and a half in 1930, including transport 
costs. It was feared that this would devastate local production, so the Acting PC for 
Northern Province, Mr Longland, appealed for restrictions to be introduced. He 
argued that the Kenyan government forbade export during times of shortage, so 
Tanganyika should forbid it now, in the time of plenty.? The Dar es Salaam 
government responded that if the Kenyan farmers can pay their far greater transport 
costs and still out -do Tanganyikan farmers, then the producers of Northern Province 
deserved to loose out.8 The Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda governments hoped to 
avoid this kind of situation by bringing about levelling out in food prices in the 
borderlands and especially on the lake shores, where smuggling was easier. They had 
no definite plans for this apart from the improvement of cross -border transport links, 
but even these links were not substantially developed prior to independence.9 
6 TNA: TS 11950/I: 136 -139, 21st July 1930. Report "Export of Maize From Kenya 
To Arusha", by F. Longland, Acting PC for Northern Province. Sent to the Chief 
Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
7 TNA: TS11950 /I: 138, 21st July 1930. See Note 6. 
8 TNA: TS11950 /I: 138. See Note 6. 
9 TNA: Dist 11/271 Lindi: 31. "Record of a Conference of Provincial Commissioners 
from the Tanganyika Territory, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Held at Lilongwe, 
Nyasaland on 18th and 19th June 1950." 
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Cameron fought East African political union, but he accepted the customs union in 
1927. "He may have regarded it as the price for political independence; more likely he 
was simply against industrialisation" (Rweyemanu, 1973: 117). It was introduced by 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and the London government was widely 
acknowledged as favouring Kenyan interests. What industry was required for East 
African development, could therefore be concentrated in Kenya. This vision had not 
been shared by the rest of the Tanganyikan executive. In 1924, the Tanganyikan 
Treasurer and Comptroller of Customs officially, "advised against a customs union on 
the ground that it would make this country a commercial satellite of Kenya, and 
subordinate Tanganyika to Kenya influence." (Yaffey, 1970: 231). The common 
market arrangements did provide small economies of scale - most notably in transport 
and communications - but the spill -over effects of Kenyan industry tended to 
strengthen the satellite- centre relationship. 
With regard to an analysis of the colonial economy it is possible to compare the 
import, export and production statistics, but it is difficult to determine how much they 
reflect reality. For what they are worth, Tanganyika's imports from Kenya and Uganda 
were 72.5 million shillings in 1951 and 180.8 million in 1958, while exports were 2.3 
million in 1951, growing to 72.5 million in 1958. It is as difficult to assess the effect of 
the customs union, as it is to determine whether the territory's position in the economy 
of East Africa was improving (Yaffey, 1970) 
The other borderlands 
The other borderlands of Tanganyika provide various examples of the economic 
effects of the colonial borders. In Bugufi on the Burundi border, in 1927, coffee was 
grown across the border in Burundi, but not in Tanganyika which had the same 
climate, rainfall and soil, and where Lumley, the DC, was looking for an export crop to 
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aid local development (Lumley, 1976: 27). The nearest market was four days' journey, 
at Malagarasi on the central railway line, but Lumley believed that production was 
viable (Lumley, 1976: 25). He imported one hundred trees himself from Burundi, but 
this contravened the Plant Pests and Diseases Ordinance and he was ordered to destroy 
them. He reported their destruction, but kept the plants and learned not to report too 
much. The whim of a local administrator could influence the crops cultivated in any 
one region, and on the borders this could create a startling difference in economics, 
lifestyle and even landscape on either side of the boundary. In the 1929 Bugufi famine, 
five hundred people died and the government decreed that food crops were to be 
grown in preference to export crops (Bryceson, 1988: 37 -46). This policy was not 
adopted on the Belgian side of the border and countless thousands died as a result. 
Apart from the northern territories, the most important cross -border economic 
input into the Tanganyikan economy undoubtedly came from the Belgian territories of 
the Congo, Rwanda and Burundi. In "western and southern Tanzania, the political 
boundaries.... set a general limit across which only small amounts of traffic reach the 
ports at irregular intervals" (Hoyle, 1967: 93, 131). 
Migration 
One of the most valuable economic resources in colonial Africa was its population. 
In most instances, the colonial powers could not stop the inward or outward flow of 
migrant labour because their boundaries were almost entirely porous. Although 
Tanganyika was by no means a prosperous colony, it was more a recipient of migrant 
labour that a source of it. Even in German times, large numbers of men from 
Mozambique, the Congo and Northern Rhodesia came to work on plantations.10 Some 
10 Such movements were part of a wider pattern of labour migration in southern 
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were borderlanders who worked across the border in the neighbouring colony, but 
most travelled further afield. For example, the Bemba from Northern Rhodesia made 
up a sizeable proportion of the workforce on the Pangani Sisal estates in 1914 (Iliffe, 
1979: 162). 
Some Tanganyikans left the territory to work elsewhere. By the 1930s, some 
10,000 Tanganyikan men were working on the Copperbelt and the Rand. This was not 
encouraged by the government - indeed the Tanganyikan authorities preferred workers 
to remain in Tanganyikan - but it was impossible to prohibit. Throughout the British 
period, far more migrants came to work in Tanganyika than Tanganyikans sought 
work elsewhere. Many plantations were located in the south -east of Tanganyika, 
around Lindi, and these were originally staffed by Tanganyikans and a limited number 
of migrant labourers. However, the decline in wages in the 1930s depression led to 
growth in the peasant sector and many Tanganyikans did not return to plantation 
employment, when the economy improved. The replacement labour came from PEA; 
the Tanganyika authorities, "were helped in this by the backwardness of the political 
economy of Portuguese East Africa, which forced thousands of Makonde and some 
Yao to stream across the border" (Rodney, 1979: 151). 
In 1937, when Lumley became DC for Lindi District in the south -east, very few of 
the sisal plantation workers were local. Most were Makonde and Mwera from 
Mozambique, and Yao from Nyasaland. The fact that many came from a non -British 
colony and that their remittances left the Empire does not seem to have been a factor. 
Africa. Most migrant workers from central and southern PEA worked in South Africa 
and Rhodesia, and in increasing numbers following the Kimberley diamond discoveries 
in 1870 and the gold strike on the Witwatersrand in 1886. Apart from the obvious 
financial attractions, there were a number of push factors in the movements: famines, 
drought, the declining importance of the ivory trade, plus the 1896 rinderpest 
epidemic. (See Lloyd, 1998 and Patton: 1995). 
11 TNA: Dist 11/271 Lindi: 29. See Note 9. 
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Labour was needed, and where it came from was immaterial (Lumley, 1976: 99). The 
number of PEA Africans working on Tanganyikan plantations continued to grow. 
During the 1930s, increasing numbers were working around Dar es Salaam and 
Morogoro, and by the 1940s, they were the mainstay of the industry in Tanga.12 
In the north -west, the men of the Haya did little manual work, so Africans from 
Belgian Rwanda came into the region to work on the coffee and banana plantations. 
By 1950 the Belgians estimated that 157,000 migrants from Belgian territory were 
working in Tanganyika, but it was difficult to be certain because of the uncontrolled 
nature of the flow of migrants and because of confusion with resident Barundi and 
Banyaruanda (Daley, 1993: 21). As most work was on the sisal estates at Tanga, Dar 
es Salaam and on the coast, this was where most were to be found. Again, migrant 
labour was mainly not a borderland affair. 
Minerals 
Another economic aspect of Tanganyika's boundaries was the mineral assets 
located in and around the rivers which were used to delimit its boundaries. Tanganyika 
has few natural resources apart from its landscape and wildlife, but it does have some 
mineral resources. While delimitation was still taking place, a German named Scheffler 
who lived in Nairobi heard of possible mineral wealth around a soda lake on the 
proposed DOA -BEA border, and advised the DOAG to try to include the area in the 
Boundary Commission negotiations. 13 It is unknown whether this played a role in the 
delimitation of the boundary around Lake Natron. 
12 TNA: TS21484. 
13 RKA: R1001 586: 38R, December 1903. Report by F.G. Scheffler in Nairobi on 
mineral wealth along the British East Africa- Deutsch Ostafrika boundary. Sent to the 
German government in Dar es Salaam. 
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Several disputes over mineral deposits occurred during the British period, but the 
most important of them concerned the Ankole -Karagwe tinfield on the Kagera 
boundary which divided Tanganyika from Rwanda -Burundi (Laws 1932: 244). The 
boundary was being modified in 1930 in order to re -unite several African groups, when 
the tinfield was discovered in an area which existing plans would have placed in 
Tanganyika.14 John Scott, the Acting Governor, wrote to Downing Street asking 
about which method of delimitation to use for the boundary, as tin prospecting had 
begun on the river, and mining companies were applying for water rights.i5 The final 
treaty placed the resources within Tanganyika, but the deposits did not turn out to be 
particularly valuable, and Belgian demands that Africans of both countries should have 
the right to navigation and fishing on the boundary turned out to be of more 
importance.16 
Impact on Africans 
The impact of colonial economic policies upon occupied Africans was massive and 
has been dealt with in some depth elsewhere, so this brief section will highlight effects 
specific to Africans in borderlands. When the boundaries were originally laid down, 
differences in taxation and duties created some startling disparities. Two of the central 
planks of revenue generation by the colonial regimes were the hut and poll taxes. 
These were applied to Africans throughout the territory, often at varying rates. 
Proximity to an international boundary provided Africans with a chance to avoid the 
14 CO691/110/5: 11, 26th September 1930. Letter from Chancery at the British 
Embassy, in Brussels, to the League of Nations. Concerns problems in modifying the 
Rwanda -Burundi - Tanganyika boundary. 
15 TNA: TS20538: 1, 2nd January 1929. Letter from John Scott, Acting Governor, to 
L.C.M.S. Amery MP, Downing Street. 
Also CO691/110/5: 11, 26th September 1930. See Note 13. 
16 TNA: TS 20538: 88 -89, unknown date. Letter from Acting Governor, Tanganyika, 
to the Governor of Ruanda -Urundi, Usumbura. 
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tax. For example, the report by Captain Close on the Delimitation of the Nyasa - 
Tanganyika Boundary in 1898, revealed that the hut tax of three shillings in North 
Nyasa (modern Malawi) had caused some people to move across the border to 
German territory or to as yet untaxed British territory.17 At that point there were no 
taxes in Northern Rhodesia, but he considered that when they were introduced, there 
would no doubt be an "exodus of short- sighted natives into German territory". 18 This 
could not be avoided when tax differentials were created in borderlands, but as with 
many colonials, he seems to underestimate Africans' sense of territoriality. Permanent 
migration was different to flows of temporary migratory labour. 
Migration with the purpose of avoiding taxes continued in the area throughout the 
colonial period, and even under British rule, substantial tax differentials existed 
between Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. For instance, the respective 
1950 hut taxes were: ten shillings in Nyasaland, six in North Rhodesia and eleven in 
Tanganyika. This obviously made Northern Rhodesia the target of immigration. The 
Nyasaland government estimated that more than half of the able- bodied men in Central 
Province were abroad at any one time.19 To counter this, the government of the 
Nyasaland Protectorate introduced a minimum wage of seventeen and a half shillings in 
1951, and this had the effect of both increasing wages and discouraging emigration. 
Unfortunately, the hut tax was also increased to seventeen and a half shillings per 
annum.2° 
17 FO881/7115: 26, March 1899. "Report by Captain Close R.E., on the Delimitation 
of the Nyasa -Tanganyika Boundary in 1898 ". 
18 FO881/7115: 31, March 1899. See Note 16. 
19 TNA: Dist 11/271 Lindi: 22, 18th June 1950. "Report on the Conference on Inter - 
territorial Relations ". 
20 TNA: Dist 11/271 Lindi: 20 -32, 18th June 1950. "Record of the Conference of 
Provincial Commissioners from the Tanganyika Territory, Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland ". 
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Sir John Gray gives the example of where the Uganda- Tanganyika boundary runs 
through a village on Rubabu Point on the shore of Lake Victoria. The villagers 
migrated from north to south when the Ugandan poll -tax collector visited, and back 
again when his Tanganyikan counterpart arrived (Gray, 1959: 196 -7). Emigration from 
Kenya to Tanganyika, which was estimated at 1,200 in 1934, was attributed by the DC 
to lower taxes and other fees in Tanganyika, and because cattle were seized and sold in 
Kenya when the payment of taxes was not forthcoming (Brett, 1973: 197).21 
The place of African traders and trade within the colonial economy often created 
problems. For instance, an agreement was reached in November 1937 with the dhow 
owners on Lake Victoria not to transport goods class I -IV (luxury goods), from Kenya 
or Uganda to Tanganyika, in order to help Tanganyika railways. However, lorries soon 
began to undertake the trade, provoking complaints from the Dhow Owner's 
Syndicate.22 
Impact on Europeans 
Taxes did not impact upon Europeans in nearly the same way as upon Africans. 
Firstly, the colonial economy generally favoured Europeans over Africans, as they 
were the potential bringers of economic growth. Hut taxes did not apply to Europeans. 
The duties on the import and export of goods, could, however, impact upon 
Europeans. For instance, settlers in south -west Tanganyika, on Lake Tanganyika, had 
to ship their exports via Mpulungu in Northern Rhodesia, before they were sent on to 
Dodoma and Dar, and they therefore had to pay customs duties and suffer customs 
21 This is a field of study that is worth consideration in its own right; a subject perhaps 
best suited to concentrated local studies. 
22 TNA: TS25682: 1 -2, 24th February 1938. Letter from the President of Dhow 
Owner's Syndicate, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
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restrictions.23 This made European enterprise difficult in that remote area of the 
territory. On other occasions, European settlers seemed to have less to complain 
about. Kenyan Europeans who came crossed into Tanganyika in the 1920s and 1930s 
in order to shoot animals complained that border regulations were imposed on them. 
They argued that there was no convenient post for them to go to to obtain permits, 
licenses and ivory export licenses.24 The Commissioner Of Tanganyika Police and 
Prisons wrote that there were two types of European who crossed illegally: criminal 
poachers and ignorant people who didn't know they had to have permits or who didn't 
know where the border lay.25 Some Kenyan safari companies organised hunting trips 
without obtaining any paperwork, while J.M. Silvester, the secretary of the East 
African Professional Hunter's Association wanted to do away with all restrictions for 
white people.26 It is creditable that the Tanganyikan government at least attempted to 
apply border restrictions to everybody, regardless of colour. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has hopefully demonstrated that there is no place in the western 
system of dividing political space, for international boundaries to exist within the 
territories of one sovereign power. It is true that the British territories of East Africa 
competed over economic development and trade routes, just as they had competed 
over territory, but there are several indications from their actions which demonstrate 
that they viewed the internal boundaries in a different light to those with other colonial 
powers. Firstly, despite all the bickering, transport development was considered to 
23 TNA: TS22980. 
24 TNA: TS 11779/I. 
25 TNA: TS11779/I: 5 -10, 9th January 1928. Letter from the Commissioner of 
Tanganyika Police and Prisons, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
26 TNA: TS11779 /II: 249 -51, unknown date. LEtter from J.M. Silvester, Secretary of 
the East African Professional Hunters' Association, to the Game Warden, Nairobi. 
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some extent on a regional basis. Elsewhere in colonial Africa and in much of the rest of 
the world, railway systems are very much matters of national concern - the rail 
authorities of one country rarely extend their networks into neighbouring states. It is 
true that the initial cross -border railway line was built during the German period, but 
there were no other lines in the area at the time, and the German authorities needed to 
make use of the Ugandan railway in order to access the riches of the Lake Victoria 
area. Secondly, despite the failure of attempts at unification and federation, the two 
most important economic functions of the boundaries were placed under a common 
authority. The effective customs union which lasted for almost all of the British period 
in East Africa, coupled with the unification of transport provision, means that a 
regional economy was able to develop. Finally, that the colonialists insisted upon using 
the term interterritorial rather than international to describe the internal divisions of 
East Africa indicates that they considered the borders to be less than international. 
********************************************************************* 
CONCLUSION TO PART THREE 
The economic partition of East Africa reinforced the political division. There was, 
however, one important difference. Whereas African pre -colonial polities and political 
systems were almost entirely replaced by western notions of dividing political space, 
African economic structures proved more durable. It is true that colonial developments 
became the most important factors in the regional economy, but African trade routes 
continued in legal and illegal forms, and were never entirely suppressed. Many pre- 
colonial African trade routes had followed lines of political and ethnic affiliation, and 
where the borders crossed these routes, links were often affected. In several instances, 
the colonial authorities attempted to reduce the impact of the boundaries upon African 
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groups where there was no other issue at stake. Often, however, rivalries with 
neighbouring territories and the need to control disease or crime encouraged the 
authorities to impose divisions to the detriment of borderlands. 
Despite this, political and economic colonial rule remained weak in many 
borderlands for much of the colonial period and many border transgressions must have 
gone undetected. That all the recorded instances of smugglers being caught on Lake 
Tanganyika occurred at the port of Kigoma, surely indicates that a high level of trade 
continued across the lake, across the border and away from the main port. This 
enabled the continuation of trade between the Congo Basin and Tanganyika which had 
formed such a large part of pre -colonial trade in central Africa. 
In any event - disease prevention apart - the colonialists were only moderately 
concerned with the prevention of smuggling. Their main interest was in the loss of 
treasury income rather than in the violation of the boundaries as symbols of national 
sovereignty. In addition, that Kenya and Uganda felt able to operate a joint customs 
department when they felt unable to countenance many other moves towards union or 
federation, indicates that customs' duties were not a strong symbol of statehood. Such 
joint efforts are also supportive of the concept of the inter -territorial boundary in East 
Africa. The inter -territorial boundaries divided competing governments who tried to 
out -do each other in many way, it is true, but they answered to the same Colonial 
Office and it is unthinkable that they could go to war with each other. They did not, in 
any case, have independent armed forces. In any hierarchy of boundaries, the 
boundaries between Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika were not particularly divisive. 
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PART FOUR: CULTURAL DIVISIONS 
Pastoralism seems to be the antithesis of the sedentary, tax -paying societies which 
were organised neatly into the tribes so beloved of the colonialists. Moreover, 
pastoralism in borderlands can be seen as being in conflict with the fixed linear 
boundaries which colonialism brought about. As such, it can certainly be seen as a 
major challenge to the colonial boundaries, and if the contents of the colonial archives 
are anything to go by, it was the major challenge following initial imposition. Despite 
this challenge, pastoralism as a concept and as a way of life was generally not targeted 
by the colonial authorities. In practice they opposed it in many ways, but only rarely 
did colonial officials express the view that as a way of life, it ought to have no place in 
the new colonial society. Chapter Eight will consider these colonial responses to 
pastoralism in the Maasai dominated Kenya- Tanganyika borderlands, and will assess 
the reaction of the Maasai and other groups of the area to the imposition of the 
boundaries. It was in this region that the African borderlanders were able to have most 
influence upon the colonialists. The pastoralist borderlands were perhaps also the 
region of Tanganyika where colonialism had least success in imposing the western 
system of dividing political space. Chapter Nine will then discuss one particular 
function of western-style boundaries - stemming the spread of disease - which hit 
pastoralist societies particularly hard. 
. . 
- . ._ 
introduction to Pastoralism and the Maasai 
Pastoralism is a way of life that has almost disappeared in the West and continues 
only in a somewhat altered form on the northern fringes of Scandinavia and Northern 
America. It can therefore be difficult to envisage it as anything other than an historical 
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way of life whose time has passed. However, nomadic pastoralism was a way of life 
that was eminently suitable to Maasailand - economically, politically and 
environmentally - as it is to much of Africa. Even today it can generally support a 
larger density of population than an agricultural lifestyle on many of the plains of East 
Africa. Apart from the effectiveness of pastoralism, forced sendentarization is doomed 
to failure because of the resistance of people to lose a very strong way of life. 
Most of the cattle peoples of East Africa were and are not purely pastoralist in 
nature: most practice a mixture of agricultural production and livestock holding. Such 
a lifestyle has been given a variety of names, including cultivating -pastoralism (Rigby, 
1969) and agro- pastoralism ( Brandstrom, 1985; Koponen, 1988). Despite the 
impression given by tourist guides, Tanzania is not one of the main pastoralist counties 
of Africa. Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia all have a far greater percentage of their 
population leading a pastoralist lifestyle. However, a large proportion of Tanzanian 
societies, while not leading a purely pastoralist lifestyle, have traditionally derived 
some of their income from raising cattle. There was a temptation in the colonial period 
to see a vast chasm between the Maasai and their more sedentary neighbours, such as 
the Chagga. Yet both groups depended to a large extent upon their cattle, and traded 
with each other in order to obtain goods that they could not produce locally. 
Moreover, some branches of the Maasai, including the Warusha, did turn to agriculture 
and were known as Kwavi. The difference between agriculturalists and pastoralists is 
not absolute but graded. 
While the number of Maasai in the borderlands of Tanganyika and Kenya was not 
overwhelming, the number of cattle which they owned was very substantial. To take 
one example, in mid -1928, the number of Kenyan Maasai known to be in Tanganyika 
was 2,400 men, women and children, and between them they owned an estimated 
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60,000 cattle, which required a lot of grazing and water to sustain them.' Such a high 
ratio of cattle to people is borne out by the fact that in 1919, Tanganyika Maasai 
District was composed of 18,470 square miles, with 41,822 people and 779,306 cattle. 
Examples from the Kenya- Tanganyika boundary have been used sparingly in the 
other chapters of this work, although there are many problems on this particular 
boundary which could be considered apart from pastoralism. In practice, many of these 
problems are caused by pastoralists and their lifestyle. Moving back and forth across 
the boundary, sometimes with thousands of cattle, without allegiance to any political 
authority but their own, their presence was a major challenge to the colonial authorities 
and colonial boundaries of the day. The question of pastoralism and boundaries in 
Tanganyika inevitably brings up the Maasai: they are the largest, most famous 
pastoralist group on the borders of Tanganyika, and certainly one of the most famous 
pastoralist groups in the world. There were also other pastoralist groups on the border, 
notably the abaKuria, and these will also be considered in this chapter. 
It is possible to divide the history of the Kenya -Tanganyikan boundary into four 
phases. Firstly, the period of German rule in Tanganyika: from the paper division of 
Africa until 1918, during which the imposition of the boundaries varied little from that 
in other areas. Secondly, there was a period of low activity, from 1918 until 1926, 
when little attention was paid to pastoralist movements. This was followed by a period 
of more intense enforcement from 1927 until the late 1930s, when the British 
authorities attempted to stamp their authority - or should it be authorities - upon the 
Maasai and the other peoples of the region. Disputes over grazing and water 
concessions hampered British efforts to impose the boundary on the ground. Lastly, 
from the onset of the Second World War until the end of colonial rule, efforts to 
' TNA: TS 10298/I: 312, 21st August 1928. "Report on the Migration of Purko and 
Loita Masai of Kenya Colony into the Sonjo Area of the Tanganyika Territory", by G. 
Webster, Acting PC, Northern Province. 
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impose more stringent control were made only spasmodically, because of the more 
peaceful nature of the borderlands, because colonial rule had to some extent already 
imposed the boundary in practice, but also because the effort required to suppress 
illegal activity was more than justified intervention. Several Maasai groups continued 
to cross the border in search of grazing, but on a much more limited scale than during 
previous years. Taken as a whole the four phases can be seen as the taming of a 
frontier and the imposition of the boundary, although the Maasai were never 
completely brought under control. 
As the rest of this chapter and the next will demonstrate, the Kenyan and 
Tanganyikan authorities bickered a great deal over cattle and Maasai policy and it 
seems that some officials on the ground began to treat each other with nothing short of 
downright hostility. The fact that the whole of the borderland came under one colonial 
power, however, was used to some effect, and conflict between the colonial authorities 
and the Maasai emanated from the efforts that were made to impose control in the 
area, particularly with regard to making the boundary a barrier in the minds of the 
people who lived in the borderlands. The Maasai were to be either 'Tanganyikan 
Maasai' or 'Kenyan Maasai'. This was nigh on impossible, as it would probably be 
easier to list those Maasai groups which were not divided by the boundary than those 
that were. In addition, most groups had allegiance with other sub -subsections and there 
was a great deal of interaction. The colonial powers could not get around "The fairly 
obvious fact that sex attraction is immeasurably stronger than national policy" (Fraser, 
1971: 8). The water and grazing concessions granted access for `Kenyan Maasai' to 
Tanganyika and vice versa, in order to alleviate hardship. In reality they maintained a 
limited amount of the freedom to move in search of water and pasturage that had been 
enjoyed prior to European colonialism. 
As far as the colonial authorities were concerned, there were two main problems 
with the Maasai: their habit of increasing stock and not selling it off when it caused 
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overgrazing; and unrest accompanying circumcision ceremonies. Both are linked to 
boundary problems. A lack of grazing encouraged groups to cross the boundary in 
search of better grazing; and following circumcision, the young men often tried to 
prove themselves by crossing the boundary and either attempting to reassert control 
upon one section of their people, or undertaking widespread cattle raiding.2 On one 
occasion in March 1928, the British DC, Mr Murrells, heard that fifty Loita Il Gitatin 
(recently circumcised warriors) had come from Kenya to force members of their clan 
back over the border. This convinced him that a permanent post was required in the 
area; he chose Loliondo as the best place for this, as it held good command of the area 
and had ample access to water supplies.3 He was so concerned about possible fighting 
that he asked for a King's African Rifles' (KAR) detachment to be sent to the area. One 
of the leaders, Sendeyo, learnt that he had been declared persona noel grata in 
Tanganyika and decided not to cross the boundary. The KAR troops were withdrawn 
as things calmed down.4 
One of the main difficulties associated with studies of the Maasai is the durability of 
two opposing visions of them in western literature and film. On the one hand they are 
seen as the Lords of Africa, tall and proud, feared by other Africans and respected by 
Europeans. Their claim to all the world's cattle led to problems, but as this was 
associated with their confidence and respect; it could be understood if not entirely 
tolerated. On the other hand, their more recent portrayal is of a people who have lost 
their raison d'etre and who have become destitute. Bereft of their lands and vast herds, 
they are to be found as alcoholics in every town from Dar es Salaam to Nairobi, and 
also on their traditional lands, where they pose for photographs for money from the 
passing tourists - tourists for whom they are a side -show in comparison with the 
2 CO691/86/6: 6, 11th September 1926. "Memorandum in regard [sic.] to the Masai 
Question ". No author given. 
3 TNA: TS 10298/I: 304 -5, 21st August 1928. See Note 1. 
4 TNA: TS 10298/I: 306, 21st August 1928. See Note 1. 
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wildlife on view. It is true that the Maasai were feared and respected by Europeans and 
other Africans during the colonial and pre -colonial periods, but the awe in which 
Europeans held them can perhaps be exaggerated. A reading of the colonial archives 
reveals exasperation with them at every turn. Today, even many of those Maasai who 
have migrated to the big cities of East Africa continue to be respected and to live as 
pastoralists. The northern suburbs of Dar es Salaam contain thousands of young 
Maasai men who guard their cattle and dress as they have done since pre -colonial 
times. 
Colonial images of the Maasai fill the archives. One DC wrote that the Kenyan 
Maasai must have used the wells across the border in Tanganyika "from time 
immemorial ".5 This was patently untrue, as the Maasai had only lived in the area for 
three to four centuries. The romanticisation of the Maasai by the British was 
misplaced, but it is not difficult to see why they did it. Many earlier secondary works 
on the Maasai either comment upon their proud nobility or describe them as people, 
"who have shown themselves so reluctant to adopt western ways" (Hughes, 1963: 16) 
often with a not -so- sneaking admiration. This admiration led many colonial officers to 
treat the Maasai with more respect than other groups and on several occasions, serious 
crimes committed by Maasai were not dealt with as harshly as might have been 
expected. The archives as a whole contain a great deal of documentation on the Maasai 
in particular and the Tanganyika -Kenya border in general. For example, files TNA: 
TS10298/I -II: 1927 -1936 on "Grazing and water facilities for the Masai on the 
Tanganyika -Kenya border" in the Tanganyikan National Archives contain some 1200 
pages. This chapter will not plough through all of the proposals and counter proposals, 
additions and negotiations for arrangements, although it looks like the division of 
Maasailand would make a good topic for a full -scale study of its own. 
5 TNA: TS10298/I: 5, 13th July 1927. Memorandum on Tanganyika -Kenya boundary 
problems by PC Mitchell of Northern Province. Sent to the Chief Secretary, Dar es 
Salaam. 
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There have been numerous studies of the Maasai and other pastoralists in East 
Africa. Those of most use include the ideas of Homewood, which are synthesised in 
her 1996 work where she considers Maasai responses to the imposed boundaries, as 
well as ecological indicators of the impact (Homewood, 1996). A great deal of 
information on the western sector of the Tanganyika -Kenya border and on pastoralism 
and cattle raiding can be found in Chapter Three of Kjerland, a study which was mainly 
based upon Kenyan sources (Kjerland, 1996). One of the best studies of pastoralists in 
border areas in East Africa is Dietz's study of Western Pokot on the Kenya- Uganda 
border 1900 -86; yet this, like many other works, is a study of pastoralists who happen 
to live in a border area, rather than a direct study of the influence of the boundary. 
While cultural and economic aspects of Maasai life have received their fair share of 
attention, political issues have received far less coverage. Maasai relations with other 
groups, relations between the various clans or sub -groups, and relations between the 
various strata of individual sub -groups have all been largely by- passed. The Maasai 
proper were divided into three sections: the Kaputiei, the Laikipia and the En- aiposha. 
The latter was the largest branch; based in the Rift Valley, it had two main groups, the 
Loita and the Purko (Beachey, 1996: 404). When the colonial authorities attempted to 
negotiate with the Maasai, they talked to the elders, but the elders did not control the 
rest of the people. Politically speaking, the elders were generally the main force, but 
there was also the Laibon - a kind of chief with a role more ritualistic or prophetic than 
political (Hughes, 1963: 17). They were most important among the En- aiposha. There 
was also the Aigwenak - a kind of spokesman, who was often believed by the colonial 
officials to be the chief. In addition, conflict always existed between the elders and the 
Elmoran (warriors); and while the colonial administrators negotiated with the elders, it 
was the Elmoran who carried out attacks (Homewood, 1996: 126). The greatest 
problem for the Maasai elders was to keep control of their warriors.6 On some 
6 TNA: TS 10298/I: 310, 21st August 1928. See Note 1. 
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occasions, a very complex situation could develop, with the Tanganyikan and Kenyan 
central authorities, their DCs and PCs, the different Maasai groups, their warriors, 
elders and Aigwenak, all taking a different standpoint. In one case, Purko elders in 
Kenya allied themselves with the Kenyan Government against the Tanganyikan DC and 
their Elmoran, because they wished to force the return of their Elmoran from 
Tanganyika. 
Cattle raiding as cultural 
From the outset, cattle raiding was one of the main features of the Anglo- German 
boundary. The initial European view of the area was formed during the period of the 
massive Maasai stock -replacing raids of the 1890s. The colonialists were more or less 
passive observers at this time because they had few stations in the area and little or no 
control or knowledge of the situation. The Maasai legend that all the cattle in the 
world had originally belonged to the Maasai and that they were merely regathering 
them reveals that cattle raiding was part of their culture. It was widely stated by the 
Maasai before the boundary was drawn and was repeated for decades afterwards. The 
effect that the raiding had upon the boundary was to destabilise it, but the effect that 
the boundary had upon the raiding is more difficult to assess. Certainly, colonial rule 
suppressed raiding, but the location of the boundary encouraged raids in various ways. 
Firstly, two relatively unco -ordinated colonial powers faced difficulties in suppressing 
it, and secondly, the division of the Maasai into yet more subgroups - that of the 
Kenyan and Tanganyikan Maasai - created more room for division and another reason 
to steal cattle. Thirdly, the boundary reduced the control that the elders had over the 
Elmoran, in that the Elmoran could move into the neighbouring jurisdiction, making it 
easier to escape the law. Lastly, the boundary created tax and policy differentials which 
encouraged the movement of cattle across the boundary and also greatly encouraged 
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cattle smuggling. Overall, the general sense of unlawfulness did not create a situation 
in which it was easy to make cattle raiding unacceptable. 
Cattle raiding was the source of much worry for the colonial authorities. "No other 
activity in abaKuira received more attention from the British than stock theft, but they 
have left East Africa without having curbed it" (Kjerland, 1995: 67). The attempts of 
the authorities to control pastoralists in border areas, as well as their perception of 
pastoralists as a threat, was to a great extent caused by cattle raiding within each 
territory, but also encouraged because of the location of the border. Kjerland writes of 
several groups along the western border, such as the Kisii, as being loyal to the British 
and disciplined, except with regard to their "lust for stealing cattle" (Kjerland, 1995: 
68 -9), and indeed, she titles Chapter Three of her thesis: "Cattle Theft: An Obsession 
beyond Cure ?" (Kjerland, 1995: Ch3). Numerous other works describe the Maasai and 
abaKuria love of raiding. Lumley writes of "the Masai who lived across the border and 
who were notorious for their habit of raiding neighbouring tribes and stealing their 
women and cattle. Indeed, a few days before there had been a Masai raid, but the 
intruders had met with stout resistance and been driven off." (Lumley, 1976: 91). 
In 1945, in response to cross -border unrest caused by cattle smuggling, the 
abaKuria were appointed with a government sociologist "to try and find out what was 
wrong in the Kuria area where internecine stock theft was such a running sore" 
(Winnington- Ingham, 1950: 10). That sociologist was the respected Hans Cory. Cory 
gave four reasons in his report for the disturbed nature of the area, one of which was 
the proximity of the boundary: "Cory states that the boundary was not a boundary to 
thieves. It was simply a boundary to those administering justice. He presented a long 
list of names of thieves and receivers of stolen stock and pointed out Bulrege location 
as one location in which it was obvious that there was a connection with Kenyan 
receivers and Tanganyika thieves" (Kjerland, 1995: 103). His description marries 
closely with other cattle raiding cultures around the world, such as the border reivers 
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of the Anglo- Scottish borderlands in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth centuries.? Cory was 
not openly critical of his government, but he made recommendations on major changes 
in the way the area was governed. For instance, he was concerned about the 
appointment of native officials and suggested closer supervision. He also 
recommended the amalgamation of the Kuria petty chiefdoms in Tanganyika (Kjerland, 
1996: 104 -5). The most positive colonial depiction of the abaKuria comes from H.C. 
Stiebel, who was PC for Northern Province. He describes them as "a very nice tribe ", 
but is forced to add that they "are confirmed cattle thieves ", who maintain an average 
of sixty prisoners in Musoma gaol. "Nevertheless they are a good wholesome people 
and only require closer administration to become useful members of society ".8 
While smuggling and cross -border raiding were common, it is difficult to disagree 
with Kjerland when she writes that it was not worse than could be expected in any 
isolated areas remote from centres of law and order (Kjerland, 1996: 109). The DC 
Kenyan Maasailand, M.P. Gordon, concurs: "This location has always been a very 
difficult one, owing to its remoteness, the proximity of the Trans -Mara Maasai area 
which is a happy hunting ground for bad hats of all neighbouring tribes, and the ease 
with which a malefactor can escape over the Tanganyika Territory border ".9 The 
remoteness of the region also meant that it was difficult to set up a station in close 
proximity to each of the peoples who were present. The abaKuria, for instance, were 
administered from Ikoma, seventy miles from the area.10 
7 See also: "Report on the General Situation in the Kuria Chiefdom of North Mara 
1945" by Hans Cory, Cory Collection, University of Dar es Salaam. 
8 TNA: TS10298 /I: 61, 22nd July 1927. Letter from H.C. Stiebel PC to the Chief 
Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
9 KNA: DC/KSI /3/3, 1910. Report "An Outline of the History of the District 1780- 
1946", by M.P. Gordon. Unknown recipient. 
10 TNA: TS 10298/I: 62, 22nd July 1927. See Note 8. 
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One of the greatest environmental difficulties was the lack of water along much of 
the border. Between Engare Naibor and Lake Natron, there was virtually no water and 
the country was uninhabited, although this can also be attributed to the presence of 
tsetse. In Maasailand itself, there were only two permanent rivers: the Ruvu (Pangani) 
and the Ewaso Nyiro. Attempts were made to demarcate the extent of Maasailand with 
rivers but this proved impracticable. The Tanganyikan Veterinary Officer for the area 
persuaded the government to use watersheds instead, but even this was problematic." 
Water and pasturage were nearly sufficient in Masailand for all, but not without the 
constant cross -boundary movement which was opposed by the colonial authorities.12 
Despite the lack of water in the borderlands, the ecology and landscape of Maasailand 
is very varied; it is not only the monotonous semi -arid savannah that many imagine. 
There are great mountains and the Rift valley, and the elevation of the region varies 
from 645 metres above sea level at the Rift Valley lakes to 3,300 meters in the 
Ngorongoro and Mao highlands.13 This variation means that a variety of temporary 
water supplies exist in different areas at different times. The variety within the region 
made pastoralism an ideal lifestyle, although this is not to justify raiding. Nothing can 
be said about the morality of the raiding culture in this work - merely that it happened, 
it was endemic and it was accepted as part of life by many of the groups affected. 
Raiding was certainly culturally- rooted, and it was part of the region's culture that 
the British authorities tried to eliminate. Punishments were often meted out to ethnic 
groups as a whole, so towards the end of the colonial period, several instance of 
raiders attempting to blame other groups for their misdeeds were recorded. In one 
instance in July 1955, a Luo was killed by a cross -border raiding party. The police 
believed it was a Maasai raid, but "later investigations uncovered that they were 
abaKuria dressed like Maasai" (Kjerland, 1995: 107 -8). It is possible that the police 
11 TNA: Dist 723/I: 18. Unknown date and correspondents. 
12 TNA: TS 10298/I: 2, 13th July 1927. See Note 5. 
13 From personal observation and Coulson 1979: 137. 
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could confuse them, but in this case it seems as if this was a genuine case of imposture. 
After this time, "The Kuria continue cheerfully and unrepentantly with a complex 
system of intervillage, interlocation and interterritory stock thefts with an attendant 
huge rate of cracked skulls ".14 
The limited scale of problems with mainly non -pastoralist groups, indicates that 
pastoralist groups and the colonial borders were not easy bedfellows. The largest 
group apart from the Maasai on the border were the Chagga. Based around Moshi in 
Tanganyika, they also grazed their cattle in BEA and cut grass there, and were not 
stopped in doing so by the German authorities before 1914.15 The Luo, who were 
much troubled by the pastoralists, had migrated across the border into Tanganyika at 
the time of partition, but did not cause any particular problems, despite being a divided 
people. Moreover, they could not easily be returned to BEA because they possessed 
vyeti vya kukaa or residency permits.16 The Maasai did not have vyeti vya kukaa, but 
were much more difficult to eject. The only non -agricultural and non -pastoralist group 
on the border were the Wandorobo, who lived south of the abaKuria on the coast of 
Lake Victoria. They lived on game and did not pay taxes, but this was considered 
acceptable. The only problem that the colonial authorities had was in attempting to 
stop them from making grass fires, as it helped the spread of sleeping sickness.17 
14 KNA: DC/KSI /1/20. South Nyanza District Annual Report 1958. 
15 RKA: R1001 587: 37, 22nd April 1905. Report by G.E. Smith of the Anglo- 
German Boundary Commission. 
16 See CO822/2974, which contains lots of information on "Independenct Celebrations 
in Tanganyika ". 
17 TNA: TS10298 /I: 61, 22nd July 1927. Letter from H.C. Stiebel, PC, to the Chief 
Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
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The Maasai, Maasailand and the boundary 
As was mentioned in Chapter Three, it would be a mistake to assume that East 
African pastoralists did not have a very highly developed sense of territoriality. The 
various sub -groups did have a strong attachment to particular areas, and these areas 
were sometimes demarcated by geographical features. It is difficult, however, to 
identify the extent of Maasailand. The area occupied by the Maasai fluctuated an 
enormous amount in the century leading up to partition, while the colonial vision of the 
extent of Maasailand was coloured by the great upheavals of the 1880s and 1890s 
which decimated the Maasai. At the time of greatest colonial worry over the boundary, 
during the latter part of the 1920s, Maasailand was meant to contain the vast majority 
of the Maasai, yet outside Maasai District, they were found in Lake Province (Maswa 
and Musoma districts), Eastern Province and Central Province (Mpwapwa). They were 
there for traditional and economic reasons, but not because of, "as is sometimes 
suggested a continual and irresponsible desire on the part of the Maasai for fresh 
pastures ".18 A definition of ethnic Maasailand is even more difficult today: in the 
hundred and twenty years since partition, its official extent has shrunk as some 
territory has been evacuated and declared conservation area (Homewood, 1996: 129) 
while other areas have been turned over to both large and small scale farming. It is 
therefore best to assume that while each group may have a had a strong sense of its 
territory, the extent of this territory varied greatly over time. 
One thing is certain, whichever definition of Maasailand is employed: it lies partly in 
Kenya and partly in Tanganyika, and is divided by an international boundary. The 
Hilton Young Commission of 1929 states that, "The boundary cuts this people in two, 
with no more concern for their ideas or for the justice or convenience of their 
18 TNA: Dist S7 /I /II: 250, 21st February 1940. Memorandum on Masai problems by 
DO Masai District. 
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administration than the scythe has for a blade of grass" (HMSO, 1929: 300). Partition 
occurred in 1886, but it wasn't until 1904 -5 that demarcation occurred. When the 
Maasai were informed of the division, they refused to accept it but were told that it 
wasn't up to them to decide (McEwen, 1971: 148). After the demarcation of 1904 -5, 
the Maasai continued to move back and forth across the boundary. It seems likely that 
they knew where the Europeans had drawn their boundary, but that they didn't care, 
found it amusing, or were hostile towards the idea. During the early years of colonial 
rule, there was little that the colonial authorities could do to stop them, but they 
considered that pastoralism was by definition a challenge to linear boundaries. Several 
commentators, such as Markakis, agree with the view that pastoralist movements 
regularly generate conflict (Markakis, 1994: 220). The western European notion of 
political space is generally based upon a sedentary lifestyle, for taxation purposes 
amongst other reasons. Movement within a territory was problematic enough, but 
crossing international boundaries did not fit with the colonial division of land and 
people. 
The colonial powers made several attempts to reduce the impact of the boundary, 
but their desire to the control the pastoralists outweighed everything else. In the 1920s, 
consideration was given by the Permanent Mandates Commission to the idea of 
unifying the Maasai people under one administration. The options under discussion 
were: annexation of the entire Maasai area to Tanganyika; attachment of Tanganyika 
Maasai District to the Kenyan administration without altering its status as part of a 
mandated territory; or creation of a special Maasai area, administered under a separate 
mandate ( McEwen, 1971: 149). Kenyan opposition to any loss of land, Cameron's 
opposition to any loss of control to Kenya, and doubt over the future of the mandate 
scuppered any changes. After the Second World War, petitions were made by the 
Maasai to the British government seeking unification and independence, and in a 1960 
meeting in Kenya, the Maasai requested Britain to stay in Maasailand after the rest of 
Kenya became independent. Both pleas were turned down, chiefly because of white 
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Kenyan influence. It is also highly unlikely that the post- independence governments of 
Tanganyika and Kenya could have accepted such a suggestion. 
The 1886 partition of the Maasai was never reversed and it was up to the people of 
the area - European and African - to try to reduce the impact of the boundary as much 
as possible. In such a difficult situation, it was vital that the DC's who operated along 
the border had a solid understanding of the environment and peoples with which they 
worked. Some did, but many did not. W.J. Lloyd, the ADO for Masai District in the 
late 1920s, believed that the Maasai were possibly unique in Africa in being divided by 
an international boundary. His solution to deciding the problems of the concessions of 
the Kenyan Maasai was to ask "to whom do these waters belong, Kenyan Maasai or 
Tanganyikan Maasai?".19 This demonstrates poor understanding of pastoralism and 
particularly of the fluidity of African ethnicities and polities. He completely accepted 
the artificial colonial constructs of Kenyan Maasai and Tanganyikan Maasai, as the 
main method of categorising the Maasai. Even if the various Maasai clans had been 
divided intact between Kenya and Tanganyika, many of their leaders were interrelated. 
In 1929, the Tanganyikan Director of Surveys wrote that although few Maasai 
were actually living on the boundary, "they were constantly seen crossing and 
recrossing it, but chiefly proceeding South in search of water and grazing. They 
disclaimed any knowledge of the boundary's whereabouts and were distinctly hostile to 
any demarcation at all and gave one no assistance or information ".20 His view seems 
naive in the extreme. As has already been mentioned, the Maasai he encountered 
almost certainly knew the location of the boundary but had no inclination to help him. 
However, it would be wrong to put this refusal down to any romantic notions of 
19 TNA: TS10298/II: 478 -9, 24th January 1935. Ltter from W.J. Lloyd, DO for Masai 
District, to the PC for Northern Province. 
20 TNA: TS13569: 1 -5, 9th March 1929. Letter from Director of Surveys, to the Chief 
Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
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nomadic pastoralists being unable to grasp the concept of linear boundaries. As has 
been shown elsewhere, the Maasai were fully aware of the concept and employed it 
themselves. Although pastoralists were a major challenge to the colonial borders, 
pastoralism is not the antithesis of linear boundaries. It was not so much a clash 
between linear boundaries and a sedentary lifestyle on the one hand and pastoralists on 
the other, but between competing powers. In the event, the British and Germans were 
stronger than the Maasai. 
As was discussed in Chapter Three, it was virtually impossible for the colonial 
powers to have much understanding about the pre -colonial political map of East 
Africa, particularly because of the weakened and dispersed nature of many groups, 
including the Maasai. One of the causes of this had been a series of Maasai wars during 
the second half of the Nineteenth Century, the greatest of which was between the Loita 
and the Purko. In the early 1880s, the Purko gradually established their supremacy 
under their laibon, Mbatian. By 1884 he was the effective if not acknowledged 
paramount chief of all the En- aiposha. As with most Maasai conflicts, after one group 
defeated another, those defeated were often assimilated into the winning side (Galaty, 
1990: 75). However, Mbatian died in 1890, and a great war followed between his two 
sons, Lenana, based around Nairobi, and Sendeyo, supported by Maasai living in DOA 
(Smith, 1907: 256). Sendeyo raided into British territory against Lenana, who was also 
harried by the Kikuyu, and eventually Lenana was forced to go to the British Fort 
Smith in BEA with 5,000 of his people (Beachey, 1996: 405).21 While great wars did 
occur, most conflict was on a more restricted scale. Inter -Maasai struggles can be 
described as George MacDonald Fraser described the clan struggles of the Anglo- 
Scottish borderlands: the perpetual petty jealousies, the conflict of national, family 
and personal interest, the great criss -cross of vendetta and alliance, of feudal loyalty 
21 An account of Maasai power struggles of the Nineteenth Century is given in (Being 
Maasai, 1993: 74 -5). 
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and blood tie, the repeated changing of sides and allegiances, and the general confusion 
bordering on chaos" (Fraser, 1971: 8). 
Disease was another major cause of the disorder of the latter part of the Nineteenth 
Century. Smallpox, rinderpest and pleuropneumonia all struck in the mid- 1880s. 
British and Germans observers who visited the border area in the early 1890s, found 
many kraals but most were empty. Beachey quotes one British observer in 1891: "their 
cattle seem to be decimated by disease....the whole of the west shore of this lake is 
hardly approachable for the number of dead beasts....when owners of great herds of 
cattle and sheep, they were insolent and quarrelsome - now that their only possessions, 
cattle, are dead and dying, they are amenable enough!" (Beachey, 1996: 405). By the 
1890s the Maasai were not the power they had been, and the Kikuyu and others began 
to react much more vehemently to their raids. 
Colonial ignorance of Maasailand can also be demonstrated by the adoption of 
inaccurate African names. Smith gives many great examples of mistakes brought about 
by linguistic problems, such as the name 'Sonjo', which means Thingamabob in Maa 
(Smith, 1907: 258 -9). It is easy to see where such names as a mountain named 
'Atorigini' - the Maa for 'I forget' - came from. While working on a boundary 
commission, Smith himself marked one place name as Olotoiboiologunya, which he 
later discovered meant: "Your boy has gone on ahead." Although such mistakes 
indicate a lack of thoroughness in understanding the area and its peoples, they are 
understandable. It is perhaps more remarkable that so many African names were 
adopted by the colonial powers, than the fact that they occasionally got them wrong. 
Maasai responses to the border will be examined in some depth throughout the 
remainder of this chapter, but it is worth considering what one of the most prolific 
writers on the Maasai - Homewood - has had to say about Maasai resistance to or use 
of the boundary. Homewood writes that Maasai responses manifested themselves in 
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"circumventing imposed boundaries, exploiting and in some cases attacking the 
resources boundaries are designed to protect, or in developing strategies to 
incorporate and utilise to good effect the opportunities that boundaries can present" 
(Homewood, 1996: 122). "What is interesting is the way the international frontier has 
set up a differential in terms of trade that invites exploitation and presents a new 
opportunity for traditional Maasai skills" (Homewood, 1996: 132). The Maasai 
Elmoran exploited their traditional skills: "They have turned the potential obstacle of 
the international border, and the complexities of the Kenya/Tanzania differences in 
livestock marketing, into an opportunity to develop a profitable if unofficial enterprise 
closely consistent with their traditional role" (Homewood, 1996: 133). Various Maasai 
groups exploited the international boundaries to gain grazing, water access and other 
benefits, at the expense of other Maasai sections. This could be perceived as colonial 
constructs provoking a policy of divide and rule. However, Maasai clans had exploited 
each other before colonial rule, the onset of the colonial period merely brought about 
changes in this way this was carried out. The large scale warfare of the 1880s and 
1890s gave way to disputes over territory along the border, with each group exploiting 
the two colonial authorities in an attempt to gain what they could. 
The German period 
Cross -border activity was most active before 1914, when there was little colonial 
presence and the boundary had yet to be consistently enforced. It was during this time 
that the abaKuria first began to cross the border from DOA into BEA. Many crossed 
the Tanganyika -Kenya boundary in 1906 -7, along with Maasai, abaSuba and Luo, so 
that some 2000 huts were discovered by the British DO, R. Hemsted, at the end of 
1907.22 This is supported by the import of 7,220 head of stock via Karungu in the 
22 KNA: PC/NZA/1 /1/2. Nyanza Province Annual Report 1906/07. 
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same year.23 Kjerland's research contradicts previous accounts, such as that by Prazak, 
which claim that the boundary split the abaKuria (Prazak, 1992: 62). By 1910, there 
were 4 -5,000 abaKuria on the British side of the border (Kjerland, 1996: 116). The 
first Zebra (a branch of the abaKuria) to arrive at Kebaroti were allegedly fleeing the 
Germans,24 and this may help to explain why thousands moved to Kenya between the 
years 1905 and 1914. Migrations on this scale, as well as more temporary crossings did 
not foster friendly Anglo- German relations. Herr Dernburg, the German Colonial 
Secretary gave a lecture in London at the African Society in 1909, and "mentioned that 
some time ago the Governor of British East Africa suggested to the German 
authorities that regular information about the movements of the natives in the 
neighbouring districts should be exchanged" (Brode, 1911: 84). 
The Germans attempted to restrict the range of the Maasai in order to make it 
easier to control them and to give land over to European farmers who were moving in, 
in part because of the attraction of the railway. The first Maasai reservation was 
created in 1905 to the south of Kilimanjaro and Meru and on the east of the Great Rift 
Valley (Koponen, 1994: 648). This was witnessed by a Swedish botanist who saw 
askari burn Maasai huts forcing them onto reservation land. They were driven out with 
what goods they could carry and their cattle and were then chased out by whips 
(Sjostedt, 1911: 298) 
German actions were not always so brutal. In 1914, reports reached German 
officials of a Maasai raid.25 The story was that some Maasai had taken their cattle over 
the boundary towards Moshi from BEA, when they came across an old Chagga man 
and young boy with cattle. They attacked and killed them, then seized the cattle. The 
23 KNA: PC/NZA/1 /1. See Note 22. 
24 KNA: DC/KSI /3/3, 1910. Report "The History of the District ". 
25 RKA: R1001 637: 122, 23rd February 1914. Telegram "Grenzzwischenfall an der 
Deutsch -Englischen Grenze" from a German officer, Wahl, based at Moshi. Sent to the 
government at Dar es Salaam. 
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following day, eighty to one hundred Chagga warriors with shields and spears went 
after them, and found that only two Maasai warriors and ten elders had been left on 
guard at a kraal. The Chagga killed three of the Maasai and seized sixty cattle and 
eighty to ninety goats and sheep.26 The Germans intervened and questioned the 
Chagga and Maasai. The Chagga said they recognised many of the cattle among the 
Maasai's sixty, as they had been stolen during the past four years, but there was no way 
that the Germans could either support or deny this view. In the end, the Germans tried 
to be even -handed, and forced the Chagga to pay four cattle and two oxen for each of 
the three dead Maasai. In return, the Chagga received seventeen of their stolen cattle 
back.27 
One of the main problems was that salt licks lying very close to the boundary were 
used by both groups and even the Germans were not sure which side of the line they 
lay on. German officers based around Moshi investigated the situation. It appeared that 
a great deal of cattle raiding went unreported, and so the Chagga and Maasai were 
informed that they could not cross the international boundary without an Ausweis 
(pass), which was obtainable from German officers.28 In addition, three Christian 
Maasai at a local Christian mission were suspected of passing on information and the 
officers requested their expulsion. Finally, the Germans wanted the British to set up 
border posts in the area to improve control - the British had difficulty in getting cattle 
back because they did not interfere as much. 
British investigations into the same incident produced a totally different story.29 A 
herd of cattle, sheep and goats, nearly 150 in all, were brought from the Mchagga 
Chief Salema to a salt lick in BEA. They were left there unattended and were 
26 RKA: R1001 637: 122, 23rd February 1914. See Note 25. 
27 RKA: R1001 637: 124, 23rd February 1914. See Note 25. 
28 RKA: R1001 637: 124R -125, 23rd February 1914. See Note 25. 
29 RKA: R1001 637: 117 -120, 26th February 1914. Letter from Governor Belfield of 
Kenya to the Governor of German East Africa. 
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discovered by four Elmoran belonging to the Maasai Chief Metiagi. The story was that 
they collected them with the intention of handing them over to the BEA authorities, 
but this seems most unlikely. Before long, large numbers of armed Chagga 
accompanied by two DOA policemen came over the border to where Meriagi and his 
people were staying, killing three men and seizing 642 cattle, 2600 sheep and goats 
and twelve donkeys. Following the German intervention, only 642 cattle, 1390 sheep 
and goats and nine donkeys were returned. The size of the figures in this case indicate 
that the two raids may have been related, but were probably not the same raids. The 
British government wanted the people and the policemen punished and believed that it 
was a pre- meditated attack, although raids were traditionally pre- meditated. Whatever 
the European moral rights and wrongs of the situation, the European powers were 
attempting to impose an alien system. 
In order to have greater control over the Maasai, both BEA and DOA introduced 
restrictions on where they could live. Game reserves were created where the Maasai 
were also permitted to live, but in many instances they were forced out because they 
were suspected of killing game. In 1906, the first reserves were established: the 
Northern and Southern Game Reserves in Kenya (Homewood, 1996: 124). The 
Maasai had begun to move from the area of the Northern to the Southern in 1904, and 
by 1912 -13, the Kenyan government evacuated the remaining Maasai from the North 
on the Laikipia plateau, thereby increasing the population in the Kenyan borderlands. 
Over the next two decades, the Kenyan Maasai became concentrated in the former 
Southern Reserve (Ngong- Kajiado) with a western extension aroung Narok and the 
trans -Mara. The earliest moves from the Northern reserve were voluntary with some 
Purko occupying the lands of defeated and dispersed groups, but it was later forced 
and resisted. The Northern Reserve became used by settler ranches and other groups. 
The Maasai in BEA generally fared better than those in DOA (Homewood, 1996: 
124). Following a series of epidemics, the Olenana and Purko Maasai co- operated with 
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the British and re -built their herds at the start of the century, while the Kisongo and 
other groups in DOA, perhaps more badly hit by the epidemics and perhaps less 
cohesive as an alliance, were weakened by German punitive raids. In the First World 
War, the Maasai joined the British when the Germans retreated, partly because the 
Germans had forced them into a reserve (Iliffe, 1979: 252). "In the north the Masai had 
suffered most from German rule. Early in the war Masai spied for both sides and were 
alleged to meet and exchange information, but as the Germans retreated the Masai 
openly took the British side. They also seized the chance to escape the hated reserve 
into which the Germans had penned them. By 1917 Masai had regained most of their 
pastures north to the Kenya border, just as Chagga, Meru and Arusha occupied 
abandoned European farms and cut into forest reserves" (Schnee, 1920: 86). 
Colonial policies in the inter -war years 
"The transfer of Tanganyika Territory to British East Africa [sic.] did little to alter 
the potential impact of the boundary as different colonial policies applied in the two 
parts of Maasailand ", "with all the corollaries for differences in infrastructure, trade, 
economy and direction of development" (Homewood, 1996: 124). Although the two 
territories were both under British rule, disputes between the two over border and 
pastoralist policy actually intensified. The fact that the same colonial power ruled both 
territories created the potential for increased control of the border and borderlands, 
thereby bringing the two administrations more regularly into contact, but 
simultaneously making policy differences more apparent. Although both governments 
wanted greater control over the area, both Kenyan and Tanganyikan policy over 
pastoralist problems was rather more reactive than pro- active. The Maasai and other 
groups on the border continued to raid each other and to cross the boundary when 
environmental and economic conditions favoured movement, and went against the 
grain of colonial control. 
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Some colonial debate over the reunification of Maasailand took place but such a 
move was not widely supported. Mr Longland, PC for Northern Province, suggested 
in the late 1920s that the inter -territorial boundary between the Kenyan and 
Tanganyikan Maasai should one day be removed, and made various recommendation 
for future cattle arrangements which will be considered in the next chapter.3° Sir 
Edward Grigg, Governor of Kenya, met Cameron at the 1926 Conference of 
Governors of East Africa, where they discussed Maasai problems.31 Grigg refused to 
give up Kenya Maasailand to Tanganyika or to allow it to become independent, but he 
believed that Tanganyika Maasailand could become incorporated into Kenya, or that 
steps could be taken to improve policy co- ordination. Needless to say, Cameron 
refused. For the most part, the jealousies of the two administrations allied to the 
obstacle of the mandatory status of Tanganyika prevented serious consideration of the 
obvious solution to disorder in the borderlands. 
The Kenyan government took a generally stricter line on restricting border crossing 
than the Tanganyikan authorities. Inter -territorial migration leading to semi -permanent 
migration was permitted by the Tanganyikan authorities, but the Kenyans often tried to 
block it. The Kisongo Maasai, who were considered to be Tanganyikan Maasai by the 
authorities, were refused permission to return with their cattle to Tanganyika by Loita 
council in Kenya and their DC. "The man may return, but he must abandon his 
cattle ".J2 It is interesting to note that Kenya imposed stricter controls on migration, 
but Tanganyika introduced tighter disease controls. This aspect of pastoralism will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
30 TNA: TS10298/II: 366, 21st November 1930. Report of a Veterinary Meeting at 
Loitokitok. 
31 CO691 86/6: 6 -8, 11th September 1926. "Memorandum in regard [sic.] to the 
Masai Question ". No author given. 
32 TNA: TS10298: 3 -4, 13th July 1927. Memorandum on Tanganyika -Kenya 
boundary problems by PC Mitchell of Northern Province, sent to the Chief Secretary, 
Dar es Salaam. 
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Although the two governments did put control and stability ahead of the 
environmental difficulties of the region, they were not totally intransigent in their 
policies, and several sensible decisions were reached. There were many essential water 
holes right on the boundary and various concessions were set up to allow Maasai living 
on each side of the border access to water and grazing on the other side. For example, 
in the area between the Pangani River and the Central Line railway, there was a large 
area of uninhabited country which the Maasai trekked across, often during drought. 
German policy had been to keep the Maasai out because the Warusha and Chagga 
objected, but the British PC and his DCs could find no reason to do so, and access was 
permitted.33 The DC for Maasailand and later PC for Northern Province, was Major 
E.D. Browne. He was effectively in charge of Maasai policy in Tanganyika from 1916 
until at least 1926, and was greatly respected by the Maasai.34 He understood the area 
very well, and it may be in no small part due to him that difficulties in the area did not 
intensify until 1927, when he left his post. 
British policy on the Maasai can best be discussed through an examination of the 
correspondence of 1927 -28, at a time when matters were brought to a head, and 
policies were introduced which formed the bedrock of British policy for the remainder 
of colonial rule. After the war, matters had been allowed to drift at territorial level and 
problems were dealt with by PCs or more usually DCs, without reference to Dar. 
Much of what follows is taken from a very useful Tanganyikan Secretariat report: 
"British Tanganyikan policy in 1927 on how and when to effect the division of the 
Tanganyikan and Kenyan Maasai".3' 
33 TNA: TS 10298/I: 6, 13th July 1927. See Note 32. 
34 CO691 86/6: 17, 11th June 1926. Report entitled "Masai Questions ". No author or 
correspondents given. 
35 TNA: TS 10298. 
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Kenyan Maasai had been ejected from land south of Taveta as part of a plan to 
provide land for Asiatic colonisation, but the scheme never got off the ground. The 
Tanganyikan government pressed for them to be readmitted to the area in 1926, 
believing the Kenyan authorities had unjustly ejected the Maasai from this area.36 The 
greatest problem of the Tanganyikan authorities was that while they seem to have tried 
to be fair to the Maasai - as far as colonial rule can be fair - they still believed that they 
could divide the Maasai into Kenyan and Tanganyikan branches, with some sub -groups 
in Kenya and some in Tanganyika.37 The Loita and Purko Maasai in Tanganyika, for 
instance, are therefore seen as Kenyan Maasai who ended up in Tanganyika after the 
great disasters. The Tanganyikan government wanted them to return but they must not 
be "induced to move as it were on false pretences: they must be told their real 
destination from the first ".38 The colonial authorities considered that they had to, "set 
the stage for the tribe to sort itself out and settle down definitely according to its 
original sub -division by sub -tribes ".39 Although understandable, as has been discussed 
throughout this work, this was not an achievable goal. 
The Kenyan Maasai who had been ejected were found living two miles over the 
border at 01 Molog in Rongai area during the mid- 1920s. As this was in breach of the 
veterinary regulations, the Tanganyikan government wanted the kraals burned and the 
people removed. This demonstrates the confusion and ignorance of the colonial 
authorities and points out the impossibility of dividing the Maasai into Kenyan and 
Tanganyikan Maasai. The Maasai in this case were the Salei and the Laitayok, and the 
area on both sides of the border had been their home for generations.`to The 
Tanganyikan government did not wish to stop the passage of cattle which accompanied 
36 TNA: TS10298 /I: 5, 13th July 1927. See Note 32. 
37 TNA: TS10298 /I: 3 -4, 13th July 1927. See Note 32. 
38 TNA: TS10298: 7, 13th July 1927. See Note 32. 
39 TNA: TS10298: 9, 13th July 1927. See Note 32. 
40 TNA: TS10298: 13, 13th July 1927. Letter from PC Mitchell, to the Chief 
Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
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marriage, inheritance and other social interaction, but wanted the bulk of that traffic to 
pass through Veterinary Control Posts.41 At the same time, local officials admitted that 
it was easier for the Maasai to pass illegally than legally. After consultation with local 
DCs, the kraals were not burnt and the Maasai in question were given a five year 
concession to the area, but the long -term intention was to turn the area over to the 
Chagga, who also grazed their cattle there from time to time.42 The Salei and the 
Laitayok agreed to keep the grass down to reduce the fire risk and to sell their surplus 
cattle when the area been fully stocked .43 
Further west, in the middle of Maasailand, the frequency with which Maasai 
crossed the border and the isolated nature of the area, caused the Tanganyikan 
government to set up a new post at Loliondo. With only a single ADO supported by 
three policemen, the post required some level of co- operation from the Maasai in order 
to maintain law and order. An Inter Colonial Native Court was set up at Pusi Mom on 
the border to deal with disputes between Africans. It was attended by the ADO at 
Loliondo, the DC for Narok and about 400 Maasai, some of whom were litigants, but 
most were just curious to hear rulings on border problems.44 The influx of the Loita 
and Purko Maasai caused a massive amount of problems through raiding and by 
annoying the authorities through repeatedly crossing the border, and so the baraza 
attempted to deal with associated cases of theft. Once the trouble subsided - probably 
because of an improvement in environmental conditions45 - it was decided to abandon 
the baraza. Such Native Courts existed in both territories, but had no "right to issue 
41 TNA: TS10298: 14, 18th July 1927. Letter from PC Mitchell, to the Chief 
Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
42 TNA: TS 10298/I: 10, 13th July 1927. See Note 32. 
TNA: TS 10298/I: 15, 30th June 1927. "Memorandum of Discussions at Longido on 
27th, 28th and 29/6/27 on Kenya- Tanganyika Masai Boundary Question ". 
43 TNA: TS10298: 16, 30th June 1927. See Note 42. 
44 TNA: Dist 7/III: 38, 28th April 1930. "Report on Inter -Colonial Boundary Affairs ", 
from the Assistant DO for Loliondo, to the DO for Lolbeno. 
45 TNA: Dist 7/III: 34, 28th April 1930. See Note 44. 
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process calling upon a native to appear from a neighbouring Territory". Any transfer of 
summons had in any case to go through the DC of the opposing territory.46 
During the short lifespan of the court, cattle theft was a far greater cause for 
concern than the human deaths which accompanied raids. The ADO at Loliondo wrote 
"A man may kill another and little notice taken of it, probably because the heirs benefit 
thereby, but let that man interfere with stock the property of another and trouble of 
some description is bound to ensue ".47 This may be a slight exaggeration, but it is not 
far from the truth. Cattle meant respect and wealth to a Maasai. For the Kenyan 
authorities therefore to seize Maasai cattle which were being taken out of the country 
was therefore a massive blow. At the end of 1927, a new DC, Murrells, was appointed 
to Loliondo. In a letter in the March of 1928, he cited the case of Partabola Ole Parsoi, 
a Tanganyika Maasai who decided to return to Tanganyika, and so had all his cattle 
seized by the Kenyan authorities.48 This seemed to be common practice and Murrells 
wanted it stopped. Ole Parsoi's story seems to have particularly touched Murrells. He 
had firstly lost his cattle to the Loita, then his land to the Germans; he fled the area to 
work near Moshi for an Abyssinian called Ailos as a herdboy. He worked hard and 
gradually built his own herd of twenty -seven cattle, before it was seized by the Kenyan 
authorities, as he returned from grazing his herd just over the border in Kenya.49 His 
case seems particularly watertight, given that one of the witnesses was Ole Kere, a 
Loita Maasai who was on his way to steal Ole Parsoi's cattle. 
46 TNA: Dist 7/111: 46 -7, 12th August 1930. Report "Inter- Colonial Baraza, Pusi 
Moru ", by the ADO for Loliondo, to the DO for Monduli. 
The dates of the setting up and disbandonment of the baraza have not been ascertained, 
but it is assumed that it lasted for about two years, approximately 1925 -7. 
47 TNA: Dist Acc.69:7 /III: 38, 28th April 1930. Report "Inter Colonial Boundary 
Affairs ", from Harvey, the ADO for Loliondo, to the DO for Lolbene. 
48 TNA: TS10298/I: 269, 15th March 1928. Letter from DO H.C. Murrells, to the DO 
for Narok. 
49 TNA: TS10298/I: 270, 15th March 1928. As Note 48. 
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By the end of 1928, both governments realised that they could not hope to prevent 
cross -border migration without a massive increase in manpower. The challenge was to 
make it orderly, in particular through the use of veterinary controls on migrating 
cattle.5° Each of the various Maasai and non -Maasai groups who lived in the 
borderlands continued to raid each other throughout the inter -war years. There was 
little that the British could do, but just before the Second World War they began to 
respond by punishing chiefs who they themselves had appointed. For example, the 
Uasin Ngishu Maasai and the abaIrege and the abaNyabasi of the abaKuria took part in 
a series of tit -for -tat raids in 1939 (Kjerland, 1995: 98). On one occasion, the abaIrege 
and the abaNyabasi carried out five raids on the Maasai, taking most of the cattle 
across the boundary into Tanganyika. Chief Kisu and Chief Nyakimore of the two 
protagonist groups reported Maasai raids upon their herds as well as the counter -raids 
of their own people, but both lost their jobs.J1 The British had attempted to 
consolidate the different branches of the abaKuria into a more manageable size, and so 
appointed chiefs to rule them as part of their policy of Indirect Rule. As a result they 
had a great deal of influence over such chiefs. This tactic could not work with the 
Maasai where the British had little influence on who the leaders were, and who did not 
have single political leaders. 
Differences between Kenyan and Tanganyikan policy 
Differences between Kenyan and Tanganyikan pastoralist, Maasai, border and 
veterinary policies - which were very often one and the same - were the leading causes 
of the strained relations which prevailed between the two British territories during the 
50 TNA: TS 10298/I: 313. "Report on the Migration of Purko and Loita Masai of 
Kenya Colony into the Sonjo Area of the Tanganyika Territory" by G. Webster, Acting 
PC, Northern Province. 
51 KNA: DC/KSI /1/4. South Kavirondo District Annual Report 1935. 
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late 1920s and early 1930s. There were several basic policy differences. Firstly, tax 
levels were substantially lower in Tanganyika. The Maasai tax was 20/- per head in 
Kenya and 10 /- in Tanganyika during the 1920s - a much higher figure in Kenya than 
for any other group. This perhaps explains why many Maasai lived in Tanganyika but 
crossed into Kenya for grazing and water. The Maasai sold cattle to pay their taxes, 
and it was difficult to reduce the tax as it was the government's main method of 
controlling stock numbers.52 Secondly, the Maasai were permitted to carry their shield 
and white spear in Tanganyika, but not in Kenya. Cameron appealed for the Kenyan 
Maasai to have their right to bear weapons restored, but the Kenyan authorities blamed 
Maasai unrest on liberal Tanganyikan policies. Cameron replied that their problems 
were of their own making.53 Thirdly, there were differences in quarantine policy which 
will be discussed in the next chapter.54 
Finally, differences in cattle purchasing policy encouraged cross -border trade. A 
long -established cross -border cattle trade existed between Kenya and Tanganyika, the 
direction depending upon market conditions. Tanganyika generally encouraged good 
market conditions and terms of trade, in an attempt to reduce herd sizes. This led to 
smuggling from Kenya into Tanganyika, while the Kenyan government discouraged 
Africans from entering the market at large (Iliffe, 1979: 132). Even in the post -war 
years, "People knew the price of stock on both sides of the border and when the price 
was higher in Kenya 'a steady flow of stock comes this way "'.55 The Maasai were not 
the only cattle people to exploit the border to their own advantage. The abaKuria were 
52 CO691 86/6: 6 -7, 11th September 1926. "Memorandum in regard [sic.] to the 
Masai Question ". No author given. 
53 CO691/86/6: 22, 11th June 1926. Report "Masai Questions ". No author or 
correspondents given. 
5-F CO691 86/6: 7, 11th September 1926. See Note 52. 
55 KNA: DC/KSI /1/13 and 17. South Nyanza District Annual Report 1954. Kjerland, 
1995: 87 -88. 
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"quick to play off one administration against another and have already learned that it is 
no offence in Tanganyika to be found in possession of cattle stolen in Kenya ".56 
Where a group had traditionally ranged across the borderlands, they now generally 
chose to be based in Tanganyika. The four main branches of the Maasai who lived in 
Tanganyika - Purko, Loita, Laitaiyok and Saleh - all traditionally used pasture over the 
border. The Kenyan authorities wanted the Laitayok and Salei returned to Kenya but 
they wanted to remain in Tanganyika Maasailand. The Kenyan authorities pressurised 
the Tanganyikan government to return them. The DC for Tanganyika Maasailand 
wrote sarcastically, the problem is "a disinclination on the part of the Masai to resume 
enjoyment of the delights of residence under that enlightened native policy which our 
Northern neighbours so frequently tell us about: the position however is the same, and 
I hope we shall not be obliged to drive them out at the point of the bayonet." These 
Maasai "are exceedingly affable to us because for ten years we have left them to do 
exactly as they pleased ".J7 The Dar es Salaam government suggested that some 
military demonstrations in the area would be useful, but such gunboat diplomacy was 
ruled out by the local officials. 
n- Mir. i on of h P rk .n. L n D 
G.A. Webster, the Acting PC for Northern Province threw himself into his 
temporary role and attempted to research the migration of the Purko and Loita Maasai 
of Kenya Colony into the Sonjo area of Tanganyika Territory. The Purko and Loita 
first arrived in 1921, with the permission of the friend of the Maasai, E.D. Browne, 
who at that time was DC for Arusha. This was never reported to Dar, and only came 
56 KNA: DC/KSI /1/4. South Kavirondo District Annual Report 1935. 
57 TNA: TS 10298/I : 93, 17th October 1927. Letter from PC Mitchell, to the Chief 
Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
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to light when the veterinary officer for Northern Province, McCall, discovered pleuro- 
pneumonia 100 miles south of the Kenyan border in 1927.58 The Chief Secretary 
complained about the Browne's actions; it was at this time that Browne disappears 
from the area, and he was presumably transfered elsewhere. A patrol under the new 
DO, Kitching, went in May 1927 to see if the Loita and Purko were there. Upon their 
arrival, the bornas had been hastily evacuated, but in the vicinity of Loliondo, warriors 
gathered to face the patrol, but negotiation led to talks.59 The Maasai told the DO that 
they had believed the patrol was a cattle raid, and that some of their bomas had 
actually been in the area since 1916, tying in with the period of greatest drought. The 
patrol removed the people to Kenya, but they returned once the patrol moved on.6° 
Kitching went back to the Maasai and informed them that Kenya -Tanganyika talks 
and then Kenya- Tanganyika -Maasai talks would have to take place, and emphasized 
that no hurried actions would be taken that would cause hardship.61 However, in the 
meantime, other unnamed government officials met the Maasai and informed them that 
migration was permitted if they paid tax in Tanganyika.62 This lack of co- ordination in 
government policy merely encouraged the Maasai to believe that they could manipulate 
officials. Kitching continued his pro- active line, the exact position of the boundary was 
checked and boundary cairns were re- built. It was discovered that the Kenyan 
government had regarded the boundary as lying some fifteen miles south of the official 
boundary, and that "the Kenya Government had for some years been administering a 
part of Tanganyika ".63 A stock inspection of Sonjo area revealed eighty -one kraals 
58 TNA: TS10298/I: 281, 22nd August 1928. Letter from the Acting PC for Northern 
Province, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
59 TNA: TS10298/I: 284, 22nd August 1928. See Note 58. 
60 TNA: TS10298/I: 286, 21st August 1928. "Report on the Migration of Purko and 
Loita Masai of Kenya Colony into the Sonjo Area of the Tanganyika Territory", by G. 
Webster, Acting PC for Northern Province. 
61 TNA: TS10298/I: 287, 21st August 1928. See Note 60. 
62 TNA: TS10298/I: 289, 21st Augst 1928. See Note 60. 
63 TNA: TS10298/I: 291, 21st Augst 1928. See Note 60. 
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with 56,000 head of Kenya Maasai cattle, but only sixty -one were infected with 
rinderpest or bovine pleuro- pneumonia. The differences in approach and attitude of the 
DCs was massive. That the change of one official could so dramatically change the 
position along the most troublesome quarter of the Kenya- Tanganyika boundary, 
shows the power of the isolated European officials on the ground. That Browne's 
permission for the Loita and Purko and their 56,000 cattle to stay took six years to be 
discovered emphasises the isolated nature of the terrain and the thin spread of 
manpower. 
Case Study Two: Loita Maasai in Lake Natron area 
Prompted by the discoveries of Webster and McCall, the Acting DO of Maasai 
District, Murrells, toured the border in early 1928 and found Maasai kraals at the 
southern end of Lake Natron. All the Maasai said they were Kissongo who were 
considered to be Tanganyika Maasai, although in fact they were mixed Kissongo and 
Kenyan Loita. Mr Murrells informed them that Kenyan Maasai could either stay in 
Tanganyika and pay Tanganyikan taxes or return to Kenya.64 Great movements of 
Kenyan Maasai followed in different directions and many moved further into 
Tanganyika.65 Murrells gradually gained the confidence of the Purko and Loita in the 
area and before the year was out, they were bringing their disputes to him for 
adjudication and he was invited to attend circumcisions.66 While staying with a group 
of Loita, Murrells gained information which is key to this entire thesis. The Maasai 
gave him their reasons for migration into Tanganyika at various times over previous 
64 TNA: TS 10298/I: 297, 21st Augst 1928. See Note 60. 
65 TNA: TS10298/I: 299, 21st Augst 1928. See Note 60. 
66 TNA: TS10298/I: 299 -300, 21st Augst 1928. See Note 60. 
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decades, although his interviewees, friends and informants obviously had their own 
purposes to serve.67 Their reasons were as follows: 
a) Restriction of tribal lands by alienation for various reasons. 
b) Curtailment and abolition of customs like carrying shields and white spears. 
c) Hatred or fear of Sendeyo, the Loita 01 Laibon. 
d) Quarrels between Sendeyo and one of his sons, which persuaded the son to take the 
Laitaiyok and Saleh over to Tanganyika. 
e) Drought caused migration in search of pastures and water. 
f) Resentment at the alienation of lands like Nau and Kinabop. 
g) Pressure by the Purko. 
h) The return of people like the Laitaiyok and Saleh to their ancestral lands in 
Tanganyika. 
i) They had asked for veterinary assistance and this had been denied by the Kenyan 
authorities 
j) Penetration of the Mara River area in Kenya by tsetse fly. 
Murrells checked these claims with Tanganyikan and Kenyan officials, and all 
seemed to be valid. Various observations can be made on these reasons, some of which 
were also supported by Murrells: 
c): Sendeyo appeared to be hated by all sections of the Maasai, including most of the 
Loita. He was believed to have caused the death of the Tanganyika 01 Laibon, Parit, 
who was also his nephew, in January 1928.68 This shows the extent to which the 
different sub -sections intermixed. 
67 TNA: TS10298/I: 300 -302, 21st Augst 1928. See Note 60. 
68 TNA: TS10298/I: 302, 21st Augst 1928. See Note 60. 
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g) In 1889 there was a great battle at Elanairobi near Ngorongoro. The Loita, the 
greatest of the Maasai groups, lost almost all their cattle to the Purko. The Loita had 
since built up their herds again and had therefore returned to their former areas.69 
h) The Laitaiyok and Saleh had lost many cattle and men to the Loita, but had been 
driven out by the Germans. They rebuilt their herds and returned to their ancestral 
homes from 1916 onwards. This show the failure of attempting to encapsulate Maasai 
geopolitics in a snapshot picture. 
i) It seems possible that this comment was tongue in check, but it was actually given as 
one of the main reasons for migrating; a group suffering heavy loses to disease may 
have been attracted by veterinary help in Tanganyika.7° At any rate, it indicates great 
awareness of differences in Kenyan and Tanganyikan policy. 
j) "The only boundary which the Masai really respect is tsetse fly ".71 It is true that all 
sections of the Maasai were greatly effected by environmental problems and showed an 
almost total disregard for the Tanganyika -Kenya border well into the period of British 
rule. Even when they did begin to pay more attention, it was as much in exploiting the 
boundary than in being restricted by it. 
In general, Murrells' discussions indicate that African politics and migrations were 
as complicated as those in Europe. Attributing cross -border migration during this 
period to tax differentials or the search for grazing rarely tells the whole story. Nearly 
all the Maasai groups which Murrells stayed with, stated that they would like to return 
to Kenya, but that if conditions were bad, they would return to Tanganyika. They 
recognised that this could be an annual process, and that increasing colonial control 









303, 21st Augst 1928. See Note 60. 
304, 21st Augst 1928. See Note 60. 
304, 21st Augst 1928. See Note 60. 
307, 21st Augst 1928. See Note 60. 
278 
demonstrates great Maasai awareness of the boundary, its function and value, and of 
the differences between Kenyan and Tanganyikan policy. 
This was a rare example of a colonial administrator gaining the trust of an African 
group, then asking them what they thought of the boundary and recording it officially. 
On another occasion, a more aggressive DC in Pare District asked some Kenyan 
Maasai in the Kiria area in 1940, why they didn't return. They replied that it was 
because the boundary river was in flood. The poor grazing in the area of Maasailand to 
where they would have been removed seems a more likely suggestion, but the DO for 
Same was convinced by the river story.73 Such brief, simplistic reasons may have been 
genuine, but it seems more likely that the lack of understanding between this particular 
Maasai group and the DC led to them giving him a reason they thought he wanted; that 
is, the high river would not last long and then they would leave. This at least would put 
off confrontation for a time. 
The role of the DC 
The role of the man on the ground has been discussed in some depth already, but it 
is worth citing several further cases. One ADO for Maasailand had an African staff of 
one Kissongo and many Purko and Loita. His every move was predicted by the Maasai 
groups whom he visited and he knew that his staff must be to blame. He could trust the 
Kissongo man, but doubted the rest. "I propose to wait my time and dismiss them for 
misbehaviour or other pretext; it is not proposed to dismiss them en bloc, as they will 
undoubtedly return to their bornas and air a grievance against me personally or the 
73 TNA: Dist 723/I: 53, 10th January 1940. Letter from L.H.L. Fost, PC, to the PC for 
Northern Province. 
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Government ".74 The DC's staff were very often locals, and he had to be very careful in 
how he treat them. 
In -depth sociological or economic studies were normally carried out by interested 
DOs during the 1920s, as they did everything else. After the Second World War, 
professionals were more likely to be drafted in. H.A. Forsbrooke, the Senior 
Sociologist was called in to write a report on the presence of Maasai in Same District 
in October 1951.75 Forsbrooke appears to have had knowledge of Maa, of pastoralism 
and of 'hamitic' cultures. He interviewed various Maasai elders and studied place 
names, and concluded that the Maasai had been present in the Toloha area from pre- 
colonial times, through the German period and up to 1951. 
Other areas of responsibility were environmental concerns and policing. Lumley 
was DC at Mbulu between Lakes Eyasi and Manyara for a time. He wanted to relocate 
some of the Barabaig and Irakh to Mbulumbui, to the north, because of overgrazing 
(Lumley, 1976: 91). He applied for a three man police post for the area and intended 
to set up posts on high ground overlooking the area. His proposal was turned down by 
the PC who believed that the Irakh should look after themselves (Lumley, 1976: 92). 
The DC could move whole societies, yet was refused his request for three policemen 
(Lumley, 1976: 164). Lumley had been forced to ask his PC for permission as such a 
post would involve a substantial financial outlay. Where finance was not involved he 
and many others acted without involving the higher authorities. 
74 TNA: Dist 7/III: 38 -9, 28th April 1930. "Report on Inter -Colonial Boundary 
Affairs ", from the ADO for Loliondo, to the DO for Lolbene. 
75 TNA: Dist 723 /III: 475 -480, October 1951. Report "The Masai in Same District" 
by H.A. Fosbrooke, Senior Sociologist. 
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The Concessions 
After 1927 -28, the policies of both governments became more pragmatic. They 
could not hope to impose a watertight boundary and environmental and humanitarian 
considerations demanded that some form of cross -border movement be permitted. 
Several Maasai groups did not have access to water supplies and grazing at certain 
times of the year without crossing the border, and the Kenyan Maasai in particular 
required access to Tanganyikan resources. The Tanganyikan authorities conceded that 
the Matapatu Maasai had enjoyed the grazing in Tanganyika since "time immemorial" 
and that in the borderlands as a whole, it would be too expensive to locate new water 
supplies.76 Moreover, several Tanganyikan groups periodically used Kenyan resources. 
The Chagga used salt licks and grazing in Kenya,77 the Matapatu used the Meto water 
in German times78 and several Tanganyikan Maasai groups used Manga water in 
Kenya. 
The Kenyan administration seem to have swung the argument in their direction by 
arguing that Maasai "rights in this respect were recognised and admitted by the 
German Administration and it would be a matter of deep regret if the withdrawal of the 
concessions gave them cause to regard their treatment by His Majesty's Government as 
less generous and equitable than that accorded them under that regime ".79 As has 
already been seen, German tolerance of Kenyan Maasai in DOA was often very 
limited, but it does seem that the sheer lack of manpower meant that the existence of 
76 TNA: TS10298/II: 462, 26th November 1934. Letter from the Acting Colonial 
Secretary, Kenya, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
Another fine example of romanticising the situation. 
77 TNA: TS 10298/11: 366, 21st November 1930. Report of a Veterinary Meeting at 
Loitokitok. 
78 TNA: TS 10298/11: 452, 18th September 1934. Letter from the PC for Northern 
Province to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
79 TNA: TS 10298/11: 466, 26th November 1934. Letter from the Acting Colonial 
Secretary, Kenya, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
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such Maasai within the borders of DOA often went unnoticed or was not acted upon. 
A formal agreement was, however, something new. 
A handful of potential water, grazing and salt lick concessions were identified. The 
reports on these concessions on Tanganyikan soil demonstrate that what historical 
evidence exists shows that the Kenya Maasai had generally greater access to the 
concessions than the Tanganyika Maasai and "tends to show that the Matapata 
territory extended for some distance across the border and included the waterholes ".80 
To introduce such concessions would in some ways compromise the western concept 
of the division of political space which the colonial powers were fighting to impose, 
but their introduction shows that the authorities were not entirely intransigent on this 
issue. 
Four concessions were introduced in 1928: Sinya, Manga and Metu which survived 
into the post- Second World War years and the Ronya (Kilimanjaro) concessions which 
were cancelled within three years because of the creation of a forest reserve.$' It was 
agreed that the Kenya Maasai must pay a nominal rent in respect of each of the grazing 
areas, to indicate that they were not there by right. One heifer each was paid for 
Rongai and Meto concessions to a Tanganyikan Maasai Laibon.82 At Namanga, where 
Manga water lay, Kenya wanted access to water and grazing, but Tanganyika was only 
prepared to offer only water access. This seems absurd as good grazing often lay next 
to water supplies, and it would be impossible to stop the cattle from eating while they 
were drinking. The Tanganyikan government reasoned that mingling between Kenyan 
and Tanganyikan cattle at Manga water would help to spread disease and that if the 
80 TNA: TS 10298/II: 465, 26th November 1934. See Note 79. 
81 TNA: TS10298/II: 416 -7, 28th April 1934. "Water Concessions Granted to Kenya 
Masai" by the Department of Veterinary Science and Animal Husbandry. 
82 CO691/100/21: 41. "Note of the Conversation at the Office of the Chief Native 
Commissioner, Nairobi, 22nd November, 1927 - l0am" by P.E. Mitchell, Acting PC 
for Northern Province. 
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cattle were only watered at the site, then it would be easier to prevent interaction. 
However, the Kenyan government agreed to pay for demarcation around the 
concession83 and introduced a cattle fence to keep the cattle off most of the grazing on 
their way to the water, to create a channel leading to the water. Within a short period, 
however, this became impractical; the fences became damaged by wild animals and the 
cost of repairs was rather high.84 
By 1933, the concessions were being given as the main reason for the failure to 
introduce a cattle free zone. Wherever a cattle free zone was set up, some important 
water sources would lie within it, thereby not being available to either side85 In a 
region as bereft of water resources as Maasailand, this would not have been a popular 
decision. Drought in 1933 caused the Tanganyikan PC to ask his Kenyan opposite 
numbër to withdraw the Meto concession because of the needs of the Tanganyikan 
Maasai, but he refused to do so. Tanganyikan officials therefore gave Tanganyikan 
Maasai use of the waters as we11.86 With both groups of Maasai now in the same area, 
the rinderpest which was prevalent in Kenya spread more easily. In addition, the 
Tanganyika Maasai asked for the withdrawal of the concession; they had been 
subjected to raids by the Kenya Maasai to whom they had granted the favour.87 Also, 
the hongo had not been paid, and they had had their waters and grazing in Forest 
Reserves, such as Rotian on Kilimanjaro, withdrawn from them.88 
83 TNA: TS10298/II: 462, 26th November 1934. See Note 79. 
84 TNA: TS 10298: 11, 13th July 1927. "Memorandum on Tanganyika -Kenya 
boundary problems" by PC Mitchell of Northern Province, sent to the Chief Secretary, 
Dar es Salaam. 
85 TNA: TS10298/II: 413, 28th April 1934. See Note 81. 
86 TNA: TS10298/II: 416, 28th April 1934. See Note 81. 
87 CO691/141/12: 41, 4th August 1934. From Mitchell, Acting Chief Secretary, Dar 
es Salaam, to the Colonial Secretariat, Kenya 
88 TNA: TS10298/II: 418, 28th April 1934. See Note 81. 
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However, the Kenyan Maasai regarded these waters as theirs by inheritance, and 
Tanganyikan demands in 1934 that Sinya and Manga concessions be withdrawn 
immediately and Metu after one year were not received gratefully by the Kenyan DC.89 
The Kenyan government would not commit to evacuating the concessions, arguing 
that the grazing in that part of Kenyan Maasailand was worse than in Tanganyika.90 
The Tanganyikan PC believed the Manga concession should continue with a corridor 
of access, along the lines of the previous attempts with fences. He believed that the 
Sinya and Meto concessions should be removed, as more water supplies could be 
found on the Kenyan side, obviating the need to bring cattle over the border. Kenya 
claimed this as a prescription right from German times,91 and refused to withdraw the 
concession. 
The concessions were maintained until after the Second World War, although they 
were occasionally withdrawn in theory by the Tanganyikan government in times of 
plenty in Kenya or of extreme drought in Tanganyika. It is interesting to note that the 
argument came down time and again to the pre -colonial state of affairs, and each side 
used the pre -colonial situation to justify their claims. That the Tanganyikans decided 
whether or not to support the concessions based upon environmental conditions during 
a single year, demonstrates the inferiority of the western system of dividing political 
space and determining access, in comparison with the pastoralist system of flexibility 
and adaptability. The pastoralist model, however, caused its proponents to pay a heavy 
price, in terms of cattle raiding and the conflict over resources which often developed. 
In time of need, when two groups had traditionally had the right to use the same water 
source, as at Matapato,92 military strength always won out and might was always 
89 TNA: TS10298/II: 413, 28th April 1934. See Note 81. 
90 TNA: TS10298/II: 451, 18th September 1934. Letter from the PC for Northern 
Province, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
91 TNA: TS10298/II: 453, 18th September 1934. See Note 90. 
92 CO691/141/12: 46, 28th November 1934. From A.D.V. Wade, Acting Colonial 
Secretary, Kenya, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
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right. Ironically enough, this was the same principle which led to the colonial 
occupation of East Africa and the imposition of the colonial boundaries. Everything 
was different but nothing had changed. 
Case Siudy Three, the Toloha Maasai 
Further to the east, around the shores of Lake Jipe and right on the border, the 
Toloha Maasai lived almost undisturbed by the boundary and by the colonial powers. 
They were known to both the British and the German authorities and by 1910 were 
already being seen as British Maasai.93 They continued to live unnoticed until after the 
German period, although they were known by the Chagga, who used the territory 
around the lake as a hunting area. The northern and eastern shores of Lake Jipe lay in 
Kenya and the rest in Tanganyika, so defining them as either Kenyan or Tanganyikan 
could not have been logically possible. It seems that because there was no colonial 
presence or awareness, the Toloha, unlike the larger Maasai clans to west, were not 
aware of the border. 
Tanganyikan DCs identified the Toloha in 1923, but it was not until 1933 that 
central government first learned about them, at which point the Kenyan authorities 
asked them to end their "trespass ".94 They were requested to return to Tanganyika 
with their 9,000 cattle and warned that they would not be allowed to graze or take 
water in future.95 This proved impossible for the Toloha to do, as the Tanganyikan 
shores of Lake Jipe were now dominated by thick -growing reeds which made it 
impossible for the cattle to approach the water from that side. 
93 RKA: R1001 633: 199, 6th August 1909. Report on Kilimanjaro area by Methner. 
94 TNA: Dist S7 /1 /II: 407, 18th August 1948. Letter from Davies, PC for Coastal 
Province, to the PC for Tanga. 
95 TNA: Dist 723/I: 69, 26th June 1945. "Masai at Toloha" from an unknown source 
at Tanga, to the Director of Veterinary Services, Mpwapwa ". 
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There was a concerted campaign by the Kenyan authorities and several local 
Tanganyikan officials from 1933 onwards to remove the Toloha Maasai, either to 
Maasailand or the lower Ruvu valley.96 The Tanganyikans suggested that water should 
be piped into the Toloha area, but this was ruled out on grounds of cost. In 1948 the 
Kenyan PC for Coastal Province, Forster, recommended using police to round them up 
at Taveta next year and returning them to Tanganyika.97 He attempted to use the 1948 
census figures to support his assertion that they were Tanganyikan Maasai, but the 
census figures on pastoralists were often widely inaccurate. At the time of the 1948 
census, it was not clear if the Toloha Masai were in Same District or over the border in 
Kenya.98 Pressure for action built up until the Kenyan authorities finally seized some 
Toloha cattle in 1952. A trespass case was heard in the Kenyan courts and the seizure 
of cattle approved. 
Tanganyikan officials accused the Kenyans of being heavy- handed, and the DC for 
Lushoto made several complaints which were supported by his PC. Firstly, more than 
five hundred cattle were taken, a far higher number than claimed in court and a 
disproportionate punishment. Secondly, fourteen people were arrested and charged, 
but the cattle were seized from only two men: five from Lasipitchi Ole Balidore and 
the rest from Lobitora Ole Sorisi.99 Finally, the Toloha claimed that the calves were 
separated from the cows and therefore died.100 In addition, further discrepancies can 
be pointed out: half of the accused were not made aware of their right to appeal; the 
price of 39407/- for the 500 cattle at 79/- per cow was very low; and one of the 
96 TNA: Dist 723/II: 211 -7. "Precis of Correspondence" from 9th May 1933 to 13th 
October 1948. No author given. 
97 TNA: Dist S7 /1/II: 406, 6th September 1948. "Tanganyika Masai - Trespass in 
Kenya" by P.F. Foster, PC for Coast Province. Sent to the PC for Tanga. 
98 TNA: Dist 723 /III: 475, October 1951. Report "The Masai in Same District" by 
H.A. Fosbrooke, Senior Sociologist. 
99 TNA: Dist 723 /III: 423. Undated, unauthored report "Masai, Katemboi Report". 
100 TNA: Dist 723 /III: 423 -4. See Note 99. 
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accused, Nete Ole Maina, was only ten years old and under Maasai custom, he almost 
certainly possessed no cattle.1o1 
Thanks to the intervention of the Tanganyikan officials and their solicitors W.P. 
Holder & Co, the Maasai received compensation. Lobitora Ole Sorisi was given 
15,000/- compensation immediately, and up to 82,098/- in total, when the figures had 
been worked out.102 The Tanganyika government had fought for the rights of the 
Maasai; and the Kenyan authorities seem to have known that they had acted wrongly, 
as they agreed not to seize cattle in that way again. The PC for Coast Province in 
Kenya assured the PC for Tanga that no more raids would be carried out until the 
boundary was clear on the glound.103 Indeed, the DC for Voi wrote that in his 
opinion, the Toloha Maasai should still have access to northern Lake Jipe, and that the 
propósed National Park boundary in Kenya must exclude the area. Otherwise "the 
inter -territorial boundary must be amended to coincide with the dt facto boundary".104 
In general, the Tanganyikan authorities seemed more prepared to defend African 
cultural and economic systems than their northern neighbours. It would be interesting 
to know if such border irregularities would have been tolerated if Kenya had not been a 
British colony. 
101 TNA: Dist 723/III: 424. See Note 99. 
102 TNA: Dist 723/III: 551, 9th November 1953. Letter entitled "re: Compensation for 
Masai cattle seized on the Kenya border ", sent from W.P. Holder, a solicitor, to the PC 
for Tanga 
103 TNA: Dist 723/III: 365 -6, undated. "Note on Impounding, in March 1952, of 500 
cattle at Katemboi by DC Voi ". 
104 TNA: Dist 723/II: 366. See note 103. 
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Restrictions on entry to Maasailand and reserves 
International boundaries were not the only boundaries which pastoralists tried to 
overcome and which were defended by the colonialists. Game reserves, forest reserves 
and restrictions on entry into Maasailand added to the policy of control of the 
movement of people and cattle. Control and sendentarisation were attempted partly to 
ensure taxes were collected, partly to prevent crime and partly because of the potential 
for more widespread conflict if groups such as the Purko were allowed to move about 
unhindered. Another reason was the prevention of the spread of disease, which will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
A Maasai reserve was created in BEA at the turn of the century; it defined the 
territory within which the Maasai were free to roam and excluded certain areas which 
they had previously used. The Germans introduced their own version in 1906, but 
according to the British it was "badly conceived" in that it excluded several key water 
resources.'°5 The Germans planned to improve it but the war intervened, and it was 
left to Byatt to extend it after the war. The Germans had created a neutral zone 
between the northern boundary of their Maasai reserve and the Anglo- German 
boundary; Byatt's change abolished this zone, thereby rejoining the two Maasai 
reserves.'06 This can be seen as an instance of the divisive nature of the border being 
reduced because both territories were ruled by the same power. The reserve was 
administered from Arusha by the PC who had two administrative officers working 
solely on Maasailand.107 Several small scale forest reserves were also introduced 
between 1905 and 1930, but entry by the Maasai was common. It was not until 1924 
105 C0691/86/6: 3, 11th September 1926. "Memorandum in regard [sic.] to the Masai 
Question ". No author given. 
106 C0691/86/6: 3 -4, 11th September 1926. See Note 105. 
107 C0691/86/6: 3, 11th September 1926. See Note 105. 
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that enforcement became widespread, and Kenyan Maasai were arrested and punished 
for continued trespass in the forest reserve on the Tanganyikan side of the boundary. 
The authorities on both sides of the border introduced by -laws to control the 
movement of people from the jurisdiction of one headman to another as well as across 
the international boundary. One man was arrested in the late 1920s on his way to sell 
honey at the Lolgorien Mine, as he didn't have a letter of admittance to Maasailand. He 
himself stated that it was because "any umuKuria heading towards Lolgorien was 
suspected of stock theft ".108 One by -law of 1951 in South Nyanza stated that no man 
could move from the jurisdiction of one headman to that of another without a permit, 
and no cattle could be moved between seven o'clock in the evening and five in the 
morning.109 This was typical of by -laws aimed at preventing raiding, but they were 
widely disobeyed by Maasai who knew how and when to move to avoid detection. 
It was not only pastoralists who were restricted in their movements in and around 
Maasailand. Previous policy had been to keep non -Maasai out of Maasailand but by 
1945 'alien' settlements existed. Sikh traders had moved into certain areas and fighting 
had broken out with the Maasai.110 Many Purko - the bad men of the Maasai - had 
been migrating into the area from Kenya since the 1920s, although the other Maasai in 
Loliondo area, the Kisongo and Kiteo, were more reasonable. The Sikhs were blamed 
by the local DC, Robinson, but he had no power to evict them.111 It seems that they 
moved on of their own accord. Nyamwezi and other groups had begun migrating to 
the village of Mto- wa -Mbu in particular, and it proved impossible to keep them out. 
The Maasai paid 15/- tax and aliens 12/ -, although the local DC wanted to make both 
108 Kjerland, 1995: 89. 
109 KNA: DC/NZA/2 /1/213. South Nyanza District Council Minutes 1951. 
110 TNA: TS33146: lA -2, 14th May 1945. Unknown author; sent to the Chief 
Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
111 TNA: TS33146: PIA, 30th April 1945. Letter from I.L. Robinson, DO for 
Masailand, to the PC for Northern Province. 
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up to 15/- to discourage immigration.112 However, this would have recognised 
migration into Maasailand, and so was not implemented.113 
Post -World War Two policy 
In the years following the end of the Second World War, perhaps because of the 
reduced manpower of the war years, stock theft, including cross border theft, became 
an increasing problem. The Suna police post in Kenya was moved to Kehancha and an 
Assistant Inspector of Police was stationed in the heart of buKuria -Kenya in 1947, 
where they would be, "better situated to deal with stock theft on the Tanganyika 
Border ".114 However, by 1949 raids across the border between the Maasai and 
abaKuria, by groups of up to 1000 men showed the uselessness of such a small post 
(Kjerland, 1995: 106). Assistant Inspector MacKenzie who was in charge of the post 
had his number of constables increased from four to sixteen. Their job "was to try to 
close the border with Tanganyika, trace the stock and find the guilty ", and collective 
punishments were given in order to put pressure on the offenders to stop. In addition, 
"a border -committee was established between the buKuria and the Luo -Suba 
locations ",115 and the authorities attempted to stop illegal trading by branding.116 
Some groups began to forge stock brands, and although this was severely punished 
(Brown, 1958: 25 -33). 
112 TNA: TS33146: 8 -9, 8th August 1945. Letter from Bruce Hutt, PC for Northern 
Province, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
113 Today, Mto- wa -Mbu contains representatives from almost every ethnic group in 
Tanzania. It has the feel of a frontier town, although the Maasai continue to make up a 
sizeable portion of the population (From personal observation in the modern-day 
town). 
114 KNA: DC/KSI /1/8, undated report "An Outline of the History of the District ", 
South Kavirondo, Kenya. Written by M.P. Gordon. 
115 Kjerland, 1995: 107. 
116 TNA: Acc.544, Dist L5 /10 /II, undated. "Stock Theft and Raids within North Mara 
District, 1955- 1967 ". 
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Local people lost faith in the ability of the police to act on raids and therefore often 
didn't even report thefts. Despite increased manpower in the Kenyan borderlands, the 
lack of resources, policemen and the scarcity of routine patrols made it an impossible 
task (Kjerland, 1995: 110). R.E.S. Tanner had been an officer in Musoma District and 
wrote a piece on cattle theft in Musoma in the late 1950s. He records that many raids 
were not reported; during the year 1958/9, he identified 447 raids, of which the police 
knew of about only fifty (Tanner, 1966: 31). He visited each chiefdom each month, and 
with the help of headsmen and elected councillors recorded cattle theft cases. The 
great problem with these figures is that no similar surveys have been carried out before 
or since, but it is useful to note that official figures on raiding offer little or no guide to 
the extent of the problem. 
"Apparent general lawlessness" on the Maasai border prompted local administrative 
officers from Kenya and Tanganyika to hold discussions to consider control. Very 
close co- operation was proposed between the two police forces, "to prevent the border 
area being considered as a refuge ",117 and near reciprocal powers were granted to the 
police forces. Despite this, the complexity of the area continued to thwart control. The 
Loliondo area continued to be populated by Loita and Purko, whose leaders remained 
in the Narok District of Kenya. The police forces wanted border restrictions to be 
removed and government to be strengthened, thereby unifying the colonial presence in 
the area. This did not prove to be possible, but Tanganyikan police did serve with the 
Kenyan forces and vice versa. 
The balance of problems seemed to be moving from the far west and the Serengeti 
in the 1920s to Taveta and Lake Jipe in the 1950s. To take one example, at the start of 
1951 an unknown group of Maasai rustled twenty -five Pare cattle, killing the 
117 TNA: TS34276: 21st January 1946. Letter from Partridge, PC for Northern 
Province, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. NB: This is a very thin file - there are 
no page number. 
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herder.118 The Pare believed that the government was scared of the Maasai, and before 
they could act, the cattle were dispersed among various Maasai groups in Kenya and 
Tanganyika, indicating widespread collusion. Eventually Kenyan police traced the 
rustlers back into Kenya, to the area around Lake Jipe where the Toloha Maasai 
continued to be allowed to cross to water their animals, but not to graze.119 They 
found the Toloha with 7 -8,000 head of Tanganyikan Maasai cattle, but they were being 
moved to the lake from inside Kenya, clearly abusing the unofficial concession. The 
DO charged them with the unlawful movement of stock under the Disease of Animal 
Rules, 1931, and they were fined, with 140 cattle taken in lieu of payment (after sale, 
any excess would be returned to the owners). Although the police were much better 
equipped in the 1950s than the 1920s - they were armed with automatic weapons, for 
example - it remained difficult for them to have much impact. One owner was said to 
have 12,000 head of cattle, and it was unlikely that such fines would have much effect 
upon him. It seems that checks were both random and seldom, and that the Maasai 
could take such losses occasionally. 120 
More and more of the borderlands were turned into wildlife reserves during the 
post -war years, and step by step, the Maasai in particular were alienated from their 
traditional lands, in the often mistaken belief that they had a negative impact upon 
wildlife. The southern reserve of Kenya became Amboseli National Reserve in 1948, in 
the same year that the Masai Mara was also set up (Homewood, 1996: 125). In 
Tanganyika, the Serengeti/Ngorongoro area was awarded protected status in 1929, the 
Serengeti later becoming a national park and Ngorongoro a conservation area. In 
1959, the Serengeti National Park was evacuated by the Maasai, but they were given 
118 TNA: Dist 723/II: 312, 2nd January 1951. Letter from Ewart Grogan, DC for 
Taveta, to Thornley, an unknown DC. 
119 TNA: Dist 723/II: 313, 19th January 1951. "Report on Lake Jipe Area ", From 
E.G. Wright, Assistant Superintendent of Police, Mombasa, to the Senior 
Superintendent of Police, Mombasa. 
120 TNA: Dist 723/II: 314, 19th January 1951. See Note 119. 
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joint land use in the Ngorongoro Conservation Area. Partly in return, the Maasai were 
permitted to remain in Mkomazi Game Reserve, permission which was revoked in 
1976 (Homewood, 1996: 126). Ironically, the Maasai responded by attacking what 
they had formerly been accused of destroying. In Amboseli and probably elsewhere, 
the Maasai opposed restrictions, "by selectively killing the wildlife tourists most 
wanted to see" (Homewood, 1996: 126). 
Conclusion 
Pastoralism is a very strong way of life and colonialism had a fight on its hands in 
attempting to impose linear boundaries. Problems of control largely stemmed from the 
pastoralists' lifestyle. Moving across international boundaries, usually accompanied by 
thousands of cattle, they did not recognise any authority but their own. In continuing 
with their cattle- raiding traditions, they effectively thumbed their noses at the 
colonialists. Pastoral groups were affected to a great extent by the boundaries, but only 
after a long struggle and they were never controlled as easily as non -pastoralist groups. 
Even during the 1927 -late 1930s period of concerted British efforts to impose control, 
the colonialists eventually gave it up as a lost cause, settling for countering the most 
negative implications of the cross -border movements. Indeed, the periodic calls for the 
reunification of Maasailand seem to have developed less out of concern for the Maasai, 
but rather from frustration over the colonial inability to impose the border. If such a 
policy had been put into practice, it would have been one of the few cases of 
abandoning a linear boundary as unworkable. 
In such a remote area, there could be no effective boundary where borderlanders 
opposed it and the rule of law was weak. Despite the great increase in manpower at 
the end of 1928, colonial control remained weak and in several cases the location of 
the boundary remained unknown by the colonial officials of both sides. The colonial 
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authorities also seem to have been somewhat ignorant with regards to why the Maasai 
crossed the boundary. The many reasons given by the Loita demonstrate the 
complexity of the situation - it was not merely a matter of paying lower taxes. 
The pastoralists and colonialists had great influence upon each other. Pastoralist 
reaction to colonial rule and colonial boundaries provoked repeated change in colonial 
policy, as the colonialists struggled to keep control of the borderlands. The failure of 
attempts to impose the boundary forced the colonialists to take more conciliatory 
steps, such as the introduction of the grazing, water and salt lick concessions. The 
Inter -Colonial Native Court on the boundary was another attempt at compromise. 
Colonial efforts were further complicated by the unpredictable effect of their policies. 
Attempts to divide the Maasai into Kenyan and Tanganyikan Maasai had the effect of 
producing yet more subgroups and provided further impetus for cattle raiding. Indeed, 
government sociologist Hans Cory went further in doubting the effectiveness of the 
boundary, stating that it was not a boundary to thieves, simply a boundary to those 
administering justice. The western system of boundaries was not suited to the 
Tanganyika -Kenya borderlands. The division of a group elsewhere in East Africa may 
not have been so important, but here, through the heartland of Maasai territory, it was 
unworkable. Access to water and grazing was vital, and the location of these resources 
moved from season to season and year to year. 
Maasai culture was able to survive colonial rule but in a much altered form. The 
Maasai never came to dominate the Rift area as they had done in the years before 
partition and the great disasters of the 1880s and the 1890s, but this had as much to do 
with the impact of the disasters themselves and changes in the balance of power among 
African groups, as it was the result of colonialism. In many ways, it is difficult to 
distinguish the impact of the colonial boundaries from that of colonial rule in general. 
However, one of the most striking features of pastoralist society is freedom of 
movement, and the imposition of the DOA -BEA boundary upon lands occupied by the 
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Maasai and upon the existing political map, partly removed this freedom of movement 
from thousands of people. The numbers of people who appeared to have previously 
used water and grazing resources which now lay across the border bear testament to 
that. Of course many groups must have used the boundary as an excuse to gain access 
to resources, particularly over the issue of the concessions, but there were also others, 
such of the Toloha Maasai, who moved across the boundary at will for many years 
after partition. Moreover, the vast majority of raids continued to go unnoticed and 
unpunished throughout the colonial period. As always, the boundaries impacted upon 
different people in different ways, and only the very broadest trends can be identified. 
In order to expand upon the relationship between pastoralism and boundaries, and to 
further examine the impact of rinderpest on the Maasai, the next chapter will discuss 
the use of the colonial boundaries to control disease in East Africa. 
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CHAPTER NINE: DISEASE CONTROL 
"They will marry and I fear love will laugh at Veterinary guards!" 
(The Provincial Commissioner, Mwanza, responding to a plan for more stringent 
enforcement of the boundary dividing the Bakuria).1 
Despite the best efforts of the colonial medical and veterinary services, social and 
economic interaction across the borders of East Africa continued to ensure the influx 
of many of the most dreaded diseases of the age. The international boundaries were 
porous to a very large degree - as they remain today - yet they remained the weapon of 
choice of the Tanganyikan authorities against the massive threat posed by human and 
animal pathogens. As will be seen in the paragraphs which follow, this was not always 
the case with the other British territories in Africa. Animal disease was a massive 
problem in eastern Africa, and is by far the most pertinent issue with regard to the 
study of the role of boundaries. While the colonialists could at least attempt to control 
stock movements, human migrations were much more difficult to curb, but on balance, 
disease control throughout much of Africa could be summed up in one word - 
rinderpest. Rinderpest was and is a virulent disease which infects and kills large 
numbers of domesticated animals, particularly cattle, as well as many types of wild 
animals. The great numbers of pastoralists and semi- or agro- pastoralists who 
depended upon cattle for their survival made this a pressing issue. 
The study of rinderpest and other disease policies are examples of the use of 
boundaries as functions of political control, as well as of socio- economic and 
veterinary control. The main problem regarding the control of rinderpest in Tanganyika 
was that as was seen in the previous chapter, the Kenya and Tanganyika Maasai, freely 
1 TNA: TS 11910: 43, 4th September 1928. Letter from the PC for Musoma, to the 
Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
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mixed together in using borderland water resources and grazing. At the same time, the 
respective cattle and rinderpest policies of the two governments were widely divergent. 
The disease could therefore easily be passed from Kenya, where the disease persisted 
as a major problem throughout most of the colonial period, to Tanganyika, where 
government efforts periodically virtually eradicated the disease. Discussing the best 
anti -rinderpest policy is not the purpose of this chapter; rather it is to determine the use 
of the boundary in this dispute. Most colonial documentation on this issue is 
concentrated in the years 1927 -28 and 1931, when the best efforts of the Tanganyikan 
veterinary service were undone by the recurrence of the disease. According to the 
Tanganyikan authorities, this was because of the ineffectiveness of Kenyan policy. 
Eradication or control of rinderpest was important to the colonial governments for 
various reasons. Firstly, the economy of the whole territory could be affected by a 
severe outbreak. Secondly, it destabilised people who depended upon cattle, causing 
migration on the scale of that in the 1880s. Finally, British plans for the economic 
development of Tanganyika were heavily dependent upon the development of 
industries that were based upon local agricultural production. As far as cattle were 
concerned, they hoped to set up a meat industry, a dairy industry and then meat export 
industry.2 This was never achieved on any great scale, partly because fears over 
rinderpest stunted the development of a meat industry during the key early years of 
British rule in the territory. 
2 CO691/141/12: 3, 1st January 1935. Mr Stockdale to unknown correspondent. 
Compares Kenyan and Tanganyikan rinderpest policies. 
297 
The Environment and the Nature of Rinderpest 
The environmental context within which this study is set is a very harsh one. Much 
of Africa, including the savannah, lake areas and coast of East Africa, has seen an 
unequal battle as man has struggled to impose his will upon his environment and 
thereby increase his numbers. Some commentators have attributed the low population 
density of East Africa to the effects that the slave trade and international, sea -based 
trade had on the spread of disease (Ferguson, 1979: 312 -4). These undoubtedly played 
a role but such views underestimate the environmental difficulties experienced by East 
Africa before contacts with the wider world intensified.3 Part of that difficult 
environment was the range of diseases which could effect the people, animals and 
development of the continent, and which often shaped the course of its history. 
European colonialism entered East Africa in the slipstream of rinderpest. During the 
1880s and 1890s, the disease had rampaged down the eastern half of Africa from 
Ethiopia to South Africa. One of the most likely causes for the introduction of the 
disease into sub -Saharan Africa, was the import of cattle and horses into Ethiopia by 
the Italian army.` This theory, however, has never been proven. As the disease had 
been able to move relatively freely across the continent, the new boundaries became 
pivotal in preventing or stemming further outbreaks. Pre -colonial methods of confining 
bovine infections - predominantly controlled burning which kept wildlife away, 
especially from river banks, as well as improving grazing - did not work (Giblin, 1992: 
32 -33). 
One factor may have been the general unhealthy environment of the period. As has 
been repeatedly mentioned in this thesis, a series of human and animal diseases struck 
3 Highlighted by Iliffe in his 1995 book, Africans: The History of a Continent. 
4 The cattle and horses had been purchased in India. 
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the continent in the final third of the Nineteenth Century. General weakness caused by 
one disease makes people and animals alike more susceptible to another. Rinderpest 
may have struck particularly weakened cattle herds, which in turn impacted upon 
already weakened people. 
Western technology did little to counter rinderpest for several decades. 
Tanganyikan anti -rinderpest policy following the Great War was hampered by two 
particularly difficult factors. Firstly, the disease lies in its endemic centres in a rather 
passive state for years and then "assumes a more virulent form and an epizootic 
character ".5 The causes of epizootics are unknown. It was therefore difficult to know 
on a spatial level whether the disease had been contained, and if so, within which 
regions. Secondly, throughout the period of British colonial rule, Tanganyika formed a 
buffer between the healthy but susceptible cattle to the south and the diseased but 
inured cattle to the North.6 It was the front -line in the battle, and was the first to be 
struck when the disease regained its strength and made another assault southwards. 
The German Years 
German rule in Tanganyika was enabled by rinderpest, and during the early years of 
their rule, the Germans had neither the means nor the inclination to make any efforts to 
combat it. Within a few years, however, as greater strides were made to develop or 
exploit the colonial economy, it became apparent that measures were needed to keep 
rinderpest out. The Germans adopted two strategies. Firstly, they attempted to impose 
cattle free zones along the border with BEA.7 When the colonialists first came to 
5 CO691/141/12: 71, 29th November 1934. From MacMichael, Governor of 
Tanganyika, to Sir Philip Cunliffe- Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
6 CO691/141/12: 76, 29th November 1934. See Note 5. 
7 TNA: TS 11910: 29, 14th February 1928. Letter from G.S. Cowin, Veterinary 
Officer at Musoma, to the Director of Veterinary Services, Dar es Salaam. 
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Maasailand, the Maasai had been dispersed by the cumulative shocks of the 1890s. The 
Germans therefore decided to maintain the "uninhabited wilderness" and attempted to 
restrict any movement by the Maasai back into the area.8 Further west, despite the 
presence of settlements along the border in the Mwanza area, they kept all Africans, 
houses and cattle back from the border, partly to prevent the spread of disease and 
partly in order to create a zone of division: in effect, they imposed the border. 
Prevention of disease appears to have mainly been the responsibility of local officers. 
Many areas had no veterinary officer, including the far north -west around Bukoba, 
where it was left up to the local officer to stem the incursion of rinderpest from 
Uganda in 1901.9 
German strategy involved preventing the entry of diseased animals from elsewhere 
whilst stamping out the disease internally. The "Contagious Diseases in Animals 
Ordinance" of 1909 ordered the slaughter of diseased animals and the inoculation of 
healthy cases. In addition, it was decreed around 1910 that all livestock entering DOA 
from British East Africa should be imported via one of the seaports" (Brode, 1911: 
40). Exceptions were possible but had to be recommended by the Imperial Consulate 
of Mombasa, and recommendations were only possible if animals had been inspected 
by veterinary officers. As a result of the wide and regular movements of cattle by 
Africans, this measure can only have been aimed at European import. 
The level of success of German policy is difficult to estimate. No records of success 
could be identified in either the Berlin, the Zanzibar or the Dar es Salaam archives. In 
TS 10298/I: 3, 13th July 1927. "Memorandum on Tanganyika -Kenya boundary 
problems ", by Mitchell, PC of Northern Province, sent to the Chief Secretary, Dar es 
Salaam. 
8 TNA: TS 1010298/I: 3. See Note 7. 
9 RICA: R1001 626: 122, 17th January 1901. Letter from A.C. Hollis, Acting British 
Vice Consul, Dar es Salaam, to Van Estorff, Major and Acting Governor of Deutsch 
Ostafrika. 
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addition, the post -war situation offers little assistance, in that the war had greatly 
disturbed veterinary practices, or in the case of the German system, ended them, while 
tens of thousands of cattle had been hurriedly taken into Tanganyika to support the 
British Empire forces present there. The level of rinderpest during the German period 
of rule does not seem to have struck German observers as being particularly high, but 
given the rampant levels of rinderpest which existed in the run -up to the colonial 
occupation, this is hardly surprising. 
Early British Rule 
When the dust had settled following the First World War and the British were 
properly able to assess their inheritance, they discovered that rinderpest had returned in 
force during the course of the war, that every district was infected, and that herds were 
rapidly decreasing.10 However, elements of the German anti -rinderpest policy 
remained. When Mr McGally, the Dar Director of Veterinary Services toured the 
Kenya -Tanganyika border in 1919, the neutral cattle free zone which had been 
established along the Kisii -Mtende border was still being observed.11 When McCall, 
the Tanganyikan Director of Veterinary Services travelled along the Mwanza area 
border in 1920, he agreed with the Kenyan senior vet that the division of the abaKuria 
by the border could cause problems with future veterinary control.12 
Under South African pressure and with South African help, a commission was set 
up to stop the spread of the disease into the colonies to the south of Tanganyika. A 
cattle free belt was created on the Northern Rhodesia- Tanganyika border and an 
10 CO691/86/6: 18, 11th June 1926. Report entitled "Masai Questions ". No author or 
correspondents given. 
11 CO691/86/6: 19, 11th June 1926. See Note 10. 
12 TNA: TS 10298/I: 3, 13th July 1927. Memorandum on Tanganyika -Kenya boundary 
problems by PC Mitchell, Northern Province, sent to Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
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immune cattle belt was created to the north of this, through a technique known as 
rinderpest suppression. This involved double inoculation: a combination of 
immunisation and exposure to the real thing. While this created a largely healthy and 
protected population, it must have caused hardship among many African groups, as 
many cattle were lost and compensation was often felt to be inadequate, and so a great 
deal of bitter feeling was created.13 Northern Rhodesia was secured relatively quickly, 
and Tanganyika continued to follow a process of rinderpest suppression, in an attempt 
to force the southernmost extent of rinderpest infection progressively northwards. 
Progress was slow, but the battle was slowly won as district after district became 
relatively rinderpest free. Once the line reached the Kenyan border, however, no 
further progress could be made; the Kenyan authorities based their entire policy upon 
serum immunisation of animals in infected areas. As this kept infected animals alive, 
interaction along the inter -territorial boundary allowed repeated re- infection from 
Kenya. McCall wrote to the Kenyan veterinary officer in 1930 that Tanganyika felt it 
was its duty to protect the countries to the south and did so, even if it affected 
Tanganyikan cattle in the short term. He wrote that "Perhaps it is old -fashioned to 
hope that Kenya can do the same ".14 
It is difficult to determine exactly why the policies of the Kenyan and Tanganyikan 
governments varied so wildly but there are three possible contributory factors. Firstly, 
a far greater proportion of the colonial officers in Kenya than in Tanganyika had served 
in India, and Indian policy was strictly one of serum immunisation. Secondly, the lack 
of veterinary officers and other colonial manpower, together with more limited 
financial resources, made the Kenyan option financially unviable in Tanganyika. Finally, 
most of Tanganyika's neighbours had brought the disease under control either through 
13 C0691/86/6: 19, 11th June 1926. See Note 10. 
14 C0691/112/19: 40 -2, 5th August 1930. Letter entitled "Operations against 
Rinderpest" from F.J. McCall, Director of Veterinary Services to the Acting Chief 
Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
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policy or good luck, so the policy of rinderpest suppression stood some chance of 
success. All of Kenya's other neighbours, however, continued to provide a ready 
reservoir for the disease. Moreover, the Tanganyikan authorities had experienced the 
benefits of a suppression policy in southern Africa and so had reason to believe it 
would succeed in their territory. 
The Tanganyikan system was applied in Uganda from 1920 until 1923, and during 
this time Uganda was rinderpest free away from the Kenyan border. In 1923 the 
controls were relaxed because it was no longer perceived to be a problem, and within a 
short time the disease again became widespread in the protectorate.15 This surely 
demonstrates the effectiveness of the Tanganyikan policy, and is also an excellent 
example of a positive use of international boundaries. Although both Uganda and 
Kenya had problems, Tanganyika was mostly in dispute with Kenya because there 
were many cattle in the Kenyan southern borderlands, and many traditional links 
existed across the boundary. 
Tanganyikan policy from 1921 to 1931 was "pursued with zeal and energy" but the 
numbers infected in 1931 were the same as in 1921, and as is demonstrated in Table 2 
below, the distribution of the disease was little changed.16 The fight against the disease 
and the debate over the best methods of combating it were never more strongly fought 
than during 1927 and 1928. Early in 1927, the Government of Northern Rhodesia 
asked Tanganyika to join it in introducing a ten mile cattle free belt on each side of the 
border, because it believed rinderpest to be endemic in Tanganyika at the time.17 Dar 
es Salaam was most offended and replied that there was no rinderpest within 600 miles 
15 C0691/112/19: 5, 18th November 1930. Letter to Mr Montgomery on rinderpest 
control. Unknown author. 
16 C0691/141/12: 68, 29th November 1934. From MacMichael, Governor of 
Tanganyika, to Sir Philip Cunliffe- Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
17 TNA: TS 11295: 1 -3, 1st October 1927. Letter from the Governor of Northern 
Rhodesia, to the Acting Governor of Tanganyika. 
303 
of the border, that the previous year's suspect cases had been unfounded, and also that 
the disease could not be spread over long distances because it required cow -to -cow 
transmission.18 This flew in the face of the evidence of the 1890s pandemic, where 
cow -to -cow transmission enabled rinderpest to sweep down the eastern half of Africa. 
Table 2: Spread of Rinderpest by Province19 
Province 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 
Northem Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y,,. 
, 
Y 
Mwanza Y Y Y Y-,.Y Y ;, Y- Y Y Y 
Tabora Y Y Y Y (. Y Y 
Central Y Y Y 




;r. ;°; ::; : Y Y Y Lake .......:...:::;=;;as:;;:;;;;;;:;;.-,...-,.....:,.. ,;.,,,.,.... .,;Y Y Y ;;;;,.,,, . .. Western °°_'- .......... ...> ;. ;. .;,.....,. .. - ,. ., ---._.. - ,. , ,. , ,....,;..,,,.....,..,...,,.,.,...,......-,,.-... .... , , . 
The above table indicates the provinces in which rinderpest during the years 1922 -34. 
Although the spread varied greatly during these thirteen years, it can be seen that the 
situation changed remarkably little between the early 1920s and 1930s. It can also be 
seen that the only province that was constantly infected with rinderpest was Northern 
Province - which was largely composed of the Tanganyika- Kenyan borderlands. Table 
3 below gives the number of cattle actually affected by rinderpest, although the 
statistics given are obviously only for proven cases. The death rate is remarkably low 
throughout the period, and falls gradually from 1923 to 1927, indicating that either the 
cattle were becoming more inured or treatment was improving. Another interesting 
point is that the number of diseased animals remains fairly steady, despite the fact that 
the number of provinces infected varies from two to six. Moreover, inoculation does 
18 TNA: TS11295: 4, 1st October 1927. Letter from F.J. McCall, District Veterinary 
Surgeon, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
19CO691/141/12: 71, 29th November 1934. Report by Harold MacMichael, Governor 
of Tanganyika, sent to Sir Philip Cunliffe- Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
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not seem to have been at all effective: in 1922, 11.04% of diseased cattle had been 
inoculated and the death rate stood at 7.3 %. The level of inoculation stood at 33% in 
1923, yet the death rate actually rose to 11.8 %. 
Table 3: Number of Rinderpest Cases20 
1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 
Number of diseased cattle 337738 374100 298532 179201 150870 283810 
Number of deaths from disease 26691 41140 28911 17620 7471 9885 
Percentage of deaths from disease 7.3 11.8 9.6 9.2 4.3 3.7 
No. of diseased animals inoculated 37229 130000 52414 73413 43925 132154 
0/0 of diseased animals inoculated 11.04 32.9 17.5 40.9 29.1 44.9 
As a result of fears over the respread of rinderpest, the Northern Rhodesian 
government unilaterally introduced the ten mile zone on their own side of the boundary 
at the end of 1927, and the Tanganyikan government revealed racist tendencies in 
claiming that it should be removed because it was affecting European as well as 
African farmers.21 The zone was lifted in 1929, although Tanganyikan cattle were still 
forbidden from entering Northern Rhodesia.22 
The discovery of a large number of cases in northern Tanganyika within a few 
weeks of the initial Northern Rhodesian appeal, seems too soon afterwards to have 
been a coincidence. It seems likely that either Tanganyika's borders and defences had 
been breached without government knowledge, that the government was trying to 
ignore the problem in the hope that it would go away, or that the disease had been 
present in the territory throughout the 1920s, but in a much reduced or dormant state. 
While Tanganyika was hoping to get rid of the cattle free zone with Northern Rhodesia 
20 C0691/141/12: 71, 29th November 1934. See Note 19. Statistics taken from the 
Veterinary Department Annual Reports by Governor Harold MacMichael. 
21 TNA: TS11295: 1 -3, 1st October 1927. See Note 17. 
22 TNA: TS11295: 29, 17th May 1929. Letter from the Chief Secretary, Northern 
Rhodesia, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
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in 1927, it was simultaneously trying to introduce one with Kenya. Tanganyika 
unilaterally introduced a ten mile cattle free belt with Kenya, "where the policy of 
double inoculation keeps the disease active throughout the great part of that 
Colony. "23 
The Tanganyika Veterinary Service believed that Kenyan adoption of Tanganyika's 
tactics would win the day, and McCall, the Chief Veterinary Officer, made a heartfelt 
plea to his opposite number in Kenya: 
"all disease control propaganda in the first instance causes impassioned hardship. The 
identical measures which met with opposition in Musoma were originally opposed on 
the Rhodesian border, in the Rungwe District, in Iringa, in Dodoma and in the 
Northern Province. I ask were they not justified - -- Where are the hardships now that 
disease is banished, and cattle movement unhampered goes on throughout these areas? 
Only give us time and the neutral cattle free zone will be along the Sudan -Abyssinian 
Frontier - From Musoma to the latter is a short cry compared to that from the Cape to 
Mwanza." [It must be solved] "lest the clock of progress be put back, discouragement 
set in, and the best chance we have yet had of finally clearing up the country be 
jeopardised ".24 
Government documents and the official statistics from Tables 2 and 3 indicate that 
the Tanganyikan government knew that rinderpest was present in Northern Province. 
Cameron wrote that "each outbreak of rinderpest which has occurred in Tanganyika 
Masailand during the past six years has been directly attributable to the unauthorised 
entry of uninspected cattle from the north ".25 The other serious disease in the area, 
23 TNA: TS 11295: 4, 1st October 1927. See Note 18. 
24 TNA: TS11910: 2, 14th February 1928. Letter from G.S. Gowin, Veterinary Officer 
at Musoma, to the Directory of Veterinary Services, Dar es Salaam. 
25 TNA: TS 10298/I: 4, 13th July 1927. Memorandum on Tanganyika -Kenya boundary 
problems by PC Mitchell, Northern Province, sent to Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
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pleuro- pneumonia, also came via Kenya, and was very expensive in cash and cattle.26 
He may have been trying to shift the blame on to the Kenyan authorities, but he was 
acknowledging the very presence of the disease within Tanganyika that his officials 
would shortly deny in their correspondence with the Northern Rhodesian government. 
Cameron did not rate the Kenyan Veterinary Service at all highly, and was greatly 
concerned about the construction of a Kenyan meat factory.27 The punishments which 
were meted out for the illegal movement of cattle across the border, however, were 
totally insufficient to have much impact. A man convicted in 1928 of bringing cattle 
from Kenya to Moshi without a permit, was fined 30/ -, and his cattle were confiscated 
and sold for 2889/ -. The High Court altered the sentence to 200/- and the man was 
repaid the balance of 2719/ -. 28 
Later Policy 
With increasing fears about the re- emergence of rinderpest as a major problem in 
Tanganyika, local and national authorities began to consider and introduce more and 
more measures which would strengthen the border as a boundary of division.29 The 
decision to reintroduce the German cattle free zone was not introduced along the 
whole border. Of the two provinces most directly involved, Northern Province 
introduced a zone, but Mwanza did not. The border in Mwanza district was largely 
unidentifiable and uncontrollable, so a plan was introduced to effectively withdraw the 
boundary some miles for the purposes of veterinary control, in order to place it along 
the line of a topographical feature. The PC for Mwanza considered that the concept of 
26 TNA: TS10298/I: 4 -5, 13th July 1927. See Note 23. 
CO691/86/6: 20, 11th June 1926. Report entitled "Masai Questions ". No author or 
correspondents given. 
27 CO691/86/6: 21, 11th June 1926. See Note 24. 
28 CO691/112/19/25A. 3rd class court, Moshi, Criminal Case No. 42 of 1928. 
29 TNA: TS10298/I: 3, 13th July 1927. See Note 23. 
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having a division between controlled and uncontrolled territory on the Mara River was 
impractical: "a cleavage right in the heart of the country among our own stock and in 
the midst of our own people ".30 This showed that if non -political divisions are to be 
created, then it is easier and more practical to do so along or near the line of political 
boundary; it does not have to be on the international boundary but in the borderlands. 
The AbaKuria cattle free area which had been established by the Germans had 
lapsed, and British Tanganyika DCs recognised the need for veterinary inspection 
posts. As has already been mentioned, attempts were made to reimpose the German 
cattle free zone. "This can be best arranged by the man on the spot in collaboration 
with the Administrative Officer and the Native Authority ".31 Mitchell, the PC, 
displayed a remarkable level of naiveté in considering that if legal movement is as easy 
as illegal, the former will prevail. He was obviously not well acquainted with the 
Maasai dislike of being monitored. Kenyan Maasailand had no veterinary supervision, 
so the decision was taken to introduce veterinary guards on the border.32 Border 
patrols of twenty men with five relieves were introduced at a cost of £720 per annum, 
of which Kenya agreed to pay half. A complete cattle free zone would have been 
better, but border patrols with the help of Native Authorities and the establishment of 
markets under surveillance were felt to be the next best thing. The practice worked 
well amongst the Chagga, who widely backed the plans, but was much less successful 
further west, where the various Maasai groups and the abaKuria lived right along the 
line of border and could not and would not be divided.33 Twenty patrol men, who 
were generally not local people, was wholly inadequate to patrol over 300 miles of 
border in a difficult environment. The PC for Mwanza admitted that for 1/- per head, 
30 TNA: TS11910: 37, 1st August 1928. Letter from McCall, Director of Veterinary 
Services, to the Acting Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
31 TNA: TS10298/I: 3 -4, 13th July 1927. See Note 23. 
32 TNA: TS10298/I: 4, 13th July 1927. See Note 23. 
33 TNA: TS11910: 38, 1st August 1928. See Note 28. 
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"owners of cattle need not even trouble to dodge the guards to cross the border ".3 4 In 
summing up the situation, he may have indicated his own prejudices, but he also 
expounded upon the helplessness of officialdom at the time: "one tribe [the abakurial, 
the best known cattle thieves, members of the same family, with nothing but good 
grass separating one village from another, rinderpest allowed full licence on one side of 
an imaginary line and stringent control measures for its elimination on the other, the 
most backward and unreliable Native Authorities governing an irresponsible people." 
The central government in Dar es Salaam was often almost totally unaware of the 
actions of the borderland PCs and DCs. For example, upon hearing that the 
Ngorongoro area contained cattle, Mr Mitchell wrongly assumed that it had been 
thrown open to the Maasai. If fact, the DC for Masailand had authorised its use for at 
least a year as a kind of quarantine for herds which had recovered from pleuro- 
pneumonia. It was "an accessible grazing ground more or less under direct 
supervision ".35 In ignorance of this action, he wanted the Kenyan Maasai totally 
removed from Tanganyikan soil: "the recent serious outbreak of rinderpest amongst 
the Wachagga was directly attributable to the movement of infected stock into 
Masailand from this area ".36 
G.S. Gowin, the veterinary officer for Musoma, wanted to identify the full extent 
and nature of the problem, before throwing his weight into the battle against 
rinderpest. During a long safari through the borderlands, he identified uncontrolled 
rinderpest on the Kenyan side of the border, and pointed out "the impossibility of 
clearing the Musoma district of the disease until the Kenya authorities will co- operate 
with us ".37 Suna and Kisii districts were particularly badly affected in Kenya. He 
34 TNA: TS 11910: 42 -3, 4th September 1928. Letter from the PC for Musoma, to the 
Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
35 TNA: TS10298 /I: 5, 13th July 1927. See Note 23. 
36 TNA: TS10298/I: 6, 13th July 1927. See Note 23. 
37 TNA: TS11910: 22 -23, 14th February 1928. Letter from G.S. Gowin, Veterinary 
Officer at Musoma, to the Director of Veterinary Services, Dar es Salaam.. 
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traced the route of the spread of rinderpest into Tanganyika: each time the Kenyan 
cattle just over the border were infected, and he himself saw sick and healthy animals 
herded together. He cited one case of a man who brought sick cattle from one part of 
Nyabwassi subchiefdom to another, and in the process, moved from Kenya into 
Tanganyika. "The Kenya natives stated that they had not seen any members of the 
Veterinary Department there for many years." Following his safari, the DO Musoma 
did what he could to stop the interchange of cattle across the border, by working 
through the native courts, but lack of resources and manpower rendered his efforts 
useless. It is difficult to disagree with Gowin, when he wrote that it was ludicrous to 
impose quarantines on the offenders when there was no control just over the border. 
Following such reconnaissance missions in 1927, it was decided that the 
Tanganyikan and Kenyan officials involved should get together to discuss their 
differences and to decide what could be done. The place which was chosen for their 
meeting was Longido, which by a happy coincidence was also the place chosen by the 
Tanganyikan authorities for a new post to keep watch for the movement of cattle into 
the mandate - cattle whose rinderpest infection was largely blamed on Kenyan policy 
by the Tanganyikan officials. Officials at the meeting pulled no punches regarding the 
discord between the two sides. The Tanganyikan contingent wrote to the governor in 
Dar es Salaam, that undoubtedly "there are divergent and quite irreconcilable 
veterinary policies ".38 In conciliatory mood, the Kenyan Veterinary services did not 
decry Tanganyikan policy, but stated that they thought it impossible that they could 
conform with Tanganyikan policy, at least not in the short term. Open hostility did not 
surface until Mr McCall said that, "Kenya must come into line with this Territory", and 
threatened to try to prevent all contact between Tanganyika and Kenya, except 
through veterinary control posts, unless this was achieved. 
38 TNA: TS 10298/I: 2, 13th July 1927. See Note 23. 
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The continuing disagreement at the meeting does not require any more elaboration, 
but several decisions were taken that are of relevance to this work. It was agreed that 
any plans to change the shape of either Masai District or to stop most Maasai 
movement because of veterinary considerations, would take a least a year of two to 
bring about. It was recognised that from the Indian Ocean to Lake Jipe the presence of 
tsetse and desert, as well as the absence of cattle and existing administration was 
barrier enough and no patrols were needed in this area.39 From Lake Jipe to Rongai 
(north of Kilimanjaro), veterinary patrols existed, and exchange and market posts had 
been established, so it was considered unnecessary to act further. It was felt that it was 
along the western third of the boundary that all the problems occurred. From Rongai 
to Lake Victoria, it was decided that more cairns were needed to indicate the extent of 
allowed grazing, with further cairns indicating the cattle free zone. As a result of 
topographical problems, this zone was set at between five and ten miles. The cost of 
further patrols and veterinary officers for this area was assumed to be prohibitive. In 
spite of the massive problems which rinderpest and the other bovine diseases posed, all 
that this meeting achieved was to sanction the construction of a few dozen cairns; 
cairns of the type that had so often been dismantled or ignored in the past. 
The authorities did not have to wait long to judge the success of their efforts to 
create a cordon -sanitaire along the border. In 1928 the storm broke. The widespread 
re- introduction of rinderpest into Tanganyika from the north which had threatened for 
two years, occurred when Loita and Kenyan Purko Maasai - eighty -one bornas in all - 
broke through the Tanganyika quarantine lines and entered the colony. Sadly, the 
extent of the outbreak is not recorded in the colonial records, while no secondary work 
has proffered a decent account of it. Suffice it to say that the Director of Veterinary 
39 TNA: TS10298 /I: 1 -2, 13th July 1927. See Note 23. 
40 CO691/1 12/19: 19, 1st October 1930. Report "The Present Rinderpest (Cattle 
Plague) Situation in Tanganyika Territory", by F.J. McCall, Director of Veterinary 
Services. 
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Services, Mr McGally considered the situation similar to that which had existed during 
the First World War.41 He wanted the re- establishment of the neutral cattle free zone 
of German times along the whole border, and believed that there was little chance of 
keeping the country rinderpest free until then. It was also recognised that it was 
impossible to patrol the whole boundary, and that nothing could be achieved without 
the co- operation of the various African groups who lived along the border. In order to 
secure this, it was decided to give the borderlanders a voice in the matter. It led to the 
setting up of the Inter Colonial Native Court at Pusi Mom, which was refered to in the 
previous chapter. The mainly Maasai African delegates and the colonial DOs and 
veterinary officers made four recommendations at the baraza, or meeting: 
i) a single cross -border veterinary policy would make everything easier. 
ii) the policy of cattle free zones had kept diseases out of South Africa and then 
gradually pushed the line northwards. It should therefore be continued in Tanganyika 
and adopted in Kenya 
iii) eventually free movement of cattle will occur and it will be easier to sell meat - this 
may lead to "a less nomadic way of living." 
iv) No changes in the present arrangements for now.42 
It is interesting to read that a "less nomadic way of life" was a favourable outcome. 
Nomadic pastoralism does not seen to have been a worthwhile activity to the 
colonialists, but it was rare that they ever directly refered to its downfall as a desirable 
outcome. Even during the times of greatest difficulty with the Maasai and abaKuria, 
the colonial records never mention any direct actions aimed at hastening its demise. 
41 CO691/112/19:19 -20, 1st October 1930. See Note 38. 
42 TNA: Acc.69 Dist 7/III: 34 -47, 28th April 1930. Report "Inter Colonial Boundary 
Affairs ", by Harvey, ADO for Loliondo. Sent to the DO for Lolbene. 
TNA: TS 10298/II: 366, 21st November 1930. Report of a Veterinary Meeting at 
Loitokitok. 
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Differences between Kenyan and Tanganyikan policy 
The Kenya- Tanganyika dispute over rinderpest control has been widely refered to, 
but several points can be made on the effectiveness of each strategy. Firstly, the 
Kenyan view that the disease was ineradicable43 had no justification. Before 
immunisation was possible, the disease had been eradicated from Britain and much of 
Europe. In addition, during the pan -African fight against the disease in the 1890s, 
modern immunisation methods were developed, but played only a minor role in the 
battle.44 Secondly, rinderpest generally has no carriers or reservoirs, so it is possible - 
at least in theory - to isolate infected herds from healthy cattle. The spread of disease 
by wild animals was a somewhat exaggerated factor. The Kenyan authorities 
considered it to be a major cause of the spread of the disease, but it seemed to have 
had little effect in Tanganyika, where wild animals and cattle often mixed together on 
the northern plains and in the Rift Valley.45 "It spreads in the main only by intimate 
contact with the sick ".46 Segregation was therefore the answer, especially as diagnosis 
was usually straightforward. The disease was easily recognised by African owners. 
Thirdly, one of the major problems with the Tanganyikan system of fighting 
rinderpest was that it created large numbers of susceptible cattle.47 Should the 
borderland defences be breached, then a very large number of cattle came under threat. 
This explains that while rinderpest remained a substantial if not overwhelming problem 
in Kenya throughout the 1920s, the level of difficulty which it posed in Tanganyika 
fluctuated wildly. This is a problem common to many functions of boundaries. Linear 
43 CO691/112/19: 5, 18th November 1930. Letter to Mr Montgomery about 
rinderpest control. Unknown author. 
44 CO691/112/19: 5, 18th November 1930. See Note 41. 
45 CO691/112/19: 9, 5th December 1930. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies on rinderpest control. 
46 CO691/112/19: 5, 18th November 1930. See Note 41. 
47 C0691/141/12: 2, 24th December 1954. Letter by unknown author to Mr Calder. 
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defences can be very effective, but once breached become totally useless. Finally, there 
is much to commend in the Tanganyikan view that if Kenya and Uganda had 
implemented the Tanganyika policies, then they would also achieve success in their 
battle with other diseases, such as pleuro -pneumonia, which were more difficult to 
combat by immunisation. 
The Kenyan strategy did have some benefits. Reliance upon the use of serum 
reduced mortality, but made the disease linger, thereby extending the period of 
infectivity. It was costly in terms of money and time, although recovered animals were 
immune. Certain problems, however, affected both the Kenyan and the Tanganyikan 
methods of control. Ignorance of infection by stock owners was a major factor, while 
the activities of cattle traders hampered the most effective control schemes. The 
success of any policy depended upon genuine co- operation from the African authorities 
and vigorous punishment for evasion.48 
The standpoint of the Colonial Office (CO) in London on the disagreement seems 
to have changed over time. For much of the 1920s it appeared to back the 
Tanganyikan government. In response to a Tanganyikan complaint against Kenyan 
inaction, the CO wrote that: "It is not quite fair to say that the Kenya government 
policy is to do nothing about rinderpest", but went on to commend the Tanganyikan 
ambition of driving the disease up to the northern Kenyan boundary.49 However, with 
improvements in the efficacy and reductions in the cost of serum towards the end of 
the decade, opinion began to turn against the mandate. The Colonial Secretary, 
H.M.M. Moore, wrote to the Chief Secretary at Dar, expressing the view that 
Tanganyika stood alone in its policy of relying upon quarantine and strong border 
48 CO691/112/19: 6, 28th November 1930. Letter from Mr Montgomery, commenting 
on rinderpest policy. Unknown correspondent. 
49 C0691/112/19: 2, 13th November 1930. Unlabelled notes written by Governor 
Cameroon of Tanganyika, on rinderpest control. 
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controls as opposed to immunisation among infected countries. Indeed, Egypt, India, 
Nigeria and others all followed Kenyan policy.50 Also, at the Pan -African Veterinary 
Conference in Pretoria in 1929, the Tanganyikan methods received little support. It 
seems that while Tanganyika was following the policy, normally known as rinderpest 
suppression, which had been adopted by the German authorities before the First World 
War, the Kenyan authorities were following standard imperial policy. 
Cattle price differentials greatly encouraged the smuggling of cattle over the border. 
As the colonial governments had a great deal of influence over price levels, and indeed, 
in some areas and for some types of cattle, they actually set the prices, it seems that the 
colonialists were making a rod for their own backs. "There is every incentive to the 
Kenya Masai to 'run' cattle across the border owing to the disparity in prices in the two 
territories and the facility with which it can be accomplished ", wrote one DC.51 In 
order to obviate the problem, the Tanganyikan authorities occasionally held markets 
for Kenyan Maasai cattle in Kenya itself, thereby absorbing surplus cattle. The last 
market was held on the 15th July 1929, at Namanga, north of Longido, but by that 
stage a very high proportion of the stock was infected with rinderpest. The 
Tanganyikan officials increased the quarantine restrictions under which the cattle 
would be imported and the sale broke down as so few of the cattle could be 
accepted.52 
Efforts against rinderpest struggled on until 1930, with the outbreak showing no 
signs of either burning itself out, or of reaching the heights which it had attained in the 
1890s. Repeated infection had probably created a pool of cattle which were somewhat 
more resistant to the disease. During the same year, the two borderland governments 
50 CO691/112/19: 29, 26th June 1930. Letter from H.M.M. Moore, Colonial 
Secretary in Nairobi, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
51 CO691/86/6, 11th June 1926. Report entitled "Masai Questions ". No author or 
correspondents given. 
52 CO691/86/6, 11th June 1926. See Note 49. 
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made further attempts to co- ordinate their actions. McCall seems to have reached a 
state of despair, writing of the border, "this imaginary line constitutes [an] insuperable 
obstacle in our path of progress "; [we are] "up against a blank wall ".53 The Senior 
Veterinary Officer for Northern Province, Lowe, after a hopeless three year campaign 
against the disease, shared his mood: "to patrol and guard efficiently such a frontier of 
nearly 200 miles is almost humanly impossible ".54 The progress from South Africa up 
to Arusha, which McCall seems to have seen as his personal mission to extent over the 
border into Kenya, had now come to a halt. He reiterated his desire to his Kenyan 
counterparts that he wanted Tanganyika and Kenya to co- operate in fighting rinderpest 
in Maasailand and among the abaKuria, effectively pushing the front line up to the 
Kenya- Uganda railway, and hopefully later up to the northern Kenyan boundaries. 
These were viewed as much more natural obstacles. 
Lowe considered that veterinary control of the Purko and the Loita was very 
difficult; they were troublesome enough in their own right, but the presence of the 
border merely served to hamper colonial controls, and aid Maasai lawlessness. He 
considered that it was best to introduce light veterinary restrictions, "but that when 
such are laid down they must be adhered to and infringements will be detected and 
punished ".55 Overall, he felt that the Tanganyikan officials must bide their time until 
"effective Veterinary measures can be enforced in Kenya Masailand ".56 
Another cross -border colonial meeting was attempted in 1930 - this time without 
much in the way of African input. The Kenyan and Tanganyikan PCs and veterinary 
53 CO691/112/19, 1st October 1930. Report "The Present Rinderpest (Cattle Plague) 
Situation in Tanganyika Territory", by F.J. McCall, Director of Veterinary Services. 
54 CO691/112/19: 25A, 20th December 1929. Letter from H.J. Lowe, Senior 
Veterinary Officer, Northern Province, to McCall. 
55 TNA: Acc.69 Dist: 7/III: 43, 28th April 1930. Report "Inter Colonial Boundary 
Affairs ", by Harvey, ADO for Loliondo. Sent to the DO for Lolbene. 
56 TNA: Acc.69 Dist. 7 /III: 44, 28th April 1930. See Note 53. 
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officials met at Loitokitok in Kijado District, Kenya. Whilst acknowledging differences 
in policy, they met to discuss which measures they could actually take jointly. Of the 
£10,100 per annum Tanganyika veterinary budget to be spent on the Maasai, the 
Kenyan government had added £360 to be spent on Kenya Maasai living on the 
southern side of the border. This was to be continued.57 The Tanganyikan delegates 
proposed a blanket cattle free zone for the twenty miles south of the boundary from 
Lake Victoria to Lake Jipe, thereby cancelling the concessions to the Kenya Maasai. 
Such a cancellation would affect the Kenyan authorities, in that they would be faced 
with finding grazing and water for the Loita and Purko Maasai on their own side of the 
border. Two points can be made about such a suggestion. Firstly, while it was never 
introduced, it indicated that the Tanganyikan government was still angry with the 
Kenyan authorities. Secondly, the impact upon the Maasai would have been great, as 
there does not appear to have been any surplus grazing and water resources on the 
Kenyan side. Finally, there is little to suggest that the Tanganyikan authorities would 
have had any more success in forcing the Purko and the Loita over the border in 1930 
than they had had in 1927. 
Mr Deck, the PC Maasai Province, Kenya, stated that the Kenyan Maasai of the 
Matapato section with approximately 5000 cattle, must have the water supply at Meto 
- there was no other - although they could use grazing in Kenya as they had been doing 
for some time. Tanganyika officials reminded Kenya that Kenya had the right to pipe a 
water supply from Rongai (01 Molog) in Tanganyika to Loitokitok. This right had not 
been exploited because of Kenyan inaction and because of the costs of such a project. 
Finally, the Kenyan side pointed out that the Chagga used salt licks and grazing in 
Kenya, so this right could also be withdrawn. The Tanganyikans concluded the 
meeting by advising all concerned that there would not be a problem if the Kenyan 
57 TNA: TS10298/II: 365 -6, 21st November 1930. Report of a Veterinary Meeting at 
Loitokitok. 
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veterinary services were more effective. Such petty squabbles did nothing to resolve 
the situation and were probably borne out of general low -level animosity between the 
two territories, as well as frustration with the rinderpest situation. 
The year 1931 saw several changes in the situation. For one thing, the situation 
deteriorated in Tanganyika, with rinderpest spreading to more areas and affecting 
greater numbers of cattle.58 Not only had the disease comprehensively breached the 
Kenyan border, it also entered Bukoba District from Uganda.59 Symes became 
Governor of Tanganyika in 1931 and his pro -Kenyan stance not only improved 
relations between the two territories, but also led to the Tanganyikan adoption of 
Kenyan policy. He did not value the protection afforded by the borders and was a firm 
believer in East African unity. Kenya was vaccinating all the cattle south of the Kenya - 
Uganda railway with a new vaccine, and hopes ran very high.60 The new policy was 
followed throughout 1931 and 1932, but it too proved to be a failure.61 The use of 
inactive serum was abandoned in Tanganyika and a policy of double inoculation was 
adopted in its place. Despite the failure, the change in leadership had at least improved 
cross -border relations, and by 1932, Kenya agreed that the eradication of rinderpest 
should be targeted.62 
By 1933, overstocking was seen as a major problem in both Tanganyika and Kenya. 
Keeping as many cattle alive as possible was not a good idea, and the Colonial Office 
advised both Kenya and Tanganyika that low level rinderpest was no bad thing, as it 
58 CO691/141/12: 22, 22nd January 1935. "Extract from the Minutes of the Twenty - 
Fourth Meeting of the Colonial Advisory Council of Agriculture and Animal Health ". 
59 CO691/141/12: 32, 17th January 1935. "Rinderpest Control in the Tanganyika 
Territory", written by the Colonial Office. 
60 For more information see file CO691/117/12. 
61 CO691/117.12: 81, 13th August 1931. From H. Martin, Governor's Deputy, Kenya 
to Lord Passfield, Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
62 CO691/141/12: 35, 17th January 1935. Report "Rinderpest Control in the 
Tanganyika Territory", written by the Colonial Office. 
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disposed of weak stock,63 and overstocking was the greatest cattle problem in 
Tanganyika. As there was next to no interference with the disease in the native 
reserves in Kenya, overstocking was considerable with the Maasai, and as many of 
these reserves were in the central borderlands, it continued to provide a ready source 
of infection for Tanganyikan cattle. However, the Colonial Office believed that 
overstocking was as bad in Tanganyika as in the reserves, as many herds were isolated 
from rinderpest for long periods (Kenya, 1993: Ch X). 
By 1934, the Tanganyikan authorities recognised that Kenya had been making good 
efforts to control and eradicate rinderpest and bovine pleuro- pneumonia.64 As a result, 
the Dar es Salaam government agreed with matters being re- opened with the Kenyan 
authorities, and a more conciliatory mood developed.65 A Tanganyikan ADC serving 
along the border, W.J. Lloyd, was asked by the Dar government to report on the 
situation. He admitted that rinderpest was almost constantly prevalent on both sides of 
the border, but was in two minds over whether this was the fault of Kenya, and 
commended several Kenyan initiatives. For instance, it was Kenyan policy to report 
outbreaks of all major diseases which occurred within ten miles of the boundary to the 
Tanganyikan authorities. In addition, Maasai bornas were moved back from the border 
where possible, in effect creating sections of depopulated borderland, thereby 
reinforcing the border. However, he considered that overall there was good evidence 
indicating that while the recurrence of rinderpest was not wholly the fault of the 
ineffective Kenya veterinary policy, it was almost certainly the largest contributing 
factor.66 He also added what has already been mentioned with regard to earlier 
63 CO691/141/12: 78, 29th November 1934.From MacMichael, Governor of 
Tanganyika, to Sir Philip Cunliffe- Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
64 TNA: TS 10298/II: 420, 28th April 1934. Department of Veterinary Science and 
Animal Husbandry report on the Kenya -Tanganyika boundary 1927 -33: "Water 
Concessions Granted to Kenya Masai ". 
65 TNA: TS 10298/I: 451, 18th September 1934. Letter from the PC for Northern 
Province, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
66 TNA: TS 10298/II: 480, 24th January 1935. Letter from W.J. Lloyd, DO for Masai 
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outbreaks, that once a major outbreak had passed into Tanganyika at a distance of 
perhaps fifty miles, Tanganyikan defences would have been breached and the disease 
would be free to advance towards North Rhodesia. 
Lloyd also wrote to the central government that disease in Maasailand had 
compounded an already severe situation. Due to a shortage of water and grazing, 
partly caused by uncertainty over the concessions, over one thousand head of cattle 
were dying weekly, and the environmental effects were worsening day by day. "For the 
first time since the introduction of Pax Britannia into Tanganyika a famine has 
occurred in the above area which necessitates the Masai being fed by the 
Government ".67 Lloyd admitted that the "Europeans are endeavouring to settle an 
agreement over which neither side knows very much about [sic]." He suggested that 
Africans in the area be consulted much more often because of their knowledge of local 
conditions, but there is no evidence of his suggestion being followed up.68 Once again, 
borderlanders with borderland knowledge were ignored by the power which ruled 
them. 
By the time of the twenty -fourth meeting of the Colonial Advisory Council of 
Agriculture and Animal Health at the start of 1935, most colonies agreed with the 
notion that Tanganyika should change its rinderpest policy. The reasons for this were 
fourfold: the cost of the policy, overstocking and the existence of too many cattle of 
too little value were relatively straightforward.69 Their fourth reason was the distrust 
of African cattle owners towards the cattle policies and this is more difficult to assess. 
It is true that cattle smuggling was widespread and that this contributed to the spread 
District, to the PC Northern Province. 
67 TNA: TS10298/II: 481 -2, 24th January 1935. See Note 64. 
68 TNA: TS10298/II: 481, 24th January 1935. See Note 64. 
69 CO691/141/12: 17 -27, 22nd January 1935. "Extract from the Minutes of the 
Twenty -Foruth Meeting of the Colonieal Advisory Council of Agriculture and Animal 
Health ". 
320 
of disease, and so it was probably true that the Tanganyikan government was fighting a 
losing battle in banking upon its border defences to protect the mandate. The policy 
seems to have been well meant but somewhat impractical as some cattle would always 
be moved across the border. To take one example, the Toloha Maasai of Lake Jipe, 
who were mentioned in the previous chapter, were thought to have spread rinderpest 
into the territory through the Ngulu gap to the Ruvu area, at least four times between 
1920 and 1935.70 This was in spite of the fact that they were so isolated that the 
colonial authorities did not know of their existence for several years into the life of the 
mandate. The idea that existing policy was too expensive, however, does not weigh up 
against the expense of attempting to inoculate all the cattle in Tanganyika. 
From this time on, rinderpest was more -or -less accepted as a feature of life in 
northern Tanganyika. Simultaneously, it seems to have become less prevalent, as the 
level of attention paid to it in the archival records following 1935 is much reduced, and 
what attention remained, appeared to switch to the southern border. As the dream of 
pushing rinderpest beyond the Kenyan border was discarded, the pan -African fight 
against the disease became centred upon the Northern Rhodesia- Tanganyika border. 
This southern border had already been used to control disease, but from 1930, 
Nyasaland wanted to employ the new technique of using goat virus to inoculate cattle 
as a belt of defence in the Tanganyika- Nyasaland borderlands. The Tanganyikan 
government did not consider this necessary: it was expensive and they did not consider 
rinderpest to be a problem in southern Tanganyika at that time.71 This surely indicates 
that Tanganyika saw it as a matter of pride to be rinderpest -free, and did not want to 
admit to the scale of the problem. It also seems to demonstrate that while the notion of 
protecting southern Africa from rinderpest was a noble idea, ridding Tanganyika of the 
disease was by far the territory's greatest concern. 
70 TNA: Acc.69 Dist 723/I: 69, 26th June 1945. Report "Masai at Toloha" from 
unknown source at Tanga, to the Director of Veterinary Services, Mpwapwa. 
71 See CO822/111/7. 
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During the latter half of the 1930s, rinderpest appeared to become more and more 
of a threat to the British colonies to the south of Tanganyika. Much greater control 
over cattle movements seemed possible in the south, and this cannot be attributed to 
greater resources during the 1930s than in the 1920s. As a result of the 1930s 
depression, deep cuts were made into the expenditure of most government 
departments and the veterinary service was no exception. The main reason seems to 
have been that the Maasai and other mainly pastoralist groups of the northern 
borderlands made control much more difficult. At the same time, however, the fear of 
rinderpest being spread by wild animals became much more of a factor. The 
topographical and ecological nature of south -western and central Tanganyika dictated 
that animals moving from the spasmodically rinderpest -infected central regions across 
the Northern Rhodesian border were generally funnelled down a corridor formed by 
the Rukwa valley. 
During the course of 1940, measures to prevent the movement of animals along this 
route were discussed. The obvious choice seemed to be to create a barrier at the inter - 
territorial or international border itself, but the Rukwa corridor petered out some 
distance from the border, allowing migrating animals to take a variety of routes across 
the boundary, so any physical defences had to be placed some distance inside the 
Tanganyikan boundary. The Chief Secretary to the Governor ambitiously proposed an 
electric fence across the valley,72 but this was considered unworkable by the British 
colonies to the south. As such a scheme required a broad financial base, the project 
was not pursued. H.J.Lowe, the Director of Veterinary Services advised that the 
alternative of bush clearing and game destruction would cause herds to scatter and 
would be difficult because the whole area was forested. He added, however, that 
localised game fences might work "across certain of the more dangerous areas 
72 TNA: TS28987: 24A, 27th July 1940. Report on Measures to counter rinderpest by 
H.J. Lowe Director of Veterinary Services. 
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particularly the upper reaches of the Mbemkuru, Mboragandu and Pitu rivers where 
they are separated by only short distances from the south -flowing tributaries of the 
Rovuma - especially the Lunnescule river ".73 He estimated the cost of such an 
undertaking at thirty -five to forty pounds per mile. 
The Chief Secretary wrote that, "short of erecting something of the nature of a 
Hadrian's Wall right across the area no action which we can take is likely to be 
effective in totally preventing the movement of game southward." However, the go- 
ahead was finally given for the fences to be built in 1941, and a solid twelve foot high 
elephant -proof wooden palisade was built across thirty miles of the valley.74 This was 
later extended to 167 miles between Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa. The number of 
game scouts in the area was increased to twenty -seven posts of three men each and 
rewards of 2/50 were given for confirmed cases. A game free zone of 20 miles was 
placed on the south side to support the barrier (Scott, 1996: 213). Breaks were quickly 
repaired and animals which broke through were shot and killed. The animals believed 
to be carrying and transmitting rinderpest were greater kuku, bushbuck, reedbuck, pig 
warthog, buffalo, eland, wildebeeste, sable, hartebeeste and waterbuck. The impact 
upon wildlife was certainly not a consideration. 
As Scott writes, "Only one man -made border has ever stopped the relentless spread 
of rinderpest across the continents of the Old World, namely the fence across the 
Rukwa Valley in Tanzania" (Scott, 1996: 201). As the barrier was placed parallel to 
the line of a political boundary, in effect in the borderland which separated two systems 
of disease control and veterinary services, it emphasized the presence of the boundary 
and the borderland. 
73 TNA: TS28987: 24A -30, 27th July 1940. See Note 70. 
74 3rd class court, Moshi, Criminal Case No. 42 of 1928. 
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The Wankonde: a case -study 
Policies aimed at countering rinderpest and other cattle diseases could easily impact 
upon the use of cattle in social and economic interaction. The case of the Wankonde in 
the 1930s was brought about by an attempt to improve socio- economic conditions in 
the Tanganyika -Nyasaland borderlands. In 1936, the Tanganyikan DC for the area 
appealed to central government to help trade among the Wankonde and to help supply 
food to the Lupa. The Comptroller of Customs responded by abolishing duties on 
African produce moved between Nyasaland and Tanganyika.' In addition, at the end 
of 1937 an amendment was made to the Customs Tariff Ordinance of 1930: "Item 
162(a) Native foodstuffs and articles of native manufacture such as mats, utensils, 
etc....which are proved to the satisfaction of the Comptroller of Customs to have been 
grown, produces or manufactured by natives of the Nyasaland Protectorate Free [of 
duties] ".76 
Unfortunately, this ordinance did not include cattle and was taken to mean that 
duties should be applied to them for the first time. The Chief Secretary at Zomba in 
Nyasaland wrote to the Dar es Salaam government to point out that he had asked the 
Tanganyikan DC over the border to ask for change with the precise intention of easing 
the transfer of cattle, which had become increasingly difficult because of rinderpest 
controls. The whole point had been "the desire to remove any obstacle to the 
circulation of ceremonial cattle between the kindred tribes residing on either side of the 
Songwe river ".77 He continued, "Ninety -nine % of cattle crossing the boundary are for 
75 TNA: TS25210: 1 -la, 12th November 1936. Letter from the Commander -in -Chief 
to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
76 TNA: TS25210: 18, 27th October 1937. "Ordinance to amend the Customs Tariff 
Ordinance, 1930" 
77 TNA: TS25210: 25 -6, 30th November 1937. Letter from the Chief Secretary, 
Zomba, Nyasaland, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
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dowry purposes: the tribe lives on both sides of the river.78 The Wankonde were 
divided by the river Songwe, "which, so far as they are concerned, is merely a river 
traversing their country, but which unfortunately for them, is an inter -colonial 
boundary".79 Mr de Meza, the Nyasaland Chief Veterinary Officer also added, 
"arbitrary intercolonial boundaries should not inflict hardship on tribes resident on both 
sides, and I stated that a consistent aim of my department has been to arrange common 
veterinary policies along such boundaries in order to minimise their effect as tribal 
handicaps." Although Nyasaland wanted to allow free movement of cattle, it wanted 
guarantees that it would not be open to rinderpest problems. Social problems were 
inevitable because of border restrictions, but colonial officers frequently attempted to 
minimise the negative impact of such controls more frequently than they are often 
given credit for. 
The control of human disease 
Control of human disease is less relevant than animal disease to a history of 
Tanganyika's borders, but several instances do stand out. The most striking of these 
related to Rhodesiense Trypanosomiasis, or sleeping sickness as it is more commonly 
known. The disease had long been a major problem in tropical Africa, and attempts to 
control it have often employed international boundaries. For instance, no overland 
traffic was allowed between the Schirati District in DOA and BEA in 1910 because 
sleeping- sickness was endemic there (Brode, 1911: 61). The effect of this ban is not 
known. The disease was not a new problem in Tanganyika; the sleeping sickness belts 
extended from Ufipa, through Kigoma, towards Mwanza and Bukoba, but it had been 
78 TNA: TS25210: 35 -9, OCtober 1937. "Extract from the Proceedings of the 
Legislative Council, 17th Session, held at Dar es Salaam, Ocotber 1937 ". 
79 TNA: TS23585: 7 -10, 17th November 1936. Letter from H.E. Hornby, Director of 
Veterinary Services, to the Chief Secretary, Dar es Salaam. 
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gradually moving northwards.80 In 1927, it was forty miles north -west of Tabora, and 
by 1928 it had arrived in Kahama, the area which provided the bulk of the migratory 
labour in Uganda.81 The Uganda government hoped to prevent the disease crossing 
into its territory, but the incubation period between infection and the development of 
signs of disease varied between six and twenty -seven days, so victims could appear 
healthy. 
At least 25,000 poor Tanganyikans from the Biharamulo, Kahama and Kigoma 
districts of Tanganyika crossed the River Kagera to work in Uganda to pay their taxes 
and other things during the late 1920s and early 1930s.82 In September 1932, the 
Ugandan Government discovered several men from Biharamulo district in Tanganyika 
suffering from sleeping sickness and therefore suggested that the Kagera ferries, which 
lay entirely within Tanganyika, should be closed to emigrants.ß3 The Tanganyikan 
government responded by closing some ferries and introducing control and medical 
examination of emigrants at others. The Ugandan government wanted more: the 
investigation of the distribution of infection in north -west Tanganyika; control of 
population movements from infected areas towards Uganda; and for the boundary to 
be closed in the meantime. At a conference in Entebbe in early 1933, the Tanganyikan 
government agreed to the following: 
i) closure of all ferries on the Kagera, except for four more tightly controlled crossings. 
ii) control of these ferries and refusal to carry prohibited natives 
iii) issue passes of entry only to inhabitants of non sleeping sickness areas, or to those 
who did not have to pass through such an area. 
80 CO691/128/6: 51. "Extract from a Memorandum No. SS100, dated 9th November 
1932, addressed to the Chief Secretary by the Director of Medical and Sanitary 
Services ". 
81 CO691/123/6: 52. See Note 78. 
82 CO691/128/6: 10, 25th May 1933. From D.J. Jardine, Acting Governor, Dar es 
Salaam, to Sir Philip Cunliffe- Lister, Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
83 CO691/128/6: 10 -11, 25th May 1933. See Note 80. 
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iv) no passes to inhabitants of Western Province of Biharamulo District and of certain 
other parts of Lake Province, near to those passing through, except where they comply 
with special conditions of medical observation. 
v) investigation of sleeping sickness in the Missenyi area of the Bukoba District 
vi) investigation of sleeping sickness in Karagwe and other areas of Bukoba District.84 
This had a massive impact upon the people of north -west Tanganyika, as an 
estimated fifteen per cent of the taxpayers of Mwanza District worked in Uganda,85 
and the area had already been severely economically devastated by rinderpest and the 
First World War. The local DO, A.W. Wyatt feared that the area would become 
permanently depopulated if the restrictions were kept in place.86 Africans from 
Rwanda and Burundi were also suspected of spreading the disease into Uganda and 
they too were restricted. In addition, fishermen from Tanganyika had their permits to 
fish on the Kagera withdrawn in 1932.87 Luckily the outbreak died back during the 
course of 1933 and all restrictions were withdrawn, but once again international 
boundaries had been used as the main weapon in the fight to control disease in colonial 
Africa. 
It was hoped at the outset of this research project that the provision of medical and 
education services in borderlands could have been assessed, but it was quickly realised 
that such a study could only be effective in a relatively small area, where an intensive 
study could be undertaken. Nevertheless, some examples of cross -border service 
provision did come to light. There was no colonial territorial policy on treating non- 
Tanganyikans in Tanganyikan hospitals - they were mostly run by charities and 
84 CO691/128/6: 13, 25th May 1933. See Note 80. 
85 CO691/128/6: 15, 25th May 1933. See Note 80. 
86 CO691/128/6: 16 -22, 9th March 1933. From A.W. Wyatt, Acting D.O., to the PC 
Lake Province. 
87 CO691/128/6: 56 -7, 9th February 1933. A.C. Weatherhead, Acting Chief Secretary, 
Uganda, to the Chief Secretary, Tanganyika. 
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churches - so there was no need for a policy. Many non -Tanganyikans were, however, 
helped by doctors who lived within the mandate and worked for missions and other 
groups. 
David Stirling has written about his own life as a doctor in the borderlands of 
Tanganyika (Stirling, 1977).88 While working at Masasi on the Makonde plateau, he 
received patients from beyond the Ruvuma, from PEA. Charges were moderate in the 
late 1930s, at one shilling per operation, so many people were able to come for 
treatment. The patients who came from PEA often brought food for their entire stay, 
as well as their families (Stirling, 1977: 44). Many patients came from deep in PEA, 
and some had never seen a white man (Stirling, 1977: 60). In keeping with most 
assessments of the level of colonial activity in most of PEA, it seems that there were 
better and more easily accessible medical facilities in Tanganyika than in PEA. Indeed, 
many Africans from northern PEA may have had more contact with the Tanganyikan 
colonialists than with those of their own colony. 
Stirling gives a sense of people very remote from colonial control coming to this 
isolated medical centre for treatment. The frontier is one between colonial control and 
traditional African society, rather than one between PEA and Tanganyika. Many 
people from PEA did not speak either Swahili or Portuguese, so the doctor learnt the 
rudiments of three other languages. To help people living on both banks of the 
boundary river, a small dispensary was set up at Chihako, actually on the Rovuma, in 
1938 (Stirling, 1977: 59). However, the people of the area moved away from the river 
after two years, and so the dispensary was closed (Stirling, 1977: 64). In 1963, Stirling 
set up a hospital at Kibosho, eight miles north of Moshi and very near to the Kenyan 
88 Stirling was firstly a doctor for the UMCA, then the Catholic Church, then became 
an M.P. and Minister for Health in independent Tanzania. He was a doctor at Lulindi 
near Masasi, then at Mnero, also in the south. Lastly at Kibosho near Moshi. Lulindi 
was on the edge of the Makonde plateau and about 20 miles from the Ruvuma. 
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border, although it appears that few Kenyans visited the hospital. It was a different 
time, geography and neighbouring state, and southern Kenya was much more 
developed in a western sense than northern Mozambique. 
Conclusion 
Rinderpest was a vital factor in the colonisation of East Africa in the 1890s, 
through the weakening of many groups, most famously the Maasai. It was therefore 
also one of the main factors in the creation of western style boundaries and in the 
political division of eastern Africa. It was also a major component in the imposition of 
the boundaries in practice, as the colonial powers fought to keep it under control. 
Control and eradication of bovine diseases proved to be the same thing: territory by 
territory, rinderpest and other related diseases were forced northwards into their 
heartlands. Measures were introduced to prevent their re- introduction, and 
international boundaries were convenient and effective places to introduce these 
measures, but this did not guarantee their success. Colonial control remained imperfect 
and the total separation of cattle by a boundary remained almost impossible. Even with 
a zone of separation it proved very difficult. Veterinary controls imposed at the border 
were also cultural and socio- economic controls, particularly for pastoralists. 
Preventing the Maasai from moving across the region was to restrict their way of life 
and ability to feed and water their cattle. With regard to the rights and wrongs of the 
Kenyan and Tanganyikan approaches to rinderpest control, it is difficult to determine 
which method was most effective. In the final assessment, Tanganyika was nine- tenths 
rinderpest free, and only reinfection from Kenya kept it alive; Kenya spent more on 
control, yet possessed no rinderpest free areas.89 
89 CO691/112/19: 32 -7, 3rd April 1930. Unauthored report, compares the comments 
of the Chief Veterinary Officer in Kenya, with that of the Director of Veterinary 
Services in Tanganyika. 
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********************************************************************* 
CONCLUSION TO PART FOUR 
Part Four has hopefully demonstrated that while control of pastoralists was an issue 
for the colonial powers, the primary policy concerns were the prevention of cattle 
disease and crime, rather than any attacks upon pastoralism as a way of life. The 
pastoralist policies of the DOA and Tanganyikan governments were mainly enforced in 
the borderlands, so these two chapters have also attempted to provide an interesting 
case -study of international relations. Borderland pastoralists were in an ideal situation 
to compare the policies of neighbouring territories as they were forced to experience 
both at first hand. Their experiences have demonstrated that pastoralism did not sit 
easily with international boundaries, and also that where environmental differences 
allowed it, pastoralists often voted with their feet and moved into the jurisdiction most 
favourable to their lifestyle. They have also demonstrated, however, that environmental 
needs - including grazing and water requirements - were far more important than the 
right to bear spears or the level of taxation. Environmental boundaries can have every 
bit as great an impact as political divisions. 
In the final assessment, conflict on the Kenya -Tanganyika border was not so much 
a clash between pastoralism and linear boundaries, but between competing powers. In 
the event, the British and Germans were military stronger. Colonial attempts at control 
were greatly affected by their ignorance, particularly of the great changes which had 
occurred in the 1880s and 1890s. The fact that many colonial decisions - such as how 
and where to grant water and pasturage concessions - were based upon the pre- 
colonial state of affairs, made this particularly important. The problem of rinderpest 
encouraged the colonialists to impose the boundary to greater extent than would 
otherwise have been the case between two British colonies and this emphasized policy 
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differences. The pastoralist and rinderpest policies of the Tanganyikan and Kenyan 
governments were remarkably different, but despite all the disagreements and dispute, 
many aspects of border policy indicate that the boundary was more inter -territorial 
than international. For instance, by the 1950s, the two police forces had near reciprocal 
powers - something that never developed between colonial forces of different colonial 
powers. 
For their part, the Maasai merely used their traditional skills to make use of the 
boundary. Cattle raiding was a major part of their pre -colonial culture and differences 
in colonial policy made it an even more attractive proposition. The case of the 
migration of the Purko and Loita into Sonjo district demonstrates how the Maasai 
could play one side off against another, with some Tanganyikan officials attempting to 
move the Maasai back over the border and others granting them access to the water 
supplies of Tanganyika. The Maasai were able to influence the colonialists to a greater 
degree than the more sedentary groups in the territory, and although their way of life 
was disrupted by the border, it survived in a recognisable form until independence. 
Cattle raid and cattle smuggling continued until after the last British DO left 
Tanganyika in 1961. 
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CHAPTER TEN: THE LEGACY 
As was mentioned in the introduction, there is currently no large scale study of 
Tanganyika's boundaries. This thesis has hopefully made some contribution towards 
filling that gap by analysing the imposition of the western concept of dividing political 
space between the initial colonial intrusion in 1884 and Tanganyikan independence in 
1961. The final chapter will set out the conclusions reached in this work under the title 
questions which were given in the introduction. It will then examine the legacy of the 
colonial boundaries for independent Tanzania, by examining border issues since 
independence. Lastly, it will consider the imposition of linear boundaries within the 
African continent as a whole, bringing the discussion back from the particular to the 
general. 
To what extent did colonialism successfully impose the western system of dividi g 
political space upon Africa? 
Colonialism was almost totally successful in imposing the western system of 
dividing political space upon Tanganyika - the lack of control over the Kenyan - 
Tanganyikan borderlands is the only partial exception. Linear boundaries were not 
unknown in pre -colonial Africa, but they were merely one of many methods of dividing 
political space. What changed as a result of colonial rule, was that boundaries became 
the norm throughout the continent. Even in most regions which contained little or 
nothing of apparent value, boundaries were delimited and very often demarcated. The 
fluid pre -colonial political landscape was replaced by fixed colonial territories, and 
colonialism was the main agent of this imposition. The broad outline of Tanganyika's 
boundaries was largely determined during the early years of German rule, although 
minor alterations were made throughout the colonial period. 
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Existing African polities could never survive because fluid structures were 
incompatible with fixed colonial territories and because western military superiority 
was overwhelming. What opposition there might have been was avoided rather than 
defeated. The power of the Sultanate of Zanzibar was gradually eroded through 
diplomatic means, while much of the rest of the region was in a state of flux and 
upheaval, and so provided little initial opposition. In particular, militarised groups such 
as the Maasai never actually fought the colonialists because of local difficulties. The 
downfall of African polities was not immediate as they were adapted by the British in 
many areas as Native Authorities, but in reality many of these authorities were mere 
caricatures of their pre -colonial predecessors. Groups were amalgamated and reformed 
to fit the colonial notion of the 'tribe'. 
One interesting aspect of the imposition of western-style boundaries was the 
variation in how important the borders were to the colonial powers. Borders dividing 
German and Portuguese territory, for example, were certainly important even if there 
was little colonial cross -border contact, because they divided competing colonial 
powers. British inter -territorial borders were far less divisive, even if there was more 
dispute between their respective officials. The British territories of East Africa can be 
seen as members of the same team - each competing for attention and each wanting to 
be the star of the show, but all were members of the British Empire and so under the 
same sovereign. The label of inter -territorial borders is not a common idea in the 
history of western borders, but some vague parallels can be drawn with the states of 
the Holy Roman Empire, with the states of the United States and perhaps even with 
the European Union. 
T h n w r n ,n O 
333 
- n r 
boundaries? 
Many African political, economic and cultural systems were disturbed, disrupted or 
destroyed by the new boundaries, but the impact upon them must be considered on a 
case -by -case basis. Some trade routes survived in some form and pastoralists 
continued to raid and smuggle throughout the colonial period. Yet overall the impact 
was massive. African pre -colonial polities and political systems were among the 
greatest casualties. Colonialism as a whole lay behind most of this disruption, but the 
boundaries themselves were one of the main agencies of the colonial imposition. One 
of the greatest problems in assessing the impact of the boundaries is the lack of 
knowledge of African systems. African polities were mainly fluid in nature, so it is 
impossible to know how they would have developed had the colonial intrusion not 
occurred. 
On some occasions - as with the Wankonde on the Nyasaland border - the colonial 
authorities attempted to reduce the impact upon African systems. At other times, they 
actually sought to directly impose division. For instance, in the northern Tanganyika 
borderlands, the British authorities attempted to divide the various Maasai sub - sections 
into Kenyan Maasai and Tanganyikan Maasai. Despite this intention, the remoteness 
and geography of the area, the lack of colonial manpower and the intransigence of the 
pastoralists frustrated colonial attempts at every turn. Despite the co- ordination of 
British police and administrators on both sides of the border, the Kenyan -Tanganyikan 
borderlands were never entirely tamed. African pre -colonial systems were also able to 
survive in such areas as the Congolese -DOA borderlands, where the boundaries 
remained uncertain. Rebels, slave traders and deserters mingled together in a last -ditch 
stand in opposition to colonial control. Yet even during the 1897 -1899 rebellions, the 
end was in sight for the uncontrolled borderlands, as German and Belgian soldiers and 
sovereignty came together and the African frontier was squeezed out of existence. 
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With regard to African economic systems, the colonial boundaries certainly 
disrupted pre -colonial trade routes, making some trade illegal and bringing much of 
what remained under colonial control. However, the impact of the colonial economies 
and traders had a greater impact than that of the boundaries in their own right. African 
iron production could not hope to compete with overseas imports, while the new 
railways could transport goods on land far more quickly than any African pre -colonial 
method of transport. This was a process which began long before partition. 
In two main ways, African pre -colonial systems were able to resist colonial 
domination. Smuggling and pastoralism presented the two biggest challenges to border 
control. Much trade between the islands and the mainland which had once been the 
mainstay of the coastal economy was now restricted by duties, but continued and 
prospered to some extent, through a variety of efforts to avoid the new duties. Yet 
again, it was with the Maasai and the other pastoralists of northern Tanganyika that the 
greatest challenges were seen. The cross -border movement of cattle, whether for 
grazing and water supplies, as a form of smuggling, or just to exert the power of one 
Maasai sub -section over another, was something the British authorities struggled with 
for fifty years and never brought under control. Even today, many trade routes 
resemble those of pre -colonial times and pastoralists continue to cross the Kenya - 
Tanganyika boundary. 
Despite the impact of colonialism, pre -colonial African systems have been disrupted 
and suppressed at least as much by post- independence governments as by the previous 
European regimes. Control of the Kenya -Tanganyika boundary is not absolute, but it 
has been tighter since the 1970s, than it ever was under British or German rule. It was 
also Nyerere's policies of detribalisation that finally removed the power of pre -colonial 
African leaders who had maintained some of their cross -border influence. 
T. wh 4 
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regarding the boundaries influence each other? 
While the policies of the colonial authorities influenced borderlanders whenever 
they had the means and the manpower to do so, the borderlanders themselves exerted 
little real influence upon the colonialists during the initial imposition of the boundaries. 
For both the British and German colonial authorities, the views and actions of 
neighbouring colonial powers were of far more relevance. The initial partition was 
achieved without any tangible African resistance. Once the broad division had been 
achieved, Africans were able to influence local arrangements, both with regard to 
boundary location and with regard to the functions applied at it. Fishing and pasturage 
rights were won in several areas, although the only boundary change which transfered 
a large number of people from one sovereignty to another was the League of Nations - 
inspired handover of territory to Rwanda in the 1920s. African campaigns for 
boundary alterations generally led to relatively minor - though numerous - adjustments. 
The influence of African borderlanders grew over time, yet mainly developed after all 
the big decisions had been made. The list of African groups which lived on both sides 
of a boundary was as long in 1961 as it had been in 1890 or 1919 although in many 
cases it is open to debate whether or not any group was actually divided. There can be 
no doubt that some groups were split in two by boundaries - the Maasai, for instance, 
certainly lived on both sides of the line before 1885. The abaKuria, on the other hand, 
surely divided themselves. 
As can be seen from the extent of Maasai influence, the Tanganyikan -Kenyan 
borderlands were where African groups were repeatedly able to force the colonialists 
to rethink their plans. For instance, their actions convinced the colonial authorities to 
be less confrontational and they introduced such measures as the cross -border grazing 
and water concessions and implemented the Inter -Colonial Native Courts. Elsewhere, 
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the introduction of new anti -smuggling staff and policies is further proof of the 
influence that African borderlanders were able to exert upon the colonialists. 
The creation of a new territorially- defined polity was perhaps the greatest result of 
the imposition of colonial boundaries. Tanzania has changed somewhat in the 
intervening years, but its land borders are almost identical to those of 1930 and the 
hundreds of loose, fluid pre -colonial polities have been replaced by a single fairly 
cohesive state. This is probably the greatest legacy of colonial rule in Tanganyika. 
To sum up, the main conclusions of this thesis are threefold. Firstly, that 
colonialism did successfully impose the western system of dividing political space in 
Tanganyika, in East Africa and almost certainly in the continent as a whole. It was the 
driving force in the imposition and its impact was so great that - with the help of 
African political elites - the system of linear boundaries has survived to this day. 
Secondly, that the impact of partition fell most heavily upon African political systems, 
and was less devastating - although still considerable - upon economic and cultural 
systems. Finally, that the influence of African borderlanders varied considerably. 
During the early years of partition they had next to no influence. Once the colonialists 
felt more secure, they were able to influence colonial policy and indeed some colonial 
officials put a lot of time and effort into acting upon their concerns, although any 
changes that were made related to the local details of partition. They did not concern 
any major transfers of territory or wholehearted defence of African systems. In any 
case, African systems were generally not understood by the colonialists and were more 
flexible in nature than the Europeans recognised. 
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Appendix 1: List of Governors (stand in governors are given in brackets) 
April 1889 - April 1891: Herman Wissman 
April 1891 - Sept 1893: Freiherr von Soden 
Sept 1893 - Jan 1895: Freiherr von Schele 
July 1895 - May 1896: Hermann Wissman 
May 1896 - Jan 1897: Rudolf von Bennigsen 
Jan 1897 - Aug 1900: Eduard von Lieben 
(Jun 1898 - Dec 1898: Fritz von d. Decken) 
(Aug 1900 - April 1901: Ludwig von Estorf 
April 1901 - April 1906: Adolf, Graf von Götzen 
(Oct 1902 - May 1903: Franz Stuhlmann) 
(April 1906 - Sept 1906: Eduard Haber) 
Sept 1906 - Oct 1911: Freiherr von Rechenberg 
(Nov 1907 - June 1908: Carl Detlef von Winterfeld) 
(Dec 1909 - June 1910: Richard von Spalding) 
Oct 1911 - July 1912: Wilhelm Methner 
July 1912 - Nov 1918: Heinrich Schnee 
1920 -1924: Sir Horace Byatt 
1925 -1931: Sir Donald Cameron 
1931 -1933: Lieutenant Colonel Sir G.S. Symes 
1934 -1937: Sir Harold MacMichael 
1938 -1941: Sir Mark Young 
1942 -1944: Sir Wilfred Jackson 
1945 -1948: Sir William Battershill 
1949 -1958: Sir Edward Twining 
1958 -1961: Sir Richard Turnbull 
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